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ARTICLE

Linguistic metaphor identification in two extracts from novels

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Abstract

This article examines a series of issues involved in identifying metaphors in texts. Metaphor identification is, in turn, a fundamental part of the more complex issue of how to relate linguistic metaphors in texts to the conceptual metaphors of cognitive metaphor theory. In section 1 we list a number of general issues involved in metaphor identification. In sections 2 and 3 we examine two short fictional extracts from novels written in the 1990s (one from popular fiction and one from serious fiction), relating our detailed analyses to the general questions raised at the beginning of the article. We thus raise and exemplify a series of issues which do not have easy resolutions but which must be grasped (a) if a corpus-based approach to metaphor is to become a reality and (b) if the relations between conceptual and linguistic metaphors are to be fully understood. Interestingly, this attempt to be extremely detailed and systematic in turn leads us to comment on differences in aesthetic effects between the use of metaphors in the two extracts examined.

Keywords: *cognitive metaphor*; *cross-domain mapping*; *Maitland, Sara*; *metaphor identification*; *metaphorizing styles*; *popular fiction*; *Rushdie, Salman*; *serious fiction*

1 Introduction

The cognitive bias in metaphor research over the last two decades has resulted in a general tendency to ignore the *linguistic* dimension of metaphor in texts. This issue of *Language and Literature*, and the present article in particular, attempt to redress the balance, following on from recent work on metaphor in language by other scholars, such as Goatly (1997) and Cameron (1999a, 1999b) (see also Steen, [1999] and Semino et al. [in press]).

We are going to focus in particular on the issues involved in deciding which words are used metaphorically in two stretches of text – a paragraph from Sara Maitland's novel *Three Times Table* (1990) and a paragraph from Salman Rushdie's novel *The Moor's Last Sigh* (1995). The process of distinguishing between literal and metaphorical expressions is clearly the most basic and crucial stage in any study of the nature and patterning of metaphors in language, and is therefore fundamental to any attempt to extrapolate conceptual metaphors from linguistic data. In Steen's (1999) procedure for metaphor identification, this is the first step, labelled 'Metaphor focus identification'.

We will begin by spelling out in detail the nature and objectives of our analyses. As Crisp has already pointed out in this issue, we are operating at what

Cameron calls Level 1 or the 'Theory Level' in metaphor analysis, i.e. 'the level at which theoretical analysis and categorization of metaphor takes place' (Cameron, 1999a: 6). This is opposed to Level 2, the 'Processing Level', which is concerned with individuals' on-line processing of metaphorical language (Cameron, 1999a: 6). As a consequence, we are concerned with 'linguistic' metaphors, which Cameron distinguishes from what she calls 'process' metaphors as follows:

> *Process metaphors*: identified through work within the processing level, as processed metaphorically by a discourse participant on a particular occasion.

> *Linguistic metaphors*: identified through work within the theory level, as stretches of language having metaphoric potential.

> (Cameron, 1999b: 108)

More specifically, we aim to be maximally inclusive in highlighting metaphoric potential in our chosen texts. We will therefore consider potential metaphoricity in every expression which can be seen as involving a mapping between two separate conceptual domains. In doing so, we will sometimes refer to Level 2 issues of processing, especially in discussing borderline cases. Theory Level analysis inevitably has to be affected by hypotheses as to what might be plausibly processed metaphorically by speakers of the relevant language. Our aim, however, is not to suggest what might be happening in any individual's mind while reading the two texts, but to provide a detailed and explicit analysis of what expressions in those texts could be identified as metaphorical.

Our attention at this stage will be limited to open-class words only (nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs). Steen (2002) explains the reason for this decision. More specifically, in identifying metaphorically used words we will highlight complexities and ambiguities, rather than attempting, at this stage, to arrive at a clear-cut distinction between the literal and metaphorical. This is because the fuzzy boundary between literal and metaphorical language can only be properly tackled by being maximally explicit as to the criteria for classifying individual expressions in one way or another (see Cameron, 1999b: 123). In order to arrive at an exhaustive and comprehensive set of criteria, the analyst has to begin by considering the many different types of problematic cases, and make explicit methodological decisions as to how each type of problem is to be treated for the purposes of a specific study. Moreover, this is crucial if we are to develop a system for the annotation of metaphors in electronic corpora, which is one of the longer-term aims of the project of which this issue of *Language and Literature* is part. Indeed, we will also make some preliminary suggestions as to how different kinds of problems could be handled in practice in corpus annotation.

We analysed the two extracts from Maitland's and Rushdie's novels exhaustively sentence by sentence. The problems we encountered during this process can be subsumed under eight main issues which, we would argue, are likely to arise more generally in any attempt to identify metaphorical expressions

Table 1

Issues in metaphor identification	Maitland sentences		Rushdie sentences
1 Problems relating to conceptual domains			
(a) Relations between words, concepts and domains	M1, 2, 3, 4,	8	R1
(b) Nature of domains, and the boundaries between them	M1, 2, 3, 6		
(c) Identification of topic/target domains			R2, 3
(d) Metaphor or synecdoche?	M1, 4,	8	
2 The influence of co-text in the metaphorical analysis of individual lexical items	M3, 6		R1, 2
3 The use of intertextual references as metaphorical source domains, and the influence of intertextual allusions on analysis	M2, 3, 6		R3
4 The metaphorical analysis of adjectives	M1, 2		R1
5 The metaphorical analysis of delexicalized verbs	M2, 3,	7, 8	R1
6 The consequences of metaphorical word formation for metaphoricity	M2,	7	
7 The existence of a cline in the semantic clash triggered by mixed metaphors	M3,	6, 7	
8 Cases where words can be seen as both literal and metaphorical	M1, 6		R1, 2, 3

in texts. Table 1 lists the eight issues and shows their distribution across the sentences of the texts.

We will now proceed to a detailed examination of the two paragraphs chosen for analysis. Section 2 deals with the Maitland extract. It is organized according to the issues listed in Table 1, but it ends with an exhaustive analysis of one particular sentence. Section 3 contains a sentence-by-sentence analysis of the (briefer) Rushdie extract. Section 4 presents the conclusions that can be drawn from the analyses and summarizes the issues that need to be tackled in future work.

2 An analysis of a paragraph from Sara Maitland's *Three Times Table*

The paragraph from Maitland's *Three Times Table* we analyse is the *second* para-
graph in the passage quoted below. The preceding paragraph is reproduced here in
order to provide some contextualization of our chosen extract. The sentences of the
paragraph we will analyse have been numbered for ease of reference, and will be
referred to as M1–M9 to distinguish them from the Rushdie sentences R1–R3.

At this point in the novel, the character Phoebe is reminiscing about her past
relationship with Jim, reflecting on the consequences of his attempt to involve her
in his political dreams and activities, and wondering about the kind of life he
might currently be leading. (Note: Words that in our analysis are unambiguously
metaphorical are underlined, with the line dotted if their metaphorical status is
open to question, and dashed in clear cases of synecdoche.)

> His eagerness made her, suddenly, want to be intelligent again. Under his
> dynamic tutelage she started reading – not the literature of her childhood, but
> hard politics, sociology, philosophy, ideas, and experimental fiction. To please
> him she learned to talk about what she read and what she thought. He was, and
> she forced herself to remember this with gratitude, one of the best talkers she
> had ever met; funny and fast. Passionate and unashamed. A man who could
> and would talk the hind legs back onto an injured donkey provided it had
> decent proletarian credentials. They had all learned from him; she and Lisa still
> spoke, stylistically, as he had taught them to. He had set his mark on them.
>
> (1) Where was he now? Phoebe, lying on her bed in her mother's house in
> north London, asked herself with a sudden rush of nostalgia. (2) In what corner
> of what foreign field did he still keep the faith, further the revolution, wake up
> his current lover at three in the morning to discuss the delicate interweavings
> of class and race? (3) She could not bear to think that he had taken all that pure
> wrathful zeal into marketing or insurance broking. (4) Occasionally she half
> hoped to see him again. (5) She would find herself watching faces rising
> towards her on the escalator of the Tube and wonder what she would feel if
> one of those faces were suddenly to be his. (6) Where had they all gone, those
> extraordinary skinny leftwing men, who had bullied their girl-friends into the
> Women's Movement and been surprised when the hand with which they had so
> kindly offered freedom had been bitten so damn hard? (7) Nearly twenty years
> later Phoebe still found it hard to suppress a little vindictive chuckle at the
> looks of growing shock on Jim's face – Jim and Lisa's Jonathan and Sue's
> Alan – when they discovered that their righteousness was not enough. (8)
> Their women, far from being grateful, turned on them, snarling, in late night
> conversations telling them to shut up; far from setting them free to work for
> the Revolution, their women demanded that they take emotional responsibility
> and also clean the loos. (9) And finally, only a year or so later, turned them out
> of house and home – put them on the street, as women who failed to be
> properly grateful to the fathers had been put for centuries.[1]
>
> (Maitland, 1990: 129–30)

The most frequent type of metaphorical expression in the passage appears to involve mappings from domains to do with concrete, physical actions/entities or quantities onto abstract domains, such as cognition and emotion, or social relations. *Find* (M5), *found*, *hard* and *discovered* (M7) and *half* (M4) all evoke concepts that literally relate to physical objects, but are here applied to cognition. In M9 *turned … out* is a metaphorical idiom resulting from a mapping from the domain of physical activity to that of social relations. The expression *put them on the street* is also metaphorical, since it contains two words (*put* and *street*) which evoke a physical scenario that is here mapped on to the more abstract domain of rejection in the context of social relations.

The most frequent set of problems we encountered in the analysis is captured by Issue 1, and is discussed in Section 2.1 below. Although Issues 2 and 3 are theoretically separate, we discuss them together in Section 2.2, as the intertextual references also function as a special kind of co-text. In Section 2.3, we discuss Issues 4 and 5, which both concern problematic relationships between word-class and metaphoricity. In Section 2.4, we discuss the consequences of metaphorical word formation. In 2.5, we briefly discuss the more peripheral Issue 7. In 2.6, we bring out the interconnections between these issues, and raise Issue 8, in relation to the single sentence M6.

2.1 Issue 1: problems relating to conceptual domains

The Lakoffian definition of metaphor that we (and many others) have adopted (e.g. Lakoff, 1993) crucially depends on claims about conceptual domains which are often very hard to substantiate (see also Semino et al., ms.). This is in part because of the difficulties involved in making hypotheses about conceptual structure, which we have no direct access to, but also because of the lack of a relevant set of criteria based on available empirical evidence. For the purposes of this article, we have not, therefore, adopted a specific theory of the organization of background knowledge, and we refer to conceptual domains at a very general level, even avoiding, for the most part, the naming of conceptual metaphors using SMALL CAPITALS, as is customary in cognitive metaphor theory. Nevertheless, the process of determining the relationship between words, concepts and domains was not always straightforward, and it was often problematic to decide what could be regarded as a 'domain' in conceptual structure and what the relationships might be between different domains.

In order to exemplify this kind of problem, we will consider in detail the word *faith* in M2 and the noun phrase *pure, wrathful zeal* in M3. The decision as to whether to classify the two nouns *faith* and *zeal* as literal or metaphorical depends on how one assigns the concepts they evoke to conceptual domains. If we decide that the relevant concepts relate directly to the domain of religion, both words involve a potential mapping from the domain of religion to that of politics, and therefore count as metaphorical. On the other hand, if we assume that the concepts evoked by *faith* and *zeal* relate directly to the domain of belief in

general, then the use of these words is literal. In spite of this ambiguity, we would, in both cases, favour a metaphorical interpretation, for the following reasons. The use of *faith* and *zeal* here seems to highlight the existence of a conventional, conceptual metaphor in English whereby the domain of religious belief is mapped on to other types of belief or enthusiasm (politics, sport, etc.). Moreover, the use of these two words in close proximity seems to be part of an attempt on the part of the author to attribute religious overtones to (Phoebe's perception of) Jim's political activities. This reading is strengthened by the intertextual allusion to Brooke's poem at the beginning of M2 (see below) which brings in a 'sacred' dimension. Other words in the immediate context can also be related to a religious, Biblical discourse (notably *pure* and *wrathful*). In terms of processing, it is therefore plausible that the domain of religion is activated in readers' minds.

In M3 all this also raises the issue of the possible metaphoricity of *wrathful*, since it could be argued that, in this context, the adjective also involves a mapping from the domain of religion (notably, the 'wrathful' God of the Old Testament) onto the domain of politics. All in all, we can see three possible outcomes to the analysis of the noun phrase *pure, wrathful zeal*, depending on decisions about the evocation of a religious, Biblical domain and about the influence of co-text on the metaphoricity of individual lexical items:

(i)   only *pure* is metaphorical;[2]
(ii)   both *pure* and *zeal* are metaphorical, but *wrathful* is not;
(iii) *pure, wrathful* and *zeal* are all metaphorical.

For the purposes of corpus annotation, a compromise solution could be found where *wrathful*, and possibly also both *faith* and *zeal*, are tagged as ambiguous.

Dilemmas over the nature and boundaries between conceptual domains frequently raised the issue of whether metonymy or synecdoche were involved. M1 provides a subtle example. The concept evoked by *asked* relates directly to the domain of verbal activity/communication, which prototypically involves spoken (or written) interaction between people. Here, however, the use of the verb is non-prototypical: the character addresses a question to herself, so that readers are likely to assume that the question is not spoken out loud but only occurs in her thoughts. This use is still conventional: we normally use words relating to (spoken) interactive communication, such as *ask* or *say* to refer to (unspoken) communication with oneself. Whether such uses are regarded as metaphorical depends on whether they are regarded as involving a mapping between two *separate* domains, or whether they simply involve a *literal extension* of the prototypical use of the verb.

Interpreting *asked* in this context as metaphorical means we regard (unspoken) self-communication as a separate domain from prototypical (spoken) communication *between* people. Such an analysis highlights the centrality of the locutionary component of the speech act evoked by the verb *ask*, which is not realized when the verb is applied to exclusively cognitive activity. Conversely, a literal analysis would derive from seeing self-communication as a particular type

of communication, rather than as a separate domain. A third option is to consider self-communication and interactive communication neither as separate domains nor as the same domain, but as *related* domains. More specifically, one could see the relationship between the two domains as either one of association or one of inclusion. In the former case, *asked* would count as a metonymy, while in the latter the domain of self-communication would be seen as part of the domain of communication in general, so that *asked* would count as a synecdoche. Our preference here is for the synecdoche/metonymy interpretation, especially with a view towards corpus annotation. The reason for this is that a metaphorical analysis would derive from rather implausible claims about what might be considered to be separate domains, while a literal analysis disguises the fact that this non-prototypical use of *asked* can be seen as involving a mapping, albeit between related (as opposed to separate) domains.

In a number of cases, the issue of whether words should be classed as literal or figurative becomes a question of whether they are literal or synecdochal. Classification depends on whether words engage two separate domains, or whether they express part–whole relationships within the same domain instead. *See* in (M4) can be interpreted as literal in its basic meaning of visual perception, an interpretation strengthened by Phoebe's hypothetical visual perception of Jim in the following sentence. Yet *see* is clearly synecdochal in its senses of social interaction and of having a romantic/sexual relationship (which also seem implied), given that seeing as visual perception is normally a part of both activities. Similar arguments in favour of viewing the relationship between two domains as one of association or inclusion, resulting in an analysis as synecdoche or metonymy, also apply to *work for* and *responsibility* in M8.

Shut up, in (M8), involves synecdoche or metonymy, rather than metaphor, since the act of shutting one's mouth can be seen as part of, or as associated with, the state of being silent. *Clean the loos* (M8) is synecdoche, since in this context it stands for housework/domestic activities in general. In a similar way, *marketing or insurance broking* (M3), as archetypal capitalist occupations, ironically represent the surrender of youthful idealism to capitalist reality. However, *faces* in M5 is not synecdoche, since the focus clearly seems to be on the face itself as opposed to the whole person.

The phrasal verb *turned (on)* in M8 also raised the problem of how decisions about conceptual domains can be retrospectively affected by the following text. *Turned (on)* involves a mapping of the domain of physical movement onto the domain of verbal behaviour. Taken in isolation, it could be considered a metonymy, as the physical movement can be seen as standing for the verbal attack it stereotypically accompanies. The following verb *snarling*, on the other hand, involves a mapping of the domain of animal behaviour onto the domain of human behaviour. But the angry animal scenario could easily involve the concepts of both snarling and turning on something. In processing terms, *snarling* may have a retrospective effect on *turned on*. This example also raises the matter (taken up by Crisp et al., 2002) of how to deal with the *mutual relationships* between

metaphorically used words in phrases, sentences and sequences of sentences, especially with a view towards the possibility of studying the frequency of (different types of) metaphorical expressions in texts. In other words, we need to account for how an individual metaphorically used word may or may not count as *one* metaphor, depending on how it interacts with the other words around it, and, consequently, for the different types of structures that could be regarded as *one* metaphor.

2.2 Issues 2 and 3: the influence of co-text and intertext

Our comments on words occurring in M3 earlier have already pointed towards the influence of co-text and intertext on the metaphorical analysis of individual lexical items, an issue we explore further in our analyses of M6 and R1, R2 below. Here, we analyse further how intertextuality affects the attribution of metaphoricity assignment in M2 and M3. The opening prepositional phrase of M2, *In what corner of what foreign field*, is clearly an intertextual reference to the poem 'The Soldier', by the First World War poet Rupert Brooke. The poem, which is a patriotic celebration of the sacrifice of English soldiers giving their lives on foreign soil, begins as follows:

> If I should die, think only this of me:
>   That there's some corner of a foreign field
> That is forever England.

If the effect of the intertextual reference is left aside for the moment, the opening of M2 raises similar issues to those above as to whether this should be analysed as metaphor or synecdoche. The concepts evoked by *corner* and *field* relate directly to a specific type of location, but here they are applied to a general domain of location 'somewhere on the earth'. If the source domain is identified as a specific location schema, FIELD, which can be seen as embedded inside a more general EARTH schema, the relevant non-literal mapping falls under synecdoche rather than metaphor. The hypothetical scenario in Brooke's original is also not metaphorical, involving rather a further synecdoche/metonymy in which 'soldier' stands for 'nation', and a metonymy in which nationality is transferred through the contact of the buried corpse with the earth.

In Maitland's appropriation of this source, however, the intertextual reference provides a further interpretative framework, within which the source domain includes the line from Brooke's poem and the specific scenario where the corpse of a soldier lies in obscurity on a battlefield in a foreign country. This maps a further set of emotional associations onto the target domain, such as a sense of inappropriate and obscure location, extreme sacrifice for a cause, and so on. Some, at least, of these mappings would appear to be metaphorical (see later). In general terms we can note that intertextual allusion can thus, on some (but not all) occasions, provide additional schemas which can give rise to metaphorical readings.

The adjective *foreign* clearly plays a different role in the two texts. In the hypothetical scenario of Brooke's poem, the *foreign field* is a literal possibility. In Maitland's text, the use of *foreign* is metaphorical if we assume that the character whose thoughts are being represented does not imagine that Jim has gone abroad (in which case the adjective would be literal), but believes that Jim has stayed in England and uses the expression as part of a set phrase derived from Brooke's poem. In this case, the reference of *foreign* would include any unspecified location within England itself. We can therefore identify a metaphorical mapping where the source domain evoked by *foreign* projects connotations of strangeness and remoteness onto the target domain. Metaphorical mappings appear to be triggered by incompatibilities between the text worlds set up by the intertextual quote and the new context it has been imported into. Hence, as Jim, in his current remote location, is clearly imagined as being far from dead, the DEATH schema invoked by the intertextual quotation can function as a source domain for concepts such as 'extreme sacrifice for a cause' and 'wasted potential'.

2.3 Issues 4 and 5: special problems raised by adjectives and de-lexicalized verbs

The analysis of adjectives in the Maitland extract raised a number of problems. In M1, *a sudden rush* is a noun phrase where the headnoun *rush* is pre-modified by the adjective *sudden*. The use of the noun *rush* is metaphorical, since the concept literally evoked by the word directly belongs to the domain of movement or action, but is here applied to the domain of emotions evoked by *nostalgia*. We therefore have a cross-domain mapping where quick movement/action corresponds to a quick emotional reaction. The situation with *sudden* is more complicated. The concept evoked by the adjective can be said to apply literally to the concept directly evoked by *rush* (in fact, the idea of 'suddenness' can be seen as part of the concept evoked by *rush* itself). More precisely, it is plausible to assume that the domain of movement/action contains a slot for 'mode of onset', for which the concept evoked by *sudden* provides a possible value. Within this line of reasoning, *sudden* is a metaphorical word involving a mapping from the same source domain as that evoked by the headnoun *rush*. The problem with this analysis, however, is that the concept evoked by *sudden* does not necessarily belong only to the domain of movement or action, but can be seen to relate directly to other types of experiences or events, including emotional reactions. In other words, the use of *sudden* in the alternative expression *sudden nostalgia* could be regarded as literal. We can thus see, in principle at least, three possible outcomes in the analysis of this noun phrase:

(i) Both *sudden* and *rush* are metaphorical expressions involving mappings from the same source domain (if one decides that the fact that *sudden* pre-modifies *rush* means that here *sudden* evokes the concept of 'suddenness of movement/action' rather than 'suddenness' in general).

(ii) Only *rush* is metaphorical (if one decides that the concept evoked by

sudden can apply literally to the domain of emotions).

(iii) The noun *rush* is metaphorical while the adjective *sudden* is ambiguous between literal and metaphorical status (if one decides that the two possible analyses of *sudden* are equally valid).

Option (i) is the most congruent with our policy decision to classify as metaphorical anything that can plausibly be analysed in terms of a cross-domain mapping. In the context of corpus annotation, however, option (iii) would be preferable, since it highlights the particular nature of this example. Indeed, this type of problem would probably require an explicit methodological decision to be applied consistently in extensive data analysis or corpus annotation, since it is likely that many similar cases will be found. This is due to fundamental differences between the metaphorical use of nouns as opposed to other word classes, particularly adjectives. Because nouns tend to refer to *entities*, whether concrete or abstract, they are relatively easy to assign to domains. Adjectives, on the other hand, typically denote *properties* of entities but, because they do not necessarily correlate with a particular type of entity, it is not easy to identify a domain they primarily belong to. As Goatly (1997: 83ff.) points out, metaphors realized by nouns are therefore more noticeable and richly interpretable, while adjectival metaphors are only highly noticeable when the relevant adjective typically applies to a particular entity (as is the case, for example, with *naked* and its close connection with human bodies). The problems posed by *sudden* are due precisely to the fact that the property it evokes does not have as strong an association with a particular type of entity as *naked* does with the body. The modification of the clearly metaphorical noun *interweavings* by the adjective *delicate* in M2 presents similar difficulties.

A subdivision of word class which recurrently raised problems is the set of 'delexicalized' verbs represented by *keep* in the expression *keep the faith* in M2, *bear* and *take* in M3 and M8, and *set* in M8. All these verbs have acquired such a wide variety of uses that they have almost lost an original, primary, literal meaning on the basis of which to make decisions about metaphoricity. Cameron (1999b) suggests that, in order to describe a particular use as metaphorical, one would have to spell out explicitly what would count as a basic literal use. In our case, we would argue that *keep* is used literally when it is followed by a direct object referring to a concrete physical entity (as in *Where do you keep your tools?*). As a consequence, the use of *keep* in *keep the faith* is metaphorical, given that the domain of abstract beliefs is constructed in terms of the domain of physical/concrete objects.

We would also argue that the verbs *bear* and *taken* in M3, and *setting* and *take* in M8 are all used metaphorically. Although *take, set* and, to a lesser extent, *bear* can all be seen as delexicalized verbs, it is still possible to identify primary, concrete uses where the direct object refers to a physical entity (e.g. *Take an umbrella with you*, *She bore the weight upon her shoulders* and *I've set some food aside for you*). In all these cases, therefore, it can be argued that the concepts

evoked by the verbs relate directly to the physical, concrete world, but that here they are applied respectively to the domains of cognition and of intellectual, emotional or political activity.

2.4 Issue 6: the consequences of metaphorical word formation on metaphoricity

Special issues are raised when metaphor is a part of the process of word formation. On the face of it, *further* in the expression *further the revolution* in M2 is uncontroversially metaphorical, since it involves a mapping from the domain of physical distance/movement to the abstract domain of promoting political (or other) causes. The complication here is that this verb derives from the adverb *further*, and that, whereas the adverb has literal as well as metaphorical uses, the verb is normally *only* used metaphorically. This is an example of the complex way in which word-formation interacts with metaphoricity. As Goatly (1997: 106) points out, 'word formation . . . involves or prepares the way for metaphorical extensions and transfers of meaning, while at the same time weakening those metaphors it makes possible'. In spite of the absence of a straightforwardly literal use of the verb 'further', however, the cross-domain mapping which underlies its meaning is still recoverable, which argues in favour of a metaphorical analysis. A special annotation could in any case be used in corpus annotation to highlight instances of words which are identified as metaphorical even though they have lost their primary, original meaning through processes of word-formation.

Similar arguments apply to *revolution* in M2 and M8, *leftwing* and *Movement* in M6, *interweavings* (M2) and *suppress* (M7). In Goatly's terms, *revolution* is on the borderline between 'dead' and 'inactive' metaphors (Goatly, 1997: 31–5). The complex, specific historical origin of *leftwing* is also presumably inactive for most users, although *wing* retains some metaphorical force, and some may accrue to *left* from both its other metaphorical uses and its relation of opposition to *right*. Also in M6, *Movement* is a metaphorical nominalization, where the source domain is to do with physical movement and the target domain is to do with more abstract social and political activities.

Suppress and *interweavings* both derive by affixation from verbs which have both physical/literal and abstract/metaphorical uses. Interestingly, the words thus formed *only* have metaphorical uses. As far as corpus annotation is concerned, our preference in such cases would be for a tag which highlights the borderline status of these words, so that such examples are not lost in either the literal or the metaphorical categories. In the process of corpus annotation, *suppress* would have to receive the same tag as *further* and *interweavings*, applying to words which have lost any literal uses due to metaphorical word formation.

2.5 Issue 7: the existence of a cline in the semantic clash triggered by mixed metaphors

There were three instances that we considered could count as mixed metaphors:

pure zeal (M3), *bitten . . . hard* (M6) and *growing shock* (M7). In each case, however, the feeling of incongruity or semantic 'clash' triggered by the two words does not appear to be strong. In the case of *pure* and *zeal* (M3), we have a single phrase involving two different metaphorical mappings, one from the source domain of substances and one from the source domain of religion. However, as the concept of purity, in the sense of 'absence of sin', is also conventionally applied metaphorically to the domain of religion itself, the collocation does not seem unusual. In the phrase *growing shock* (M7) both elements are metaphorical, drawing respectively from the domain of living entities and from the domain of physical objects. Once again, the expression can be analysed as a mixed metaphor but involves a very low semantic clash, since both elements are conventionally used metaphorically. We analyse *bitten . . . hard* in context in the next section.

2.6 A detailed analysis of Sentence 6 from Maitland's text

All the above issues also occur in M6, along with Issue 8, which concerns expressions that can be seen as both literal and metaphorical simultaneously. The various issues are so inextricably inter-related that we present them together in the context of this single sentence.

M6 is the second of two free indirect representations of questions that Phoebe appears to address to herself. The opening of the sentence 'Where had they all gone' works both literally *and* metaphorically. From the beginning of the paragraph, there has been an emphasis on Phoebe's doubt about Jim's whereabouts (cf. 'Where was he now?' [M1] and 'In what corner of what foreign field' [M2]). As a consequence, 'Where had they all gone' could be analysed literally as being to do with the current location of Jim and other men like him. On the other hand, the possibility of a mapping from the domain of location to the domain of human activities in general means that the question could be to do with what has become of them. This could therefore be a realization of the well-known LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor. For the purposes of corpus annotation and of quantification, we need to account for the fact that we have two metaphorically used words (*where* and *gone*) drawing from the same source domain. As a further example of the influence of co-text, this interpretation retrospectively suggests a similar metaphorical analysis for 'Where was he now?' in M1, which did not at first sight strike us as involving anything metaphorical, in spite of the more clear-cut reference to location in the opening of sentence M2.

In M6, the clause 'when the hand with which they had so kindly offered freedom had been bitten so damn hard' is rather complicated from the point of view of metaphoricity. Starting from individual words, *hand, which,*[3] *bitten,* and *hard* are all uncontroversially metaphorical, since the concepts they evoke do not apply literally to the text world. The verb *offered* can also be seen as metaphorical, given that in this context the relevant action is performed with a hand but, in addition, the concept evoked by the direct object *freedom* is abstract. The word *freedom* itself could be seen as metaphorical if one decided that the

concept it evokes relates directly to domains such as slavery and imprisonment. However, our preference is for a more general interpretation of the concept of freedom, as relating to the ability to choose what one wants to do without constraints from others, so that we prefer to see both *freedom* in M6 and *free* in M8 as literal.

In order to determine how many metaphors are contained in the clause as a whole, one also needs to decide what source domain each word relates to and how many different source domains are involved. The main issue is whether to identify a single physical source domain where hands can be used to give things and can be bitten in the process, or whether one wants to separate a hypothetical OFFERING-WITH-HANDS scenario from a HAND-BITING scenario. The allusion to the idiom *biting the hand that feeds you* can also function as a source domain. More precisely, the relationship between the application of the scenario set up by the idiom to the specific scenario in the text world can be explained in terms of the notion of GENERIC-IS-SPECIFIC metaphors: the idiom provides a specific example of a generic situation (where an act of generosity is met by an ungrateful and aggressive response) and can be applied to other specific situations sharing the same generic structure (see Lakoff and Turner, 1989: 162; Grady, 1999). In addition, the verb–adverb combination *bitten . . . hard* results in a mixed metaphor, since the relevant concepts belong to separate source domains (respectively [hand-]biting and hardness). Once again, however, the semantic clash appears to be weak because of the wide range of conventional metaphorical uses of *hard* and the conventionality of the linguistic association between *bite* and *hard*.

We will make some overall comments on the use of metaphor in Maitland's extract in section 4, after a detailed analysis of our second passage.

3 An analysis of a paragraph from Salman Rushdie's *The Moor's Last Sigh*

The first textual extract we have examined is taken from the popular fiction section of the Lancaster Speech and Thought Presentation corpus (see Wynne et al., 1999 for the criteria used in operationalizing the controversial and fuzzy distinction between 'popular' and 'serious' fiction). We will now look at a short paragraph from a novel by a more prestigious writer, Salman Rushdie's *The Moor's Last Sigh*. The paragraph we will concentrate on is the second of the two following paragraphs, numbered R1–3. We supply the first paragraph to help the reader understand the second and also to make clear some issues in relationship to the influence of the co-text on the metaphorical analysis of individual lexical items. This text is particularly interesting for metaphor identification because Rushdie is clearly playing very purposefully with the literal/metaphorical distinction. For example, in the first paragraph of the following extract, the word *literally* in the sentence 'Sometimes she literally rubbed their noses in the dirt' is used to cancel the common conventional metaphorical reading that '*rubbed*'

would otherwise have,[4] and then, three sentences later, *rub* is clearly deployed metaphorically in 'she was rubbing it in'. Indeed, the phrase *this attempt to make metaphors of her victories* is used to characterize the process. Not surprisingly, then, there will be issues in the short paragraph we examine about the literal/metaphorical boundary, particularly in connection with co-textual relations. It is also clear from the discussion of the Maitland extract in section 2 that the issues we have raised concerning the identification and characterization of metaphors often interact with one another. This is especially true of the Rushdie extract. (Note: We have used double-dot-dash underlining to indicate words which can be analysed as simultaneously literal and metaphorical.)

> About my grandmother Flory Zogoiby, Epifania da Gama's opposite number, her equal in years although closer to me by a generation: a decade before the century's turn Fearless Flory would haunt the boys' school playground, teasing adolescent males with swishings of skirts and sing-song sneers, and with a twig would scratch challenges into the earth – *step across this line*. (Line-drawing comes down to me from both sides of the family.) She would taunt them with nonsensical, terrifying incantations, 'making like a witch': Obeah, jadoo, fo, fum, chicken entrails, kingdom come. Ju ju, voodoo, fee, fi, piddle cocktails, time to die. When the boys came at her she attacked them with a ferocity that easily overcame their theoretical advantages of strength and size. Her gifts of war came down to her from some unknown ancestor; and though her adversaries grabbed her hair and called her Jewess they never vanquished her. Sometimes she literally rubbed their noses in the dirt. On other occasions she stood back, scrawny arms folded in triumph across her chest, and allowed her stunned victims to back unsteadily away. 'Next time, pick on someone your own size', Flory added insult to injury by inverting the meaning of the phrase: 'Us pint-size jewinas are too hot for you to handle.' Yes, she was rubbing it in, but even this attempt to make metaphors of her victories, to represent herself as the champion of the small, of the Minority, of girls, failed to make her popular. Fast Flory, Flory-the-Roary: she acquired a Reputation.
>
> (1) The time came when nobody would cross the lines she went on drawing, with fearsome precision, across the gullies and open spaces of her childhood years. (2) She grew moody and inward and sat on behind her dust-lines, besieged within her own fortifications. (3) By her eighteenth birthday she had stopped fighting, having learned something about winning battles and losing wars.
>
> (Rushdie, 1995: 73–4)

R1 opens with a straightforward conventional metaphorical use of *came*, resulting from a cross-domain mapping between movement in space and the passing of time. The use of *went on* in 'she went on drawing' is a little more difficult, in that it could be argued that this also belongs to the set of delexicalized verbs, on the grounds that it can take a wide range of verbal complements. But like *came*, its basic literal use has to do with movement of bodies from one spatial

location to another, which is here applied to the notion of continuing an activity. Hence we would want to annotate this use as metaphorical.

The rest of the sentence is rather more complicated. There are clear cross-domain mappings relating to *lines, drawing* and *cross* because here the lines are drawn (and crossed) not on some physical surface but across time: 'across the gullies and open spaces of her childhood years'. Thus *lines*, *drawing* and *cross* all involve mappings between the physical domain of line-drawing/crossing and a more abstract domain of social relations, and, within it, the idea of challenging others. But at the same time they can each be seen as having at least some literal force because, as the co-text (the preceding paragraph) has made clear, some of Flory's childhood-years challenges have literally involved drawing lines and challenging others to cross them: 'Flory . . . with a twig would scratch challenges into the earth – *step across this line*'.

This possibility of having co-existing literal and metaphorical readings of the same expression in a particular textual context also applies to 'the gullies and open spaces of her childhood years'. *Gullies* and *spaces* are both metaphorical here because years do not literally have gullies and spaces. In other words, the domain of time is characterized in terms of spatial location. But bare earth playgrounds of the sort Flory was in when described as drawing lines in the first paragraph can literally have gullies and open spaces which Flory could have drawn lines across. Indeed, as 'her childhood years' will include, among others, the times when she was literally drawing lines on a playground containing gullies and open spaces, *gullies* and *spaces* can be construed both literally and metaphorically. This phenomenon of the metaphorization of items which have been used literally in the immediately preceding context appears to be related to what Hrushovski (1984) refers to as literal statements being 'integrated metaphorically' in the basic frame of reference of a text, and the inverse of what Goatly (1997: 272–8) has called the 'literalization of vehicles'. In our terms, there is an interaction between issues 2 and 8 in the list of issues we outlined in section 1. Moreover, it is by no means always possible to see the metaphorical reading as dominant over the literal one, or vice versa.

The theoretical issue raised here has potential consequences for corpus annotation. Do we add codings to capture such relations so that they can be examined later to see whether the phenomenon occurs more generally (and, if so, in what forms and with what effects) across a range of texts and text-types? We would argue that, if possible, we should add such codings. But, depending on the extent of the features to code, this desire may become impractical. Effectively the issue cannot be properly decided until enough text has been examined to give a sense of the range of problems involved.

Finally, the phrase *fearsome precision* raises again (as in the Maitland text) the problem of the metaphorical analysis of adjectives. *Fearsome* looks as if it could be metaphorical here, as precision is not normally classed as the kind of quality to be feared. But *fearsome* can relate literally to more than one domain (e.g. genus: *fearsome tiger*; behaviour: *fearsome attack*; facial expression: *fearsome glare*).

This, in turn, raises the issue of which cross-domain mapping is most appropriate. Moreover, once *fearsome* is seen as relating literally to a wide range of qualities, it is easier to conceive of the extension here as literal rather than metaphorical. In this sense, the adjective problem (Issue 4) appears to overlap to some degree with Issue 1 (the relationship between words, concepts and domains) and Issue 5 (the metaphorical analysis of delexicalized verbs) in that they all have to do with the scope of literal reference.

In R2, *grew* is a linguistic realization of a conventional conceptual metaphor where changes over time in emotional disposition are seen in terms of physical growth. We treat *moody* as literal here, as it involves no obvious cross-domain mapping. But nonetheless there is a noteworthy peculiarity in that the noun *mood*, from which the adjective is derived, can refer to any mood, positive or negative, whereas *moody* appears to apply only to negative mind-states. *Moody* is co-ordinated to *inward* which is clearly metaphorical, with changes in attitudes or mind-states being construed in terms of physical movement.

The co-text for *dust-lines*, like the examples discussed in sentence 1, introduces the possibility of both literal and metaphorical analysis. Indeed this sentence, like sentence 1, would also appear to need a shuttling back and forth between literal and metaphorical construals to capture its overall meaning. The dust-lines which Flory sat behind can be literal when she was very young and within the playground, as described in paragraph 1, but, once the scope has been widened to her childhood years in general, a metaphorical reading is also easily available. Given that the previous paragraph has been playing explicitly with the literal/metaphorical divide, a careful reading of the text could not escape this playful equivocation over literal and metaphorical. Indeed, once the literal/metaphorical problem has been noticed for *dust-lines*, it can also possibly be seen to apply to *sat*, to which it is grammatically connected. Given that the context of *her childhood years* from the previous sentence suggests a wide time-scope for the sentence to apply to, Flory could have been sitting literally for some of that period (within which scope some of the sitting could have been literally behind dust lines), while for other times she could be construed as sitting metaphorically, involving a cross-domain mapping between (lack of) physical movement and (lack of) change in mental attitude.

The last clause of the sentence contains two metaphorically used words, *besieged* and *fortifications*, which raise an issue we have not yet discussed, namely the identification of topic or target domains (this is an issue we also discuss in Semino et al., in press). Both words relate to the domain of war, but it is not clear whether they are an example of the well-known conventional metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR, or whether they realize a different metaphor, which we might characterize as PSYCHOLOGICAL/ATTITUDINAL/SOCIAL OPPOSITION IS WAR. Clearly there are cross-domain mappings and there are lexical items connected with the domain of war (*besieged, fortifications*) in the sentence. Indeed the war domain has been used already in the first paragraph, where fights in the playground are described in terms of war, sometimes metaphorically (e.g. 'gifts of

war') and sometimes literally, because particular lexical items can be used appropriately in both domains/context (e.g. *attacked*). But although the WAR source domain is definite, it is not so clear what the target domain is. It is not specified in the sentence, and so has to be inferred from the previous co-text, which would support any of the possibilities in the previously shown triple, plus combinations of them. Clearly this theoretical issue involving domain ambiguity had practical consequences for any system of corpus annotation that included tags for source and target domains. This kind of problem might be met by the introduction of portmanteau tags (along the lines of the portmanteau speech, thought and writing presentation tags used in the Lancaster Speech, Thought and Writing Presentation Corpus [see Wynne et al., 1999] to allow for ambiguity in domain mapping).

As with other words we have examined in R1 and 2, *fighting* in the first clause of R3 can be seen as having both literal and metaphorical readings as a consequence of its interaction with the co-text. Within her first 18 years, Flory will have literally had fights in the playground (and perhaps elsewhere) but will also have been involved in oppositional social and mental activity which can be related to war through cross-domain mapping. This metaphor is also another example of the problem just discussed concerning which domain to relate WAR to in the cross-domain mapping, and there is a clear serial relationship between this instance and the others which would need to be captured in corpus annotation. Indeed, *fighting* would appear to be an example of an extended metaphor, where the same general metaphor type occurs more than once in the same text (see Leech, 1969: 159). This is also true for the other four metaphorically used words in this sentence, *winning, battles, losing* and *wars*. However, in other respects this dense set of four metaphorically used words at the end of the sentence are all straightforward, in the sense that (a) *battles* and *wars* must only be being used metaphorically (unlike *fighting* and equivalent words in previous sentences, there is no co-textual evidence that the young Flory took part in this kind of fighting); and (b) they can all be related to the ARGUMENT IS WAR conceptual metaphor. Even here, though, there is still the issue as to how exactly to specify the target domain.

4 Concluding remarks

Most of this article is concerned with trying to identify in a precise and recoverable way the possible metaphorically used words in two short textual extracts. The issues concerning metaphor identification which we have raised will, in our view, need principled solutions if an annotated corpus of metaphors in texts is to be produced for research purposes and if a clear relation between linguistic metaphor and conceptual metaphor is to be arrived at.

However, it is also interesting to note how this attempt to produce analytical precision is helpful in characterizing a text's or author's style, as shown by our remarks on what is interesting and impressive in the extract from Rushdie's novel.

In essence, Rushdie is playing with the boundaries between the literal and the metaphorical and also with the boundaries between one domain and another. The exact nature of this complex verbal play becomes clearer as a result of our attempts to be analytically precise. This shows that the methodologies we are exploring are not just a necessity for connecting the analysis of linguistic metaphors in texts with the abstractions of cognitive metaphor theory, but also have useful applications for those trying to capture and explain the meaning and effect of complex verbal artefacts.

It is also interesting to consider the differences that our analysis has highlighted between the Maitland and Rushdie texts. The language of Maitland's extract, and her use of metaphor in particular, are characterized by her use of intertextuality as a stylistic device. Apart from the prominent string of Biblical allusions in a very short space, Maitland displays a marked tendency to produce variations on highly familiar and often clichéd expressions, whether idioms or quotations from poetry. As we have shown, the use of intertextual quotation as metaphorical source domain can significantly affect the way in which the echoic derived version is read. The divergence between original and adapted versions is also a source of irony: it is richly ironic that Jim and his friends practised revolutionary leftwing politics with the tub-thumping ardour of street preachers, or that they failed to see the incongruity of their 'offering' freedom to their women. However, Maitland employs this device so frequently that it soon begins to lose some of its stylistic impact.

Rushdie, on the other hand, is doing rather more complicated things with language in general and metaphor in particular, something which he explicitly signals textually. Near the beginning of the first paragraph of the larger passage, after the reference to Flory scratching lines in the earth (which itself is a metonymy for scratching challenges) we are told that 'line-drawing comes down to me from both sides of the family'. This clause can also be construed both literally and metaphorically. Having been alerted by this previous co-text to the possibility of the drawing of lines being both literal and metaphorical, in R1 we are presented with three words related to line-drawing which appear at first sight to be literal but which, when we get to the end of the sentence, can also be seen as metaphorical. Then a rather similar literal/metaphorical pattern is developed in relation to fighting and related concepts in R2 and R3, again involving co-textual connections to the previous paragraph. This patterning is all too carefully constructed to ignore, and indeed a close reading which explores this complex set of inter-relationships would appear to lead fairly directly to aesthetic pleasure during reading (or analysis!). Given all this playing with metaphors involving line-drawing and war as source domains, when we arrive at the four conventional metaphors, all involving the domain of war, at the end of the second paragraph ('having learned something about winning battles and losing wars') it is difficult to believe that this sudden and dense 'bone-ordinariness' is really ordinary at all. Because it comes at the end of such a complex and innovative piece of metaphorical writing, and thus constitutes an example of internal deviation

(Levin, 1965; Short, 1996: 59–62), the final nexus of very conventional metaphors has all the makings of a literary conceit.

We have not specified all that is interesting about the excerpts we have analysed. But we do think that our attempts to be analytically precise about metaphors in texts have helped us to characterize, again with reasonable precision, the different styles of metaphorizing in the two extracts. We have also highlighted some of the issues that need to be addressed in order to arrive at an explicit and exhaustive procedure for metaphor identification in language.

Notes

1   The text is replicated verbatim from the original. However, there appear to be two small slips in it. Sentence (2) does not end with '?', in spite of its interrogative structure, and the absence of a comma after the second occurrence of 'Jim' in sentence (7) will have an unfortunate garden-path processing effect for many readers.

2   The metaphoricity of '*pure*' is due to the fact that the relevant concept relates primarily to the physical domain of substances (in the sense of 'unmixed'), but is here applied to the abstract domain of emotion/cognition. That '*pure*' in relation to '*zeal*' can be seen as mixed metaphor is further discussed in 2.5 below.

3   The pronoun '*which*' co-refers to '*hand*', and so would be replaced by 'HAND' in the propositional analysis described by others in this issue.

4   Oddly enough, in spoken contexts the word *literally* is often used to indicate not literalness but strength of emotion inducing the use of a metaphorical construction, as in 'I was literally knocked flat by what she said' (see Goatly, 1997:173ff.).

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