Matthijs Bogaards ·
Sebastian Elischer (Eds.)

Democratization and Competitive Authoritarianism in Africa

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EDITORIAL

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERGLEICHENDE POLITIKWISSENSCHAFT

Preface

Lucan Way

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Since Steven Levitsky and I first wrote about hybrid regimes in the early 2000s, the concept of competitive authoritarianism has resonated more than he and I could have hoped. In fact, the term is often used without citing us—a sure sign of success. This and other new work—exemplified by the essays in this special volume—have offered important insights into hybrid rule.

The concept of competitive authoritarianism originally emerged out of a comparison of corruption scandals in Peru and Ukraine in the early 2000s. We noticed that the two countries exhibited characteristics of a novel regime type. On the one hand, both regimes were highly authoritarian. Autocrats engaged in widespread harassment of opposition, attacks on media, and abuse of state resources. Yet both regimes were also highly competitive. Parliaments had real power, media was often critical of incumbents, and elections were hotly contested. Our initial inclination was to use existing terminology to describe this regime type. As Richard Snyder has argued, scholars should resist inventing new concepts when existing terms suffice.[1] But we quickly realized that older terms did not adequately describe this new phenomenon. For example, "electoral authoritarianism," a term proposed at the time by Andreas Schedler, describes any regime that is both authoritarian and has multiparty elections.[2] This concept encompasses many cases in which multiparty elections are merely a façade, as in Uzbekistan. In the cases we were trying to describe, by contrast, competition is in fact real but unfair. Similarly another term, Freedom House's "partially

[1] Richard Snyder. 2006. Beyond Electoral Authoritarianism: The Spectrum of Non-Democratic Regimes. In *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*, ed. Andreas Schedler, 292–310. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

[2] Andreas Schedler, ed. 2006. *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

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free," also included a much broader range of regime types than we were trying to conceptualize.

So against our better judgment we decided to invent a new term that captured a phenomenon left obscured by existing terminology. Yet measuring this regime type presented significant challenges. The easiest and by far most common approach would have been to use existing datasets and measures from Polity or Freedom House. But such an approach was highly problematic for two reasons. First, as mentioned above, Freedom House's "partially free" encompasses a diverse range of regimes not captured by our concept—including tutelary military regimes such as Honduras, democracies such as Estonia and Latvia that severely limit the voting rights of minorities, and "soft monarchies" such as Jordan in which the top executive is not elected. Second, and relatedly, these scores are highly opaque. It is not at all obvious what the differences between a "4" and a "5" are in Freedom House's 7 point scale. Given that these scores describe a wide range of regimes, it is literally impossible to disagree with a particular scoring. For example, how can I know whether Moldova in 1993 was a "5" when there is no definition of what a "5" is? We might assess the validity of these scores by comparing regimes with the same ranking. But in reality, Freedom House (as well as many other indices) utilize quite different standards to score cases in different regions of the world. In areas such as Africa and the former Soviet Union, many observers have less demanding standards for democracy than they do in Latin America. For example, in 1997, Brazil—which was widely considered a full democracy—received a worse Freedom House score than either Malawi (where there were frequent attacks on the opposition and media) or Russia (where the government had bombed parliament and elections had been marred by fraud and manipulation). Such diverse standards result in the fact that these indices are primarily coded by regional experts who have their own—and largely unknown—criteria for assessing the level of democracy.

Thus we realized that we needed to develop an approach that was transparent, falsifiable, and that could be applied to any national government in the world. The end result was a list of quite specific criteria for coding competitive authoritarian regimes in the appendix of our book. They are extensive, which is largely a function of the multidimensional and complex character of regimes. In addition to this list of criteria, we provide specific indicator-level data on why we scored each case as competitive authoritarian in the appendix. The case studies in the main text offer detailed descriptions of specifically how and why we coded each case. Finally, in the introduction, we discuss a number of borderline cases and why we excluded them from the analysis (although the authors in this volume are correct that we might have included a systematic assessment of a larger range of these cases).

We fully expected that country experts would disagree with some of our codings, and in fact, that was the point of providing extensive and very specific coding rules. Our criteria are transparent enough that in contrast to Freedom House and some other rankings it is *possible* to disagree with them. Thus, although we would disagree with Bardall, whose essay in this volume criticizes our coding of specific cases, the fact that she has been able to use our criteria to identify new cases of competitive authoritarianism speaks to the transparency of our coding rules. It goes without saying that much more effort is required to apply our criteria than some other available clas-

sifications—such as "electoral authoritarianism"[3] and NELDA[4]—that code regimes as hybrid simply if they have multiparty elections. But the advantage of our criteria is that it captures actual regime dynamics described in our concept, including non-electoral dimensions mostly ignored in other classifications. While easy replicability is important, it is also critical to get cases right.

Levitsky and I started this project with an analysis of Ukraine and Peru. Yet, it turned out that Africa was the region where competitive authoritarian regimes were most prevalent. Given the relative dearth of major oil producers or large and powerful states, countries in the region are mostly low leverage (as well as low linkage) and therefore subject to at most sporadic Western democratizing pressure. In addition, the region includes large numbers of weak states. Consequently, incumbents have had a relatively difficult time sidelining even weak opposition. At the same time, most African states lack the standard prerequisites—well developed economies, strong civil societies—for stable democracy. The result has been various forms of hybrid rule.

The large number of African competitive authoritarian regimes (and the fact that neither Levitsky nor I are experts on the region) make this special issue particularly worthwhile. First, Bardall and Helle offer some thought-provoking ideas about how to refine the operationalization of our concepts. This is especially worthwhile with regards to the concept of a level playing field, which is both relatively novel and presents particularly thorny issues of measurement. At the same time, as discussed above, the authors are incorrect in claiming that our framework is "impossible to falsify" or that we fail to provide indicator-level data.

Second, a number of authors in this issue apply our ideas to cases outside the scope of our original study. Hartmann and van Eerd examine the impact of linkage and leverage of regional actors within Africa not included in our book. In a similar vein, Southall contends that linkage and leverage may explain why South Africa democratized despite being dominated by a highly cohesive African National Congress. Focusing on Tanzania, Makulilo offers a valuable analysis of subnational governments that were not the object of our original study. Next, Cassani and Carbone explore the socio-economic consequences of competitive authoritarianism. They suggest, surprisingly, that such rule may lead to social improvements.

Finally, Hill and Kagoro respectively explore the origins and impact of coercive capacity in two regimes that emerged out of violent struggle: Algeria (a fully authoritarian regime) and Uganda (which only later became competitive authoritarian). It is particularly gratifying to see that our theory helps us to understand cases that were not originally part of our study. In fact, both of these cases are quite pertinent to our next book—*The Durability of Revolutionary Regimes*—that examines the impact of violent revolutionary struggle on authoritarian durability. We can only hope that this new book will generate the kind of fruitful discussion and critique found in this special issue.

[3] Andreas Schedler, ed. 2006. *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

[4] Susan D. Hyde and Nikolay Marinov. 2009. *National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy: Putting the "Competitive" into Competitive Authoritarianism*. Unpublished manuscript. New Haven, CT: Yale University.

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EDITORIAL

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERGLEICHENDE POLITIKWISSENSCHAFT

Competitive authoritarianism in Africa revisited

Matthijs Bogaards · Sebastian Elischer

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Abstract Competitive authoritarianism has emerged as a major concept in the study of political regimes. The introduction of this special issue revisits Levitsky and Way's seminal study *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. Although Africa is the world region with the highest absolute number of competitive authoritarian regimes, political scientists working on Africa have rarely engaged with Levitsky and Way's modern classic. In this introduction, we summarize their arguments, outline the empirical findings for Africa, and review the critiques. In doing so we provide the background for the contributions to this special issue.

Keywords Comparative politics · Political regimes · Autocratization · Competitive authoritarianism · Africa

The third wave of democratization and the end of the Cold War made multiparty elections a common phenomenon across the globe.[1] The initial euphoria that accompanied the political changes of the early 1990s soon gave way to the realization that elections do not automatically result in fully democratized regimes (Schedler 1998;

[1] The authors would like to thank the Fritz Thyssen Foundation and the Centre for the Study of Democracy at the Leuphana University Lüneburg for their generous funding of an author workshop in Lüneburg in November 2013.

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Carothers 2002; O'Donnell and Schmitter 2013; Schedler 2013; for Africa see van de Walle 2002). In many countries the democratic transitions of the third wave saw the establishment of hybrid regimes, which share a mixture of democratic and autocratic features (Diamond 2002; Karl 1995; Bogaards 2009). Levitsky and Way are the first scholars to engage systematically, and in a global manner, with the analysis of one particular type of hybrid regime: competitive authoritarianism. They first introduced the concept of "competitive authoritarianism" in a 2002 article in the *Journal of Democracy*. According to the Social Science Citation Index, their article had been cited 402 times when this issue went to press. Levitsky and Way's book *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War* (2010) has been very well received. Praise has been unanimous, with epithets such as "game-changing" (Bejarano 2011, p. 715), "benchmark" (Slater 2011, p. 388), "classic" (Weidmann 2011, p. 818), and "new classic" (Seeberg 2011, p. 143; Kubik 2011, p. 664)

Although 14 of Levitsky and Way's 35 cases of competitive authoritarianism are located in Africa, and Africa is the continent with the highest absolute number of competitive authoritarian regimes today, scholarship on Africa has failed to engage with the concept and the theory.[2] As far as we know, their book was not reviewed by any journals specialized in African politics. Apart from Matti's (2010) case study of competitive authoritarianism in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Africanists have not worked systematically with the concept or the theory of competitive authoritarianism. That is regrettable because, as the contributions to this special issue show, Levitsky and Way's analysis has much to offer students of Africa's many hybrid regimes.

This introduction revisits comparative authoritarianism in Sub-Saharan and North Africa by summarizing Levitsky and Way's argument and its application to the continent, reviewing the critiques, and by outlining how the contributors to this special issue have engaged the theory, the concept, and the empirical evidence, taking the study of regime trajectories in Africa forward.[3]

1 Democracy, competitive authoritarianism, and autocracy

Levitsky and Way distinguish between three regime types: democracies, competitive autocracies, and full autocracies. Their definition of democracy starts with Dahl (1971, pp. 5–6), but then adds the existence of a reasonably level playing field to free, fair, and competitive elections, full adult suffrage, broad protection of civil liberties, and absence of non-elected "tutelary" powers. Only if all of these conditions are met are countries classified as democracies.

[2] More countries would have qualified if Levitsky and Way (2010) had not excluded electoral autocracies where the military is a veto player. This is a contestable decision.

[3] For a rare analysis of democratization combining Sub-Saharan Africa and Arab North Africa see Thiriot 2013.

Competitive authoritarian regimes are regimes in which democratic institutions exist on paper, but are subverted by incumbents.[4] Regular elections take place in all competitive authoritarian regimes. These elections are meaningful in the sense that the opposition does at least stand a theoretical chance of winning. At the same time, however, competitive authoritarian regimes have an autocratic character as the conditions favour the incumbents. According to Levitsky and Way, in competitive authoritarian regimes the incumbents violate at least one of the defining features of democratic regimes (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 5–12).

In fully autocratic regimes multiparty elections either do not take place de jure or the opposition parties are de facto excluded from effective participation in the elections. The latter might be due to large-scale falsification of results or severe repression of the opposition (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 12–13). This category thus includes what the literature calls hegemonic authoritarian regimes as well as closed autocracies.

The operationalization of these three regime types is explained in detail in appendix I of Levitsky and Way's book, where they code for unfair elections, violation of civil liberties, an uneven playing field, tutelary powers, and voting rights (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 365–371). While in an early publication they suggested that "as a rule of thumb, regimes in which presidents are reelected with more than 70 % of the vote can generally be considered noncompetitive" (Levitsky and Way 2002, p. 55), their later operationalization uses an elaborate coding scheme that looks at the electoral process, not election outcomes (see Bogaards 2010). This allows them to identify 35 regimes that became competitive authoritarian in the first half of the 1990s and to track their development up to 2008. Different from their 2002 article, which outlined three paths leading to competitive authoritarianism (decay of a full-blown authoritarian regime, collapse of an authoritarian regime, decay of a democratic regime), the dependent variable in their book is what happened after competitive authoritarian regimes emerged. Thus, they monitor whether competitive authoritarian regimes became full democracies, stable competitive autocracies, or instable competitive autocracies.

To explain the divergent regime trajectories, Levitsky and Way go beyond structural, institutional, and actor-centred explanations, and focus on three independent variables: linkage, leverage, and organizational power. The three explanatory factors can be grouped into international and domestic factors and described as follows:

International explanatory factors:

1. "Linkage (to the West)" refers to the linkage between competitive autocratic regimes and Western states. Linkage can have an economic, political, multilateral, technocratic, or civil society character. Linkage is the most important explanatory factor in accounting for the trajectories of competitive authoritarian regimes. Only linkage can lead to successful democratization. Global linkage scores vary from a low of zero for Tanzania to a high of 0.97 for Guyana. The highest African

[4] An illuminating example of the way in which competitive authoritarian regimes manipulate supposedly democratic institutions is Goodfellow's (2014) analysis of parliamentary law making for political purposes rather than policy making in Uganda.

score is 0.38 for Gabon (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 375). In qualitative terms, linkage is judged low for all African cases of competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 306).

2. "(Western) leverage" refers to the vulnerability of competitive authoritarian regimes to the external pressure of Western powers to initiate democratization processes. Vulnerability alone rarely results in effective democratization. Leverage is judged high in all African cases of competitive authoritarianism except for Cameroon, because of the so-called "black knight support" from France, and Gabon, because of oil.

National explanatory factor:

3. "Organizational power" refers to the organizational capacity of each government to suppress the democratic opposition. Organizational power can come from three sources: state coercive power, ruling party strength, and state control over the economy. In the coding scheme of organizational power, state coercive power and ruling party strength are measured on two dimensions: scope and cohesion (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 376–380). Scores for the various sources of organizational power are added up. No country achieves the theoretical maximum of ten, but Serbia and Zimbabwe come close with a score of eight. In Africa, Benin received the lowest score of zero. In fact, organizational power is the independent variable where African cases show most variation (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 306).

However, this variation in organizational power among competitive authoritarian regimes in Africa makes no difference for the prospects of democratization, which is determined solely by linkage. The causal logic inherent in Levitsky and Way's theory is brought out most clearly and forcefully by Slater (2011, p. 386), who writes that the "three variables do not so much causally interact as they unfold in a logical sequence". When Western linkage is high, democratization will follow. When linkage is low and organizational power is high, authoritarianism will be the outcome. Under these conditions, then, "Levitsky and Way's argument is essentially monocausal, deterministic, and unidirectional" (Slater 2011, p. 386). When linkage and organizational power are both low, leverage comes into play. This accounts for the difference between stable (low leverage) and unstable (high leverage) authoritarianism. "In other words, Western linkage is the only causal factor theorized to explain the democratization of competitive authoritarian regimes in the post-Cold War era" (Slater 2011, p. 387). When linkage is high, democratization is inevitable and when linkage is low, democratization is unthinkable. Democratization, thus, is always exogenous. "The upshot is that *Competitive Authoritarianism*—far from teleologically over-predicting democratization—actually *under*-predicts it" (Slater 2011, p. 387, emphasis in original). Slater, in contrast, argues that more roads lead to democratization than Levitsky and Way (2010) allow for. In particular, authoritarian weakness and Western leverage are presented as factors that not merely destabilize authoritarianism but can bring about democratization.

In their reply to Slater, Levitsky and Way (2011, p. 388) explain that "the absence of a domestic route to democracy in our study is a product of the particular nature of our cases." By looking exclusively at countries that were competitive authoritarian in

the early 1990s, almost 20 years after the third wave of democratization had started, they left out the successful early democratizers: those countries that democratized on their own, so to say. Levitsky and Way remain skeptical about the possibilities of democratization when organizational power is low, pointing out that "these cases are characterized not only by weak civil societies and domestic oppositions but also by state and party weakness" (2011, p. 388) and provide unpromising conditions for democratization. A case in point is Ukraine, which they classified as having democratized in their 2010 book, although their theory predicted unstable authoritarianism. One year later they observed that "the Ukraine had already reverted to competitive authoritarianism" (2011, p. 388).[5] This point is well taken, but the critique of Morse (2012, p. 186) stands that Levitsky and Way do "not provide a theory of democratization within the context of low linkage", which is precisely the situation that Africa finds itself in.

For Africa, Matti (2010, p. 53) finds that in the DRC "postconflict democratization can be largely accounted for by the pressure applied by and incentives attached to foreign aid", aid that was accepted as long as it did not threaten existing patronage networks. Matti's prediction is that the balance of Western aid and Chinese investment will determine whether the country goes into a slightly more democratic or a slightly more authoritarian direction, but that the DRC will remain competitive authoritarian. Similarly, Peiffer and Englebert conclude that "both African and donor dynamics conspire to infuse hybridity with equilibrium qualities likely to inhibit further democratization" (2012, p. 377). On the other hand, recent studies of political parties and elections in Africa have highlighted the role of domestic actors in African politics (Weis 2014; Elischer 2013; Resnick 2013; LeBas 2011; see also Wisemann 1990).[6]

2 Competitive authoritarianism: what the critics say

From the book reviews of Levitsky and Way (2010), seven themes emerge: the temporal scope of the argument; the number of regime outcomes; other subtypes of electoral authoritarianism; possible subtypes of competitive authoritarianism; the decisiveness of linkage; the origins of linkage, leverage, and organizational power; and the scope for democracy promotion.

First, the theory is "time- and context-specific" and therefore "may not have much predictive power in the future" (Bours Laborin 2011, p. 255). The starting point is the end of the Cold War and the ending point might well be the emergence of a multipolar world, with an increased role for China as "black knight". Slater (2011, p. 386) has similar concerns and calls this "the question of temporal portability". In their reply,

[5] Gilley (2010, p. 165) is alone in his optimistic reading of Levitsky and Way (2010), counting ten countries that "thanks to the rise of effective oppositions, have progressed enough to become borderline democracies". On closer scrutiny, these are cases that Levitsky and Way classify as "unstable authoritarianism"—countries where turnover did not result in democratization but in the continuation of competitive authoritarianism with new, or often not so new, players.

[6] In a similar vein, Vladisavljevic (2014) highlights the role of popular protest in competitive authotarianism.

Levitsky and Way (2011, p. 388) counter that the sensitivity of their theory to "world historical time" is an asset. The question remains, though, how much explanatory power linkage, leverage, and organizational power have for countries that became competitive authoritarian after the 1990s. It is also not clear how much the scope of the theory can be expanded across a broader set of authoritarian regimes (Fenner 2011).

Second, Kubik (2011, p. 663) points out that there are four regime outcomes, not just three. In addition to democratization, unstable competitive authoritarianism, and stable competitive authoritarianism there is also "full authoritarianism", as can be seen in appendix I of their book. Two cases ended up as fully authoritarian regimes: Belarus and Russia. The concept of "full authoritarianism" is specified in the introductory chapter of Levitsky and Way (2010, p. 13) but does not return in the case studies or the conclusion. By consequence, Levitsky and Way fail to look at the process of "autocratization".

Third, in the literature on electoral authoritarianism, which following Schedler (2013) can be broadly conceived as any authoritarian regime with multi-party elections, it is common to distinguish between competitive and hegemonic authoritarianism (see also Bogaards 2013; Bogaards 2014). The difference between the two lies in the chances for success of the opposition: slim but not remote under competitive authoritarianism, negligible under hegemonic authoritarianism. As Morse (2012, p. 187) observes, Levitsky and Way ignore the concept of hegemonic authoritarianism. Cases that they classify as (stable) competitive authoritarian, others would regard as hegemonic authoritarian (e.g. Gabon). On the other side of the political spectrum, Levitsky and Way (2010) may draw the boundary with democracy too tightly, thereby including into the category of competitive authoritarianism cases that are more properly treated as "defective democracies", to use Merkel's term (see Bogaards 2009). For example, Botswana is usually seen as one of the few longstanding liberal democracies in Africa.

Fourth, we may need to unpack the concept of competitive authoritarianism and identify subtypes. Mainwaring (2012, p. 960) describes Venezuela under Chávez as a "participatory, mobilizational, competitive authoritarian regime", different from Fujimori's "demobilizing" competitive authoritarian regime in Peru in the 1990s.

Fifth, does high linkage always result in democratization? Mainwaring (2012, p. 963) observes that "the Venezuelan experience under Chávez runs counter to Levitsky and Way's generally sound argument that it is difficult to consolidate competitive authoritarianism in the Western Hemisphere because of high linkage to the United States. Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Bolivia today are also arguably cases of competitive authoritarianism". Levitsky and Loxton (2013) seek the root of competitive authoritarianism in the Andes region in populism. Because populists are outsiders with little political experience, have an electoral mandate to reform the existing system, and often face hostile institutions dominated by the traditional parties, they tend "to push weak democracies into competitive authoritarianism" (2013, p. 110). Unfortunately, Levitsky and Loxton do not explain why populists are so popular in the Andes and no attempt is made to situate populism in Levitsky and Way's (2010) theory of linkage, leverage, and organizational power.

Sixth, where do linkage, leverage, and organizational power come from? And are they independent of each other? Van de Walle (2012, p. 172) complains that "Levitsky and Way treat their causal factors as exogenously determined". Tolstrup (2013), in contrast, emphasizes the endogenous nature of linkage, showing how what he calls "gate-keeper elites" have influenced the degree and direction of economic, intergovernmental, technocratic, social, information, and civil society ties in Belarus and Ukraine. Tolstrup's (2013, p. 728) main insight is that linkages are not given and fixed but subject to processes of "linkage-building and linkage-cutting". In a reply, Levitsky and Way (2014) defend their emphasis on structure over choice and play down the relevance of leadership, suggesting it matters only in cases of medium linkage.[7]

In a new line of research, Levitsky and Way (2012, 2013) explore the sources of stability of party-based authoritarian regimes. They argue that "the identities, norms, and organizational structures forged during periods of *sustained, violent, and ideologically driven conflict* are a critical source of cohesion—and durability—in party-based authoritarian regimes" (Levitsky and Way 2012, p. 870, emphasis in original). Hence, revolutionary or liberation parties are expected to remain in power and withstand democratic challenges, at least as long as the original cohort is still at the helm. The argument is illustrated with four cases from Africa, following a most similar research design: Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The two parties with origins in violent struggle are still in power (the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front and the Mozambique Liberation Front) whereas the two ruling parties without such roots (the Kenya African National Union and the United National Independence Party in Zambia) lost power, demonstrating the vulnerability of patronage-based parties to crisis. Although Levitsky and Way (2012, 2013) make no attempt to link this argument to their previous work on (the trajectories of) competitive authoritarianism, their current research on the durability of revolutionary regimes could be seen as deepening our understanding of the origins of organizational (and coercive) power, implicitly answering questions of the type: "Why do some dictators succeed in building effective coercive institutions while others fail"? (Art 2012, p. 369).

Finally, what does Levitsky and Way's structuralist theory imply for attempts to spread democracy around the world? Burnell (2013) criticizes the book for failing to make explicit the policy implications. Using the distinction between linkage and leverage, Burnell associates democratic *assistance* with the former and democracy *promotion* with the latter, thereby providing a framework for thinking about the possibilities of strengthening the background conditions for democracy and aiding domestic democratic actors (see also von Soest and Wahman 2015).

3 Competitive authoritarianism in Africa

According to Levitsky and Way (2010) there are 14 African countries where competitive autocracies formed in the early 1990s. The continent is generally characterized

[7] Though Way's (2012b) analysis of incompetence and political skills suggests a more prominent role for agency.

by a low degree of linkage with the West. This means that democracy is unlikely, irrespective of the vulnerability of a country to Western leverage or the organizational power of the regime. Their boldest claim, according to Fenner (2011, p. 936), is that high-linkage countries "will democratize even when domestic conditions favor authoritarianism". This implies that all authoritarian efforts are, in the end, futile as "even brick houses will collapse where linkage is high" (Fenner 2011, p. 936).

Variation in leverage and organizational power merely helps to predict the stability of competitive authoritarianism. When organizational power is even medium high, the regime is expected to be strong enough to withstand both the domestic opposition and any foreign pressure to democratize that might exist. Only when organizational power is low or medium does leverage make a difference: Low domestic sources of strength coupled with the typically high vulnerability to leverage in Africa are supposed to result in unstable competitive authoritarianism.

As evident in Table 1, 11 of the 14 African cases conformed to the theoretical expectations. The deviant cases are Benin, Mali, and Ghana. Contrary to Levitsky and Way's prediction of competitive authoritarianism, these countries democratized.

Table 1 Trajectories of competitive authoritarian regimes in Africa. (Source: Levitsky and Way (2010, p. 306))

Country	Linkage	Organizational power	Leverage	Predicted outcome	Actual outcome
Benin	Low	Low	High	Unstable authoritarianism	Democratization
Botswana	Low	High	High	Stable authoritarianism	Stable authoritarianism
Cameroon	Low	Medium	Medium	Stable authoritarianism	Stable authoritarianism
Gabon	Low	High	Medium	Stable authoritarianism	Stable authoritarianism
Ghana	Low	Medium	High	Unstable authoritarianism	Democratization
Kenya	Low	Medium	High	Unstable authoritarianism	Unstable authoritarianism
Madagascar	Low	Low	High	Unstable authoritarianism	Unstable authoritarianism
Malawi	Low	Low	High	Unstable authoritarianism	Unstable authoritarianism
Mali	Low	Low	High	Unstable authoritarianism	Democratization
Mozambique	Low	Medium High	High	Stable authoritarianism	Stable authoritarianism
Senegal	Low	Medium	High	Unstable authoritarianism	Unstable authoritarianism
Tanzania	Low	Medium High	High	Stable authoritarianism	Stable authoritarianism
Zambia	Low	Medium Low	High	Unstable authoritarianism	Unstable authoritarianism
Zimbabwe	Low	High	High	Stable authoritarianism	Stable authoritarianism

Levitsky and Way (2010, p. 306) downplay the first two as being fragile democracies at best. Ghana's democratization, they admit, "is not explained by our theory" (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 307). It is important to add that the temporary democratic downfall of Mali in 2012 has little to do with the factors outlined by Levitsky and Way. The military coup of March 2012 was a reaction to the failure of Mali's civilian rulers to contain the conquest of the country's North by a Salafi militia with Algerian and Arabic origins. Interestingly the military coup ushered in the restoration of multiparty democracy. Malian democracy survived the dramatic events of 2012, which indicated that it might not be that fragile after all and thus remains a "deviant democracy" (Seeberg 2014).

In line with recent research that is careful to distinguish between opposition victory and democratization (Cheeseman 2010; Wahman 2014), Levitsky and Way (2010, p. 308) observe that "the African cases experienced more turnover than democratization". This accounts for the high number of cases of unstable competitive authoritarianism. The critical question, as formulated by Wahman (2014, p. 224), is: "Why do some turnovers lead to democratization while others do not?"

4 Competitive authoritarianism in Africa revisited

There has been a lively debate about the causes of the so-called color revolutions in some Eastern European and post-Soviet countries, with country and regional experts highlighting the importance of regional diffusion effects, leadership strategy, and the opposition's power to mobilize (Bunce 2011; Way 2008 and 2009). Such debates have been absent in the literature on regime change in Africa. This special issue hopes to stimulate such exchanges through a critical engagement with the role of linkage, leverage, and organizational power in the shaping of regimes and regime trajectories across the continent. Some of the articles collected here focus on the theory, the concept, or measurement issues, while others are empirical studies of selected cases. What all nine contributions share is the desire to work with Levitsky and Way's framework, to deepen our understanding of a particular regime type in post-third wave Africa, to further develop our means for studying this phenomenon, and to assess the prospects of democratization in these cases.

Gabrielle Bardall uses Levitsky and Way's coding scheme in an attempt to verify their classification of African regimes. While in the hard sciences the replication of existing studies is common practice, unfortunately very few social scientists follow this lead. Her findings are sobering: Her team is unable to confirm most of the 14 competitive authoritarian regimes that Levitsky and Way identify and even adds some cases that Levitsky and Way dismiss. Bardall then takes a critical look at the concept and the measurement, before formulating suggestions to improve the empirical study of competitive authoritarian regimes.

Svein Erike Helle provides an in-depth reexamination of Levitsky and Way's concept of the level playing field, one of their main contributions. Helle raises three points: First, the definition does not match the operationalization of the concept. Second, the empirical link between a level playing field and the emergence of competitive authoritarian regimes in Africa proves tenuous. Third, there is a need for

a more differentiated measurement of the concept. Subsequently, Helle presents a new disaggregated framework and illustrates its empirical validity by applying it to Zambia. He is able to show that over time Zambia's playing field has become more even, an important factor that accounts for the opposition victory in the 2011 Zambian elections.

Christof Hartmann highlights the positive effect of regional organizations on democratization. Going beyond the preoccupation with the African Union (see Fombad 2012), he compares the mandate of all major regional organizations to foster democratic rule and finds that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has played an important role in turning Mali, Ghana, and Benin into democratizers. By designing a model of regional linkage and leverage, Hartman adds an important new element to Levitsky and Way's framework.

Will South Africa go the way of Zimbabwe? What explains the different trajectories of these two neighboring countries, both governed by former liberation movements? While some South African scholars already found evidence that South Africa is moving in the direction of a competitive authoritarian regime (De Jager and Meintjes 2013), Southall detects more differences than similarities.[8] In his view, linkage and leverage have kept the African National Congress (ANC) and thereby South Africa democratic.

Jonathan Hill, Jonathan van Eerd and Jude Kagoro apply Levitsky and Way's framework to a number of additional cases. In doing so, all three contributions question Levitsky and Way's original case selection. Jonathan Hill's discussion of regime developments in Algeria explains how Algeria was able to withstand the Arab Spring and why meaningful democratic reform has not yet taken place (see also Parks 2012 and Volpi 2013). Hill demonstrates the empirical validity of the conceptual toolkit of competitive authoritarianism in a world region where the study of regime change is still in its infancy.

Like Hill, Jonathan van Eerd provides a systematic application of Levitsky and Way's framework to a new empirical case. Van Eerd focuses on Lesotho's first democratic turnover of 2013. Going against the grain, he argues that Lesotho will remain a competitive authoritarian regime due to the country's low linkage with the West and the low organizational power of Lesotho's former incumbents. In addition, van Eerd sheds light on South Africa's unfulfilled potential as a democratic patron in the region.

Jude Kagoro examines the position of the Ugandan military. Although it is difficult to downplay the role of the military in African politics, the literature on competitive authoritarianism has remained largely silent on this topic. Kagoro's article demonstrates that the Ugandan military enjoys extensive links with Uganda's ruling party and plays an important part in keeping President Museveni in power.

In his case study of Tanzania, Alexander Makulilo examines spatial variation in authoritarian stability, going beyond the general focus on the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) (see Morse 2014). His contribution highlights how linkage, leverage, and especially organizational power are not uniform across the two main parts of the country: mainland Tanzania versus Zanzibar and Pemba. Makulilo thus connects the

[8] For a critical account of Namibia's post-independence trajectory, see Melber 2015.

study of competitive authoritarianism to the recent literature on subnational authoritarianism (Gibson 2010). Moreover, his findings would seem to provide additional support for Way's claim (Way 2012a, p. 439) that regional identity can be a source of opposition strength.

Finally, Andrea Cassani and Giovanni Carbonne approach competitive authoritarianism from a new angle. They examine the socioeconomic consequences of competitive authoritarian regimes. Their quantitative study shows that competitive authoritarian regimes outperform full authoritarian regimes. They further demonstrate that full democratization is very likely to have provided even greater benefits to African populations.

Conclusion

Collectively, these nine original articles make important points that can be grouped under two broad headings: new insights into hybrid regimes in Africa and advances in the study of competitive authoritarianism. However, any such distinction in the end is artificial, as all contributions arguably do both simultaneously. Bardall's critique of the empirical identification of competitive authoritarianism in Africa and Helle's article on the concept and measurement of the level playing field help to delineate competitive authoritarian regimes, deepening our understanding of what makes this type of hybrid regime different from both democracies and more fully autocratic regimes. The contributions by Hartmann and van Eerd emphasize the importance of regional organizations and regional powers, giving prominence to linkage and leverage *within* Africa, substituting African regional organizations and African regional powers for Western linkage and leverage.[9] On the other hand, Southall's examination of the countervailing powers of organizational power highlights how the trajectories of similarly situated dominant parties and former liberation movements may be crucially affected by linkage with and leverage by the democratic West. Kagoro's contribution brings to the fore the role of the military in understanding organizational power, while Hill's article reminds us of the intricate interplay of organizational power, linkage, and leverage. Taken together, these articles thus shed new light on the key variables in Levitsky and Way's theory of competitive authoritarianism. Makulilo's analysis of competitive authoritarianism in Tanzania across space and time highlights the territorial dimension and warns us not to generalize from one part of a country to the next. Finally, Cassani and Carbone, taking competitive authoritarianism as an independent variable, show how regime type makes a difference in the lives of African citizens.

At the very least, this special issue should thus have confirmed the added value of the concept and theory of competitive authoritarianism for the study of Africa's hybrid political regimes. But hopefully it has also shown ways in which the concept and measurement of competitive authoritarianism can be refined, suggested new interpretations of linkage, leverage, and organizational power as the variables shaping the trajectory of competitive authoritarian regimes, and added a new dimension

[9] For a similar argument, focusing on what they term regional "authoritarian gravity centres", see Kneuer and Demmelhuber 2015.

by asking what these regimes do, not just where they come from and how they developed. In this sense, the contributions have relevance far beyond Africa and should inspire scholars of hybrid regimes researching other parts of the world.

Some questions could still not be addressed in this special issue. First, there are no definitive accounts yet of deviant democracies in Africa. What made democracy succeed in Benin, Ghana, and Mali, despite Levitsky and Way's dire predictions? Second, the scope of the theory will remain unclear until scholars use the concepts of linkage, leverage, and organizational power to study the development of other regime types. In other words, the question whether Levitsky and Way have provided us with a theory of competitive authoritarianism or a much broader theory of regime change and stability as such remains unanswered. Third, there are internal inconsistencies in Levitksy and Way's own oeuvre about the role of leadership and the effects of dominant parties that began as liberation movements. One can only hope that they will integrate their new line of inquiry into their previous work and not abandon the study of competitive authoritarianism. But even if they do, the contributions to this special issue show that a new generation of scholars is ready to assume the task.

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Coding competitive authoritarianism

Gabrielle Bardall

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Abstract Hybrid regimes have posed an empiric, methodological and conceptual challenge to academics since their emergence in the early 1990s. One of the most ambitious studies of the nature and behavior of hybrids in the past decade is Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way's 2010 book, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War* (Cambridge University Press).

In this "era of unprecedented abundance of cross-national political data" (Mudde and Schedler, Pol Res Quart 63(2):410–416, 2010, p. 410), the Levitsky and Way framework both organizes data into a uniquely operable model and contributes to it by generating new information on regime type. Yet those who look to build and expand upon it must be aware of the "structural problems of information about data supply and data quality" (Mudde and Schedler, Pol Res Quart 63(2):410–416, 2010, p. 410) inherent in current political quantitative data and models. The competitive authoritarian (CA) model is no exception to these problems. In order to reproduce it and to use the regime model and theory for further research, it is necessary to address a number of conceptual, methodological and empirical deficiencies present in the work.

This article assesses Levitsky and Way's CA regime classification model by independently reproducing it in the 14 Sub-Saharan African countries in the original analysis as well as in a limited number of additional cases in Sub-Saharan Africa. The paper opens with a presentation of the core concepts of competitive authoritarianism, an argument for the purpose of the present study, and an overview of the CA model. The replication exercise is described and the findings are reviewed in detail. The paper closes with a systematic analysis of the work, drawing on Munck and Verkuilen's framework (Comp Pol Stud 35(1):5–34, 2002) for assessing

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quality of democracy data. I describe the most significant empirical indeterminacies that arise from the methodological indeterminacies identified in the replication exercise. I conclude that the inability to replicate the case selection undermines the usefulness of the proposed model to systematically identify CA. I consider how the broader conclusions of the original work are impacted by these findings, specifically how the persistence of competitive authoritarianism in this region is impacted by variations in case selection. The article offers recommendations on how to address shortcomings in the model in order to strengthen it and adapt it to the study of other non-CA hybrid regimes.

Keywords Competitive authoritarianism · Elections · Hybrid regimes · Methodology

1 Competitive authoritarianism

Hybrid regimes are a persistent and unique regime form. Brownlee notes that "the 'half way house' has become a fortress"—an enduring blend of liberalization and repression indicating the durability of authoritarianism in an age of purported global democracy (Brownlee 2007, p. 16). Since the emergence of the concept and the recognition of its enduring nature (Diamond 1999; Geddes 1999, 2005; Linz 1975; O'Donnell et al 1986), over a dozen authors have offered a similar number of distinct typologies for hybrid regimes (Alvarez et al 1996; Bogaards 2009, 2010; Bollen and Jackman 1989; Collier and Levitsky 1997; Coppedge and Reinicke 1990; Diamond 2002; Wigell 2008; also Hyde and Marinov 2011).

The intense debate over the identification and classification of hybrid regimes (Karl 1995; O'Donnell et al 1986; Ottaway 2003; Schedler 2006; van de Walle 2002) has often taken precedence over the operationalization of frameworks to predict their behavior. One of the most significant exceptions to this is Stephen Levitsky and Lucan Way's work on competitive authoritarian regimes (Howard and Roessler 2006). A distinct sub-type within the field of hybrid regimes, CA regimes are defined as "civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist but … they are not democratic because the playing field is heavily skewed in favor of incumbents" (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 5). On a conceptual spectrum, CA regimes fall between minimalist democracies (where competitive elections are held but may coexist with human and civil rights violations and weak rule of law) and hegemonic authoritarian regimes (where non-competitive elections are held).

One of the most critical innovations of Levitsky and Way—that which most concerns us here—is their organization of dozens of the traits of hybrid behavior into an empirically operable framework for measuring regime type and, ultimately, regime change. Their original model is designed to distinguish competitive authoritarianism from full authoritarian (FA) regimes, on the one hand, and from democracies on the other.

2 Objectives and pertinence of the replication study

Mudde and Schedler note that "the academic rewards for systematic, in-depth assessments of data quality are scant … and the required efforts substantial" (2010, p. 411). So why undertake this study?

The original intent of the exercise was to reproduce and extend the important findings on competitive authoritarian regimes, however the Levitsky and Way publication failed to meet the replication standard, which holds when "sufficient information exists with which to understand, evaluate and build upon a prior work if a third party could replicate the results without any additional information from the author" (King 1995, p. 444; also Gabaix and Laibson 2008; Lieberman 2010). Ultimately I was only able to achieve commensurate results in just over a third of the cases. Of those cases where I found corresponding outcomes, we came to the same conclusion via different paths. Additionally, using the same methodology on a limited external sample, I identified an additional three cases of competitive authoritarianism excluded from the original study.

King asks, "if the empirical basis for an article or book cannot be reproduced, of what use to the discipline are the conclusions?" (King 1995, p. 445). In this case, the inability to reproduce the case selection choices undermines the usefulness of the proposed CA model. If we cannot consistently agree on if, or why a regime is CA, we cannot measure the behavior of the regime type with consistency. "Without complete information about where data come from and how we measured the real world and abstracted from it, we cannot truly understand a set of empirical results" (King 1995, p. 445).

Some may argue that revising the case selection may not impact the predictive ability of the broader theory in light of the exceptionally high rate of success of the overall conclusions of the book (Levitsky and Way achieved a 93 % rate of agreement for their theory in the Sub-Saharan region).[1] It is vital to settle this question, given the vast amount of time and energy that can be wasted on extending, expanding and building on bodies of work that lack firm empirical foundations (King 1995, p. 445). Indeed, in the short time since its publication, the work has been cited over 350 times in the literature and has been recognized as a seminal work. I argue in my conclusion that the case selection does impact the theory's predictive ability and that the empirical inconsistency of the case selection model is reflected in the work's other proposed models, rendering it impossible to falsify.

Beyond the empirical critique, this exercise seeks to serve other researchers interested in using the Levitsky and Way model. Regime classifications are not an end in themselves, but serve only as heuristic devices designed to shed light on some part of a given phenomenon (Collier and Adcock 1999). Levitsky and Way examine only a fraction of the hybrid regimes in existence during the period of their study.[2] Yet the three central variables (unfair elections, violation of civil liberties and uneven playing field) apply to virtually all forms of hybrid regimes, in varying degrees. While

[1] Calculated by the author from the results in the reference publication.

[2] In Africa alone, Levitsky and Way's study only recognizes 14 CA cases, although Freedom House identified almost twice the number of "Partly Free" states during the baseline period (1990–1995).

these regimes are excluded from Levitsky and Way's analysis, the prospect of adapting this tool to operationalize them holds promise.

A second reason to invest in further applications of the framework is because of its innovative description of the third "defining attribute" of democracy that has hitherto been elusive in empirical studies: the uneven playing field. As the "menu of manipulation" (Schedler 2002) grows increasingly sophisticated, electoral wrongdoing and human and civil rights abuses are replaced by more subtle manipulation of institutional machinery and state resources. While electoral abuse and human and civil rights violations can be measured against firm, internationally-recognized standard[3] no such codification of political and institutional manipulation exists. Thus, the "uneven playing field" variable merits deeper examination. What does it add to what we know? Is it truly independent of the other variables? Does the uneven playing field manifest itself through the same indicators in other hybrid states?

3 Challenges in modeling competitive authoritarianism

The replication exercise seeks to address a number of specific deficiencies presented by the CA model. First, a brief recap of the CA model itself: The framework for coding CA regimes established by Levitsky and Way operates from the bottom up—if states do not meet one of the two criteria for full authoritarianism,[4] they are run though a gamut of conditions that would classify them as CA. Should they clear these many demanding indicators, they must meet two additional criteria to qualify as democracies.[5] Beyond three basic measures,[6] the detailed criteria for competitive authoritarianism are categorized according to the "three defining attributes of democracy" (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 7): election fairness, defense of civil liberties and the existence of an even playing field. Each group is determined by three or four variables with differing degrees of specification (between zero and seven indicators per variable). The presence of any one of these indicators is sufficient to classify the case as CA. All told, over three-dozen indicators of competitive authoritarian behavior are identified and classified according to these three families, thereby operationalizing a notoriously complex concept and making the study unique in its depth and detail (Fig. 1).

The work claims to test all competitive authoritarian regimes in the world between 1990 and 1995. This implies that all or most regimes worldwide were tested accord-

[3] Such as the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation.

[4] The criteria for full authoritarian elections are that there are no national-level elections or that national-level elections are essentially non-competitive (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 365).

[5] Democracy is measured according to five criteria, three of which refer to previously coded elements. The two new conditions are (1) "the existence of near-universal suffrage" (compared to "broad adult suffrage" under CA—a negligible distinction in practice) and (2) "basic civil liberties (speech, press, association) are systematically protected" (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 368).

[6] CA regimes must meet three basic conditions: (1) not meet the conditions of full authoritarianism, (2) respect broad adult suffrage and (3) unelected "tutelary" powers cannot restrict the authority of elected governments (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 365).



Fig. 1 Overview of Levitsky and Way's model of competitive authoritarianism. (Source: Author's overview of Levitsky and Way's model 2010)

ing to the CA model to narrow the set down to the final 35 cases. While the criteria for inclusion of these 35 cases is provided in the work,[7] the empirical basis for the exclusion of the other 150+cases is not. The authors kept no record of the cases that were excluded (Levitsky 2013). Were they too authoritarian? Too democratic? A different kind of hybrid? In order to test a regime change model, it is essential to comprehend the basis of case exclusion. Pepinsky (2007, p. 18) notes, "In addition to making clear statements about social facts that are requisites for variable coding decisions, coders should make data available for non-included cases as well as included cases … In principle, this should be relatively costless." By rejecting existing indices of regime type, the authors assume the onus of providing information not only about why they chose some cases, but also about why they didn't chose the others.[8]

The absence of documentation on case exclusion is pertinent because the cases identified as competitive authoritarian vary significantly from corresponding indices. As discussed above, although multiple indices classify intermediate regime forms, Levitsky and Way eschew pre-existing datasets that were not designed to specifically measure CA regimes or that rely on proxy variables, in favor of a specifically developed model (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 35). Given the nature of competitive authoritarianism as a specific sub-set within the hybrid spectrum, this approach is consistent. Yet, based on this construction, one could reasonably expect to find substantial overlap between CA regimes identified by Levitsky and Way and intermediate regimes as identified in other major indices. Simply stated, if CA is a sub-set of hybrid regimes, one would expect the case selection to generally reflect this when compared to other major indices, particularly in the absence of documentation on case exclusion. It is surprising to find that this is not the case.

Table 1 illustrates this for the 14 African cases identified by the authors compared to their corresponding classifications on the Freedom House and Polity IV scales (grey-shaded areas in Table 1 indicate intermediate regime form classification). Freedom House classifies regimes based on aggregate scores of political rights

[7] Appendix I, Regime Scores 1990–1995, pp. 369–370.

[8] Ancedotal information on the basis for exclusion is provided in an ad hoc manner for a number of individual cases, however no data to systematically document the basis for exclusion has been made publically available to date. This is most likely attributable to the "least common denominator" approach to coding the cases, as explained in the concluding section.

Table 1 Hybrid regime indices compared. (Source: Levitsky and Way 2010; Freedom House Freedom in The World—Individual country ratings and status, 1973–2014; Polity IV Individual Country Regime Trends, 1946–2013)

Country	Year	Levitsky & Way	Freedom House			Polity IV	
			PR	CL	FH Score	Combined Score	Category
Benin	1991	CA	2	3	F	6	Democracy
Botswana	1994	CA	2	3	F	7	Democracy
Cameroon	1992	CA	**6**	**5**	NF	**-4**	**Anocracy**
Gabon	1990	CA	4	4	**PF**	-88 (-6*)	**Anocracy**
Ghana	1992	CA	**5**	**5**	**PF**	**-1**	**Anocracy**
Kenya	1992	CA	**4**	**5**	**PF**	**-5**	**Anocracy**
Madagascar	1993	CA	2	4	**PF**	9	Democracy
Malawi	1994	CA	2	3	F	6	Democracy
Mali	1992	CA	2	3	F	7	Democracy
Mozambique	1994	CA	**3**	**5**	**PF**	**5**	**Anocracy**
Senegal	1994	CA	**4**	**5**	**PF**	**-1**	**Anocracy**
Tanzania	1990	CA	6	5	NF	-6	Autocracy
Zambia	1991	CA	2	3	F	6	Democracy
Zimbabwe	1990	CA	6	4	**PF**	-6	Autocracy

* Revised Combined Polity Score for Gabon 1990, -6

and civil liberties indexes ranging from 1 ("Free") to 7 ("Not Free")[9]; Polity subtracts each country's authority score (0–10) from their democracy score (0–10) to classify regimes as autocracies (−10 to −6), anocracies (−5 to +5) and democracies (+6 to +10). In contemporary research, the empirical study of hybrid regimes and the definition of diminished subtypes to autocracy and democracy have primarily been operationalized with the help Freedom House or Polity scores (Bogaards 2009, 2010). While the Freedom House and Polity scores are broadly consistent in Table 1, the discrepancies between these dominant indexes and the Levitsky and Way classification would appear to be more than a few "borderline" cases (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 34) and bears further investigation.

4 The replication exercise

This study tests Levitsky and Way's model of competitive authoritarianism for reproducibility and consistency. The objective of the study was to determine whether independent researchers could (a) agree on which cases should be classified as CA and (b) why these cases are CA. Such an exercise offered the opportunity to analyze the CA model's strengths and potential shortcomings, and to consider its potential for future adaptation and further extensions. It also provides the opportunity for further investigation into the nature of electoral authoritarianism in several Sub-Saharan states.

[9] Freedom House's scale is divided according to "Free" (1 to 2.5), "Partly Free" (3 to 5) and "Not Free" (5.5 to 7).

Table 2 Compared Freedom House and competitive authoritarian classifications in Africa. (Source: Levitsky and Way 2010; Freedom House Freedom in The World - Individual country ratings and status, 1973–2014)

GROUP I	GROUP II	GROUP III	GROUP IV
Competitive Authoritarian & "Partly Free" (7)	Competitive Authoritarian & "Free" (5)	Competitive Authoritarian & "Not Free" (2)	Not Competitive Authoritarian & "Partly Free" (8)
Gabon	Benin	Cameroon	Burkina Faso
Ghana	Botswana	Tanzania	Central African Republic
Kenya	Malawi		Congo (Brazzaville)
Madagascar	Mali		Côte d'Ivoire
Mozambique	Zambia		Guinea-Bissau
Senegal			Lesotho
Zimbabwe			Niger
			Nigeria

Seeking to independently reproduce the exercise, the study applied the CA coding model to the 14 Sub-Saharan cases identified as CA by Levitsky and Way, as well as to the eight additional "Partly Free" cases that were not classified as CA. These additional eight cases are countries that held multi-party legislative/parliamentary elections between 1990 and 1995 (NELDA) and were ranked as "Partly Free" in the year of the election during that timeframe (Freedom House). Cases were chosen based on the existence of legislative/parliamentary elections although in several cases, executive elections were also held as part of the same electoral process.[10] This was taken into consideration in the coding. For those countries that held multiple elections during this period or where election results were annulled due to massive fraud or violence, the first competitive, multi-party election was selected as the baseline year.

Based on the selection process described above, four types of cases emerged: (Table 2)

A few caveats: Competitive authoritarianism reflects the quality of a regime, not of a single election, thus identifying cases according to a single moment in time is sub-optimal. However, elections are the most important variable in CA classification and thus, for the purposes of this sample study, the electoral process was used as the pivotal point for examining the nature of the broader regime. I chose to work with the Freedom House index because its simplicity and broad lines favor inclusion of cases, allowing for a representative sample. Freedom House is one of the most widely used measures of democratization by scholars of hybrid regimes (Munck and Verkuilen 2002), making it both accessible and a legitimate reference. Freedom House's definition of democracy reflects the definition adopted by Levitsky and Way in that it is essentially based on Dahl's procedural minimum definition but includes the presence of "significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through the media and through generally open political campaigning" (Freedom House). This is somewhat reflective of Levitsky and Way's level playing field criteria. Finally, Freedom House data is highly correlated with the other widely used dataset, Polity IV (Casper and Tufis 2002, p. 2), making it a representative option.

[10] Uganda, 1994, was excluded because the elections were for a constituent assembly only.

All 22 cases were independently coded through a double-blind process. The research team consisted of myself and three research assistants.[11] Several months before launching the coding, the group reviewed the literature and discussed the coding model extensively. Three preliminary trial runs were conducted to train the team and establish reliability. The results of the trials were recorded and addressed during group discussion.

To complete the exercise, we found it necessary to introduce additional clarifications to some of the coding rules. The most notable clarification regards the behavior classified as the "uneven playing field" (UPF). We established that UPF behavior refers to the incumbents' use/abuse of the state's resources and institutions, not to incumbent behavior towards opposition parties, which is documented under "unfair elections" and "civil liberties" variables. Steven Levitsky confirmed this distinction in an interview before the launch of the exercise.

An additional guideline was introduced relating to the CA model's emphasis on incumbent behavior to determine regime type. While the incumbent-opposition power dynamic was clear in many cases, in others it was more ambiguous, with opposition groups driving the undemocratic dynamics in the country equally or more than the incumbent. I chose to apply the model in strictest adherence to its original design and exclude opposition behaviors from consideration while recognizing the potential this had in affecting outcomes.

I set a number of rules in approaching the documentation for each case. The original model is highly demanding in its criteria for inclusion as a CA regime—the presence of any one of the 30+indicators is sufficient to classify a regime as CA. This minimal threshold is problematic, as it could conceivably lower the bar for coding. We cannot know if this was the case, as indicator-level data from the original study is not available. To overcome this, throughout the approximately 160 sources used for the coding exercise, I sought to ensure that the material covered all areas of the classification model and drew upon both academic analysis (where available) and policy analysis (election observation reports, human rights reports, etc.), supported by national legal documents and contemporaneous media articles, reflective of the described approach in the original text. I could not replicate the identical reference material, as the 100+page bibliography in the original text is not case-specific, however we used as much as possible and, for supplemental documentation, exclusively used reference sources that were available to the original authors (i.e., published by 2010).[12]

I also introduced a number of additional guidelines regarding the temporal parameters of the CA variables. As described above, each case required an identified election in order to be coded for "electoral fairness". Since the elections in question were not specified in the original work, I made the decision to use the first competitive,

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[12] Three of the 160+sources were published after 2010, however these were used to clarify information and did not affect the overall coding decisions.

multi-party election in the identified timeframe as the baseline year.[13] Finally, additional specifications for the timeframes covered by each variable were determined (please see below, *Aggregation and Theory Implications* for further detail).

Before launching the full coding exercise, I met with Dr. Steven Levitsky to discuss some of the challenges I faced and to clarify some technical questions. A debriefing session was held with the research group following the coding exercise to review the experience, identify common problems and provide feedback on the exercise and the model. I extend sincere thanks to this committed team of researchers as well as to the Trudeau Foundation for providing the funding for the double-coding,[14] to Dr. Marie-Joelle Zahar for her generous contribution of time, expertise and professional collaboration, and to Dr. Steven Levitsky for his advice and encouragement in pursing this exercise.

5 Empirical findings

Of the 14 original CA cases in the Levitsky and Way study, I ultimately achieved commensurate findings in only five (Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique Senegal and Zambia). I was unable to reproduce the authors' results in over 60 % of the cases. Six of the fourteen appeared as borderline cases, with coders in disagreement over their classification as CA (Benin, Botswana, Gabon, Madagascar, Tanzania and Zimbabwe). I found an additional three cases of competitive authoritarianism from among the Group IV series (Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville and Lesotho).[15] Table 3 illustrates the number of cases of agreement between the original study and the replication exercise.

To interpret the findings, numerical values were attributed to each of the three regime options and averaged between coders for each case. Values of "1" were most democratic and values of "3" most authoritarian. An attribution of "2" designates competitive authoritarian; these appear in boldface in Table 4. In Groups I—III, this signals agreement with the Levitsky and Way classification. The cases in Group IV were not included in the original study. The boldface cases in Group IV are CA regimes not identified in the original work.

Group I (CA and "Partly Free") was expected to achieve the highest level of agreement between the original authors' coding and our test group, however the results demonstrate the significant challenges faced in engaging with the model. Of the seven cases in this group, I found only three (Ghana, Mozambique and Senegal) that fell clearly into the CA classification. Three others were found to be at or below the standard of CA (Gabon, Kenya and Zimbabwe) while one (Madagascar) was deemed at or above CA status.

[13] The baseline year is defined as the year between 1990 and 1995 in which multi-party elections were held for legislative/parliamentary office. In some cases, executive elections were also held during the same electoral cycle. The "Partly Free" classification is the closest corresponding classification to CA.

[14] Funding for the double-coding was provided through the author's 2012 Trudeau Scholarship.

[15] "Unanimous" cases were those where both coders were in agreement with Levitsky and Way; "borderline" cases were those where only one coder identified the case as CA.

Table 3 CA Replication Study Outcomes. (Source: Author's own compilation based on research findings)

		Levitsky & Way	
		Competitive Authoritarian	Not Competitive Authoritarian
Bardall	**Competitive Authoritarian**	5	3
	Not Competitive Authoritarian	9	5

Table 4 Detailed outcomes of CA replication study. (Source: Author's own compilation based on research findings)

GROUP I		GROUP II		GROUP III		GROUP IV	
CA & "Partly Free"		CA & "Free"		CA & "Not Free"		Not CA & "Partly Free"	
Gabon	2.5	Benin	1.5	Tanzania	2.5	Burkina Faso	2.5
Ghana	**2**	Botswana	1.5	Cameroon	3	**Central African Republic**	**2**
Kenya	3	**Malawi**	**2**			**Congo (Brazzaville)**	**2**
Madagascar	1.5	Mali	1			Côte d'Ivoire	2.5
Mozambique	**2**	**Zambia**	**2**			Guinea-Bissau	3
Senegal	**2**					**Lesotho**	**2**
Zimbabwe	2.5					Niger	1.5
						Nigeria	3

Although I arrived at the same outcome as the authors for Ghana, Mozambique and Senegal, we did not agree on the variables leading to the classification. In the case of Ghana in 1992, electoral fraud and the existence of an uneven playing field were unquestionably documented, which, in itself, was sufficient for CA classification. However, Jerry Rawlings used his authority as head of state to establish extensive impediments to the electoral process beyond the fraudulent electoral practices cited in the original work. Opposition groups were routinely refused applications for police permits for rallies (HRW 1991; Oquaye 1995) and reports of significant violence and intimidation against political opponents was recorded, including physical violence by state security forces against campaigning opposition members, threatening chiefs with destoolment and making death threats against rural voters for failing to vote for Rawlings (Oquaye 1995, p. 263; Jeffries and Thomas 1993). Likewise, our analysis recorded widespread civil liberties violations in all areas of the assessment. The offices of several dissenting private media were closed down, vandalized or burnt and in one instance, the proprietor and editor of an independent paper were arrested, detained and tortured—one later died of his injuries (Oquaye 1995). Free speech and assembly were tightly circumscribed (HRW) and several repressive laws were withdrawn the month before the election only to be replaced by the Public Order Law, which gave the regime other powers of detention (HRW). In sum, our assessment of the Ghanaian case is more critical than the original evaluation, noting twice the amount of violations of fair electoral practices and respect of civil liberties.

Mozambique reflects a similarly pronounced discrepancy in the justification for the CA classification. Although multiparty elections were officially introduced in 1994, the ruling Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) party swept the general elections. Its success in the 1994 (and subsequent) elections is largely attributable to its extensive control of state resources. A pattern of FRELIMO harassment of oppo-

sition parties throughout the country involved heckling and stoning opposition candidates, and systematic defacing of opposition campaign material (US Department of State 1994). Although freedom of speech and association were constitutionally protected and permission for public gatherings was generally granted, security forces used excessive force to control unauthorized demonstrations, killing and wounding several persons on several occasions (US Department of State 1994). Again, I identified twice the number of variables justifying the CA classification than the original study. This result was consistent in the case of Senegal.

I anticipated a high rate of agreement for cases in **Group II** (CA and "Free") based on the understanding of CA as a more demanding and broader reaching classification than the FH standard for "Free". This bore out in practice. I only differed substantially in the case of Mali, which I classified as a "Democracy" according to the CA model. The Malian case illustrates our difficulty with the question of timing in the application of this model. Although military coup leader Amadou Toumani Touré had the capacity to wield state resources in his favor during the 1992 elections, he chose instead not to participate. The elections were widely viewed as free and fair and resulted in the peaceful transfer of executive power and turnover in parliament. Based on our application of the model, this qualified the case as a democracy. The CA nature of the regime only took shape under the newly elected president, Alpha Oumar Konaré. While Mali unquestionably met CA criteria by the time of the 1997 elections (beyond the period of analysis), determining exactly when the shift took place prior to that is highly debatable. Indeed, the authors classified the case as CA based on the presence of a single variable that was only present during events of 1996–1997—frequent harassment of media under the Konaré government (Myers 1998, p. 205). Leaving aside the contentiousness of determining the precise moment of a shift in regime nature, the Mali case suggests potential conflicts in applying the model to cases where the CA regime—the "incumbent of interest"—did not preside over an election (i.e., assessing the authoritarian behavior of a democratically elected opposition group outside of an electoral period). This issue is also present in the classification of Madagascar.

The two cases in **Group III** (CA and "Not Free") were the most problematic conceptually; predictably, they demonstrated the lowest level of empirical consistency. Our coding team unanimously classified Cameroon as "Full Authoritarian" and Tanzania the lowest possible borderline. There was no agreement with the Levitsky and Way coding of cases in this group. The study of these two cases revealed some insight into the classification of full authoritarian regimes under this model.

Tanzania held its first multiparty elections at the tail end of the analysis period (October 28, 1995). Despite the official legalization of pluralism, the 1995 elections were so deeply flawed that observers determined that the officially announced results of the contest did not reflect the choice of voters at the polls (Reeves and Klein 1995; US Department of State 1996). In Cameroon, the repression of political and civil groups in the lead-up to the 1992 legislative and presidential elections[16] was severe. In the year preceding the elections, the government banned at least six independent

[16] We assessed Cameroon based on both the presidential and legislative elections that took place in 1992, although they were separated by eight months.

organizations associated with the Opposition Coordinating Group and five independent newspapers. The period was characterized by intense violence, widespread imprisonment and torture of protesters and political opposition (HRW 1994, Agendia 2013, ICG 2010, NDI 1992). The main opposition party boycotted the legislative elections after the government failed to meet its demand for the establishment of an independent electoral commission (Ngoh 2004, p. 440). Although the opposition fiercely contested the presidential elections later in the year, the actions taken by the government to ensure Biya's reelection were deemed "unusually extreme and illegitimate" (NDI 1992) to the extent that the legitimacy and validity of the elections were undermined.

Both of these cases fall into a "phantom" regime category excluded from this model: They are hegemonic authoritarian states where non-competitive multiparty elections take place. The authors recognize the existence of this regime type Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 16) but do not make a provision for it within the coding model. As a result, I was left to interpret the limited specifications of "Full Authoritarian" and relied heavily on the criteria defining large-scale falsification of electoral results rendering voting effectively meaningless.

Group IV (not CA but "Partly Free") results were largely consistent with our expectation that these cases would be a mix between "Full Authoritarian" and "CA". Indeed, of the eight cases, four were Full Authoritarian cases or almost FA (Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria) and three were Competitive Authoritarian (CAR, Congo-Brazzaville and Lesotho). Niger appears as an outlier, falling between CA and Democratic.

The authors suggest that competitive authoritarianism in Congo-Brazzaville (RoC) may have existed after 1995, however the brutal tug-of-war between authoritarian leadership and multi-party politics defined the entire period between the completion of the transition in 1990 and the descent into civil war in 1997. Indeed, RoC crossed the line between CA and full authoritarianism/conflict several times between 1990–1995, but is best described as a CA regime during this turbulent period. Although the president dissolved the National Assembly in 1992, new elections were held the following year under CA conditions. Two major episodes of violence in reaction to the elections in 1994 were resolved with a ceasefire agreement by December of that year, and the country maintained a precarious multi-party status until civil war erupted during the lead-up to the abortive 1997 elections.

In the Central African Republic (CAR), general elections were held in 1993 following the Supreme Court's decision to annul the results of the 1992 elections due to irregularities. The elections marked the end of 12 years of military rule and the beginning of a well-defined CA regime under Ange-Felix Patassé. While a competitive multi-party contest was permitted by the military during the 1993 elections, the electoral environment was characterized by electoral impediments and civil liberty violations described by CA conditions. Violence and political detention were commonly employed against opposition actors and the right of assembly was restricted by regulations and discretionary use of permits by government ministries (HRW 1993). The government controlled the media and restricted publication of dissenting views. Despite the political turnover, the CA nature of the state persisted under the new regime of Patassé, an "incredible demagogue" (ICG 2008). The CA regime

ultimately survived another round of elections in 1999 and several military mutinies and coup attempts until finally being overthrown in 2003 when rebel leader François Bozizé seized Bangui.

On the other end of the spectrum, the cases of Lesotho and Niger were much closer to democracy during the 1990–1995 period. In Lesotho, the opposition Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) swept the largely free and fair March 1993 elections, and the military handed over power to the civilian government after almost 30 years in power (Southall 1994). The constitutionally-elected government was briefly interrupted by a coup and suspension of parliament, but was restored within a month and saw out its term under CA conditions. In Niger, a transitional government established by national conference organized the November 1991 elections under free, fair and nonviolent conditions. The elected government of Mahamane Ousmane improved some political and civil rights in the country but was regularly condemned by international human rights monitors for the detention without charge or trial of dozens of members of the Tuareg minority, some of whom had been beaten and tortured (AFR 43/02/93). Ousmane's CA regime lasted for almost the entire period of the analysis (1991–1995) before collapsing and returning to military rule in 1996.

Niger (and presumably also Lesotho) were excluded from the original study because their CA regimes collapsed before the full completion of a presidential term Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 32, footnote 169). The choice to exclude these two is problematic, however. The Ousmane and BCP regimes were more clearly-defined and longer-lived CA regimes then several others included in the case selection. The decision to exclude these cases based is this criterion is not fully justified in our opinion. Further, Niger's appearance as an outlier in our exercise (between CA and Democracy) demonstrates the model's failure to adequately define the baseline time period of relevance. Identical to the Malian case, competitive authoritarianism in Niger began *after* the elections. However, the model requires the inclusion of at least one defining election during the baseline period and precludes simultaneously coding multiple regimes.

6 Evaluation

I was unable to replicate the results of the CA case selection model through my exercise. The final section of the paper discusses the impacts of these findings on the theoretical robustness of the work. I discuss the causes of the dissimilarities and provide tips for researchers seeking to develop further work on this material. In this final section, I draw on Munck and Verkuilen's framework (2002) for the analysis of data to develop a systematic review of the LW model.

6.1 Conceptualization

Munck and Verkuilen define the first task in the construction of a dataset as its conceptualization, or "the identification of attributes that are constitutive of the concept under consideration" (Munck and Verkuilen 2002, p. 7). The specification of the concept consists of identifying its attributes (avoiding either maximalist or minimalist

definitions) and vertically organizing the attributes within a conceptual logic so as to avoid redundancy and conflation (Munck and Verkuilen 2002, p. 8). In the CA model, the identification of regime attributes according to three groups (elections, civil liberties and playing field) was comprehensive, however the maximalist approach results in the pitfalls of redundancy and conflation suggested by Munck and Verkuilen. This pertained both to variables within a group (for example, between the different electoral variables) and between the groups (electoral variables vs. UPF, for example).

A number of the variables within each of the three groups are so close as to be extremely difficult to differentiate. For example, Civil Liberties variables 1 and 2 distinguish between limitations on media and threats to media that are often linked or nearly indistinguishable in practice. Similarly, the difference between "legal harassment" (Civil Liberties 1) and "legal actions" (Civil Liberties 2) are so close that the empirical distinction is blurred. Limiting the opposition's ability to meet and to campaign (Elections 3) is also a violation of right to free speech (Civil Liberties 3) and free assembly (Civil Liberties 4). The effect is either to inflate the value of a single incident by coding it under more than one category, or to risk inter-coder consistency by choosing between effectively identical variables.

Most significant are the conceptual overlaps between the three variable groups. The conceptual distinction between the elements of the level playing field and electoral variable 4 ("uneven *electoral* playing field") and civil liberty variables 1 and 3 (harassment of media and restricted freedom of speech and association) posed a particular challenge. I sought to address the issue by distinguishing clear time references for each variable. Additionally, I developed an enhanced description of the variables to specify between electoral variables, which refer to opposition access to the process, and UPF variables, which refer to the degree of fusion between the incumbent part and the state. Nonetheless, the presence of an uneven electoral playing field systematically corresponded with the presence of the other uneven playing field variables. This was the case in the original study as well, where the correspondence appeared in 13 of the 14 cases (Kenya excepted).

The same issue emerged with the two civil liberties variables, both in the replication exercise and, to a greater degree, in the original study. The indicators of these variables reflected actions that can only be undertaken where the incumbent and the state are closely bound. The definition of media harassment includes censorship, legal harassment by central government and discretionary use of licenses, while the restriction of civil freedoms is described by enforcement of repressive laws inhibiting speech, frequent use of the legal or tax system to harass critics, and state or paramilitary repression of protests and public meetings. These actions reflect a widespread influence of political interests across different areas of state administration—the defining characteristic of the uneven playing field. The corresponding presence of these variables and the UPF variables indicates a potential overlap in the conceptual definition of the two civil liberties variables.

While some variables had a tendency to be "overcoded" due to conceptual overlap, others were underutilized. In our exercise, the Elections 1 variable where "at least one candidate or political party is barred for political reasons" was never used. Levitsky and Way only recorded it once, for Kenya. This may be attributable to the similarity an indicator of Full Authoritarianism (where parties and candidates are *routinely* excluded).

In sum, the model fails to meet Munck and Verkuilen's standard for vertical organization of attributes in the conceptualization of the data framework. This conceptual approach of working from the "bottom up", along with the heavy emphasis on the CA variables (almost 75% of the model assesses CA characteristics, compared to less than 10% each for FA and Democracy), affects the neutrality of the model. The model presumes cases "guilty" (authoritarian) until proven "innocent" (democracy). Lack of clarity between the variables amplifies this effect and potentially distorts the outcomes.

6.2 Measurement

"A second challenge in the generation of data is the formation of measures, which link the conceptual attributes identified and logically organized during the prior step with observations" (Munck and Verkuilen 2002). Three tasks are involved in the measurement of the concept: (1) the selection of indicators, (2) the selection of the measurement level, and (3) the recording and publicizing of the coding rules, process and disaggregate data.

The CA model establishes the basis for cross-system equivalence by selecting a multitude of indicators to specify each variable. By doing so, the model overcomes any focus on identical measures and establishes a " … *similarity of the structure of indicators … Equivalence is a matter of inference, not of direct observation*" (Przeworski and Teune 1970, pp. 117–118, emphasis in original). In theory, this should minimize measurement error and allow for cross-checking (Munck and Verkuilen 2002).

The selection of the measurement level is more challenging. To establish measurement validity, Munck and Verkuilen advise to "maximize homogeneity within measurement classes with the minimum number of necessary distinctions… [in] an attempt to avoid the excesses of introducing distinctions that are either too fine-grained, which would result in statements about measurement that are simply not plausible in light of the available information and the extent to which measurement error can be minimized, or too coarse-grained, which would result in cases that we are quite certain are different being placed together." In the CA model, the onus of this came down to distinguishing the original variable ("Uneven Playing Field") from the other two groups. The difficulty of this become apparent in one of the principle methodological difficulties I experienced, specifically, maintaining inter-coder reliability throughout the exercise, both for the overall regime classification as well as for the individual variables that defined why CA regimes were classified as such (Table 5).

Table 5 Intercoder reliability test results. (Source: 22 cases double-coded by Bardall team)

Percent agreement					
Elections_1	100.0%	CL_1	68.2%	UPL_1	63.6%
Elections_2	63.6%	CL_2	77.3%	UPF_2	72.7%
Elections_3	59.1%	CL_3	72.7%	UPF_3	68.2%
Elections_4	59.1%	CL_4	45.5%		

The broad reasons for this may be attributed to two structural factors. First, I found the time periods covered by the coders both over-specified in some regards and under-specified in others.[17] Two of the four civil liberties variables specified the inclusion of acts that took place "within a one-year period that can reasonably be expected to have a 'chilling effect'" (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 367). I interpreted this to refer to acts within a one-year period *preceding the elections*[18] that could have a chilling effect *on political participation in the elections*. The timeframe served as a useful parameter, but strictly respecting the one-year date limit was over-restrictive in some instances. The remaining two civil liberties variables and the UPF variables did not specify time frames and therefore proved to be the area of broadest leeway in coder interpretation. I found it necessary to consider the elections as the end-point reference: virtually the litmus test of UPF infrastructure. Under this model it was extremely difficult to identify CA regimes in the absence of an electoral contest, as in the cases of Mali and Niger.

Regimes in consideration that did not hold elections during this period were, by default, newly elected to office (i.e., a democratic contest resulted in the election of a party that subsequently transformed the state into a CA regime). This implied the need to assess the behavior of the previous opposition actors who had recently acceded to power. The variables specified in the model were insufficient to fully determine this. The UPF variables generally reflect characteristics of long-held and deeply entrenched regimes, which are difficult to achieve within the first term of office. Likewise, it was problematic to consider these groups "twice" in the given period: once as potential victims of oppression under the previous regime and a second time as newly elected incumbents. Although in most CA regimes the power dynamic between an oppressive incumbent and a besieged opposition was clear, in others the opposition was equally or even more violent and aggressive than the regime. Indeed, many opposition groups engaged in dual game behavior[19] during elections, however only some successfully acceded to power. In order to maintain conceptual coherence in the model, it is necessary to either entirely exclude opposition behavior from consideration (as we have done) or recognize the complex relationship between successful dual game behavior and the nature of the ensuing regimes.

The second structural issue also relates to the baseline timing. Very broadly speaking, elections in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 1995 were either "first" or (almost) "last" elections. First elections following peace agreements[20] or national conferences[21] were moments of sweeping transition, often characterized by rapid liberalization of the political and civil spheres, the creation of independent electoral

[17] This did not affect the electoral variables. Electoral variables were coded for pertinent issues present during the electoral process defined as starting from the official announcement of elections and/or opening of official campaign period, ending with the investiture of the new offices.

[18] In cases of post-conflict and transitional elections, the period starts with the signature of the peace accord or the transfer of power to a transitional body following a national conference.

[19] Dual game behavior refers to opposition groups that seek to win power by existing rules while simultaneously trying to change them (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 32), often though manipulative and violent tactics.

[20] Mozambique, Mali

[21] Benin, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Mali, Niger, Madagascar.

bodies and the elimination or stern restriction of hyper-presidential powers. The last (or "almost last") elections were authoritarian holdouts that in most cases terminated sometime in the following decade. In some cases, such as Malawi, this effect was so dramatic that Freedom House ratings shifted from "Not Free" to "Free" in the course of a single year (1993–1994). This issue compounds the timing problem described above and creates a highly unstable baseline period from which to judge the persistence of an uneven playing field. Furthermore, although we did not code regime status in the outcome year, we are concerned that this issue could create an unequal basis for comparison between the baseline year and the outcome year. Regime outcomes in the original study were based on three consecutive election cycles in most cases, whereas the baseline was determined during a short and highly volatile period. This may be an area for further examination.

In sum, although one of the great attractions of the Levitsky and Way model is the move away from excessive electoralism in regime classification, we found it necessary to anchor our evaluation in relation to at least one electoral event. Without the presence of a pertinent election, the model was insufficient to determine and describe a regime type. The lack of specification of applicable time frames for several variables resulted in conceptual confusion in the replication process. On the other hand, the clear specification of pertinent timeframes for other variables was highly effective in determining the presence of determinative behaviors. The question of timing is problematic both within the cases and in the overall selection of cases in this time period starting in the early 1990s.

7 Aggregation and implications for CA theory

The selection of the level of aggregation and the rules of the aggregation process are clearly set forward. Yet, as I have demonstrated, the CA model fails the final aggregation test of replicability. The failure to meet this standard has implications for the theories of organizational power, linkage and leverage presented in the original work.

"The numbers we choose are likely to affect the world we see" (Mudde and Schedler 2010, p. 412). Despite the high rate of agreement of the original theory, case selection still matters. Levitsky and Way conclude that their theory explained the persistence of stable or unstable authoritarianism in 11 of the 14 original Sub-Saharan cases. It explained instability in Mali and Benin, but failed to account for democratization in these two states or in Ghana. Yet, if the sample is restricted to the five cases where we agreed on the classification, the theory would predict a greater probability of authoritarian stability in the two cases of medium linkage (Ghana and Senegal) and greater instability/opportunity for democratization in the other three states with lower linkage and organizational power levels. However, Ghana and (disputably) Senegal both democratized by 2008 while (according to Levitsky and Way's measurements) authoritarian abuse tightened in Malawi and Mozambique.

Further to this, to explore the implications of case selection on the broader CA theory, I initiated an additional line of study to code the other three cases of competitive authoritarianism (Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville and Lesotho) according to the criteria for organizational strength, linkage and leverage provided

in the original text. Here again, for reasons too numerous to list in the space of this article, I found I was unable to do so.

In sum, this preliminary inquiry suggests that altering the case selection reduces the robustness of the theoretical findings. In the final section of this article, I review the findings to provide practical suggestions on how to overcome some of the challenges in the CA model to apply it in future studies.

8 Further applications

Despite the challenges I found in reproducing the case selection, the Levitsky and Way model is a useful tool for studying the nature of CA regimes and has potential to be expanded to evaluate other forms of hybrid regimes.

The strengths of the model are in its broad lines of conceptualization. The literature to date has identified several dozen indicators of hybrid behavior, and Levitsky and Way performed a vital service to researchers by organizing many of them into an approachable model. The model makes a further contribution by distinguishing between electoral incidents and the many significant issues that take place between electoral events that create a fundamentally unfair playing field during electoral competition. The inclusion of the UPF variables is vital to the concept, although its specification and operationalization need further refinement.

Notwithstanding the empirical shortcomings identified in the preceding pages, the basic components of the CA model are largely compatible as a basis for the study of other hybrid regime forms. Clearly, the conceptual definitions and specification on timing must be addressed. In order to expand the study to other hybrid forms, the most significant nuances to be specified are the level of competitiveness, the degree of repression and the inter-election period behavior. Scholars engaging with this coding framework in the future should consider the following:

- The nature of election violence is a complex phenomenon, especially in CA regimes, and merits clarification. The presence of ongoing civil conflict, regional conflict, attempted coup d'état and orchestrated post-election violence are features of many hybrid electoral environments in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere, and should be considered for their impact on competitiveness. The intensity of violence varies substantially between cases, as do the actors involved. Cases where intense violence between opposition and incumbents exists vary significantly from cases of minor violence or non-violent state-only repression.
- The presence of an uneven playing field extends beyond the areas of "media" and "finance" writ-large. In specifying this variable, it may be worthwhile to consider state capture of other pertinent sectors (justice, security, humanitarian aid, education and health access).
- The "Full Authoritarian" category subsumes hegemonic authoritarian regimes as well as closed regimes. While this is a legitimate grouping, further specification would benefit its operationalization, particularly to clarify between "large scale falsification of results that makes voting effectively meaningless" (Full Authoritarian 2) and the indicators of Elections 2, including "falsification of results" and

other forms of electoral malpractice. Indeed, the fundamental distinction between the two is to distinguish between competitiveness and the absence of competition. It should therefore be recognized in the model that voting can be meaningless reasons other than falsification of results. Severe intensity of violence and intimidation, judicial court rigging, and many other options are available to render an election meaningless. Specifying the distinction between (un)competitiveness would enhance the explanation of the variable.

- The UPF does not apply to a number of political contexts in Sub-Saharan Africa. Specifically, in cases of post-conflict, revolution, death or exile of head-of-state or other cases where an incumbent is not clearly identifiable to benefit from state capture, the UPF is not applicable. Likewise, UPF variables reflect a long-term relationship of state capture whereas today, many states have experienced political turnover and the creation of a new CA relationship. Indicators of "young" CA regimes might be envisioned.
- The model relies on the availability of highly nuanced and cross-case consistent data from countries over 20 years ago. This was challenging especially for states such as the Central Africa Republic and Guinea Bissau, which were not the object of significant international assistance or academic study. This is a practical challenge to be considered when extending the model to other cases.
- The requirement of "broad adult suffrage" often does not reflect the reality of women's political participation in our cases. In Mozambique, for example, there are no legal restrictions on women's participation, yet targeted government tactics coupled with cultural practices in the country severely limited women's suffrage. While I did not apply a gender analysis to the assessment, the growing influence of gender as a basis of political exclusion especially in the Sub-Saharan region must be taken into account. Alternately, the use of empty pro-women policies as a way for CA regimes to "gender wash" their behavior and enhance their credibility should also be noted as a tactic for maintaining CA stability (Bardall 2014).
- The model does not account for opposition behavior. While this is appropriate, in some cases it is problematic. Specifically, in cases of major opposition boycotts the model will achieve false positives for electoral fairness (i.e. where there is no opposition, there is no need to commit electoral fraud). In most cases, the regime will still qualify as CA due to the existence of the UPF (the cause of most boycotts), however this undermines the use of the model as a quantitative tool.

This last point brings the discussion to a close on a broad note. Despite its implied scope, the Levitsky and Way model was not designed as the foundation for a database or even for more limited use beyond the purposes of the book (Levitsky 2013). It was solely intended a tool to narrow case selection based on a least common denominator. As Steven Levitsky explained, "we had a low tripwire … you just had to cross off one of the violations for a regime to be competitive authoritarian" (Levitsky 2013). Naturally, the study went well beyond this and recorded the basis for case selection according to the individually specified variables that I have examined in the pages above. However, the original conceptualization was developed for a strictly utilitarian purpose. In the preceding analysis, I have considered the reliability of the model as the basis of case selection for this subset of electoral authoritarian regimes. The

impact of the case selection on the authors' theoretical findings is a future path to explore. While the replication exercise reminds us to proceed carefully where regime classification is concerned, the rich detail and insightful categorization of the traits of these complex states offers a promising basis for further study of the many forms of electoral authoritarianism in Africa and elsewhere.

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Defining the playing field

A framework for analysing fairness in access to resources, media and the law

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Abstract The playing field is a concept often used to describe level of fairness in electoral competition. With Levitsky and Way's definition of the playing field as a case in point, this paper takes a critical look at existing work on the playing field, arguing that current conceptualizations suffer from lacking conceptual logic, operationalization and measurement. A new and disaggregated framework that can serve as the basis for future research on the playing field is then proposed. This framework is applied to an illustrative case study on the development of the playing field in Zambia under MMD rule, thereby demonstrating that it is able to capture both the changing nature of the playing field and the differing mechanisms at play to a larger degree than the framework put forth by Levitsky and Way. The 2011 elections in Zambia also clearly highlight the importance of conceptually and empirically separating the slope of the playing field from its impact on both the opposition and electoral outcomes.

Keywords The playing field · Electoral competition · Regime typologies · Africa

1 Introduction

The past 25 years have seen a large increase in the number of regimes that hold multiparty elections but do not conform to international standards when it comes to the conduct of elections, access to political rights, and civil liberties (Carothers 2002; Hadenius and Teorell 2007). Nowhere in the world are these regimes as prevalent as Sub-Saharan Africa: "The reality across the sub-continent is clearly one of 'hybrid

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regimes'" (Lynch and Crawford 2011, p. 281). Despite the "routinisation of elections" (van de Walle 2003, p. 299) on the continent, the majority of these elections take place in contexts where incumbency advantages are extreme due to excessively strong executives (Rakner and van de Walle 2009, p. 112).

This trend has coincided with increasing use of the concept of the playing field to evaluate electoral quality. Often, and especially in less developed countries, election monitoring reports and the media claim that the lack of an even playing field compromised the quality of a given election because it prevented fair competition between the incumbent and the opposition (Levitsky and Way 2010b, p. 57; Merloe 1997; Schedler 2006, p. 1). General agreement exists among both scholars and election observers that a relatively even playing field between parties and candidates competing in an election is essential for fair competition (cf. Bjornlund 2004; Goodwin-Gill 1998). However, left unresolved are what the concept of the playing field entails within the context of electoral competition, which components are part of the concept, which indicators can measure its evenness and how these indicators should be aggregated. The result has been widespread use of a concept (especially in the media and election monitoring reports) without consensus on what this concept entails or how it should be measured and applied.

Levitsky and Way (2002, 2010a, 2010b) have changed this through their work on competitive authoritarianism. They argue that in addition to free and fair elections and civil liberties, an even playing field—defined as equal access to resources, media and the law—is essential for democracy, making the presence of an uneven playing field a hallmark of a competitive authoritarian regime (Levitsky and Way 2010a, p. 7, 2010b, p. 63). Their work has provided a clear purpose and analytical tools for this concept but as this paper will highlight, it falls short of actually measuring the playing field. Building on Levitsky and Way's work, this paper proposes a framework that can be used to anchor an analysis of the evenness of the playing field. After a brief review of existing work on the concept, a critique of Levitsky and Way's conceptualization and measurement is presented. Subsequently, an alternative, disaggregate framework for measuring the playing field is proposed and discussed before it is presented and applied in a study of the playing field under the competitive authoritarian Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) regime that held power in Zambia from 1991 until 2011.

The analysis highlights several advantages of this framework relative to that of Levitsky and Way: (1) The importance of separating the evenness of the playing field from its effects on political actors, as emphasized by the fact that the playing field was more even in the 2006 election when the MMD retained power compared to 2011, when it lost. (2) That a dichotomous measure of the playing field as either even or uneven as proposed by Levitsky and Way hides important variation between elections in Zambia. (3) Although changes in the evenness of the different attributes of the playing field are relatively synchronized, the initial analysis indicates that there are different dynamics driving these changes for each attribute, implying that a disaggregated framework is fruitful. The Zambian case thus illustrates that the framework proposed here leads to different conclusions and different avenues for future research than do existing studies of the playing field.

2 Understanding the playing field

The traditional use of the playing field as a concept can be found in discussions on distributive justice, especially concerning the important principle of equality of opportunity (e.g. Roemer 1998). The notion here is that "justice requires levelling the playing field by rendering everyone's opportunities equal in an appropriate sense, and then letting individual choices and their effects dictate further outcomes" (Arneson 2008, p. 16). Equality of opportunity thus focuses on the opportunity of individuals to make informed decisions through (1) eliminating initial inequalities not chosen by the individual, and (2) providing fair conditions for interaction. The focus on fair interaction is key to understanding the link between an even playing field and democratic electoral competition. As Bartolini (1999, 2000) notes, competition is a central aspect of democracy. However, for competition to be democratic it depends on *contestability*. Contestability focuses on the fairness of the political contest between political actors. One of the issues Bartolini highlights as imperative for fairness is "the possibility of accessing resources necessary for an electoral race with the other" (Bartolini 1999, p. 457). Thus in Bartolini's conceptualization of democracy, the playing field is a key issue.

Within the context of real life electoral contests, a "level playing field" has since the 1990s been used to denote a situation where no group participating in an election has a better chance at winning as a result of unfair conditions (Elklit and Svensson 1997, p. 36; see also Goodwin-Gill 1998; Merloe 1997; Gould and Jackson 1995). However, early work on the playing field was often focused strictly on a narrow, pre-election time period and on formal and legal factors, thus failing to be of significant analytical value.

Levitsky and Way correct many of the mistakes in early work on the playing field by giving the concept a clear purpose. They argue that the central point is whether or not the playing field is even. This, they contend, can be determined by identifying where "the opposition's ability to organize and compete in elections is seriously handicapped" (Levitsky and Way 2010b, p. 58) as a result of incumbency advantage throughout the electoral cycle (Levitsky and Way 2010a, p. 6). The authors then specify the advantages crucial for the playing field:

> We define an uneven playing field as one in which incumbent abuse of the state generates such disparities in access to resources, media, or state institutions that opposition parties' ability to organize and compete for national office is seriously impaired. (Levitsky and Way 2010b, p. 57)

Thus the playing field is fundamentally about incumbents' abuse of state power in order to generate relative differences in access to resources, media and the law[1] between the incumbent and opposition, both during and between elections. The attributes of this concept—access to resources, media and the law—are largely in tune with the wider literature on electoral competition under authoritarianism, which

[1] Levitsky and Way alternate between referring to this attribute as "access to state institutions" (Levitsky and Way 2010a, p. 368, 2010b, p. 57) and "access to the law" (Levitsky and Way 2010a, p. 12, 2010b, p. 60). This is linked to a discrepancy between conceptualization and measurement (see discussion below).

highlights access to resources, media and the law as central factors for understanding the fairness of political competition and subsequently the degree of control enjoyed by the incumbent (cf. Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Morgenbesser 2013; Morse 2012; Schedler 2013).[2] To measure the concept, Levitsky and Way (Levitsky and Way 2010a, p. 368) further operationalize it by creating an indicator per attribute (with subcomponents), adding that a violation of any indicator is sufficient to score the playing field as uneven. In terms of access to resources, an uneven playing field is present if the incumbent makes widespread use of public resources or uses public tools to limit or skew access to private-sector finance. Concerning access to media, the playing field is uneven if state-owned media is the primary source of news and biased towards the incumbent, or if private media is manipulated through various mechanisms. While these operationalizations are clear, the operationalization of the third attribute, access to law, is somewhat problematic. This problem is linked to the first of my three criticisms of Levitsky and Way's conceptualization of the playing field: the partly lacking *conceptual logic*. The other issues are *untested causal relationships* in the conceptualization and the *dichotomization* of a disaggregated concept. I will deal with each in turn below.

2.1 Conceptual logic: redundancy[3]

While the initial discussion of the attributes of the playing field seems to indicate that access to law refers to the relative neutrality of nominally independent dispute resolution institutions (Levitsky and Way 2010a, pp. 10–12), this is not reflected in Levitsky and Way's operationalization, where the indicator focuses on the politicization of state institutions in general (Levitsky and Way 2010a, p. 368). This creates a discrepancy between conceptualization and operationalization, making it difficult to know what Levitsky and Way really mean by access to the law. At the component/indicator level, Levitsky and Way state that access is uneven if "state institutions are widely politicised and deployed frequently by the incumbent" (Levitsky and Way 2010a, p. 368). This overlaps with both the indicators for resources and of media, as these are also fundamentally about incumbent abuse of public institutions to garner

[2] There are some who would disagree, however. In a recent analysis of the playing field in South Africa and Botswana, de Jager and Meintjes (de Jager and Meintjes 2013, p. 249) argue that Levitsky and Way's categories are not comprehensive enough, as the difference in the playing field between these two countries is fundamentally about the African National Congress's (ANC) liberation credentials in the South African case. What de Jager and Meintjes fail to specify, however, is whether the liberation credentials are an unfair advantage in and of themselves, or if it is the potential consequences (such as increased access to public finances) of the liberation credentials that could create an uneven playing field. This highlights the importance of separating the causes and effects of the playing field from the measurement of the concept, and underscores the importance of it being as minimalist as possible for the concept to have any analytical purpose (for a similar argument on measures of democracy, see Munck and Verkuilen 2002, p. 9).

[3] At the level of conceptualization where Levitsky and Way link the playing field to the issue of regime identification, they are guilty of another breach of conceptual logic as they have the playing field as a separate component at the same level as civil liberties, and free and fair elections and as a subcomponent of free and fair elections (l.evitsky and Way 2010a, pp. 366–368). This is an example of conflation (Munck and Verkuilen 2002, p. 13), which is a potentially serious problem not just in a logical but also in an empirical sense. However, since this article is primarily concerned with the playing field as a concept and not how the playing field is linked to the issue of regime, the issue will not be pursued further in this article.

advantages in terms of funding or attention. It is thus an example of *redundancy*: Access to law as defined by Levitsky and Way relates to the same issues of the overarching concept as the two other attributes within the concept (Munck and Verkuilen 2002, p. 13). The consequence is that there should be no instances that violate the criteria for access to resources or media but not access to the law. Yet Levitsky and Way identify several such instances, notably Benin, Botswana and Madagascar between 1990 and 1995, and Botswana in 2008 (Levitsky and Way 2010a, pp. 369–371). As the attribute is operationalized, it does not serve a clear purpose. Had the operationalization been more connected to supposedly neutral arbiters and their conduct, access to law would be clearly distinguishable from the other attributes.

2.2 Untested causal relationships: agency, cause and effect

As noted by Goertz (2006, pp. 54–55), the fact that causal relationships are often central components of concepts can potentially be problematic and they should therefore be both explicitly stated, theoretically well-founded and, if possible, empirically tested. Levitsky and Way include two causal relationships in their definition of the playing field. First, they state that the playing field is "uneven" if and only if "incumbent *abuse* of the state" generates disparities (Levitsky and Way 2010b, p. 57, emphasis added). Here they argue that for the playing field to be uneven, any disparities between incumbent and elite must be a result of incumbent *agency*: The incumbent must intentionally manipulate access to resources, media or the law. However, must unfair disparities always be the result of incumbent abuse? And how do we separate "abuse" from use? These questions should be addressed in greater detail.

I argue that while intent to abuse might be present in most cases, this is not necessarily so. The issue of patronage highlights this. According to Levitsky and Way's analysis, patronage-based machines were one of the most important aspects of the uneven playing field in many competitive authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa (Levitsky and Way 2010a, Chap. 6). However, if the patronage networks were created as a side effect of policies intended to do otherwise—for example policies aimed at boosting employment—they would not qualify as contributing to an uneven playing field according to Levitsky and Way's definition. Botswana is a case in point. While the state-owned Debswana company's monopoly in the diamond industry undoubtedly contributed to an uneven playing field as illustrated by Levitsky and Way (2010a, pp. 255–256), it is hard to prove that the intent of establishing and running such a monopoly was and is to prevent the opposition from effectively mobilizing. The question of agency and intentionality should therefore be analysed and measured to the greatest extent possible, but not necessarily included in the definition and operationalization.

The second causal relationship mentioned and included in the definition is that the playing field is only uneven if the disparities created by incumbent abuse impede the opposition's ability to organize and compete (Levitsky and Way 2010a, p. 368). As it stands, Levitsky and Way's framework is not primarily intended for the purpose of understanding the playing field. Instead it is primarily used for operationalizing a cut-off point between different regime types based on precisely this point. However, while there might be merit to Levitsky and Way's causal claim, this should not in

any way rule out a more thorough focus on and measurement of the playing field *before* investigating its relative impact. If, as Levitsky and Way argue, an uneven playing field is an increasingly important "tool" for autocrats (Levitsky and Way 2010b, p. 57), then it is imperative to investigate the issues involved separately from their origin and especially their impact. Furthermore, it is important to investigate the causal claim and identify where and when the playing field prevents opposition mobilization. It is therefore necessary to separate cause and effect. Some existing studies highlight this. Opalo points out that the 2011 election in Zambia led to a turnover despite "the tilt that he [incumbent President Banda] and his party … had given to the electoral playing field by misusing state resources and vastly outspending the opposition" (Opalo 2012, p. 80). Similarly, while de Jager and Meintjes (2013) find that the playing field is uneven both in Botswana and South Africa, its composition is very different, which in turn has significant effects in terms of its impact on the opposition. Cause and effect should therefore be held as separate as possible.

2.3 Dichotomization: oversimplified measurement of a complex concept

Given that Levitsky and Way are primarily interested in the impact of the playing field for categorical purposes, a dichotomous measure makes sense as it provides a clear cut-off point. However, there are important arguments for a more differentiated measurement of the evenness of the playing field. While it is true that something is either even or uneven, there are clearly different degrees of unevenness, and with events involving people there is almost never perfect evenness. Levitsky and Way themselves acknowledge this as they discuss the "slope"[4] of the playing field (Levitsky and Way 2010b, p. 64). They furthermore describe a total dominance of the playing field in the early 1990s in Zimbabwe, but after the economic downturn in the late 1990s the playing field became much more even (Levitsky and Way 2010a, p. 241). Nevertheless, the playing field is coded as static throughout the entire period, thus hiding temporal variation. De Jager and Meintjes (2013) find the playing field uneven in both South Africa and Botswana, but describe significant variation in this unevenness. A more discriminating and disaggregated measure would therefore allow for more variation across both time and space.

A disaggregated concept furthermore makes it possible to look at the different aspects of the playing field separately or together, depending on the purpose. This does however necessitate an open approach regarding which data is used, who does the coding and what the coding decision is based on. Thus the coding process must be transparent and open, especially as coding decisions involved in measuring an abstract concept such as the playing field will entail some sort of subjective judgement. While such judgements are not inherently unwanted and are often necessary and even productive, they necessitate a very open approach in terms of how judgements are made (Schedler 2012). While Levitsky and Way provide a list of indicators (Levitsky and Way 2010a, p. 368), they are extremely hard to replicate, as they are very broad. They do not provide an explicit list of coders or sources of data. Instead,

[4] Levitsky and Way use the term "slope". To avoid confusion, this framework prefers to use "degrees" to highlight the categorical nature of the framework.

they base their decisions largely on secondary literature and expert opinions, without applying any standardized framework.[5] We are thus left to wonder why Zambia violates the criteria of access to media in 2008 whereas Benin and Mali do not, despite VonDoepp and Young (2013) identifying relatively free private media that all experienced harassment in the period in all three countries.

3 A new framework studying the playing field

Following the discussion above, the playing field is defined as the balance between incumbent and opposition in access to resources, media and the law. The proposed concept is organised as a four-level framework (Goertz 2006; Munck and Verkuilen 2002), with each level (concept—attribute—component—indicator)[6] organised in a hierarchical relationship as illustrated in Table 1. The framework roughly corresponds to Levitsky and Way's framework in two ways: (1) the overall attributes (column 1 in Table 1) discussed above, and (2) which actors that are relevant to study. Given that the playing field in this instance is related to electoral politics, it makes sense that what is relevant is the difference in access between the incumbent and opposition competing in elections.[7] While it might be slightly misleading to lump all opposition parties together, it is analytically useful as it provides a better understanding of the opportunity structure they face.

It is nevertheless important to do something that Levitsky and Way disregard as a result of their focus on the impact of the playing field: specify the different components (column 2 in Table 1) of the attributes of the playing field and clarify the respective indicators (column 3 in Table 1). The point of departure of the components of the framework is that access to resources, media or the state can come from different sources. This means that each component in the framework represents a different possible avenue of access. This focus on different sources allows for an understanding of which parts of the playing field are "closed" to the opposition, and which are open. Previous studies have highlighted that precisely the diversity of the "menu of manipulation" (Schedler 2002) and the interplay between different sources of resources is important to understand the electoral playing field between incumbent and opposition (e.g. Albaugh 2011; Arriola 2013; Lynch and Crawford 2011; Rakner and van de Walle 2009).

[5] The author has contacted Levitsky and Way to ask them about whether they kept any additional records of coding guides and/or overview of sources consulted, but their answer was that the information provided in the book (2010a) is what was used. See Bardall (2015) in this volume for a similar critique.

[6] In Goertz's (Goertz 2006, p. 6) framework, the corresponding levels of the framework are called basic level, secondary level, and indicator/data level. The latter can be seen as a combination of the component and indicator level.

[7] The framework is primarily designed to analyse electoral contests at the national level of politics. In systems with different elections for the executive and legislative, the playing field might plausibly be different in each race. In instances where it is possible to distinguish between these cases, it would be a worthwhile effort. In most cases it would be difficult to separate them though. While the framework is designed to analyse contests at the national level, most of the concepts and indicators could also serve as a point of departure for analysing the playing field in sub-national contests.

Table 1 Attributes, components, indicators and importance criteria for the playing field. (Source: author's own compilation)

Attribute	Component	Indicators
Access to resources	Internal funding	Do both the opposition and incumbent have fair opportunities to recruit fee-paying party members and establish party businesses and income schemes? If not, who is favoured and to what degree?
	Private funding	Are wealthy individuals and businesses allowed to contribute with funds and resources to the political party or candidate of their preference without fear of harassment or of facing harassment? If not, who is favoured and to what degree?
	Public funding	Are the criteria and disbursement for regular public funding of political parties between elections fair? If not, who is favoured and to what degree?
		Are parties allocated public campaign funding fairly and in due time before the election? If not, who is favoured and to what degree?
	Illicit public funding	Are public funds used for partisan purposes in a non-legal fashion? If so, who is favoured and to what degree?
		Are public resources (material, transportation, offices, and employees) used for partisan purposes and functions? If so, who is favoured and to what degree?
		Are public appointments to the bureaucracy based on partisanship? If so, who is favoured and to what degree?
		Are public programs implemented on a partisan basis? If so, who is favoured and to what degree?
	Foreign funding	Are political parties and candidates allowed to raise funds from foreign sources on an equitable basis? If not, who is favoured and to what degree?
		Are political parties and candidates allowed to raise funds from the diaspora on an equitable basis? If not, who is favoured and to what degree?
Access to media	Private media	Is ownership of private media partisan based, and are private media free to publish what they want about both the opposition and the incumbent without censorship or fear of harassment? If not, who is favoured and to what degree?
	Public media	Is access to coverage in public media equal and coverage neutral between incumbent and opposition? If not, who is favoured and to what degree?
	Popular, communal and social media	Is access to communal media and popular media partisan-based? If so, who is favoured and to what degree? Are all political actors allowed to access and use social media? If not, who is favoured and to what degree?
Access to law	EMB	Is the EMB neutral in terms of representation for incumbent and opposition, and does it accept and treat content and complaints fairly from both the incumbent and the opposition? If not who is favoured and to what degree?
	Courts	Are all political parties and candidates allowed to forward their complaints to the courts equally, and are complaints treated in an unbiased fashion and without undue influence by external parties? If not, who is favoured and to what degree?

The indicators that the coders should use to assess the evenness in access to the different components are posed as a set of questions. This is a common way of measuring elements related to complex, composite concepts with regard to electoral quality (e.g. Bland et al. 2013; Elklit and Reynolds 2005; Norris et al. 2013). The coder should code each indicator on a scale from −4 to +4, where −4 is a situation where the indicator totally favours the opposition, 0 symbolizes a relatively even opportunity for both incumbent and opposition, and +4 is a situation where access to the indicator totally favours the incumbent. The intermediate scores of −3, −2, −1, 1, 2,

and 3 refers to a high, moderate and low advantage for the opposition and incumbent respectively.[8] The indicators are then averaged at the component level. For the temporal scope of each unit, the coder should focus on the situation during a full electoral cycle.[9] This means that a score should be assigned based on the situation from the point in time when a national election ends (the result is official and all complaints are settled) and until the next national electoral cycle is complete (the results of a new national election is official and all complaints settled).[10]

However, the coder will not only have to assess the score of the component, but also its importance for the playing field. As highlighted by Bland et al., a common problem with measures that rely on a list of issues that should be assessed is that they often "do not provide a means of weighing the relative importance of each item on the list" (Bland et al. 2013, p. 360). Goertz (2006, p. 46) argues that the issue of weighting is especially crucial for concepts where the different attributes and components are potentially substitutable and vary across space and time, both of which I argue are true for the playing field. While adding an importance weight might seem similar to the impact criteria of Levitsky and Way, it is different because importance refers to whether and what importance the component has in the overall picture of the playing field rather than the impact it has on the competition between the incumbent and opposition. Each coder must therefore assign an "importance score" of 0 (no importance), 0.5 (low importance), 1 (medium importance), or 1.5 (high importance) based on how important the component is deemed to be for the playing field. This is a version of what Goertz (2006, p. 46) calls "weighting of necessary conditions". The component score will then be multiplied with the importance score of that component, thus eliminating the value of any component with little or no importance and increasing the value of any component with high importance. The importance-adjusted component-scores should then be added together and standardized at the component level.[11]

In the following, the components of each attribute are explained and discussed. The discussion of the framework is based on studies of electoral competition in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, I would argue that the attributes of the framework are universal in nature and can therefore serve as a point of departure for studies of the playing field from other locations as well.

3.1 Access to resources

Access to resources is extremely important in the Sub-Saharan African electoral game. Large geographic distances and poor infrastructure combined with a campaign culture of visiting as many people as possible and organising rallies demands large

[8] See Appendix 1 for more thorough instructions on coding, or contact author directly for more exhaustive information.

[9] In situations where executive and legislative elections are not held simultaneously, efforts should be made to measure the playing field separately.

[10] In terms of founding elections, the starting point of the electoral cycle will have to be decided on an individual basis.

[11] The components that are deemed as not important will be left out of the standardization exercise, as they should have no effect on the playing field.

quantities of both material and non-material resources (Saffu 2003, pp. 21–23). On average, incumbents in Africa tend to be well funded, especially in countries where the state plays an important economic role (Butler 2010; Saffu 2003; van de Walle 2003). And with a weak private sector and relatively few instances of institutionalized public funding, opposition parties tend on average to be underresourced (Arriola 2013; Rakner and van de Walle 2009; Randall and Svåsand 2002). Five broad categories of funding sources are particularly important for political parties in the Sub-Saharan African context: internal funding, private funding, public funding, illicit public funding, and foreign funding (Bryan and Baer 2005; Butler 2010; Helle 2011; Saffu 2003).

In terms of internal and private funding, the indicators selected focus on fundraising through small-scale membership contributions as well as wealthy individuals and businesses, all of which have an effect on the Sub-Saharan African context (Bryan and Baer 2005; Butler 2010; Saffu 2003). Despite this, there is still no denying that on average the most important source of revenue for political parties in Africa is the state (Saffu 2003, Bryan and Baer 2005). If there is legal public funding of parties or party campaigns, it is still not necessarily based on fair criteria and implementation (Bryan and Baer 2005; Helle 2011). The indicators on public funding therefore focus on this. In terms of illicit public funding, either abuse of public resources such as staff and infrastructure or direct money flows form public coffers to the ruling party or elite can contribute to an uneven playing field (Helle 2011; Prempeh 2008). Finally, the diaspora, foreign governments and business interests have been found to play a significant role in funding political parties in Sub-Saharan Africa (Bryan and Baer 2005; Burnell and Gerrits 2010; Helle 2011; Levitsky and Way 2010a, p. 249).

3.2 Access to media

In the last 10 years, online media and mobile technology have gradually expanded the variety of sources and availability of media in Sub-Saharan Africa (Wasserman 2011, p. 4). However, access is contingent on social status and place of residence, creating vast differences in the importance of various media sources (Hyden and Okigbo 2002; VonDoepp and Young 2013). Three broad categories of media are important: private, public, and PSC[12] media.

Private media varies significantly in importance and outreach, but has still played a central role in electoral struggles on the continent. Like private funding, access to private media can be uneven, either as a result of ownership structures (Andriantsoa et al. 2005) or through government pressure or harassment that might induce self-censorship and biased reporting (VonDoepp and Young 2013). In terms of public media, demands should be stricter. Public media should in theory represent the interests of the citizens of the state, and provide relatively equitable coverage for all political parties competing in an election. For the playing field to be coded as even in terms of public media, the opportunities of access should be equal both in terms of quantity and quality of coverage in all relevant media platforms. With other types of media, a combination of new technological innovations and public frustration with existing

[12] PSC refers to popular, social, and communal media.

media has fuelled an increasingly vibrant popular and communal media environment in many African countries that uses both new and old technology to reach out to people (Wassermann 2011). Opportunities to access and use alternative media such as communal radio stations, SMS campaigns and mobile services, as well as online and social media should therefore also be equal where relevant.

3.3 Access to law

As mentioned above, this framework focuses on the narrower notion of access to law as access to nominally independent arbiters that affect the playing field. The two prominent institutions here are electoral management bodies (EMBs) and courts. In the case of the former, these can be uneven in their direct or indirect dependence on government, or through skewed access (Bland et al. 2013; Elklit and Reynolds 2005; Lopez-Pintor 2000; Mozaffar 2002). EMBs must thus be neutral in composition, funding, and access; act on all legitimate input despite where the input originates from; and act as a neutral arbiter if conflicts arise.

In cases where the EMB is not the designed arbiter for complaints related to conduct of elections and thus the playing field, the court system usually is (Schedler and Mozaffar 2002, p. 16). Given that courts can be controlled through direct and indirect means (Ginsburg and Moustafa 2008, pp. 14–20; Gloppen et al. 2010), it is essential to develop indicators that investigate the fairness of access to the courts. All relevant parties should have equal possibilities to forward, advocate for and win their cases, and the courts should uphold their role in ensuring that the legal aspects of the playing field remain equal.

3.4 A small note on data

Given the specific nature of the indicators above, the demand on data quality is high. The framework is therefore best suited as a guide for primary data collection. A non-exhaustive list of data collection techniques and sources of data include interviews with key actors, stakeholders and experts; expert and media surveys; media publication data; party accounts; legal evaluations; and public documents and reports. Thorough primary data collection would allow for a triangulation of data to evaluate the composition of the playing field. This could potentially make the framework a valuable tool for election observation missions, political risk analysis and political economy analysis.

Using the framework to analyse the playing field by investigating secondary sources is more difficult, especially across time and space. This is because the framework asks for very specific information that may not be easily accessible. If secondary sources are used, it requires a very rigorous analysis of the variety of sources available. The coding is much more difficult because secondary sources invariably involve some form of subjective evaluation, and the differences found in access between the indicators might be as much about differences of opinion between the researchers as actual differences in access to different sources of the playing field. A triangulation exercise is therefore preferred because it is easier to code cases where plenty of information exists, and where this information is recent. Another option

would be to find indicators that function as proxies for the questions posed in the framework. For example, instead of making an overall assessment of access to private media, a researcher might use social network analysis to calculate the relative closeness of media owners to the incumbent or opposition.

Although there are clear challenges in using secondary data, it is a worthwhile effort, especially as a point of reference given that Levitsky and Way base their analysis on secondary sources. Thus in the following section, the framework is applied to one of Levitsky and Way's cases: Zambia after the MMD came to power in 1991.

4 (Re)coding Zambia under MMD rule

Levitsky and Way (Levitsky and Way 2010a, pp. 370–371) code the playing field in Zambia as static. It is uneven in terms of access to resources, media and the law both during the 1990–1995 period and in 2008. While acknowledging in their empirical analysis that changes did occur in access to the different aspects of the playing field (Levitsky and Way 2010a, pp. 288–291), this is not reflected in their measurement. By applying the framework presented above, a somewhat different scenario emerges. Tables 2–6 in Appendix 2 present the information, the coding decisions and the results of the coding exercise. The coding is based on a review of published literature, including Levitsky and Way's own sources that focus on political competition in Zambia. Empirical information from country reports on Zambia from Freedom House, the US Department of State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, and election-monitoring reports have also been consulted.[13] They highlight clear variations over time in access to resources, media, and the law. Even at the aggregate level, there are changes for every electoral cycle with the exception of access to law from 2001 to 2006 and 2006 to 2008, and media from 2008 to 2011. The changes are described in Fig. 1. A score of 0 constitutes an even playing field, while scores above 0 can be seen as higher access for the incumbent relative to the opposition. A score of 3 would indicate that access largely favours the incumbent.

In Zambia the playing field has moved from providing the incumbent with a clear advantage in the 1996 election, to a much more even (though still unfair) contest in the post-Chiluba period from 2001 onwards. At the aggregate level the changes between electoral cycles have been relatively synchronized. However, while access to media and access to law have become increasingly even over time, access to resources has consistently favoured the incumbent to a large extent. The analysis of the Zambian case thus shows how the framework presented here offers a much more dynamic picture of the playing field than that of Levitsky and Way. It shows not only that the playing field is changing, but also which elements of the playing field are changing and at what level. While the playing field has indeed remained uneven and tilted towards the incumbent in all elections under MMD rule in Zambia, the degree of the tilt has varied considerably.

While it is not within the scope of this article to thoroughly investigate what is driving these changes, scores at the component and indicator level provide at least

[13] See the end of Appendix 2 for a full list of literature reviewed.



Fig. 1 Development of the playing field in Zambia at concept and aggregate levels, 1996–2008. (Source: Coding information and sources can be found in Appendix 2)

some clues that can form the basis for further research. Regarding access to media, it becomes clear that what changed from the 1996 election cycle onwards was not that access to public media became significantly more even, but that there were simply other alternative media channels for the opposition to access and that these became gradually more important. First the presence of private newspapers and community radio stations, and later private broadcasters and new media, made the continued bias of public broadcasters less significant. Thus, while Moyo (2010) might be right in labelling the MMD government "reluctant liberalizers", the fact that several private media outlets with significant outreach did emerge out of the liberalization process in Zambia (Willems 2013, p. 225), has contributed to a more even playing field. While some private outlets, notably *The Post* newspaper after 2006, were biased towards the opposition, most provided relatively balanced political coverage, demonstrating the positive role of neutral media outlets in balancing the playing field.

Access to law slowed over time, as the supposedly "neutral arbiters" (the EMB and the courts) became more substantively neutral. There are several potential reasons for this: increasing professionalization and capacity, a more benevolent incumbent, or that the level of electoral malpractice has decreased over time. These explanations nevertheless support Lindberg's (2009) hypothesis of the democratizing effect of elections over time, as institutions and actors gradually adopt more democratic practices through repetitious processes.[14]

As Fig. 1 shows, access to resources is the attribute of the playing field that remained tilted against the opposition throughout MMD rule. Even in the 2011 elections won by the opposition, the MMD had a massive resource advantage, largely as a result of its creative use of state resources (EUEOM 2011, p. 14). As Pitcher (Pitcher 2012, p. 118) highlights, the MMD abused state resources both for in-campaign and between-campaign purposes throughout its tenure. The lack of access to state funding for other parties meant that opposition parties had to rely on wealthy private indi-

[14] However, as noted by Bogaards (2013), the evidence regarding the overall effect of elections is far more varied than Lindberg's theory predicts.

viduals in order to compete with the financial muscle of the MMD. While available private sector funding never balanced the playing field, the presence of at least some independent private funding, both as a result of liberalization processes and wealthy individuals defecting from the ruling party in the 1990s, meant that the MMD did not succeed in closing access to resources completely (Pitcher 2012, pp. 116–125). This contrasts with Mozambique or Uganda, where the ruling regimes have been able to successfully control funding from private businesses as well as private media to a much larger extent (Helle 2011; Pitcher 2012). Again, this highlights the importance of understanding different sources of access to different aspects of the playing field.

These discussions show the merit of disaggregating a complex concept such as the playing field to understand not only what drives changes in the playing field at the aggregate level but also what drives the changes in its respective attributes. It is especially important given that the underlying causes of changes in the playing field might vary significantly between its different components.

The point about access to resources also highlights why it is so important to separate the playing field as a concept from the impact it has on the opposition. As Hess and Aidoo (Hess and Aidoo 2013, p. 138) have recently argued, in the 2011 elections the Patriotic Front (PF) actually managed to turn the resource advantage of the MMD into an electoral advantage, as the opposition could claim that the government was bought by foreign (mostly Chinese) interests and therefore did not have the best interests of Zambians in mind. Party Leader Michael Sata and the PF also actively encouraged voters to accept bribes offered by the MMD but to vote for the PF instead, as it would put more money in voters' pockets after the elections instead of offering government hand-outs in advance (Helle and Rakner 2012, pp. 10–11). While the abuse of state money clearly made access to resources uneven, the impact it had on the opposition was at the same time partly positive. This was, however, contingent on an intermediate factor: the tactics chosen by the opposition.

This leads to a final note regarding the mapping of the playing field in Zambia: The MMD did not lose power at the point in time when the playing field was most even. Though the differences were not large, the 2006 elections were in many ways fairer than the 2011 elections. However, while Levy Mwanawasa and the MMD won the election in 2006, Rupiah Banda lost in 2011. This corroborates the finding above that the impact of the playing field on not just the opposition but also the outcome of elections is contingent on or subservient to a number of other factors. Opposition parties can and do win when the playing field is uneven, as long as it is able to adapt to the circumstances. As highlighted by Schedler (Schedler 2013, pp. 369–370), the response of the opposition to the uneven playing field might be just as critical for understanding eventual regime change as underlying structural variables and the state of the playing field. It is therefore essential to see the nature of the playing field as simply one of many variables that affect the opposition's ability to mobilize and compete.

5 Studying the playing field: a way forward

The case of Zambia thus highlights three important issues regarding the concept of the playing field. First, the playing field should not be seen as static, as the level of unevenness shifts significantly between electoral cycles. Second, a disaggregated approach to measuring the playing field highlights that there may be different underlying drivers and mechanisms of change involved in the different attributes of the playing field. Third, the slope of the playing field is not necessarily a suitable indicator of the impact it has on the opposition or election outcomes.

The framework put forth and discussed in this paper thus presents a very different reality to the static presentation of the playing field in Zambia made by Levitsky and Way. It highlights the deficiencies of Levitsky and Way's definition and measurement, particularly with respect to the static nature of their measure and their failure to separate the playing field from its impact on the opposition. While the creation of a dichotomous measurement might have been necessary for Levitsky and Way's purpose, it might not serve as the best tool for understanding the playing field. Studies of the playing field or its attributes should thus use caution when applying Levitsky and Way's framework.

If the primary purpose of future studies is to understand the playing field itself, the framework presented here can provide a point of departure. It opens several new interesting avenues of research. First, efforts should be made to use this framework to investigate the causal claims inherent in Levitsky and Way's definition. How important is agency for the emergence or preservation of an uneven playing field? When does an uneven playing field prevent the opposition from mobilizing effectively? Second, further effort needs to focus on how different attributes of the concept act separately and collaboratively. Are the same underlying conditions driving changes in all attributes? Are some combinations of an uneven playing field more unfavourable for fair competition than others? Finally, efforts need to be focused on solving the "big" question: What drives changes in the overall playing field? How can we achieve true "contestability" (Bartolini 1999, p. 457) in a political system? And what level of fairness is fair enough? These are all questions that future applications of this framework should aim to address.

Appendix 1

Directions for how to assign scores on indicators

– 4 = Indicator completely favours the opposition. Opposition has total control over access to this source.
– 3 = Indicator largely favours the opposition. Opposition has good control over access to this source, but the incumbent also enjoys negligible access.
– 2 = Indicator favours the opposition to a medium degree. Opposition has a clear edge over the incumbent in access to this source, but the incumbent also has some access.

– 1 = Indicator slightly favours the opposition. Opposition has a slight edge over the incumbent with regards to access to this source, but the difference is small.
0 = An even playing field. Either both the opposition and the incumbent have little to no access, or access is equal.
1 = Indicator slightly favours the incumbent. Incumbent has a slight edge over the opposition in access to this source, but the difference is small.
2 = Indicator favours the incumbent to a medium degree. Incumbent has a clear edge over the opposition in access to this source, but the opposition also has some access.
3 = Indicator largely favours the incumbent. Incumbent has good control over access to this source, but the opposition also enjoys negligible access.
4 = Indicator completely favours the incumbent. Incumbent has total control over access to this source.

Directions for how to assign importance scores on components

0 = No importance for the playing field. Access to component is non-existent, either as a result of the issue not existing or none of the actors using it.
0.5 = Low importance for the playing field. Access to component is of limited importance for electoral competition.
1 = Medium importance for the playing field. Access to component is important, but is not imperative for electoral competition.
1.5 = High importance for the playing field. Access to the component is critical for electoral competition.

Appendix 2: Using the framework to for measuring the playing field in Zambia under MMD-rule, 1991–2008

Table 2 Indicators for the playing field in Zambia, 1991–1996

Indicator	Score	Basis of coding	Importance
RINTPAR	0	No reports found on denial of right to party membership, or abuse based on party membership. MMD only party competing with significant membership base (Lodge et al. 2002, p. 393). UNIP enjoyed small income from some party businesses established during one-party era, but most of this had been confiscated by state (Kabemba 2004, p. 15)	0
RPRIWEL	1	Wealthy businessmen most important sources of independent funding in Zambia (Lodge et al. 2002, p. 393). Associates of MMD government consistently favoured and business-community firmly behind MMD at the beginning of period. Privatization process favoured associates of ruling party, especially circle surrounding Chiluba who became very rich (van Donge 2008). Some fall-out as several high profile business allies of MMD and ministers left party and government to contest for elections for new parties. New parties largely dependent on personal wealth of party elite or independent businessmen (Ihonvbere 1995, pp. 13-15)	1.5

Table 2 (continued)

Indicator	Score	Basis of coding	Importance
RPUBPAR	–	No public funding of political parties	0
RPUBCAM	–	No campaign funding of political parties	
RILLFUN	3	Some abuse of public office to procure funds through corruption, especially at minister level, used in campaigns (Ihonvbere 1995, pp. 13–15; van Donge 2009). State funds used to conduct campaign and party activities (Le Bas 2011, p. 224; Pitcher 2012, p. 118)	1.5
RILLRES	2	Cabinet ministers and president used official transportation during campaigns (Lodge et al. 2002, p. 393; Rakner 2003, p. 106)	
RILLAPP	2	MMD increased size of government to accommodate supporters (Rakner 2003, p. 104). Patronage prevalent but corresponded with cuts in reach of state (Rakner 2003, pp. 184–185). Offices handed out based on party membership, not merit (Pitcher 2012, p. 118)	
RILLPOL	2	Relief food and heavily subsidized housing provided just before or during campaign (Lodge et al. 2002, p. 393). Fertilizer, maize and development fund handed out in rural areas (Rakner 2003, p. 109)	
RFORGOV	–	No information about importance	–
RFORDIA	–	No information about importance	
MPRIMED	0	Relatively few privately owned newspapers – three newspapers that where to some extent independent of MMD control. Had a relatively balanced cover, but favoured opposition candidates (Banda 1997, pp. 38–58) No significant private broadcasting (Chirwa 1997, p. 42). Legal framework contained threat of President closing media (Banda 1997, p. 11), while the constitution at the same time recognizes press freedom (Banda 1997, p. 17). Legal framework also compromises rights for journalists (Banda 1997, p. 17). MMD sources frequently consulted in reports (Banda 1997, pp. 38–58). An issue of *The Post* banned by the President in early 1996, and several editors arrested. Editors also threatened physically, and journalists harassed (Chirwa 1997, pp. 30–31; Rakner 2003, p. 110)	0.5
MPUBMED	3	Double the coverage for MMD in campaigns (Baylies and Szeftel 1997, p. 123). State owned papers covered MMD to a much larger extent than the opposition (Banda 1997, pp. 27–37). ZNBC broadcast coverage largely focused on Chiluba and MMD (Kasoma 2002, p. 19). Some critical content allowed against MMD on television, but had consequences for persons involved (Banda 1997, p. 5). Content covering opposition was negative or balanced, never positive, both in print and broadcast media (Banda 1997, pp. 27–37; Kasoma 2002, p. 19). Journalists were pressured to report positively about MMD (Phiri 1999, p. 58)	1.5
MPOPCOP	0	Although the opening up of the airwaves in the early 1990s allowed for communal radio, only limited, church-based radio stations emerged in this period (Kasoma 2002, pp. 21-22)	0
MPOPSOC	–	Not applicable in this period	
LEMBNEU	2	EMB appointed and controlled by ruling President, seen as illegitimate (Baylies and Szeftel 1997; Lodge et al. 2002, p. 382). Characterized by both low competence and some bias (Baylies and Szeftel 1997; Banda 1997, p. 2)	1

Table 2 (continued)

Indicator	Score	Basis of coding	Importance
LCOUNEU	1	President could dismiss judges based on incompetence (VonDoepp 2006, pp. 396–397), however, seldom effective, and records of judges appointed show little difference from long-serving judges (Gloppen 2003; VonDoepp 2005). Court much less likely to rule against state if important government actors such as President and Ministers were involved (VonDoepp 2006, p. 395), and generally ruled in favour of government (Gloppen 2003). However, courts did rule against government on important issues such as access to public space and media freedom (Gloppen 2003, pp. 119–120). Bowed to executive pressure on petitions on Presidential elections (Gloppen 2003, pp. 120–121). Ruled for press freedom in several instances, but did not declare controversial law unconstitutional (Chirwa 1997, pp. 34–35; Phiri 1999, p. 56)	1

Component and attribute scores

Internal party funding = not applicable Private funding = (1) × 1.5 = 1.5 Standardized = 1.5 Public funding = not applicable Illicit funding = (3 + 2 + 2 + 2) × 1.5 = 13.5 Standardized = 3.37 Foreign funding = not applicable	***Access to resources = (1.5 + 3.37)/2 = 2.43***
Private media = (0) × 0.5 = 0 Standardized = 0 Public media = (3) × 1.5 = 4.5 Standardized = 4.5 Com., pop. and social media = not applicable	***Access to media = (0 + 4.5)/2 = 2.75***
EMB = (2) × 1 = 2 Standardized = 2 Courts = (1) × 1 = 1 Standardized = 1	***Access to law = (2 + 1)/2 = 1.5***
	The playing field score = (2.43 + 2.75 + 1.5)/3 = 2.23

Table 3 Indicators for the playing field in Zambia, 1996–2001

Indicator	Score	Why	Importance
RINTPAR	0	Most parties competing in elections were relatively new. Exception MMD and UNIP, but membership fees constituted a small part of funding, and even these parties had relatively weak organizations (Rakner and Svåsand 2004, p. 59; Le Bas 2011, p. 227). Party cards cost more to produce than they cost for buyers to buy, and party business was negligible (Kabemba 2004, p. 15). Members and voters typically expected goods in return rather than to contribute (Pitcher 2012, p. 123). UNIP sold off party businesses to fund campaign (Momba 2004, p. 29)	0
RPRIWEL	0	Several opposition leaders were wealthy businessmen (Masoka, Mwila) who had contributed to funding MMD or former MMD-stalwarts (Tembo, Sata, Miyanda) who all brought significant funds to their parties (Burnell 2003, pp. 391–392; Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003, p. 36; Pitcher 2012, p. 123; Rakner 2003). MMD also supported by state-dependent businesses as well as internal party elites who had massively benefitted from privatization processes (Pitcher 2012, pp. 124–135; van Donge 2008). Government threatened those who made efforts to gather support and funding for opposition parties (BDHRL 2001, p. 6)	1.5
RPUBPAR	–	No public funding of political parties	–
RPUBCAM	–	No campaign funding for political parties	

Table 3 (continued)

Indicator	Score	Why	Importance
RILLFUN	4	State resources were used in presidential campaign for ruling party (BDHRL: 2002, p. 11; Carter Centre 2002, p. 28). Party and campaign activities also funded by state funds (Kabemba 2004, p. 16). Massive abuse of state resources (Gould 2006). President had own discretionary fund that could be used (lawfully outside campaign period) for purposes he wanted (Rakner and Svåsand 2004, p. 61)	1.5
RILLRES	4	MMD made use of civil servants, including lower level officials and newly created district officers (Burnell 2003, p. 394; Carter Centre 2002, pp. 27–28; Rakner 2003, pp. 113–115). Ministers, president and vice-president made use of state vehicles for transportation (Carter Centre 2002, p. 28). Party also used departmental staff and telecommunication facilities (Kabemba 2004, p. 27)	
RILLAPP	3	MMD had established civil servant positions that were given to party cadres who used them for party work (Burnell 2003, p. 394; Carter Centre 2002, p. 28). MMD used government appointments to build inclusive patronage alliance (Lindemann 2011)	
RILLPOL	1	MMD created favourable policies for those who supported them financially (Pitcher 2012, p. 124)	
RFORGOV	–	No reports about significance of contributions from foreign sources	0
RFORDIA	–	No reports about significance of contributions from the diaspora	
MPRIMED	–1	Private newspapers, TV stations and radio stations owned by individuals who were not in association with ruling party, many supported opposition (Carter Centre 2002, pp. 29–30). Private media covered all parties, but were markedly more critical of MMD (BDHRL: 2002, p. 8; Mwalongo 2002). Journalists from *The Post* arrested several times when publishing critical reports about regime (Rakner 2003, pp. 199–201). Independent newspapers, radio and TV stations that where consistently targeted and harassed throughout the period and in the build up to the elections (BDHRL 2001, pp. 8–9; Carter Centre 2001, pp. 29–30; FH 1999, 2001)	1
MPUBMED	3	A clear overrepresentation of MMD (Mwalongo 2002). Coverage of MMD was presented as news, whereas coverage of opposition was presented as adverts (Burnell 2003, p. 394; Carter Centre 2001, p. 29; Kabemba 2004, pp. 27–28). Public media prevented from critical reporting of ruling party—practices self-censorship (BDHRL 2002, p. 8; Phiri 1999, p. 58; Kabemba 2004, p. 28). Government media proclaimed MMD-victory while voting was still ongoing (Burnell 2003, p. 394). Presidential debate on day before voting cancelled by ZBC in favour of MMD-related program (van Donge 2008, p. 307). Government dominates broadcasting, and tightened control in run-up to election in 2001 (FH 2002)	1.5
MPOPCOP	–1	By early 2000s the three first independent communal radios were up and running. They were seen as opposition friendly, and communal radio stations that where critical of government were harassed and targeted by the government (Carter Centre 2002, p. 29; Kasoma 2002, p. 289)	0.5
MPOPSOC	–	*The Post* had established a small following of its online paper. State-owned newspapers also had an online presence, but the impact of politics was negligible (BDHRL 2001, p. 9, 2002, p. 8)	

Table 3 (continued)

Indicator	Score	Why	Importance
LEMBNEU	2	Funding and appointment of EMB controlled by government. (Carter Centre 2002, pp. 23–24). Delay of funds led to mismanagement and mistrust—clearly lacked independence. Poor performance in registration exercise (Tordoff and Young 2005, p. 416). It did however strive for more opposition access to media and other smaller issues. Widespread accusations of favouritism towards MMD—also confirmed by courts (BDHRL 2006, p. 7; Carter Centre 2002). Main problem was weakness of EMB, which benefitted ruling party (Kabemba 2004, pp. 33–35)	1
LCOUNEU	1	Executive and legislative had budgetary control of parliament (Gloppen 2003, p. 127). Some evidence of patronage in judiciary (VonDoepp 2005, pp. 292–294). President could dismiss judges based on incompetence and choose new candidates with aid of MMD-controlled parliament (Gloppen 2003, p. 125; VonDoepp 2006, pp. 396–397), however, given that it was end of his term it was less likely to be of consequence (VonDoepp 2005, p. 277). Furthermore, process is very difficult and has multiple veto points (both institutional and external pressure) (Von Doepp 2005, p. 288). Small pool of candidates to select from makes possibilities of appointing "favourable judges" limited (VonDoepp 2005, p. 289). Successful defeat of constitutional reforms that would curb judicial review function of judiciary (VonDoepp 2005, p. 287). Smear campaign by ruling party against the chief justice may have led to him becoming more lenient towards the president (Gloppen 2003, p. 121). Court much less likely to rule against state if important government actors such as the president and ministers are involved (VonDoepp 2006, p. 395). While courts generally favoured the ruling party, the supreme court ruled against the president in key electoral decisions regarding term limit issues, as well as on eligibility for citizenship for former President Kaunda, (VonDoepp 2005, p. 277, 283) and abuse of public resources for electoral purposes (Carter Centre 2002, p. 28). Courts often ruled in favour of opposition with regards to electoral petitions in the 2001 election, especially in parliamentary races, but while critical of performance of EMB as well as abuse of state resources and media, it did not find that irregularities in presidential election were critical for results (BDHRL 2006, p. 7; Gloppen 2003, pp. 120–121; FH 2006)	1.5

Component and attribute scores

Internal party funding = not applicable Private funding = (0)×1.5=0 Standardized = 0 Public funding = not applicable Illicit funding = (4+4+3+1)×1.5=18 Standardized =4.5 Foreign funding = not applicable	***Access to resources = (0+4.5)/2=<u>2.25</u>***
Private media = (–1)×1=–1 Standardized =–1 Public media = (3)×1.5 =4.5 Standardized =4.5 Com., pop. and social media= (–1)×0.5=–0.5 Standardized =–0.5	***Access to media = (–1+4.5–0.5)/3 =<u>1</u>***
EMB = (2)×1=2 Standardized =2 Courts = (1)×1.5=1.5 Standardized =1.5	***Access to law = (2+1.5)/2=1.75***
	The playing field score = (2.25+1+1.75)/3=<u>1.66</u>

Table 4 Indicators for the playing field in Zambia, 2001–2006

Indicator	Score	Why	Importance
RINTPAR	0	While most parties claimed large membership numbers in this period, members contribute little with regards to funding (Momba 2005, p. 28) Party cards cost more to produce than they cost for buyers to buy, and party business was negligible (Kabemba 2004, p. 15). Members and voters typically expected goods in return rather than to contribute (Pitcher 2012, p. 123). Most parties demand contributions from MPs salaries for campaigns of party, which is significant source of income for parties (Momba 2004, p. 29). MMD rebuilt some party structures in this period (Le Bas 2011, p. 229)	0.5
RPRIWEL	0	MMD continued to be supported by state-dependent businesses as well as internal party elites who had massively benefitted from privatization processes, as well as business sector dependent on government contracts. Also prevented opposition-linked businesses from competing on equal terms for access to public contracts and parastatals (Pitcher 2012, pp. 139–142; van Donge 2008). Parties largely dependent on candidates contributing funds to own campaigns, especially in opposition. Opposition linked to business community and former MMD stalwarts (Momba 2005, p. 28)	1.5
RPUBPAR	–	No public funding of political parties	–
RPUBCAM	–	No campaign funding for political parties	
RILLFUN	2	MMD loaned money from parastatals to fund campaigns (Pitcher 2012, pp. 139–140). Continuous reports about use of government funds for party purposes, but less clear evidence (BDHRL 2005, p. 11, 2006, p. 13). However, steps were taken to reduce abuse of office by MMD (COG 2006, p. 23; EUEOM 2006, pp. 18–19; Gould 2006). President had own discretionary fund that could be used (lawfully outside campaign period) for purposes he wanted (Rakner and Svåsand 2004, p. 61)	1.5
RILLRES	3	Continuous reports about use of government resources, particularly transportation and infrastructure, in elections (BDHRL 2005, p. 11, 2006, p. 13; EUEOM 2006, p. 19). Some attempts to limit abuse at minister level (Gould 2006)	
RILLAPP	2	MMD used government appointments to build inclusive patronage alliance (Lindemann 2013). Reports of state officials threatening to fire public employees who votes for opposition and hiring based on party membership (BDHRL 2007, p. 14; EUEOM 2006, pp. 18–19). Extensive use of parastatal system for political purposes (Pitcher 2012, pp. 139–140)	
RILLPOL	3	MMD created favourable policies for those who supported them financially and used fertilizer subsidies in the countryside (Pitcher 2012, pp. 138–142). Districts that voted for MMD got disproportional access to subsidized fertilizer (Mason and Ricker-Gilbert 2013, p. 89). MMD extensively used local development projects, health initiatives, housing and fertilizer policy selective for campaign purposes, particularly in countryside (BDHRL 2006, pp. 13–14; COG 2006, p. 23; EUEOM 2006, pp. 18–19; Larmer and Fraser 2007, p. 633). However, some of these initiatives must also be seen as general policy successes rather than simply election policies (Larmer and Fraser 2007, p. 634)	

Table 4 (continued)

Indicator	Score	Why	Importance
RFORGOV	0	Fundraising from abroad legal. UPND raised some funds from unspecified sources abroad, but hard to determine significance (Momba 2005, p. 29). Some general donor funded programs, and some programs with individual parties, but impact is considered small (Svåsand and Rakner 2011, pp. 1260–1264)	0
RFORDIA	–	No reports about significance of contributions from the diaspora	
MPRIMED	–1	Private media, both radio stations and print media, of increasing importance and routinely criticized government (BDHRL 2003, p. 8, 2004, p. 9, 2006, p. 8). But journalists were frequently harassed and charged with libel by government (BDHRL 2003, pp. 8–9, 2004, p. 9, 2005, pp. 8-9, 2006, pp. 9–10; FH 2006), although MMD-directed attacks on independent newspapers declined in period leading up to election (BDHRL 2007, p. 10; FH 2007). Gradually increasing number and significance of privately owned radio stations that produced government-critical content, but they were often threatened with revoked licenses if they ran stories critical of government (BDHRL 2004, p. 9, 2006, p. 9; Larmer and Fraser 2007, p. 627; FH 2007). Only private TV station closed by government in 2003—new alternatives reopened in 2005-2006 (BDHRL 2004, p. 10, 2006, p. 10, 2007, p. 9). *The Post* newspaper also critical about parts of the opposition (BDHRL 2007, p. 10; Larmer and Fraser 2007, p. 630)	1
MPUBMED	2	MMD and government continued to dominate public media, providing negligible neutral or positive coverage for opposition both between elections and during campaigns, especially with regards to broadcast media. Self-censorship was common (BDHRL 2003, pp. 8–9, 2004, pp. 9–10, 2005, p. 8, 2006, p. 8, 2007, pp. 8–9; COG 2006, pp. 24–25; FH 2005). Gave substantially more coverage to MMD during elections (BDHRL 2007, p. 8; FH 2007). Small increase in opposition access to sponsored programs and debates during campaigns (COG 2006, pp. 24–25; EUEOM 2006, pp. 21-22; FH 2007)	1.5
MPOPCOP	–1	At least three community-based radio stations broadcasted throughout the period, and they and other smaller channels increased outreach significantly. Although nominally independent and critical of government, they faced pressure from MMD officials and where often not allowed to publish political material (Banda 2006; BDHRL 2004, p. 9) Opposition benefited significantly from access to these and private radio stations to spread their appeal (Larmer and Fraser 2007, p. 627)	1
MPOPSOC	0	Government did not restrict access to the internet. Both government-owned media and privately owned media had presence (BDHRL 2004, p. 10, 2006, p. 11)	
LEMBNEU	1	EMB received praise for being less pro-government (FH 2007), better organized elections and increased transparency (EUEOM 2006, p. 12; COG 2006, p. 38; Larmer and Fraser 2007, p. 620), but given a lack of legal framework, capacity and bias it failed to act on resource abuse of MMD (BDHRL 2007, p. 14). It also failed to resolve election disputes in a satisfactory manner (EUEOM 2006, p. 9)	1

Table 4 (continued)

Indicator	Score	Why	Importance
LCOUNEU	1	Executive and legislative had budgetary control of judiciary, and president could dismiss judges based on incompetence and choose new candidates with aid of MMD-controlled parliament (Gloppen 2003, pp. 125–127). Some evidence of patronage and corruption in judiciary (BDHRL 2003, p. 7; VonDoepp 2005, pp. 292–294). In general the courts did not seem averse to ruling against the government on issues related to the playing field such as abuse of funds, and access to media (BDHRL 2003, p. 7, 2004, p. 7, 2005, p. 6, 2007, pp. 7–8). However, courts were much less likely to rule against state if important government actors such as president were involved and in cases where there were clear and decisive interests for ruling party (BDHRL 2004, p. 13, 2005, p. 6; VonDoepp 2006, p. 395). Courts protected opposition candidates on several instances during campaigns (BDHRL 2007, pp. 7–8)	1

Component and attribute scores

Internal party funding = (0)×0.5 = 0 Standardized = 0 Private funding = (0)×1.5 = 0 Standardized = 0 Public funding = not applicable Illicit funding = (2 + 3 + 2 + 3)×1.5 = 15 Standardized = 3.75 Foreign funding = not applicable	***Access to resources = (0 + 0 + 3.75)/3 = <u>1.25</u>***
Private media = (–1)×1 = –1 Standardized = –1 Public media = (2)×1.5 = 3 Standardized = 3 Com., pop. and social media = (– 1 + 0)×1 = –1 Standardized – 0.5	***Access to media = (– 1 + 3–0.5)/3 = <u>0.5</u>***
EMB = (1)×1 = 1 Standardized = 1 Courts = (1)×1 = 1 Standardized = 1	***Access to law = (1 + 1)/2 = 1***
	The playing field score = (1.25 + 0.5 + 1)/3 = <u>0.9</u>

Table 5 Indicators for the playing field in Zambia, 2006-2008

Indicator	Score	Why	Importance
RINTPAR	0	Most parties in Zambia top-down, little time to fundraise for campaign from members (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2010; Resnick 2012). Both PF and MMD had organization to offer handouts during campaign; other opposition parties struggled to have same national presence (Resnick 2012, p. 1366)	0
RPRIWEL	1	Banda backed by wealthy individuals with previous ties to MMD. PF and UPND also with wealthy internal and external supporters, but not to same extent (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2010, pp. 59–60; van Donge 2010, pp. 521–523)	1.5
RPUBPAR	–	No public funding of political parties	0
RPUBCAM	–	No campaign funding for political parties	

Table 5 (continued)

Indicator	Score	Why	Importance
RILLFUN	3	Reports about clear abuse of government funds, especially in presidential election (BDHRL 2008, p. 12, 2009, p. 11; FH 2009; FH 2010). Use of government resources in campaigns (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2010, p. 70). Audit reports highlighting embezzlement in the period (FH 2010)	1.5
RILLRES	3	Reports about use of government airplanes and hospital vehicles in MMD campaign (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2010, p. 70). Government vehicles used extensively in campaign (EISA 2010, p. 15)	
RILLAPP	2	MMD used government appointments to build inclusive patronage alliance (Lindemann 2013). Co-optation of local and traditional leaders (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2010, p. 70)	
RILLPOL	3	Reports about threats of selective use of government programs (BDHRL 2008, p. 12). Big increase in fertilizer subsidies in period before and after election (Mason et al. 2013). Food distributed by acting president in rural areas (EISA 2010, p. 16)	
RFORGOV	–	Some reports about Chinese companies and other mining companies supporting MMD, but not enough information (Rakner 2012; van Donge 2010, p. 523)	0
RFORDIA	–	No reports about significant funding from diaspora	
MPRIMED	–1	Privately owned newspapers and radio stations relatively free to publish and air what they wanted, and played a significant role in urban areas (FH 2009). Generally critical of government (BDHRL 2008, p. 8), and positive towards at least parts of opposition (EISA 2010, p. 15). Both international and local TV and radio stations present but with limited outreach, especially in countryside (BDHRL 2008, p. 8; Murthy and Muzzamil 2010). Several important private radio stations (BDHRL 2009, p. 8). Little harassment of private journalists in period between elections (BDHRL 2008, p. 9). Arrests in relation to opposition-friendly radio broadcasts (BDHRL 2009, p. 8). Clear attempts to bring private media in line or silence them during elections (FH 2009)	1
MPUBMED	3	Self-censorship and direct government influence in public media, which were still the most important media outlets in print and broadcast (BDHRL 2008, pp. 8–9, 2009, pp. 7–8; FH 2008). Explicit threats if they did not publish positive content on Bandah during MMD succession (BDHRL 2009, p. 8). Limited access for opposition to print and broadcast during campaigns (BDHRL 2009, p. 8; EISA 2010, p. 15)	1.5
MPOPCOP	–1	Community radio stations broadcasting as in previous period, but most of them mandated not to broadcast political content (Willems 2013, p. 225). Nevertheless several talk shows with political content and popular participation, and opened up space for opposition (Murthy and Muzzamil 2010, p. 31; Willems 2013)	1
MPOPSOC	0	Few restrictions on social media and internet use, but very limited outreach (BDHRL 2008, p. 9, 2009, p. 9, 2010, p. 11)	
LEMBNEU	1	Elections were relatively well run, but lack of updated voter registry probably favoured the MMD (BDHRL 2009, p. 11; Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2009, p. 70; EISA 2010, p. 13). Generally favourable review of EC in monitoring report (EISA 2010). Little or no attempt to sort out unfairness in playing field and resources (EISA 2010)	1

Table 5 (continued)

Indicator	Score	Why	Importance
LCOUNEU	1	Some abuse of government positions to circumvent judicial procedures, but also several cases where court acted independently of government (BDHRL 2008, p. 7, 2009, p. 6; FH 2008). General increase in judicial independence and competence (FH 2009). Court dismissed petition by PF over election results (BDHRL 2010, p. 13)	1

The death of President Levy Mwanawasa on 19 August 2008 led to new presidential elections on 30 October 2008, which necessitated treatment of the 2006–2008 period as a new electoral cycle. However, given the relatively short timeframe between from the 2006 elections and the lack of parliamentary races, many aspects of the playing field are more likely to remain the same than during a normal electoral cycle. Some issues were of less relevance and importance because of either the short space for preparing for the contest or for the presidential nature of it. This must be taken into consideration when interpreting the results

Component and attribute scores

Internal party funding = not applicable Private funding = (1) × 1.5 = 1.5 Standardized = 1.5 Public funding = not applicable Illicit funding = (3 + 3 + 2 + 3) × 1.5 = 16.5 Standardized = 4.125 Foreign funding = not applicable	***Access to resources = (1.5 + 4.125)/2 = 2.8***
Private media = (− 1) × 1 = 1 Standardized = 1 Public media = (3) × 1.5 = 4.5 Standardized = 4.5 Com., pop. and social media = (− 1 + 0) × 1 = − 1 Standardized = − 0.5	***Access to media = (− 1 + 4.5 − 0.5)/3 = 1***
EMB = (1) × 1 = 1 Standardized = 1 Courts = (1) × 1 = 1 Standardized = 1	***Access to law = (1 + 1)/2 = 1***
	The playing field score = (2.8 + 1 + 1)/3 = 1.6

Table 6 Indicators for the playing field in Zambia, 2008-2011

Indicator	Score	Why	Importance
RINTPAR	0	Parties report that internal contributions and membership fees are a source of income, but opposition complains that it is not sufficient to maintain party organization (COG 2011, p. 17). Parties generally free to operate and fundraise without restrictions (BDHRL 2011, p. 13). Top-heavy parties and little membership participation (Simutanyi 2013, p. 17). PF control over local councils contributed to increased evenness in quality and size of party organizations (Simutanyi 2013, p. 22)	0.5
RPRIWEL	1	Top leadership in MMD, UPND and PF were at this time either wealthy businessmen or former leaders in government, contributing heavily to the party (Simutanyi 2013, p. 17). Private businessmen typically supported both incumbent and PF, as the election was expected to be close, but typically the MMD was supported to a larger degree (Media reports and interview)	1.5
RPUBPAR	–	No public funding of political parties	0
RPUBCAM	–	No campaign funding for political parties	

Table 6 (continued)

Indicator	Score	Why	Importance
RILLFUN	3	Misuse of government resources in by-elections throughout period (BDHRL 2010, p. 14, 2011, pp. 17–18). Advantage of incumbency exploited by president and MMD in election (BDHRL 2012, p. 13; COG 2011, p. 16; EUEOM 2011, p. 14). Contributed to the common perception that the MMD had the most financial leverage in electoral history in Zambia at the time (COG 2011, p. 17)	1.5
RILLRES	3	Use of state infrastructure and resources, including different forms of transportation for candidates and for supporters to attend rallies, both in by-elections throughout period and in national elections (BDHRL 2010, p. 14; BDHRL 2011, p. 18; COG 2011, p. 17; EUEOM 2011, p. 14)	
RILLAPP	3	Partisan behaviour of state employees. Provincial secretaries and district representatives campaigned on behalf of ruling party, showing their partisan loyalty (EUEOM 2011, p. 14). Growing sense of partisan and ethnic employment (Simutanyi 2013, p. 18)	
RILLPOL	3	President timed inauguration of new state projects to coincide with campaign period and used them for campaign purposes (EUEOM 2011, p. 14). Maize relief program used for partisan and campaign purposes (EUEOM 2011, p. 14)	
RFORGOV	1	China accused of supporting MMD, and Banda used inauguration of Chinese infrastructure projects for campaign purposes (Hess and Aidoo 2013, pp. 137–138). Sources in political parties also claimed Chinese state and non-state actors were contributing funds, both to incumbent and opposition (Rakner 2012, p. 10)	0
RFORDIA	–	No information found	
MPRIMED	0	Radio still most important media (especially in rural areas), followed by TV and print (EUEOM 2011, p. 16). Some attempts by government to influence private media (BDHRL 2010, p. 9, 2012, p. 9). Private media generally more critical of government, in turn threatened, charged and attacked by incumbent (BDHRL 2010, pp. 9–10, 2011, pp. 12–13, 2012, pp. 8–9). Private media editors quite frequently charged in court (BDHRL 2010, p. 10, 2011, p. 13) Active threats of license revocations (BDHRL 2010, p. 11, 2011, p. 14). One government-critical radio station closed for inciting violence (BDHRL 2012, p. 10). Journalist in private media subject to surveillance (BDHRL 2011, p. 11, 2012, pp. 8–9). Private broadcasting media favoured opposition slightly throughout campaigns, though also covered the incumbent (EUEOM 2011, pp. 16–17). Broadcast media relatively balanced (COG 2011, p. 20). Print media very partisan, either for MMD or PF. *The Post* very pro-PF (COG 2011, p. 20; EUEOM 2011, p. 17)	1.5
MPUBMED	3	Access to national broadcasters restricted for opposition (BDHRL 2010, p. 10, 2011, p. 13, 2012, pp. 8–9). Government controlled and influenced both directly and through self-censorship (BDHRL 2010, p. 10, 2011, pp. 12–13, 2012, pp. 9–10). ZNBC admitted censoring political content in public programs (Willems 2013, p. 228). State media dominated by MMD and the President, MMD received 37% of all campaign coverage relative to 4–8% by PF (EUEOM 2011, p. 16). ZNBC openly promoted MMD (COG 2011, p. 20; EUEOM 2011, p. 16). Opposition invited to debates, but declined due to perceived bias (EUEOM 2011, p. 16)	1.5

Table 6 (continued)

Indicator	Score	Why	Importance
MPOPCOP	0	Community radio stations of relevance as over 10% of the population regularly listened to some of the major community stations (Murthy and Muzammil 2010, p. 31). Limited geographical coverage for single station and restrictions on political content, total government control over licensing (Willems 2013, p. 225)	0.5
MPOPSOC	0	In 2008, only about 5.5% of all country inhabitants used internet (BDHRL 2010, p. 11). While not restricting access, the government monitored critical internet outlets and sometimes acted on this information (BDHRL 2010, p. 11). Social media gradually increased in importance with regard to communication between media and population (Willems 2013, p. 226). Editor of online newspapers investigated and charged (BDHRL 2011, p. 13). Towards end of period, reports that government monitoring was non-existent (BDHRL 2012, p. 10). All parties used mobile and internet technology in campaign (COG 2011, p. 16)	
LEMBNEU	0	EC's administration of election seen as "impartial" by EUEOM (EUEOM 2011, p. 9). While initially faced with criticism regarding its lack of impartiality, the EC implemented confidence-building measures in this period that were somewhat effective (EUEOM 2011, p. 10). Appointments still controlled by incumbent, but more debated (COG 2011, p. 11; EUEOM 2011, p. 10). Voter registry updated to the satisfaction of most players (EUEOM 2011, p. 11). EC failed to act on MMD's breach of code of conduct (COG 2011, p. 13). Professionalization of staff in this period, hiring based on merit (COG 2011, p. 14)	1
LCOUNEU	1	President appointed judges (BDHRL 2011, p. 10). Incumbent did not consistently respect judicial independence and officials used their offices to circumvent judicial proceedings (BDHRL 2010, p. 6, 2011, p. 9, 2012, p. 7) However, court did rule against government, including ruling for PF leader Sata (BDHRL 2010, pp. 6–7, 2011, p. 9). Court played relatively neutral role in complaints made during campaign, though perhaps with slight incumbent bias (EUEOM 2011, p. 19). Court was active in electoral petitions in aftermath of election (EUEOM 2011, p. 20). Court ruled in favour of then-opposition PF in many petitions after election (BDHRL 2013, pp. 13–14)	1

Component and attribute scores

Internal party funding = (0) × 1.5 = 0 Standardized = 0 Private funding = (1) × 1.5 = 1.5 Standardized = 1.5 Public funding = not applicable Illicit funding = (3 + 3 + 3 + 3) × 1.5 = 18 Standardized = 4.5 Foreign funding = not applicable	***Access to resources = (0 + 1.5 + 4.5)/3 = 2***
Private media = (– 1) × 1.5 = 1.5 Standardized = 0 Public media = (3) × 1.5 = 4.5 Standardized = 4.5 Com., pop. and social media = (0+0) × 1 = 0 Standardized = 0	***Access to media = (– 1.5 + 4.5 + 0)/3 = 1***
EMB = (0) × 1 = 0 Standardized = 0 Courts = (1) × 1 = 1 Standardized = 1	***Access to law = (0 + 1)/2 = 0.5***
	The playing field score = (2 + 1 + 0.5)/3 = 1.16

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Leverage and linkage: how regionalism shapes regime dynamics in Africa

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Abstract Differences in African regime dynamics are clustered in sub-regions and thus might not be driven entirely by domestic variables such as the coercive capacity of states or the cohesion of ruling parties. The main argument of the paper is that leverage by regional organisations and by regional hegemons as well as specific types of regional linkages matter for domestic political developments. There is huge variation in terms of the competencies of regional organisations to influence democratisation processes, a varying availability of hegemons to enforce regional democratic standards and varying degrees of leverage vis-à-vis member states, which partly explain the regional patterns of regime dynamics. In the African context regional linkage is important in explaining how leverage is used by regional organisations and hegemons.

Keywords Regionalism · Sub-Saharan Africa · Regional organisations · Democratisation · Leverage · Linkage · SADC · ECOWAS

Introduction

There is a large consensus that international factors have played an important role in influencing political reform in Sub-Saharan Africa over the last two decades. Economic dependence had created a legacy of heavy influence by international actors on policy-making, and when liberalisation started in the early 1990s many observers quickly pointed to structural adjustment, donor conditionalities and the fall of communist rule in Eastern Europe as obvious triggers of the political reforms initiated in

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nearly all African countries. When the trajectories of these reform processes began to vary quite widely, this was interpreted in terms of the different positions of states in the international system (Ihonvbere 1996), varying policies of donors (Carothers 2002; Robinson 1995), or by more structural domestic factors such as the level of economic development or previous experiences with political competition (Bratton and van de Walle 1997).

Comparative research on the international side of democratisation only developed alongside the process of regime change in Eastern Europe (Pridham 1994; Schmitter 1996; Whitehead 1996). International relations (IR) scholars were slower to initiate research on the role of the international system in domestic political reforms (Haggard and Maxfield 1996; Stallings 1995). The main importance of the seminal study by Levitsky and Way (2010) was to aggregate different aspects of the international side of regime change into one systematic framework and explain on this basis how various types of integration into the international system shaped different trajectories of regimes worldwide.

However, in Levitsky and Way's empirical analysis, Sub-Saharan Africa proved quite homogeneous with regard to integration into the international system: All states share low linkage to the West and nearly all share high leverage of the West; thus differences in regime dynamics between African states have to be explained largely by domestic variables, i.e. organisational power. Interestingly, three of Levitsky and Way's cases, namely Benin, Mali and Ghana, made the transition to democracy against all odds, i.e. within the given theoretical model, the combination of international and domestic influences should preclude this. But Benin, Mali and Ghana are situated in the same region, which raises the question of whether integration into a regional system of linkage and leverage might shed light on the actual differences between African cases.

The main argument developed in this paper thus refers to the emergence of new regional forms of linkage and leverage in Sub-Saharan Africa that are beginning to impact national regime dynamics. I will more specifically investigate the extent to which leverage by regional organisations and regional hegemons, as well as specific types of regional linkages, have mattered for domestic political developments. I will show that large variation exists in terms of the competencies of regional organisations to influence democratisation processes, that there is a varying availability of hegemons to enforce regional democratic standards and varying degrees of leverage vis-à-vis member states, and that this results in regional patterns of regime dynamics. In contrast to Levitsky and Way, regional linkage will not be considered a separate causal mechanism but an important factor in explaining how leverage is used by regional organisations and hegemons.

The paper thus engages with a more recent strand of literature that is interested in the relationship between regionalism and democratisation. The role of the European Union in promoting the democratisation of potential member states has attracted most interest, but research has gone beyond an analysis of EU policies and instruments (Donno 2010; Keohane et al. 2009; Pevehouse 2002, 2005) in the direction of a comparative assessment of democracy promotion and enforcement of regional organisations (Börzel et al. 2013; Collins 2010; Kelley 2009; Ulfelder 2008; van der Vleuten and Hoffmann 2010).

The paper begins by mapping regime dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa since the 1990s, revealing interesting regional patterns in these dynamics. I cover the entire universe of African cases and do not limit my analysis to the 14 cases selected by Levitsky and Way, as I assume mechanisms of regional leverage and linkage will matter not only for those regimes that were considered competitive authoritarian in the mid-1990s. The third section uses the two concepts of linkage and leverage and adapts Levitsky and Way's framework to the regional level. I then proceed with an empirical analysis of the leverage and linkage mechanism in four African regions to verify the plausibility of the framework. Here I discuss four country cases that highlight both the variance in regional institutions and their differing impact on domestic regime dynamics.

1 Regional patterns of regime dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa

While democracy remains a contested term in Africa (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Ihonvbere 1996), my analysis considers democracy the creation of a polyarchic order (Dahl 1971) with a focus on the procedures that allow citizens to govern themselves, i.e. to choose and remove leaders. This requires an inclusive form of suffrage, a genuinely competitive election, and the civil liberties that guarantee citizens free access to obtain political information and to opt for political associations of their choice. Empirical assessments of political regimes such as Freedom House or Polity IV have also used these criteria to distinguish between democratic and non-democratic countries (Bogaards 2009).

Most analyses of African democratisation processes agree in that they consider the majority of regimes to be hybrid, a limited version of democracy, or a competitive sub-type of authoritarianism (Hyden 2006; Lynch and Crawford 2011; Whitfield and Mustapha 2009). One of Levitsky and Way's contributions to this debate was to introduce the new concept of competitive authoritarianism (CA). They assumed that, contrary to the self-understanding of many regimes in Africa and elsewhere, these regimes had basically maintained a predominantly authoritarian nature, as incumbents had abused the state by committing electoral fraud, by violating civil liberties, or by hindering the emergence of an even playing field.

On the basis of this definition, the authors coded a total of 14 African states as competitive authoritarian for the 1989–1995 phase. Levitsky and Way's book focuses primarily on explaining the different trajectories of 33 CA regimes worldwide in the 1995–2010 period. They therefore neither exclude the scenario of countries developing to CA after 1995 nor a regime change away from CA. According to the authors, the three West African countries of Benin, Ghana and Mali made a transition to democracy by 2010. Other countries maintained stable or unstable forms of authoritarian rule. Table 1 gives an overview of how all Sub-Saharan African regimes should be classified by 2013.

While the number of democracies has increased over the last two decades, CA remains (in its various manifestations) the dominant regime type in Africa. This means that a number of formerly hegemonic or closed types of authoritarian regimes have liberalised. There is also a constant group of countries that resist political liber-

Table 1 Competitive authoritarian and other regimes in Africa, 1989–1995 and 2013

	West Africa	Central Africa	East Africa	Southern Africa
Democracies	Cape Verde ↑ **Benin** ↑ **Ghana**↑ **Senegal**↑	Sao Tomé and Principe↑		Lesotho ↑ Mauritius Namibia South Africa
Competitive Authoritarianism	Burkina Faso ↑ Côte d'Ivoire ↑ Guinea ↑ Liberia ↑ **Mali** Niger ↑ Nigeria ↑ Sierra Leone↑ Togo ↑		**Kenya** **Tanzania** Burundi ↑ Uganda ↑	**Botswana** Comoros ↑ **Madagascar** **Malawi** **Mozambique** **Zambia** **Zimbabwe** Seychelles
Full Authoritarianism	Gambia	**Cameroon** ↓ **Gabon** ↓ Chad Congo Equatorial Guinea	Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia Rwanda Sudan	Angola Swaziland
State Collapse	Guinea Bissau	Central African Republic ↓ DR Congo	Somalia	

Competitive authoritarian regimes (1990–1995) according to Levitsky and Way (2010) are marked in bold. As Levitsky and Way's coding ended in 2008, subsequent regime developments have been taken into account. Mali has been recoded as a(n) (electoral) democracy following the 2013 elections. Using the coding rules of Levitsky and Way (2010, pp. 365 ff.), Lesotho and Seychelles were re-coded as CA in 1990–1995 by the author. Cameroon and Gabon were considered fully authoritarian in 2013, as the competitiveness of elections further decreased significantly. In the many cases that have turned into CA, the criteria of Levitsky and Way (2010, p. 365) for a fully authoritarian regime are no longer met (routine exclusion of major opposition, large-scale falsification of results, and severe repression of major civic and opposition groups), but due to continuous problems with an uneven playing field these countries did not qualify as democracies at the end of 2013. My own coding was based on data by Freedom House, Polity IV, and various issues of Africa Research Bulletin, Political and Cultural Series. Please note that the regime type 'democracy' includes both 'liberal' and 'electoral' democracies, but according to Levitsky and Way (2010, p 368) it includes only countries that have experienced three consecutive terms of democracy. Arrows indicate regime developments between 1990–1995 and 2013.

alisation and in some cases (such as Cameroon or Gabon) have seen a re-hegemonisation of the political process by former single parties.[1]

Interesting regional patterns are emerging. Sub-Saharan Africa is divided into four broader sub-regions that reflect distinct geographical and cultural areas, and have gained importance throughout the last two decades as the African Union (AU) has promoted the strengthening of regional organisations in each of these sub-regions with broader political and economic objectives. The resulting regions are therefore to some extent the products of political engineering and are socially constructed (de Lombaerde et al. 2010; Hurrell 1995). All 15 West African states are members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), all states in Southern Africa are represented in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and all Central African states are represented in the Economic Community of Central

[1] For a more detailed account of the different trajectories of African regimes cf. Bogaards (2013).

African States (ECCAS). Only in East Africa do two rival organisations exist, the East African Community (EAC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), each with a slightly different vocation.[2]

Important differences can be observed by looking at regime dynamics from such a sub-regional perspective. A core of democracies developed and survived in both Western and Southern Africa. In these two regions the remaining states are competitive authoritarian, and have thus accepted the principles of political competition and elected government. In East Africa four of the five EAC member states are competitive authoritarian regimes, while the remaining states are fully authoritarian. Only in Central Africa has authoritarianism remained the norm and the prospects for more competitive political systems grim.[3] Adhering to the original group of 14 competitive authoritarian regimes as identified by Levitsky and Way (marked as bold in Table 1), the regional difference in trajectories becomes even greater: All West African CAs democratised, while CAs in Eastern and Southern Africa remained competitive authoritarian; the CAs in Central Africa are the only 2 of the total 14 cases that returned to full authoritarianism.

2 Towards a model of leverage and linkage at the regional level

2.1 Western leverage and linkage

Levitsky and Way hypothesise two main external variables, leverage and linkage. Leverage is "governments' vulnerability to external democratising pressure" and can be assessed by looking at a regime's bargaining power vis-à-vis the West, or their ability to avoid Western action aimed at punishing abuse or encouraging political liberalisation, and by looking at the potential impact (in terms of economic health or security) of Western punitive action toward target states (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 40–41). Linkage is defined as "the density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organisational) and cross-border flows (of capital, goods and services, people and information) among particular countries and the United States, the EU (and pre-2004 EU members), and Western-dominated multilateral institutions" (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 43). Levitsky and Way's core hypothesis is that the more intense these ties, the greater the likelihood of sustained forms of democratic rule.

The leverage and linkage framework builds on previous research from comparativists and IR scholars pondering the proper conceptualisation of the international side of regime change (Pridham 1991; Stallings 1992). Levitsky and Way take a rather structuralist position, i.e. they assume the relevance of the international context can be reduced to a combination of the position of a country in the international system and the degree of Westernisation of that country's society and economy. This is a bold view because many observers of African politics would question the assumption

[2] For more contingent political reasons some countries have overlapping memberships and belong to more than one organization (Herbst 2007).

[3] The island state of Sao Tomé and Principe is much closer politically and geographically to Southern Africa, and has remained an outsider within ECCAS.

that dependence on Western governments and actors generally translates into a pro-democratic impact on the ground.

According to the empirical assessment of the authors, Western leverage on African CAs was generally very high (except for the regimes protected by *la Françafrique*) while linkage was generally low.[4] As African states are poor, donors could potentially use this leverage to push directly for democratic reforms. The average dependency of African states on Official Development Assistance (ODA) is very high, which could explain why so many African states have apparently been ready to transform into a variety of hybrid regimes over the last 20 years, a step considered sufficient by many donors, and which allows incumbents to remain in power (Peiffer and Englebert 2012). However, this high dependency explains neither further variance among these regimes nor the dynamics during the last 20 years (with the structural position of African states remaining quite stable).[5]

2.2 Leverage at the regional level

While Levitsky and Way refer exclusively to Western donors, there is no reason why the proposed mechanisms should not work with other external actors as well (for similar reasoning see Tolstrup 2012, p. 721). Regional leverage would then be measured via a) regimes' bargaining power vis-à-vis the regional organisation or regional hegemon, or their ability to avoid regional action aimed at punishing abuse or encouraging political liberalisation; and b) the potential impact (in terms of economic health or security) of regional punitive action on target states.

Whether regional arrangements can indeed exert such leverage depends in the first place on the legal mandate of the organisation dealing with the domestic politics of member states, as well as the range of activities available to effectively reward or punish behaviour of member state elites. Diplomatic pressures, suspension of membership, and resulting regional isolation can help to delegitimise an authoritarian regime at home. If regional peers and institutional partners treat the regime as a pariah state, some influence on public and elite perceptions of the regime within this state should be expected (Pevehouse 2002). Ultimately, regional arrangements may have legal norms that entitle them to intervene with military means to defend humanitarian principles or the constitutional rule in the wake of military and other coups d'état. Below the level of military enforcement other regional sanctions might also involve costs or the loss of benefits linked to membership in a regional arrangement. Suspension from participation might create problems for the export of goods within regional integration schemes.

[4] It is strange that one of the four components measuring linkage (of inter alia African and Asian states) to the West is "membership in the Organization of American states or potential membership in the EU" (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 375). It is no surprise, then, that all states with high linkage belong to these two areas (with the single exception of Taiwan).

[5] Western leverage is actually a poor explanation for democratization, because in Africa much of Western leverage was rather directed towards strengthening supposedly apolitical concepts of good governance, and technocratic and modernising forms of authoritarian rule, as seen in the strong support for the regimes of Ethiopia, Uganda and Rwanda (Booth 2011; Kelsall 2013).

While few regional organisations outside Europe distribute direct material benefits such as ODA, they often serve as crucial coordinating mechanisms used by donors for financing regional infrastructure projects or for launching initiatives of a regional nature (Bach 2004). The regional arrangement can thus create economic difficulties for the regime if pressure from the regional body includes the suspension of trade and financial benefits, and if the country has few alternative trade options.

As all African regional organisations lack a supra-national agency and a strong bureaucracy, one might hypothesise that the regional organisation's leverage will also depend on membership of a hegemonic state that has the capacity to make the scenario of regional action credible. In other words, it is unlikely, at least in the African context, that a strong regional mandate alone will be sufficient to shape regime developments in member states. With regard to the role of hegemonic states I follow the argument by Coleman (2007) and Pedersen (2002) that hegemonic states might indeed prefer to use regional arrangements to pursue their foreign policy interests within their regions. Hegemony will be assessed by looking at the relative power dominance of states vis-à-vis other member states within the region and some acceptance of this hegemony by the regional environment (Buzan and Waever 2003; Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012). In the empirical analysis I will attempt to assess the vulnerability of African states toward regional leverage by looking first at the existence of regional organisations and their mandates, and then at the role of regional hegemons.

2.3 Linkage: emerging transnational coalitions and socialisation

The concept of linkage has been discussed with broader understandings in the democratisation literature both with regard to transnational coalitions (Schmitz 2006) and the socialisation of elites through membership or the prospect of membership (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2011). According to Levitsky and Way, linkage is supposed to contribute to democratisation in three ways: by heightening the international reverberation caused by autocratic abuse, by creating domestic constituencies for norm-abiding behaviour, and by reshaping the domestic distribution of power and resources (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 43–44).

The specific nature of the public sphere in African countries is likely to minimise the relevance of the first causal mechanism: media attention for autocratic abuse in one African country is unlikely to trigger regional action (Bussiek 2008). Regional linkage might, however, indeed create domestic constituencies for norm-abiding behaviour and reshape domestic power balance through the socialising effects of the rules and norms embodied within the regional organisation that impact on key individuals and modify their preferences. These individuals and groups (such as the military) might thus internalise democracy through their regular involvement in diplomatic or joint military activities of the regional arrangements.

The neo-functionalist tradition of regional integration has maintained since the 1960s that regional arrangements are the ideal framework for such linkage processes to occur. Neo-functionalists were ultimately interested in the role of transnational coalitions in strengthening the project of regional integration (Haas 1958). There is no reason to doubt that regional arrangements provide an institutional



Fig. 1 Regional leverage and linkage. (Source: author's own compilation)

framework where many diplomatic and political linkages are facilitated or directly supported. The extent to which these linkages are actually decisive for shaping processes of regime change will depend on the character of the regional arrangements and networks.

In contrast to Levitsky and Way's concern with the intensity of linkages, we will concentrate on differences in the type of linkages, both for methodological and theoretical reasons. A first assumption—in line with the literature quoted above—is that linkages among geographically proximate member states of a given region are strong. Empirical assessment of remaining variation is, however, impossible due to a lack of data collection for such a broad array of linkages at the regional level within Africa. Theoretically, it cannot be assumed that regional organisations are per se 'democratic' actors. Thus a 'stronger' regional linkage will not directly increase the pressure to democratise. Similar to Pevehouse (2002), who used the 'democratic density' of regional organisations as an explanatory variable, one hypothesis may be that the effects of regional linkage on regime dynamics of member states will vary with the norms that prevail among the elites in the respective regional context. Thus depending on the political culture of state elites, the existing regional linkages may or may not strengthen norm-abiding behaviour.[6]

I finally assume that these regional linkages interact with regional leverage. This direct relationship has already been emphasised by studies of EU enlargement (Checkel 2007; Kelley 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). In the context of regionalism, linkage and leverage should be conceptualised as different elements of one causal mechanism (cf. Fig. 1). Leverage is of prime importance at the regional level. Without a strong mandate of regional organisations and strong hegemons, there will be fewer transnational regional linkages in the political and economic sphere and no framework in place to make socialisation come about. Regional linkage, in other words, does not create a separate causal pathway to regime change but reinforces and further shapes regional leverage.

[6] For a similar argument about state elites' political culture cf. Taylor and Williams (2008).

3 Mandates and hegemons

Despite the renewed interest in a comparative analysis of regionalism, no index exists that captures the degree of legalisation of democratic norms within regional organisations. I must therefore look at the evolution of standards and legal mandates for each of the organisations.

3.1 ECOWAS

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) did not include political integration as a main objective of the organisation upon its foundation in 1975. Nevertheless, ECOWAS did become active in the fields of conflict management and military intervention for the first time in the early 1990s in Liberia with the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) Operation. With the 'political principles' of 1991 ECOWAS members committed themselves to the promotion and consolidation of democratic systems of government. The commitment to democracy in the modified 1993 ECOWAS treaty served to legally entitle member states to plan and implement the second military intervention in Sierra Leone in 1997 and to condemn the military coups in Gambia, Niger and the Ivory Coast (Adebajo 2004; Gandois 2009; Hartmann 2013).

The importance of democratic rule within the organisation increased with the *Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance* in 2001, which formally established explicit democratic requirements for member states: rule of law with autonomy for parliament and judiciary, free and fair elections and political participation, civilian supremacy over military forces, and civil liberties. ECOWAS also committed itself to "zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means" (ECOWAS 2001). The ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council was created in 1999 with the task of deciding on military intervention in member states "in the event of an overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government" (ECOWAS 1999, article 25). Both the 1999 and 2001 Protocols have also provided ECOWAS the possibility to engage in any other activities it deems necessary to promote or defend democracy and constitutional rule in member states.

Thus with the 2001 Protocol, ECOWAS had a robust mandate to exercise leverage on member states. Yet the ECOWAS Commission lacked the legal and actual capacity to act on its own. It therefore had to rely on member state commitment. The supreme decision-making powers of ECOWAS are concentrated in the Council of Heads of State and Government. Nigerian membership also provides ECOWAS with a hegemonic state that possesses the military muscle to enforce such standards. Without Nigerian military support and financial resources, few ECOWAS-specific policies and activities could be exercised aside from electoral observation and diplomatic missions (Obi 2008). Nigerian-backed ECOWAS action in Sierra Leone in 1998 was the first African military intervention for the restoration of democracy.

3.2 SADC

In contrast to ECOWAS, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) had a political mandate right from its foundation in 1992. The SADC Treaty and the accompanying Windhoek Declaration affirmed a set of political principles and a code of conduct for intra-regional relations. According to one of the five fundamental principles, human rights, democracy, and rule of law must be respected comprehensively. As mechanisms for the implementation or enforcement of these principles are lacking, the principles have to be seen as political commitments and not as binding rules. Still, in contrast to ECOWAS, SADC was established with the explicit objective of building common political values, systems, and institutions (Gandois 2009; Nathan 2012; Oosthuizen 2006; Van der Vleuten and Hulse 2014).

The decision-making process in SADC is dominated by the summit of the Heads of State and Government. A 2001 reform of SADC institutions included an agreement on a Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, which lists 12 areas of cooperation, among which figure the promotion and development of "democratic institutions and practices within the territories of State Parties" (SADC 2001). According to the first Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SIPO) formulated in 2004, member states need to fulfil democratic criteria. The consolidation of democracy and good governance is hence to be obtained by inter alia "establishing common electoral standards in the region, including a code of electoral conduct; promoting the principles of democracy and good governance; encouraging political parties to accept the outcome of elections held in accordance with both the African Union and the SADC Electoral Standards; …by strengthening Members States' judicial systems" (SADC 2004). SIPO, however, has neither the legal quality of the ECOWAS protocols nor a sufficiently detailed definition of the constitutive principles of democracy and good governance.

SADC has a clear (but less detailed) democratic mandate as well as a democratic hegemon and should thus be able to exercise considerable democratising leverage. South Africa's democratic credentials are beyond doubt and the potential dominance of South Africa in comparison to the other SADC members is as important as Nigeria's dominance in ECOWAS. The SADC Secretariat, on the other hand, is weaker than its counterpart in ECOWAS (Van der Vleuten and Hulse 2014).

3.3 EAC and IGAD

As already noted above, several regional organisations exist in Eastern Africa. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was created in 1986 to coordinate the efforts of six states in the Horn of Africa in combating desertification and promoting efforts to mitigate the effects of drought. IGAD brings together Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Uganda, and (since 2011) South Sudan. The organisation has been involved in conflict management since 1994, when Kenyan President Moi used the IGAD framework to initiate negotiations during the Sudanese civil war. In 1995 the organisation's mandate was enlarged to encompass economic as well as political issues. In reformulating the objectives of the organisation, an official commitment was made to promote peace and stability in the sub-region but

no mention made of the promotion of democracy, constitutional rule, or governance. The small secretariat assists member states in launching regional projects but the organisation has no mandate to deal with domestic issues in member states. IGAD has been marked by rivalry between Kenya and Ethiopia over political dominance (especially in dealing with the Sudanese and Somali conflicts), but none of the two states has come close to achieving hegemonic status in the sub-region (Murithi 2009; Weldesellassie 2011).

The East African Community (EAC) was created in November 1999 as a mechanism of economic cooperation between the three former member states of the East African Community (1967–1977) Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. On 30 November 2006 the EAC decided to admit Rwanda and Burundi as full members to the organisation effective July 2007. Main areas of cooperation are transport and communication, trade and industry, immigration, and the promotion of investment. Although emphasis was placed on economic cooperation, the EAC has committed itself to creating a political federation and wishes to promote good governance, including adherence to the principles of democracy, as one of the organisation's main goals. However, perhaps due to the small size of the organisation, the EAC has not developed any policy or instruments to actively promote democratisation of member states. Although Kenya has the strongest economy within the EAC, it cannot claim any hegemonic status in Eastern Africa (Braude 2008; Onoria 2010).

3.4 ECCAS

The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) was created in 1984 as the common organisation of states that had previously been organised in two separate bodies: the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) that brought together the mostly Francophone states linked to the Franc-CFA, and the Economic Community of the Great Lakes States (CEPGL) of the three former Belgian colonies DR Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi. The main objective of ECCAS has been the promotion of economic cooperation. ECCAS activities came to a standstill between 1992 and 1998 when seven of the eleven member states were involved in the violent conflict in DR Congo on opposing sides. In 2004 the ECCAS Protocol establishing the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX) entered into force, but it has no mandate to deal with political instability or crises in member states (Ikome 2013). ECCAS is mainly promoted by the African Union, which defined ECCAS as the Central African 'pillar' of its continental projects of Economic Community and Peace and Security Architecture. Very little unites these countries beyond geographical proximity, and the 'Central African region' has no aspiring hegemon.

Several important differences among African regional organisations must thus be emphasized. While both ECOWAS and SADC have strong regional mandates to promote and defend democratisation in member states, this is markedly less so in the case of the EAC. IGAD and ECCAS have no competencies to monitor regime dynamics in member states. As the EAC lacks a hegemonic member state that can make credible commitments to regional action in member states, effective regional

leverage should only be expected in ECOWAS (West Africa) and SADC (Southern Africa). Thus further analysis will be restricted to these two regions.

4 Assessing regional leverage in West Africa

I have shown above that in West Africa most countries have developed either from CA to a democratic system, or from authoritarian systems to some variant of competitive authoritarianism over the last two decades. Practically all West African regimes became more competitive in the 1995–2013 period. It therefore seems plausible that this trend is not explained exclusively by simultaneously occurring but isolated domestic processes. The regional trend could be explained by diffusion, by the leverage of Western donors (which, however, decreased after 1995), or by the influence of regional actors.

Nigeria's armed forces make up 40 % of all military forces within ECOWAS and its economy represents 66 % of the total GDP of the ECOWAS region. Thus Nigeria's dominance is overwhelming, with only Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana not fully eclipsed by the regional powerhouse.[7] ECOWAS and Nigeria also face few competing policy objectives in pushing for further democratisation, and with the exception of French patronage in Burkina Faso and Togo no foreign power is likely to save an autocrat from regional leverage (Banégas et al. 2007; Chafer 2002). Most ECOWAS states are extremely poor and some of them have landlocked economies that make them particularly vulnerable to economic sanctions.

In Mali and Niger military or civilian coups d'états overthrew the regimes in place. A closer look at these two countries will demonstrate how regional leverage mattered for regime dynamics.

4.1 Mali

Mali's fragile democracy has been a case of successful democratisation 'against all odds'. Democratic institutions were established following the army's decisive action against incumbent dictator Moussa Traoré in 1991, and both the collapse of the former single party and the decision of coup leader Amadou Toumani Touré not to stand in the founding elections opened the way for the emergence of a government elected by a large majority and led by former opposition politician and intellectual Alpha Oumar Konaré (Villálon and Idrissa 2005). Re-elected for a second term in 1997, President Konaré became a key figure in regional politics. Between 1999 and 2001 he served as Chairman of ECOWAS, and during his tenure the 2001 ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance was enacted. When constitutional term limits hindered him from standing for re-election once again, Konaré eventually became Chairman of the African Union between 2003 and 2008. Konaré's activities are a good example of the attempt to lock in domestic reforms through regional standard-setting (Hartmann and Striebinger 2015).

[7] Data on GDP come from the World Bank (2014); data on armed forces are based on the Military Balance 2014.

Amadou Tourani Touré was elected president in 2002 and under his administration democracy became more institutionalised. Diffusion effects from the collapse of the Libyan regime in 2012 eventually led to political crisis and a coup d'état, which toppled Touré's regime in 2012. Faced with an increasing loss of territory the coup leaders eventually agreed to a French military intervention that stabilised the country and to the establishment of a transition government that prepared national elections held in 2013. ECOWAS suspended Mali's membership in the wake of the military coup. While a range of factors (inter alia the French military intervention) explain the re-establishment of democratic institutions, the threat of ECOWAS sanctions (especially suspension of trade flows to landlocked Mali but also the realistic scenario of armed military intervention from ECOWAS) was strong and played a critical role in inducing the military government to engage in the transition leading to the 2013 elections (Bergamaschi and Diawara 2014).

4.2 Niger

In Niger, the second and last mandate of President Mamadou Tandja ended in December 2009. Like many other African constitutions, Niger's constitution allows two consecutive terms as president. At the end of 2008, Tandja and his supporters requested a constitutional revision to allow him to run in a third presidential election. When Tandja failed to secure the two-third majority in Parliament necessary to modify the constitution, he simply called for a referendum concerning an extension of his term, a procedure clearly not in accordance with the constitution. In May 2009, the Constitutional Court declared the referendum unconstitutional. Tandja then dissolved both Parliament and later the Constitutional Court. The referendum took place despite national and international protests, and 92.5 % of the population that participated supported an extension of President Tandja's term for an additional three years, plus the unlimited possibility of candidature thereafter.

ECOWAS reacted to the constitutional crisis early on (Sperling 2009). It condemned the dissolution of the Parliament and Constitutional Court. A few days before legislative elections scheduled for October 2009, the ECOWAS Summit of Heads of State defined the events as a violation of the 2001 Protocol and asked President Tandja to annul the elections and end the constitutional crisis. Diplomatic mediation by former Nigerian Head of State Abubakar and Liberian President Sirleaf Johnson yielded no results. The elections went on and ECOWAS suspended Niger's membership. Nigeria also announced it was closing its border with Niger and was evaluating the possibility of a military intervention according to article 45 of the 1999 Protocol. In an atmosphere of growing isolation and continued activities behind the scenes, Nigerien military units finally deposed Tandja in a bloodless coup in February 2010 and new elections were held. Thus ECOWAS policies could not enforce the democratisation of Niger but only guarantee that some level of political competition was maintained.

In the case of ECOWAS, it is both the mandate and the influence of the regional hegemonic power that explain events. ECOWAS leverage was instrumental in raising the cost for presidents who violated the basic constitutional principles of both their home countries and ECOWAS protocols (Hartmann 2013). Only when Nigeria itself

returned to constitutional rule in 1998 did ECOWAS fully use the mandate. Since that time, ECOWAS has played a role in protecting the fragile democratisation processes taking place in a number of member states, including Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire.

5 Regional leverage in Southern Africa

Regime dynamics in Southern Africa have been more stable than in West Africa. While a few regimes such as Madagascar or Malawi have been quite unstable, nearly all countries still have the same regime type as 15 years before. The economic dominance of South Africa in Southern Africa is even more overwhelming than Nigeria's dominance in West Africa. Due to its oil exports, Angola has managed to build up a strong economy and an army larger than South Africa's, and thus South Africa and SADC have only limited leverage there. No foreign powers challenge the political hegemony of SADC and South Africa. Most states are poor, have landlocked economies and are thus particularly vulnerable to economic sanctions. I again look at two cases to verify the relevance of regional leverage for regime dynamics.

5.1 Lesotho

Throughout its history, Lesotho has been highly dependent on its big neighbour South Africa, especially in the economic sphere, with GDP depending on remittances from South Africa and its currency being tied to the South African Rand. The democratisation that started in 1993 soon led to a de facto one-party rule by the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD). When protests against the government turned violent in 1998 and the military left the barracks, South Africa intervened militarily in Lesotho, claiming it was acting on behalf of SADC after being invited to do so by the government of Lesotho. At that time the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation was not in place, but the scenario of a military coup d'état in its backyard was clearly not acceptable to Nelson Mandela's South Africa (Likoti 2007; Southall and Fox 1999).

In the wake of military intervention the conflicting parties agreed on certain reforms of the political system (including the electoral system), which would guarantee a better representation of the opposition in parliament. Despite on-going problems in the democratic process, inter alia violations of press freedom, South Africa and the SADC did little to push for further democratisation of the political system. The 2007 elections led to new violence. The SADC troika brokered a dialogue among the stakeholders that resulted in new constitutional and electoral reforms in 2011 (van der Vleuten and Hulse 2014, p. 47). In 2012, for the first time in its history, the opposition won the elections, and an oppositional coalition deposed the ruling party and the prime minister. While the better quality of electoral governance (and SADC activities in this regard) contributed to a more even playing field, the change resulted primarily from strong factionalism in the ruling party that led to the disintegration of the LCD, with some party barons creating their own parties (van Eerd 2015).

5.2 Zimbabwe

The governance crisis of Zimbabwe is generally considered a symbol of SADC failure to promote democratic change in the region. In 2000, Robert Mugabe's government, which had ruled the country since independence in 1980, lost a referendum on changes to the constitution. Such changes would have allowed Mugabe to prolong his term of office, grant members of the state apparatus immunity from prosecution for offences committed during their terms in office, and enable compulsory land acquisition by the state (Nathan 2012). Mugabe's decision to nevertheless advance land reform led to violent seizure of farms and mounting conflict with Britain and other Western countries, and emboldened the previously marginalised political opposition. From 2002 onwards, elections were marred by a growing number of malpractices, systematic human rights violations, and violence. SADC election observation missions declared these elections largely credible and no discussion arose about suspending Zimbabwe from full participation in the organisation.

In 2007 an Extraordinary SADC Summit asked South African President Mbeki to serve as official mediator in Zimbabwe. Mbeki opted for a strategy of 'quiet diplomacy' (Prys 2008) that only worsened the situation on the ground, as witnessed in the 2008 elections when the electoral commission did not declare the probable victory of opposition candidate Tsvangirai in the first round of elections. Instead, Mugabe eventually won in the second round amidst a climate of violence and intimidation. Under increasing pressure from some SADC members (especially Botswana, Mauritius and Tanzania), Mbeki then brokered a power-sharing deal, the Global Political Agreement (GPA), which allowed the opposition to join the government. Between 2008 and 2013 SADC and South Africa still refrained from openly criticising Zimbabwe, choosing instead to emphasise implementation of the GPA and economic recovery (van der Vleuten and Hulse 2014).

South Africa clearly refrained from using its leverage to promote regime change in Zimbabwe. A long debate exists about the motivations behind South Africa's Zimbabwe policy. In terms of the analytical framework, South Africa had competing foreign policy objectives (such as avoiding further instability in Zimbabwe) that could have led to even more migration to South Africa (with an estimated 30% of the Zimbabwean population already living in South Africa). This strongly reduced South Africa's regional leverage.

Given its strong economic dominance, South Africa could have used its influence to pressure other countries in the region to liberalise or further democratise their political systems. The absence of further open defiance to constitutional rule is proof of a nascent community of 'constitutionally ruled' states,[8] but it is difficult to clearly assess what role SADC has played in this process. Despite SADC's mandate and a democratic regional hegemon, regional leverage was less effective even if regional actors certainly played a role in restoring stability and competitive political systems in Madagascar and Comoros.

[8] Zimbabwe is not an exception because the regime has clearly tried to stay in power within the boundaries of constitutional rule, even if this constitution may have become a hollow document.



Fig. 2 Regional leverage and linkage in Africa. (Source: author's own compilation)

6 Regional linkage in Western and Southern Africa

Thus ECOWAS and SADC each had a mandate to promote democratisation and undisputed hegemons to enforce regional standards. But why did ECOWAS apparently succeed much better in promoting democratisation than SADC? While further research is needed to corroborate this hypothesis, the assumption is that differences can be explained through the types of linkages prevailing among regional elites.

Regional linkages become effective through transnational coalitions of political and economic actors that are formed within the forums of regional agencies and are composed of both governmental and non-governmental actors. But these transnational coalitions are not necessarily catalysts for democratisation. When many ECOWAS states were liberalising in the 1990s and the Commission was controlled by pro-democratic actors, transnational and trans-governmental coalitions of pro-democratic actors were empowered. This empowerment played a critical role in controlling the agenda of the organisation towards the enactment of highly innovative and radical standards (Hartmann and Striebinger 2015). A new generation of policy-makers and state presidents gained power and influence in many West African countries and in ECOWAS organs. Norm-abiding behaviour in places such as Niger or Mali was thus strongly promoted through ECOWAS. Civil society actors in many West African countries started to build regional umbrella organisations to maximise their influence on decision-making. These regional linkages were thus embedded within the growing leverage of ECOWAS and had a stronger effect on how ECOWAS exercised its leverage rather than working independently in the domestic arena.

In Southern Africa, social and political ties among governmental elites and social movements are as intense as in Western Africa. The values and standards diffused through these linkages are nevertheless strongly marked by the heritage of the fight against apartheid and political solidarity among former allies against white supremacy and 'imperialism'. South Africa's failure to enforce political democratisation in the sub-region does not stem from a lack of interaction and networks with neighbouring states, but from linkages that are instrumental in shielding a former comrade like President Mugabe from undue international criticism. The civil societies of some Southern African countries (and some governments) have taken a more principled stance vis-à-vis Zimbabwe, and thus regional linkages promoting normative change and democratisation of the region's political systems have developed. But these linkages do not extend to all member states and remain powerless, at least in the short and medium term, to reshape the domestic distribution of power and resources in the face of SADC and South Africa's unwillingness to use their leverage. (Fig. 2).

Developments in Central and Eastern Africa imply another type of linkage. In East Africa all countries (with the exception of Kenya and Tanzania) are governed by former liberation movements or army officers. Regional diffusion and transnational linkage in such a context seem to work clearly towards the stabilisation of various types of authoritarian regimes (whether competitive or closed).

Conclusion

Regional organisations within Africa have assumed a more important role in shaping discourses and directing policy action over the last 15 years. Their development confirms observations from other continents that regional environments rather than the global system provide the appropriate context for diffusion and interactions influencing changes in political authority structures (Gleditsch 2002). Although the African Union has recently affirmed a role in democracy promotion on the continent (Vandeginste 2013; Vines 2013), variations in regime trajectories might rather be explained by the strength and normative ground rules of sub-regional organisations that vary both in their emphasis on democratic institutions as a membership requirement and in the role of (democratic) hegemons.

Such a sober assessment of the importance of hegemonic power should not eclipse the importance of regional organisations as important actors. African regional organisations certainly need the military and economic strength of the regional powers to sanction non-democratic behaviour. Moreover, these regional organisations lack the institutional resources and competencies to engage in a more systematic policy of democracy promotion. The paper's main argument has thus not been to claim that regionalism determines regime dynamics in Africa. Many African regional organisations have shown a tendency to restrict democracy to the principle of constitutionalism and to protect regimes that acquired power via constitutional means. Such defence of the constitutional rule of elected governments—even in a context of a not-so-even playing field—should, however, not be considered a small achievement in a region where until the 1990s most rulers were never elected. Democracy remains something to be acquired and defended by the people, and international factors will not fully 'explain' a process or success of democratisation. I have shown, however, that explanations of the variation of such processes will indeed gain insight from looking at the external environment (a claim made strongly by Levitsky and Way), and more specifically at African external actors, regional institutions and norms that continue to shape these domestic processes.

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From party dominance to competitive authoritarianism? South Africa versus Zimbabwe

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Abstract Similarities between the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the African National Congress of South Africa pose the question whether South Africa faces a 'Zimbabwean future'. In seeking to address this question, authors have compared the two parties in terms of 'party dominance' and 'electoral authoritarianism'. However, this paper proposes that despite the utility of such approaches, greater explanatory power is provided by the notion of 'competitive authoritarianism' as developed by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. Application of their approach suggests that although the ANC's *organisational ways* and character emulate those of ZANU-PF, it is constrained as a ruling party by South Africa's *stronger linkage* to the West and remaining *Western leverage* over South Africa in spite of the rising influence of Russia and China.

Keywords Party dominance · Electoral authoritarianism · Competitive authoritarianism · ZANU-PF · ANC · Organisational capacity · Linkage · Leverage

Introduction

Following the 2013 election in Zimbabwe, when the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union—Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) once again used state power to secure a resounding victory, a not atypical media commentary suggested that South Africa's transition to a Mugabe-style dictatorship was a genuine danger. This suggested that like ZANU-PF, the ruling African National Congress (ANC) had failed to transform

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from a liberation movement into a democratic political party: The economy was characterized by low growth, low investment, low productivity, high taxes and alarmingly high unemployment. Furthermore, the rise in corruption was 'palpable', as the ANC's high ideals had 'replaced by high living', corruption and crony capitalism. In short, if a Zimbabwean-style destination was to be avoided, urgent action was necessary since 'Democracy's survival depends on an opposition that operates as a check and balance on government excess and encourages a healthy economy' (Hartley and Mills 2013). In my own work I adopt a more historically contingent perspective than Hartley and Mills. However I similarly argue that 'democracy is at risk' if the darker elements of the heritage of the ANC as a liberation movement are not confronted (Southall 2013, 2014). From this perspective, the ANC shares with ZANU-PF a political culture that identifies the movement with the nation, regularly delegitimizes opposition as unpatriotic or racist, and which in seeking to capture the 'commanding heights' of the state and economy to bring about 'transformation', threatens to extinguish political accountability and democracy.

While it is important to recognize the similarities between ZANU-PF and the ANC, we must also acknowledge the differences. The most widely adopted way in which these have been explored in the academic literature within and on the sub-continent has been via the notion of party dominance. Thus it is customarily argued that party dominance in Zimbabwe has shifted from democracy to authoritarianism, but in contrast, a party-dominant system in South Africa has remained democratic. Yet this only poses the question of how and why Zimbabwe regressed to authoritarianism, while asking what factors are likely to keep South Africa democratic or, in contrast, propel it in the direction of authoritarianism. While the analysis of Zimbabwe's post-colonial trajectory allows for firm conclusions to be drawn, the attempt to answer the second question regarding South Africa will be more speculative. Nonetheless, I will attempt to answer this in a relatively schematic fashion by relating perspectives on party dominance to those of competitive authoritarianism.

1 Party dominance and competitive authoritarianism

In *Uncommon Democracies* (1990), Pempel examines the political dominance of the ruling parties in Japan, Italy, Israel and Sweden and the implications for democracy. The three criteria through which he identifies 'dominant parties' are: electoral dominance for an uninterrupted prolonged period; dominance in the formation of governments; and dominance in determining the agenda, often based around an 'historic project'.

Pempel's work provided the impetus for Giliomee and Simkins (1999) to compare party dominance in post-apartheid South Africa with that of four other semi-industrialized countries (Mexico, Malaysia, India and Taiwan). They concluded that dominant parties in semi-industrialized countries were more likely to abuse their dominance than in those studied by Pempel. This was especially so where societies displayed high levels of inequality, as the state was more likely to impose authoritarian controls upon organized labour to attract the capitalist interests upon which it was dependent for investment. However, such dominant parties needed to retain sufficient

cross-class and cross-ethnic support to retain electoral predominance. This led to a distinction between 'authoritarian dominant party systems', which featured some pluralist/democratic features but were unable to tolerate a competitive party system, and 'democratic dominant party systems' in which the dominant party played according to some liberal democratic rules but still steered clear of alternations in power (although the more such parties implemented democratic procedures, the more the party system would edge towards 'real democracy').

Building upon these and other foundations, Bogaards (2004) followed Sartori (1994) in distinguishing between dominant and dominant authoritarian party systems, the latter being those in which dominance is maintained by extra-democratic means, with alternation in power being only a theoretical possibility. More recently, a volume edited by de Jager and du Toit (2013) compares dominant party systems in India, South Korea and Taiwan to shed light upon the party systems in the southern African states of Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Again they propose a distinction between those dominant parties that exercise their power in an authoritarian manner and those that exercise it in a more liberal manner, ultimately citing ZANU-PF as an example of the first and the ANC of the later. In contrast, while comparing party dominance in South Africa and Malaysia, Kaßner (2014) worries that the ANC is moving in an authoritarian direction.

The key question posed by such work is whether dominant party rule may provide a vehicle for a long-term transition to democracy. In *Why Dominant Parties Lose* (2007), Kenneth Greene poses the question rather differently. The key feature of dominant party systems, he argues, is that they conduct elections that are simultaneously 'meaningful but manifestly unfair'. Meaningfulness, he argues, entails three procedural elements: (1) the chief executive and a legislature that cannot be dismissed by the former are chosen through elections; (2) opposition forces are allowed to form independent parties and compete in elections; and (3) the incumbent does not engage in outcome-changing fraud (Greene 2010, p. 23). From this perspective, Green argues that dominant parties win elections consistently because they possess advantages (notably fundraising capacity and perquisites of office) that skew the partisan playing field in their favour and render elections substantially unfair. Dominant party systems are therefore 'hybrids' that combine meaningful electoral competition with continuous rule by a single party.

Emphasis on the 'hybridity' of dominant party systems points to related literature on 'electoral authoritarianism', which according to its most celebrated exponent, Andreas Schedler (2006, p. 4), 'takes seriously both the authoritarian quality these regimes possess and the electoral procedures they put into practice'. Electoral authoritarian regimes differ from both 'closed autocracies', which refrain from holding multi-party elections and 'electoral democracies', which lack key attributes of liberal democracy (such as checks and balances, bureaucratic integrity, and an impartial judiciary), yet conduct free and fair elections. The notion of electoral authoritarianism, he continues, places its emphasis upon access to power (through popular elections), whereas conventionally, typologies of authoritarian rule stress the exercise of power. He argues it is not that questions about authoritarian governance (who rules how) are irrelevant, but rather that they become *contingent* on *how* rulers access power.

Although insightful, Schedler's approach essentially re-describes the dynamics of authoritarianism that analysts find present in party dominance. However, a more pungent criticism of analyses of both party dominance and electoral authoritarianism may be that they divert attention away from *external dimensions* that may be critical in either sustaining regimes, or in propelling them either towards or away from democracy. Hence greater explanatory power may be provided by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, for whom 'competitive authoritarianism'—descriptive of regimes which in the post-Cold War era allow open political competition but under whose auspices the terms of competition are unfairly skewed in favour of ruling parties—is an outcome as much of international influences as domestic ones. In brief, Levitsky and Way argue that three independent factors determine whether a competitive authoritarian regime will become fully democratic or not in the present era:

First, the *leverage* of the West on the regime, by which is meant a government's vulnerability to externalizing democratizing pressure (ranging from military intervention through democracy assistance to the influence of transnational advocacy networks) (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 40).

Second, *linkage* to the West, that is 'the density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social and organizational) and cross-border flows of capital, goods and services, people and information)' (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 43).

Third, the regime's *organizational capacity* whereby its ability to resist opposition challenge is balanced against its ability to tolerate political competition (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 57–99).

Levitsky and Way's interest is to explain how the wave of democracy that occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall has stagnated in so many countries. Critics may therefore well argue that this wave was a result of timing, not least because it relied heavily on the constructive influence of Western powers whose global weight is currently in decline relative to the rising industrial countries of the East and South. Even so, despite various other criticisms[1] their approach has proved influential.

In the following I explore the explanatory power of party dominance and competitive authoritarianism perspectives to examine and compare the post-liberation trajectories of governance in Zimbabwe and South Africa. The particular focus will be upon whether this may help answer the opening question: Does Zimbabwe represent the future of South Africa?

2 Competitive authoritarianism in Zimbabwe

Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF has managed to cling to power and entrench itself as Zimbabwe's increasingly authoritarian ruling party, in the process establishing a dominant party system. ZANU-PF's reputation as one of the leading liberation movements in the struggle against the white-minority Rhodesian regime, initially afforded it the overwhelming support of the Zimbabwean electorate. However, the ambitions

[1] An obvious criticism is that the neo-liberal economic policies proselytized by Western regimes undermine the social and economic foundations for democratic outcomes that extend beyond mere electoral democracy.

of ZANU-PF went beyond the confines of democratic conduct and competition as it became clear early on that the ruling party was intent on staying in power, whatever the cost, even if that cost included the gains of the liberation struggle and the democratic rights of the Zimbabwean citizenry. The case of Zimbabwe has become a warning sign for the rest of the region, a barometer by which to determine whether other southern African states are following a similar path to democratic decay (Britz and Tshuma 2012, p. 171).

Andreas Schedler's (2006, p. 1) 'spectre of electoral authoritarianism' has haunted Zimbabwe since independence in 1980. Post-2000, it hardened into what Michael Bratton and Eldred Masunungure (2008, p. 42) have called a 'militarised form of electoral authoritarianism' (Masunungure and Shumba 2012, p. 125).

The conventional narrative highlights key factors in Zimbabwe's decline into authoritarianism under the rule of ZANU-PF. Here I cite the following overlapping factors as follows:

First, the ruling party's liberation movement heritage: No party in southern Africa reiterates its role as a revolutionary liberation movement more than ZANU-PF. The past and present run together in a glorious celebration, with ZANU-PF projected as the embodiment of patriotic virtue. In line with this hagiographic logic of what I elsewhere term 'exclusive nationalism' (Southall 2013, pp. 5–7), those not *for* ZANU-PF are *against* Zimbabwe. With the political arena thus constructed around ZANU-PF's struggle against *enemies*, the electoral arena has been transformed into one, if necessary, of mortal combat.

Second, despite ZANU-PF's claim to be the authentic representative of the Zimbabwean people, the liberation struggle had been bifurcated along regional and ethnic lines. ZANU-PF's power base stemmed from the Shona majority, but it was the rival Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) that enjoyed the loyalty of the Ndebele minority. Although external pressures had led ZAPU and ZANU to merge as the Patriotic Front during the final phases of the settler regime, the fragility of the alliance was confirmed by ZANU-PF's decision to fight the transitional election in 1980 separately. Its subsequent triumph, sweeping some 63 % of the 'common roll' vote to ZAPU's 24 %, confirmed its status as the predominant party of national liberation. In victory, ZANU-PF was overtly magnanimous, not only to whites (just 5 % of the population), but to ZAPU, which became a junior partner in government. Yet it did not take long for Mugabe to challenge ZAPU's loyalty.

Third, while democratic consolidation in Southern Africa is widely believed by scholars to require the transformation of liberation movements into democratic political parties, this process in Zimbabwe has been strikingly incomplete. Zimbabwe has not only seen the post-liberation merger of party and state, which has characterized the politics of other countries under liberation movement rule, but also the added dimension of fusion between the military and the party. The origins of this lie in the guerrilla warfare waged by ZANU against the settler regime. This blurred distinctions between political and coercive mobilization of the population, a dimension that significantly skewed the result of the independence election, with ZANU-PF using its military muscle to encourage the size of its vote (Kriger 1992). Subsequently, once ZANU-PF came to power, the settlement-driven integration of the two libera-

tion movement-armed wings (ZANU-PF's ZANLA and ZAPU's ZIPRA)[2] with the Rhodesian military soon fell under ZANLA domination. Thereafter, former ZIPRA guerrillas and commanders were a key target of the 1982 Gukurahundi campaign in which, following accusations that ZAPU was in league with South Africa to wage armed resistance against the elected government, approximately 20,000 Ndebele were killed in a brutal military crackdown. The pretence that the armed forces were politically neutral was thereby eliminated. Henceforth ZANU-PF's deployment of personnel to virtually all public institutions featured the recycling of military officers into high positions. With the police also under firm party control, the country saw the rise of a politico-military whose shared interests in the fortunes of the ruling party were enhanced by the army's involvement in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the 1990s. This war rapidly degenerated into a campaign of massive plunder and money-making by the elite.

Fourth, Zimbabwe's transition to an increasingly militarized authoritarianism was catalysed by the rapid downward spiral of the economy during the 1990s and the resultant rise of a trade union-backed opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). ZANU-PF inherited a reasonably developed albeit extravagantly unequal economy, but under settler rule it had been highly protected. Accordingly, it faced major challenges after independence, two of these being redistribution and the need for industry and agriculture to adapt to foreign competition. While the ZANU-PF government made major investments in education, health and related spheres, and while the agricultural sector (led by white commercial farms) boomed, industry floundered, not least because of the political elite's penchant for imported consumer goods. Inequalities remained extreme and by 1990, with money running out, the government was forced to turn to the IMF and World Bank. Resultant structural adjustment programmes failed miserably, the reasons for this including lack of official sympathy for industry; failure to engage with civil society; and the government's reluctance to rein in expenditure in favoured areas, notably defence. Mugabe's decision in 1997 to become involved militarily in the DRC was also critically damaging to the economy By the late 1990s, Zimbabwe was confronted by rapid deindustrialization, job loss, social service cutbacks, growing poverty and spiralling public debt. Ironically, it was the government's maintenance of good relations with white-owned commercial agriculture that shored up the economy. However, amidst much wider popular discontent amongst workers, peasants and the unemployed, a first major land invasion of white farms by 'war veterans' highlighted the need for land reform. Initially, the war veterans were bought off with financial hand-outs, but these were paid with money that the government did not have. As a result, the Zimbabwean stock market plunged along with the value of the currency, the IMF pulled out, and the government defaulted on its foreign debt.

Fifth, ZANU-PF skewed the electoral playing field to ensure its return to power, regardless of the strength of opposition challenge. ZANU-PF would have won the independence election of 1980 even without the pressures placed upon peasant voters by guerrillas, but Mugabe had threatened to return the movement to the bush if it lost. Subsequently, apart from its suppression of ZAPU, it was to shore up its

[2] The Zimbabwe National Liberation Army and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army.

ability to withstand electoral challenge by dominating the country's electoral institutions, backed by its ruthlessness in countering opposition. It experienced an initial setback by the MDC's performance in a referendum in 2000, in which proposals for a new constitution put forward by the government were defeated. This indicated potential defeat for ZANU-PF in legislative elections later that year, and that MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai might outpace Mugabe in the 2002 presidential elections. ZANU-PF's most significant response was its decision to forge an alliance with war veterans and launch its 'fast track land reform', which over the next few years saw violent seizure of a large majority of white farms. Unsurprisingly, this magnified the economic crisis, and Zimbabwe lurched into bankruptcy accompanied by an era of hyperinflation. This had culminated in majority popular support for the MDC by the time of the 2008 elections. In National Assembly elections its majority wing won 45 % of the vote and its dissident minority wing another 7 to 8 %, giving it an overall majority. In the simultaneous presidential election, the official result (almost certainly manipulated to deny an outright victory) recorded that Tsvangirai won 48 % of the vote to Mugabe's 43 %. Because neither candidate won 50 %, they were forced into a run-off from which, citing high levels of violence inflicted upon his supporters, Tsvangirai eventually withdrew. Denying him that right, the official result recorded a 90 % vote for Mugabe.

The sixth and final plank of ZANU-PF's authoritarianism concerns its undermining of the Global Political Agreement (GPA), brokered by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) after the 2008 election ended in a stalemate. Although the MDC now possessed a legislative majority, ZANU-PF clung to its control of the executive by virtue of Mugabe retaining the presidency. The GPA resulted in a coalition government, with Tsvangirai becoming prime minister and important government posts allocated to the MDC. However, ZANU-PF retained control of defence, police and security. Critically, ZANU-PF ensured it retained control of the country's electoral institutions. Buoyed by the military's diversion of resources from newly-discovered diamond mines into party coffers, the partial recovery of the economy, Tsvangirai's political naivety, as well as his party's significant internal troubles, ZANU-PF was able to flout GPA conditions and bounce the MDC into an early election on 31 July 2013. Dismally unprepared, it fell to a comprehensive defeat in both the presidential and National Assembly elections. Although the MDC complained bitterly about ZANU-PF's gross manipulation of the electoral process, it also lost the election in the wider sense that it had been thoroughly outplayed by its rival. ZANU-PF claimed for itself the credit for a nascent economic recovery; and enjoying some genuine support for its land reforms, preached a gospel of 'indigenisation' that the MDC lacked the wit to counteract.

Given Zimbabwe's post-colonial political trajectory as it is conventionally analysed and outlined above, I argue the two following conceptual points:

First, it is not useful to characterize ZANU-PF merely as a 'dominant party', despite the fact that it has presided over successive legislative and presidential elections for over two decades and used its domination of the state and electoral machinery to reproduce itself in power. ZANU-PF may originally have enjoyed a popular (albeit ethnically skewed) electoral majority, but since the first democratic election in 1980 it has relied heavily upon military force. As argued elsewhere, ZANU-PF elec-

toral domination has been 'imposed' (Southall 2013, p. 107) by undemocratic means, suggesting that at the least it has transited to 'authoritarian dominance'. In Greene's terms, Zimbabwean elections—although competitive—have not been 'meaningful', as ZANU-PF has resorted to 'outcome-changing fraud' when necessary.

Second, the ZANU-PF regime displays the hybrid characteristics that allow it to be more accurately categorized as 'electorally authoritarian'. For reasons of self- and international image it wishes to claim electoral legitimacy, and thus provides for competitive elections. Yet between and during elections, opposition parties are subject to extensive illiberal restrictions, ultimately even to military power. 'Electoral authoritarianism' in Zimbabwe therefore relates to how ZANU-PF's militarized domination of the political arena hides behind a civilianized façade of democracy. Yet although this approach provides a more accurate depiction of the characteristics of ZANU-PF than categorizing the latter as a 'dominant party', it suffers from a similar inadequacy.

Whether deploying the armoury of 'party dominance' or 'electoral authoritarianism', authors refer extensively to the salience of international factors in shaping ZANU-PF's political trajectory. For instance, Britz and Tshuma (2012, pp. 174–176) provide a commentary on the 'international context' in which ZANU-PF was enabled to establish itself as a 'dominant party'. They emphasize how the US and other Western powers extended strong support to the newly-independent Mugabe government, both to keep it out of the Soviet orbit and to be a stable partner in an era of South African destabilization of the region. This instilled a willingness by the West to overlook the transgressions of the Gukuhurandi campaign, and it was only after the collapse of the Soviet Union and ZANU-PF's implementation of its violent land reforms that Western countries stressed good governance and democracy. This approach, however, now came in an era of firmly established ZANU-PF dominance. Similarly, although Masunungure and Shumba (2012, pp. 144–149) argue that SADC played a salutary role in unblocking the 2008 post-election stalemate, they feared that fatigue with the long-running Zimbabwean crisis would undermine its determination to police the GPA and to curb ZANU-PF's 'unilateralist' behaviour. Again, the analysis of the international factors that have shaped Zimbabwean authoritarianism is both sensible and insightful. However, the problem for both approaches is that while apparently essential for understanding the wider arena in which ZANU-PF has operated, the focus on international factors is not internal to the logics of either party dominance or electoral authoritarianism. In contrast, reference to 'competitive authoritarianism' allows for international factors to be incorporated into the explanation of ZANU-PF's trajectory as explanatory variables.

In their own case study, Levitsky and Way argue that 'conditions for democratization in Zimbabwe were more favourable than elsewhere in the region'. Zimbabwe in 1980 was one of the wealthiest and most literate countries in Africa, with a history of electoral competition and judicial independence, a relatively strong civil society, and—beginning in the late 1990s—a well-organized and unified opposition. Nonetheless, as Levitsky and Way note:

> Zimbabwe combined high leverage and low linkage. In terms of leverage, the regime did not benefit from either black knight assistance or competing Western

> security issues. In terms of linkage, years of international isolation had eroded Rhodesia's ties to the West. Zimbabwe's primary economic partner was South Africa, international media and NGO penetration was limited, and ZANU elites had few connections to the West. (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 238)

Meanwhile, organizational power was high and thus ZANU-PF inherited a remarkably efficient and brutal state; state cohesion was high, rooted in ZANU-PF's guerrilla origins; and party strength was high, with a ZANU-PF organizational structure that penetrated downward from the national to local level. Thus ZANU-PF entered the post-Cold War era with a competitive authoritarian regime, with a 'playing field' rendered highly uneven by the ruling party's access to public finance, its domination of the media, and not least its use of pre- and post-colonial legislation, which severely impeded the activities of opposition parties and civil society. Competitive authoritarianism persisted through 2008, by which time it had become 'stable' (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 75).

What matters here is less whether Levitsky and Way are 'right' in their empirical account but whether they provide the tools for a more comprehensive understanding of ZANU-PF's authoritarianism than provided by competing approaches. I argue the following in urging adoption of their characterization of Zimbabwe as exemplifying competitive authoritarianism:

First, all perspectives are broadly united around their depiction of ZANU-PF's high *organizational* power. However, Levitsky and Way usefully distinguish between ZANU-PF's combined deployment of high levels of state coercive capacity, strong party cohesion (when necessary) and extensive state economic control to thwart economic challenges (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 54–70).

Second, Levitsky and Way are correct that the West enjoyed high *leverage* during the 1980s and 1990s. The terms of the independence settlement were largely forced upon a reluctant Mugabe, who would have preferred to have continued the liberation war but was subjected to massive pressure to agree to them, not only by the US and UK but also by Zambian and Mozambican states desperate to bring an end to a conflict adversely affecting them. Western disapproval was also a significant factor in constraining Mugabe's drive for a one party state. IMF and World Bank conditionality was similarly critical in determining the adoption of successive structural adjustment plans. Yet Western leverage diminished as Zimbabwe's linkage to the West declined following the seizure of white farms. While Mugabe depicted the imposition of Western sanctions on key personnel and firms associated with ZANU-PF as fundamental factors behind the economy's demise, the reality was that Western investment increasingly stayed away because of the attack upon property rights. Further, US and British aid—already reduced by disagreements over land reform—was terminated after the white farming community had been appropriated and largely exited the country. As Western leverage declined, ZANU-PF 'anti-imperialist' rhetoric increased proportionately, underpinning Mugabe's (rather optimistic) 'looking East' strategy that sought to strengthen ties with China.

Third, *linkage* to the West in 1980 was low, increased during the 1990s, and thereafter fell back again. UDI brought the imposition of sanctions (backed by the UN), but these were widely evaded, notably by Swiss, Austrian and other banks. However,

restrictions on the export of capital trapped profits within the country, further reducing the attractiveness of investment to foreign corporations. At the same time, the Smith regime became increasingly beholden to South Africa: economically, diplomatically and strategically. This later proved crucial in forcing Smith into negotiations with his liberation movement opponents, as the apartheid regime became increasingly wary of the costs of sustaining an internationally isolated state beyond its borders. Although economic links with the West recovered somewhat after independence, they declined again as the economic crisis deepened throughout the 1990s. Although further overseas borrowing continued unabated, Zimbabwe still lacked the capacity to repay foreign debts (Bond and Manyana 2003, pp. 45–49). As the resources available to ZANU-PF dwindled, the regime resorted to asset stripping. Thus in the run-up to the 2008 elections, the regime seized platinum claims held by Amplats (an Anglo-American subsidiary) and sold them to a dubious purchaser, using the profit to fund its militias.[3] Western investment and aid registered a cautious return under the coalition government, a process that has slowed since the Mugabe government secured 'victory' in the 2013 elections. Although international investors are attracted by the prospects of the country's mineral wealth, they are simultaneously repelled by the government's demands for 'indigenisation'.

It was in this wider context of initially high (but subsequently declining *leverage*) and continued low *linkage* that ZANU-PF's *organizational capacity* became enabled to lead Zimbabwe down the road to authoritarianism. Note further that although Western powers increasingly looked to SADC to resolve the Zimbabwean political impasse, this enabled Mugabe to appeal to the liberation movement solidarity sentiment that infuses the regional organization. As a result, SADC countries have proved reluctant to sanction any actions of the ZANU-PF regime of which they may disapprove.

3 Foundations of and threats to ANC electoral dominance

As observed above, there are significant concerns that the ANC is becoming disturbingly impatient of constitutional and other constraints upon its actions as it encounters choppy waters, most notable of which are dismally low growth rates (despite an increasing population), a massive surge in popular protests over government performance, and an increasingly problematic electoral terrain. Extensive commentary has suggested growing threats to the democratic system established in 1994, much of it centred around the ANC's subordination of the state to the ruling party. Numerous red flags have also been raised concerning the extent to which the ANC is prepared to defend President Jacob Zuma, who rose to the presidency after winning a viciously fought factional battle with former President Thabo Mbeki.

Zuma's presidency—marred by the persistent possibility that he could be prosecuted for corruption related to a notorious 1998 arms deal, and recently by claims that

[3] After seizure, Amplats' platinum claims were sold for US$100 million, to Camac, 40% owned by Dan Gertler, an Israeli diamond trader with close links to DRC president, Joseph Kabila. Camac was in turn quietly financed by Wall Street hedge funds (Simpson and Westbrook 2014).

public resources have been diverted to fund the development of his private residence in Nkandla (KwaZulu-Natal)—has been vigorously defended by his supporters, who have wrested control of the party machinery from their internal rivals. This has come at heavy constitutional cost. The independence of key bodies, notably the National Prosecuting Authority, has been subverted to obstruct the possibility of reinstating arms deal-related corruption charges against Zuma (Southall 2013, pp. 158–164). The ANC has scathingly criticized Thuli Mandonsela, the Public Protector (i.e. Ombudsperson), whose constitutionally-empowered report on the Nkandla affair has sought to render Zuma financially accountable. Recently, the ANC's determination to defend Zuma extended to the decision by Speaker of the National Assembly Baleka Mbete to suspend parliament in the face of demands by the Economic Freedom Front (EFF, a newly arrived opposition party) that Zuma 'pay back the money', her summoning of police to remove its MPs from the house. In addition to the ANC's penchant for secrecy (crassly justified in terms of national security), clear evidence exists that the security and intelligence agencies themselves are subordinate to Zuma's mission to maintain control over the party machinery (McKinlay 2014).

Such concerns come in the wake of the most recent (April 2014) election when, although the ANC again returned to office with a handsome majority, its proportion of the vote (62%) was lower than in all previous elections. Furthermore, participation in the electoral process is declining[4] and the ANC's majority in Gauteng, the province that functions as the country's economic powerhouse, slumped disastrously. Thus the ANC must now confront the prospect, assuming free and fair elections, not only that it might lose control of major metropoles in forthcoming local government elections in 2016, but that it might be restricted to a plurality in national elections likely to be held in 2024, if not earlier in 2019. This in turn poses the larger question of whether the ANC would be prepared to accept electoral defeat. This requires examination of the ANC's electoral dominance.

First and foremost, the ANC's party dominance rests upon its long history as a liberation movement representative of the majority of South Africa's people. The ANC has long positioned itself as 'a parliament of the people', and as having served the oppressed masses since its foundation just over 100 years ago. To be sure, an official discourse celebrating unity amongst a diversity of racial and ethnic groups challenges the ANC's claim to be the sole embodiment of the struggle against apartheid. Partisans of other movements stress contributions made by liberals, Black Consciousness advocates and other activists. Nonetheless, the ANC maintains a rhetoric that constantly evokes its 'struggle heroes', elevates the 'armed struggle', and proclaims monopolised versions of history that claim victory over apartheid for the liberation movement. Equally, the ANC's rhetoric of mobilization speaks of 'liberating' provinces and local governments controlled by parties of opposition. The ANC claims that only it can genuinely provide 'a better life for all'; all other parties are pilloried as sectional, at their worst serving as fronts for capitalist oppression and for those who would return South Africa to apartheid.

[4] Schulz-Herzenberg (2014, p. 39) indicates a decline in the participation of eligible voters from 86% in 1994 to 57% in 2014.

Second, the 1994 elections were the founding moment of the ANC as a dominant party (Southall 1994). The 'interim' constitution of 1993, which was the product of extended negotiations between the ANC, the formerly ruling National Party (NP) and other actors, included a provision for a politically neutral Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) alongside the other requirements of a liberal democratic state (free elections, a Bill of Rights, a separation of powers, an independent judiciary, and so on).[5] It also adopted a national list system of proportional representation that provided maximum representation of all shades of opinion; this system was replicated in parallel elections for legislatures in nine newly created provinces. The outcome, a 63 % victory for the ANC at the national level, was widely regarded as peculiarly beneficial, for while the liberation movement secured an indisputable victory, it fell short of the two-thirds majority that would have enabled it to drive the finalization of the constitution-making process without the support of at least one or more other political parties. Furthermore, parties that gained 10 % or more of the vote were entitled to serve within a Government of National Unity, this leading to the first post-apartheid government led by the ANC, but serving in coalition with the NP and Zulu-ethnic based Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). Meanwhile, the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as president consolidated the reputation of the country as a new democracy, his emphasis upon national reconciliation and political inclusiveness holding ANC claims to exclusivity at bay.

Third, the ANC's political dominance has subsequently been entrenched by its remarkable capacity to win successive elections in contests that have been competently administered and which—while not without flaws—are generally agreed to have been 'free and fair'. Four elections have been held since 1994, the ANC's proportion of the vote having ranged from 63 % in 1994 to a high of just under 70 % in 2004, before falling back to 62 % in 2013. These victories have been built upon four factors:

1. *Historically grounded political identity*. This is often crudely summarized as 'race', with the ANC drawing its overwhelming support from the 76 % of the population (SAIRR 2012, p. 5) who are black African. There is a strong association between voting patterns and race, but party preferences are far more complicated than any 'racial census' approach allows. While the white, and much of the minority Indian and Coloured votes, has increasingly veered behind the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA), the African vote has gone in different directions, thereby sustaining a handful of smaller parties (the IFP, the United Democratic Movement, what is left of the Pan-Africanist Congress and so on). Nonetheless, it remains the case that the majority of African voters have consistently favoured the ANC. For many, it remains difficult to consider voting for any party other than the party of liberation although increasingly, discontent with government performance underpins a growing tendency to simply not vote at all. Against this, there are increasing signs that the foundations of the ANC's constituency based upon political identity are eroding. The rise of the EFF (which secured 1.2 mil-

[5] The 'interim' constitution was negotiated by parties participating in fora that had not been elected. It provided for a democratically elected parliament to negotiate a final constitution and to approve it by a two-thirds majority, a process completed in 1996.

lion votes and 6.4% of the total vote in 2013) was accompanied by the DA's capture of approximately 760,000 votes in African areas (Schulz-Herzenberg and Southall 2014).

2. *The ANC's claim to inclusivity*. Although having always prioritized the claims of the African population, the ANC has consistently emphasized its openness to all who were opposed to apartheid. This claim was further based upon its evolution as a cross-class alliance. Historically, the ANC was largely led by black middle class elements, whilst drawing its majority support from workers and impoverished rural dwellers. Central to its cross-class nature were its long relationships with the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the majority wing of the black trade union movement. During the 1950s, those links were embedded in the cross-racial and cross-class Congress Alliance. Since the early 1990s, they have been organizationally expressed via the Tripartite Alliance that binds the ANC to the SACP and Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). Claims for equality in decision-making between the three organizations have consistently been downplayed by the ANC, which has always claimed pre-eminence. However, relationships have often been highly strained around economic policy. Indeed, it was the conviction that the ANC government had abandoned collectivist aspirations in favour of 'neo-liberalism' in 1996 that eventually led COSATU and the SACP to play a central role in the unseating of Thabo Mbeki as ANC president in favour of Zuma at the party's 52nd National Congress at Polokwane in December 2007 (and subsequently as state president in September 2008). Overall, however, the ANC pays major attention to keeping the Tripartite Alliance afloat, wary above all that disagreements with COSATU could translate into working class disaffection.
3. *The ANC's organizational capacity*. The ANC has always been run by elites. During the years of exile, after its banning by the NP in 1960, it was primarily 'a hierarchical, exile, military bureaucracy' (Butler 2014, p. 43). Nonetheless, since its return to South Africa in 1991 it has successfully transformed itself into a mass organization, absorbing activists from other anti-apartheid bodies into its ranks and establishing a nationwide organizational structure based upon its local branches. Although today the branch-based organization of the ANC at the local, regional, provincial and national level is riven with factionalism, the ANC remains the only party with a 'wall-to-wall' organizational presence across the country: in rural, peri-urban and urban areas. This provides it with a built-in advantage in mobilizing the vote, which is constructed not only around the party's embrace of professional and modern electioneering techniques (opinion surveys, focus groups, extensive advertising and so on) but also around door-to-door canvassing. When combined with extensive support on the ground lent by trade unionists, teachers and public servants, this translates into a massive advantage for the ANC before any electoral campaign has even begun (Butler 2014).
4. The final factor underpinning the ANC's electoral dominance is its ability to mobilise unequalled financial resources. State funding for political parties has been provided since 1997, with funds allocated largely in a way that reflects parties' proportional representation in the national and provincial legislatures. While there have been continual complaints that the formula for distribution dis-

criminates heavily against smaller parties, the major controversies have revolved around: first, various instances in which state funding was directed via dubious means into ANC hands; second, the ANC's blatant use of its ruling status to elicit funding from business; and third, the ANC's financial investment in companies that either do business with or are directly owned by the state. The most notorious of the latter is the involvement of an ANC investment trust, Chancellor House, in a joint venture that has won massive tenders from ESCOM, the state-owned electricity supply company, to build new boilers for the Medupe and Kusile power stations. Suffice it to say, the ANC can now massively outspend all the opposition parties put together (Jolobe 2010; Southall 2013, pp. 287–290).

Despite this battery of advantages, the ANC's electoral predominance is eroding. The average voting age continues to decrease and the 'born free' generation is far less inclined to vote for the ANC than its predecessors. Living standards for the majority have risen since 1994, primarily because the ANC has instituted a comprehensive system of social grants and pensions for the old, sick and disabled. Yet massive discontent persists, expressed through some of the highest incidences of protest and rioting in the world, indicating widespread disillusionment with the ANC government's 'delivery' (of water, electricity and other such services). Furthermore, the party-state has provided cover for burgeoning levels of corruption, with the result that in many communities, membership in the party is the only viable route to employment and wealth. Resulting battles for state resources lead, in turn, to entrenched factionalism at virtually all levels of the party. Correspondingly, relationships between the government and business have become increasingly strained, and an initial 'reform coalition' that sustained the economy after 1994 is faltering. Above all, while the economy has grown steadily, it has failed to do so at a rate capable of providing the requisite number of jobs needed to provide employment for a growing throng of youthful job-seekers, the majority of whom emerge from a seriously underperforming public schooling system. These and other indications suggest that the ANC will increasingly struggle to hang on to its popular vote.

The growing sense that the ANC party-state is facing an impasse is leading to major tensions within the Tripartite Alliance. The gains envisioned by the COSATU-SACP axis under a Zuma presidency have not been realized. This has in part been due to the difficult conditions resulting from the 2008 global economic meltdown. Closer to home, however, the coalition that brought Zuma to power has come under increasing strain. The 2014 election was prefaced by a violent police assault on striking mineworkers in the platinum belt who had deserted COSATU's National Union of Mineworkers in favour of an upstart Association of Mine and Construction Workers union. Approximately 34 were killed outright by lethal police fire and others died later. This provided a popular basis of support for the EFF, formed by Jacob Malema, former leader of the ANC's Youth League who had been expelled from the ruling party after a long-running battle with Zuma.

The EFF provided a radical nationalist challenge to the ANC during the 2014 election campaign and has since then positioned itself as an uncompromising champion of the poor. Meanwhile, although the SACP and its adherents within COSATU remain firmly behind Zuma, the latter is openly divided, with the National Union of

Metalworkers of South Africa (its biggest affiliate) having recently been expelled for advocating independence from the ANC and the formation of a socialist alternative.

Only when the Alliance breaks will the ANC's majority be seriously endangered. Hitherto, the ANC has conceded power at the provincial level, notably in Western Cape, where since 2009 the DA has enjoyed a popular majority. However, conceding power at the national level might be a different matter. Only then will the ANC face the test of true democracy, either adhering to democratic principles or taking the path to competitive authoritarianism.

4 South Africa: from party dominance to competitive authoritarianism?

The prospect of a Zimbabwean future for South Africa is posed by fundamental similarities shared by the two countries. Both are former settler colonies, their indigenous populations subjected to systematized racial discrimination; both are currently ruled by liberation movements that share similar ideologies (orientation towards exclusive nationalism and authoritarianism); both are immediate neighbours of each other, with closely interconnected populations and economies. Their governments are closely aligned around issues such as anti-imperialism and staunch national sovereignty. Furthermore, ZANU-PF's radical nationalist policies (notably the appropriation of white farms and strident calls for 'indigenisation' of investment and capital ownership) appeal to significant strata of the African population of South Africa. Finally, the ANC's increasing tendency to present the constitution as an obstacle to 'transformation' raises concerns that a shift in the broad direction pursued by ZANU-PF since 2000 is an increasing possibility.[6]

In contrast to such fears, significant counter-arguments can be made. First, although the two liberation movements share many characteristics, the ANC today reflects the greater diversity of South Africa as a far more urbanized and industrialized society, subject to a multiplicity of social currents. Although the ANC adheres to a formal image of internal unity, it is far more difficult for the party leadership to maintain this façade than is the case for ZANU-PF (though admittedly, that party is currently highly factionalised around the struggle to succeed the 90 year old Mugabe). Second, whereas the Zimbabwean settlement in 1980 was, in essence, imposed from outside, the South African transition was genuinely negotiated by competing forces within the country. Although the constitution remains contested, it was the product of compromise. Importantly, its inclusiveness allowed space for 'white settlers' to become 'citizens', represented proportionately within legislature, whereas in Zimbabwe, whites remained under separate representation in parliament for 10 years and effectively chose to remain political outsiders. Third, whereas ZANU-PF has succeeded in imposing massive controls upon a 'thin' civil society, the ANC is confronted with a far more complex, 'thick', civil society terrain that it struggles to contain. A myriad of organizations representative of business, labour, churches, environmental groups, different political ideologies, and welfare organizations lobby government and wider opinion through a diverse and lively media. Fourth, whereas the military in Zim-

[6] Essentially this is the problematic tackled in Southall (2013).

babwe has fused with political power, in South Africa it remains organizationally quite separate (although concerns have been raised by the increasing militarization of many aspects of policing). Fifth, whereas ZANU-PF's political repression has led to the political flight of millions (most to South Africa), the ANC government confronts high levels of revolt from within it is own broad constituency, with protests climbing to a level that severely tests the official capacity for containment.[7] If, in addition to all this, the Tripartite Alliance was to split and a popularly-based rival political movement—whether the EFF, a NUMSA-related socialist party or a combination of both—was to prove capable of mounting a significant challenge to the ANC, then the ruling party might be prompted to extend its control over the electoral terrain to deny the prospect of defeat at the polls.

Yet Levitsky and Way would urge us to move beyond examination of the ANC's organizational capacity to assess the likelihood of such a shift. From this perspective, I argue:

In terms of *linkage*, South Africa remains largely dependent upon investment from and trade with the United States and European Union. Much is made of South Africa's political, economic and strategic reorientation towards the global South since 1994, notably with regard to the growth of its trade and investment links with other Africa countries, alongside its recent accession to the BRICS countries (the Brazil, Russia, India, China grouping, with South Africa now tagging along as the de facto junior partner and representative of Africa). This has resulted in changing economic linkages, with China having emerged as South Africa's most important individual export trading partner since 2009, and India overtaking the UK as South Africa's fifth largest export destination. Nonetheless, traditional connections remain strong. Collectively, the EU remains South Africa's largest trading partner. Trade between SA and the EU has increased dramatically since the early 1990s, this sealed by the recent finalisation of an Economic Partnership Agreement between SADC and the EU which is touted as dramatically increasing access to the European market for South African products. Whereas trade with China is evocative of colonial patterns (China imports South African minerals in exchange for manufactured products), South African exports to Europe are considerably more varied. Meanwhile, boosted by South Africa's benefitting from the US African Growth and Opportunity Act of 2000, bilateral trade with the US has also increased greatly, with the balance of trade in South Africa's favour. Investment patterns are even more dramatic: the EU accounts for over 80 % of FDI in South Africa compared with China, which accounts for less than 4 %, while South African portfolio investment abroad is similarly overwhelmingly (77 %) located in Europe. Despite much anti-Western rhetoric, the South African economy remains inherently connected to Europe and the US (Sandrey 2013).

Concerns abound that China and Russia possess increasing *leverage* that compromises South African commitments to democracy and human rights (Smith 2015). These concerns have been downplayed consistently since 1994, as South African for-

[7] National Police Commissioner Riah Phiyega recently informed parliament that while the level of 'protest related incidents' remained largely constant from 2010 to 2011 to 2011–2012 (12,651 compared to 12,399), the number of violent protests doubled from 971 to 1,882 during the same period (*Business Day*, 08.09.2014).

eign policy has moved away from the noble aspirations declared under Mandela to a more pragmatic realpolitik. Such fears are compounded by radical nationalist rhetoric and symbolism emanating from various levels of the ANC/SACP, anti-Western sentiment celebrating Soviet-era, and Chinese support for the liberation struggle. Still, Western leverage remains high. Despite reservations, the West continues to promote South Africa as a force for democracy and stability in an unruly region. This is underpinned by a remarkably high flow of cultural relations infused with Western liberal norms, buoyed by South Africa's ever-deeper incorporation into Western-dominated global communication networks (Le Pere 2015).

Strong impulses within the ANC could lead it in the direction of competitive authoritarianism if the party were confronted with the risk of losing power. However, such a shift would encounter major opposition from both outside and within the country. It would also have major economic consequences, as threats to democracy and stability would imperil Western trade and investment links which even South Africa's growing linkages with the BRICS countries and Africa would be unable to replace. Above all, despite liberation movement solidarity with ZANU-PF, ANC policymakers are fully aware of the economic fate that has accompanied Zimbabwe's retreat from democracy. Ultimately, it likely they would rather attempt to tame the uncertainties of party dominance than risk the clear dangers of competitive authoritarianism.

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Linkage, leverage and organisational power: Algeria and the Maghreb Spring

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Abstract As Abdelaziz Bouteflika begins his fourth term as Algeria's president, questions persist over his regime's survival. Why has it endured while those of Tunisia's Ben Ali and Libya's Qaddafi have not? What has Bouteflika done differently? What sets Algeria apart? The aim of this paper is to address these questions by using Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way's (Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) celebrated model for explaining democratisation to chart and examine Algeria's links to European and North American countries, the amount of leverage Western governments have over Algiers, and the Bouteflika regime's organisational strength. The paper concludes that Europe and North America have little appetite and only limited means to press Algeria to democratise and that the regime possesses strong coercive capabilities. Together, these factors have helped ensure Bouteflika's survival.

Keywords Algeria · Maghreb · Arab Spring · Levitsky and Way · Competitive authoritarianism · Democratisation · Linkage · Leverage · Organisational power

Introduction

More than any other ballot in Algeria's recent history, the 2014 presidential election was marked by genuine doubt. Staged against the backdrops of the Maghreb Spring and Abdelaziz Bouteflika's continued ill health (Martín 2013, p. 69), uncertainty and

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speculation abounded over what might happen.[1] Would this be the moment when the country finally succumbed to the tide of change that had already swept neighbouring Tunisia, Libya and Egypt? Could the military backed regime engineer an unprecedented fourth election victory for a candidate who was so obviously unwell? Would Bouteflika survive the rigours of the election campaign? Did his candidacy indicate the regime's lack of imagination and options, and herald its possible demise? Might the army's iron grip on the political system finally be loosening?

In the end, many of these doubts were swept away by Bouteflika's emphatic victory.[2] News of his triumph did not spark any great outpourings of discontent or disbelief. There was no march on the capital. Government buildings were not attacked and occupied. Boroughs and districts that had voted against him did not rebel. The regime prevailed and, in so doing, confirmed both its strength and capacity to endure. For in a climate of regional political upheaval in which voters were no longer afraid to demand and agitate for change, it had successfully orchestrated the re-election of a candidate who was 77 years old, had held a senior political post for long periods since independence,[3] had already been in office for one and a half decades, and was so ill he could barely stand.

The removal of these doubts, for a little while at least, have in turn raised pressing questions about the country's democratic process, the ongoing vigour of the Maghreb Spring and the ability of democratisation scholars to explain and anticipate the development of political systems. Why has Algeria not gone the way of Tunisia and Libya despite having so much in common with them? Do the subdued domestic and international reactions to the election mark the ebbing of the Spring tide? And how do democratisation scholars account for Algeria's difference? The aim of this paper is to address these questions by drawing on Levitsky and Way's (2010) dimensions of linkage, leverage and organisational power to explain the survival of President Bouteflika's regime.

In so doing, the paper makes three valuable and original contributions. To begin with, it is the first to use Levitsky and Way's dimensions to structure an analysis of Algeria's recent political development. This unique approach leads it to place special emphasis on Algeria's changed relationship with Europe and North America, and ways in which President Bouteflika exercises greater control over his country's coercive capabilities than did either Ben Ali or Gadhafi. To be clear, the paper makes no claim as to the originality of the information it includes, only to the way this information is organised and the factors it focuses on. This approach is consistent with that adopted by Levitsky and Way in their 2010 book as they also relied upon existing studies of each of their cases. By using these dimensions to structure its examination,

[1] The term Maghreb Spring refers to the wide range of events, demands, initiatives and actors that together comprise the Arab Awakening as it manifests itself in Northwest Africa.

[2] Bouteflika won over 80 % of the votes cast (Markey and Chikhi 2014, p. 1).

[3] After serving as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1963 to 1978, Bouteflika was one of the frontrunners to succeed President Houari Boumedienne when he died in December 1978. Then in 1989, after spending 6 years in self-imposed exile to avoid corruption charges, Bouteflika re-joined the ruling National Liberation Front's (Front de Libération Nationale, FLN) Central Committee before being elected president in April 1999 (Lowi 2009, p. 129).

the paper lays the organisational groundwork for Algeria's systematic comparison with its neighbours. The paper does not attempt this comparison itself.

Second, by seeking to explain Algeria's recent political experiences, the paper addresses the shortfall of studies into the country during this critical period. Post-independence Algeria has often struggled to command the same level of scholarly attention as its Maghreb neighbours. And this comparative neglect has been particularly pronounced over the last few years because of the heightened dramas elsewhere. Perhaps inevitably, the scholarly eye has been drawn to the spectacular and significant developments that have taken place in Tunisia and Libya. The intense and widespread protests that quickly drove Ben Ali to flee, and the brutal civil war that fractured Libya and led to Gadhafi's death have invited more urgent investigation than Algeria's more limited and less effective demonstrations (Layachi 2014, p. 136). By exploring what has happened in Algeria, the paper casts new light on the Maghreb Spring.

And third, the paper extends the application and broadens the applicability of Levitsky and Way's model. The paper is the first to use their dimensions of linkage, leverage and organisational power to examine Algeria's recent political development. In so doing, it not only extends their model to a group of countries (the Maghreb) that defy convenient categorisation as African, Middle Eastern or European and are, therefore, only imperfectly covered by existing analyses of cases from each of these regions,[4] but it also confirms the model's utility in explaining democratisation in places where the military holds tutelary power. For when selecting the case studies for their 2010 book, Levitsky and Way purposefully excluded 'other types of hybrid (or "partly free") regime[s]' including those 'in which top executive positions are filled via elections but the authority of elected governments is seriously constrained by the military or other nonelected bodies' (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 32). They did so on the grounds that 'in all of these regimes, the power of actors outside the electoral process generates a distinct set of dynamics and challenges not found under competitive authoritarianism' (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 32).

This decision raises two important concerns. First, that they chose their case studies to support their thesis. Second, that by excluding military backed and controlled regimes; they limited their model's claim to universality. For there are numerous countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and elsewhere in which the armed forces are politically influential or dominant. If none of these can be considered, large swathes of the world are potentially placed beyond their model's explanatory power. This paper uses Algeria to demonstrate the falsity of this limit.

The paper is organised along the same lines as each of their original case studies. Accordingly, it assesses the type and strength of Algeria's links to Europe and North America, the degree of leverage Washington, London, Paris and Brussels have over Algiers, and the strength of the Bouteflika regime's organisational power. It then moves on to trace the origins and development of the Algerian regime. In fact, the

[4] The Maghreb has long been considered a special region. Located at the geo-cultural intersection between Africa, the Middle East and Europe, its countries (Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya) are bound by commonalities that distinguish them from everywhere else (Humbaraci 1996, p. 10 and Willis 2012, p. 9). As a result, none of the various African, Asian and European case studies considered in Levitsky and Way's 2010 book completely speak to the Maghreb'

paper's only structural innovation is a short section at the start defining the dimensions of linkage, leverage and organisational power.

1 An overview of linkage, leverage and organisational power

In 2010 Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way published their celebrated and highly influential book, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*.[5] Its premise was that the end of the Cold War triggered a sharp decline in international tolerance of authoritarian practices and the regimes that employed them. Confronted by this new, far less sympathetic international environment, many of these regimes, but by no means all, were forced to change. Some, like Poland and Estonia, did so fundamentally to become fully functioning democracies. Yet others did so only partially. They adopted some or more of the trappings of democracy but fell short of becoming fully democratic. In these countries, 'electoral manipulation, unfair media access, abuse of state resources, and varying degrees of harassment and violence skewed the playing field in favour of the incumbents' (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 3).

Levitsky and Way describe such regimes as competitive authoritarian, and spend the remainder of their book developing and testing a model that can explain why some of them 'democratized during the post-Cold War period, while others remained stable and authoritarian and still others experienced turnover without democratization' (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 5). Their model emphasises the importance of international relations but still places significant weight on domestic factors, most notably, a regime's willingness and ability to defend itself. More specifically, they argue that a regime's readiness to democratise and the extent to which it does so are heavily influenced by the strength of its relations with the United States and European Union. Both are considered paragons and active proponents of democracy.

Levitsky and Way argue that relations with the US and EU take two main forms: linkage and leverage. Linkage relates to the 'density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organizational) and cross-border flows (of capital, goods and services, people, and information) among particular countries and the United States, the EU … and Western-dominated multilateral institutions' (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 43). Leverage, on the other hand, 'encompasses both … regimes' bargaining power vis-à-vis the West, or their ability to avoid Western action aimed at punishing abuse or encouraging political liberalization; and … the potential impact (in terms of economic health or security) of Western punitive action toward target states' (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 40–41).

A regime's capacity to withstand any such pressure is also affected by three other considerations. The first is the size and strength of its economy. The smaller and weaker it is, the less able a regime is to resist any pressure placed upon it. The second is the extent to which the United States and European Union coordinate their foreign policies and the consistency with which they pursue them. The more US and EU objectives are synchronised and rigorously pursed, the greater the pressure on a regime. And the third is the level of assistance provided by a black knight or

[5] For more on the reception of this work, please see the introduction to this special issue.

counter-hegemonic power. The more economic, military and/or diplomatic support such a power furnishes, the more a regime is able to withstand any pressure put upon it (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 41). Levitsky and Way grade Western linkages to and leverage over regimes high, medium and low. When linkage is high democratisation is more likely even if leverage is low. But when linkage is lower 'regime outcomes are driven largely by domestic factors' (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 70–71).

The most decisive of these domestic factors is the organisational power of a regime. For Levitsky and Way, organisational power has two key elements: the state and the party. If these are effective a regime is well placed 'to prevent elite defection, co-opt or repress opponents, defuse or crack down on protest[s], and win (or steal) elections' (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 56). Moreover, it is better able to withstand even 'vigorous opposition challenges' (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 56). But if the state and party are ineffective a regime is vulnerable to 'relatively weak opposition movements' (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 56). By extension, therefore, if external leverage is high a regime with low organisational power is susceptible to 'weak opposition challenges' (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 71). But if outside leverage is low even a regime lacking in organisational power is 'likely to survive, for they will encounter limited external democratizing pressure' (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 71).

2 Linkage, leverage and organisational power

The purpose of this section is to apply Levitsky and Way's model to Algeria. It does so by using the three dimensions and each of their respective sub-dimensions to frame and structure its analysis. That is, it focuses on events and actors relevant to the dimension and sub-dimensions in question. In this way, the section makes a comprehensive and evidenced assessment of the strength of Algeria's links to Europe and North America, the West's leverage over Algiers, and the Bouteflika regime's organisational capacity.

2.1 Linkage

Algeria has medium links to European and North American countries. The links between countries take a range of forms. Levitsky and Way organise these connections into six categories: economic ('flows of trade investment, and credit'); intergovernmental ('including bilateral diplomatic and military ties as well as participation in Western-led alliances, treaties, and international organisations'); technocratic ('the share of a country's elite that is educated in the West and/or has professional ties to Western universities or Western-led multilateral institutions'); social ('flows of people across borders, including terrorism, immigration and refugee flows, and diaspora networks'); information ('flows of information across borders via telecommunications, Internet connections, and Western media penetration'); and civil society

('local ties to Western-based NGOs, international religious and party organisations, and other transnational networks') (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 43–44).[6]

The strength of a country's linkage to Europe and North America is determined by the number and quality of connections between them. Algeria's economic ties to the West have grown stronger over the past 30 years. The forging of these closer bonds was initially triggered by the collapse of international oil and gas prices in the mid-1980s. Between 1985 and 1986 oil prices fell by around 60 %, from US$ 30 per barrel to just US$ 10 (Ruedy 2005, p. 245). This led to a similarly drastic drop in Algeria's foreign currency earnings and income as the value of its oil exports plummeted from US$ 47 to US$ 21 billion (Joffé 2002, p. 38). With its revenue much reduced and an increasing amount of what it did earn spent on repaying the country's spiralling debts (Dillman 1998, p. 3, pp. 13–14), the Algerian government was forced to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank for emergency support (Lowi 2009, p. 140; Dillman 1998, pp. 13–14).

Under the IMF and World Bank's guidance—first to qualify to receive loans and later in accordance with the loan agreements it signed—the Algerian government greatly scaled back its public spending, with far-reaching social and political consequences. It then set about liberalising its economy, which included placing some state-owned industries up for sale and inviting private and foreign investment in others (Meliani et al. 2004, p. 94). As a result, private and overseas investment in the economy has grown steadily over the past 20 years, leading to the establishment of significant links between Algiers and selected foreign companies and their governments (Witton 2010).

The West's willingness to work with Algiers has been further enhanced by the country's vital contribution to the global energy markets, and roles in both combatting *Al Qaeda* and promoting regional security. By 2005, the six largest consumers of Algeria's gas were Italy, Spain, France, Turkey, Portugal and the United States (Le Sueur 2010, p. 108). And for the past 25 years, its security forces have been fighting against a range of Islamist terror groups targeting Europe and North America (Le Sueur 2010, pp. 146–150). These groups also threaten Algeria's immediate neighbours, some of whom are ill equipped to deal with the danger. The size, experience and proven competence of Algeria's security forces, therefore, make it an essential regional partner.

The presence of large Algerian diaspora communities in their countries has also prompted Western governments to work more closely with Algiers (Silverstein 2004). The World Bank (2011, p. 1) estimated that in 2010 around 3.4 % of the total Algerian population lived abroad. Economically, the remittances the diaspora sends back to Algeria are worth billions of dollars and help support thousands of families.[7]

[6] There is an apparent inconsistency in *Competitive Authoritarianism* over the number of categories of links. In the subsection entitled Linkage to the West, Levitsky and Way identify six groupings: economic, intergovernmental, technocratic, social, information and civil society (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 43–44). Yet in Appendix III: Measuring Linkage, they identify only four categories: economic, social, communication and intergovernmental (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 374–375). Based on what they include, the information and communication groupings are broadly the same. This paper considers the six categories of links so as to cover the greater breadth of connections.

[7] The World Bank (2011, p. 1) values the money transfers made in 2010, at slightly over US$ 2 billion.

Politically, many of them retain the right to vote in Algerian elections, and eight seats are currently reserved for their representatives in the Algerian parliament. The security dimension is also important, as European governments worry about terrorist infiltration of these communities. One of the main reasons *Al Qaeda* entered into an alliance with the *Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat* (Groupe Salafiste pour Prédication et le Combat, GSPC) in January 2007 was to gain access to its European sources of funding as well as its networks of members and supporters (Le Sueur 2010, p. 156).

Inevitably the existence of this large, extensive population means that numerous well-developed civil society links connect Algeria and countries with significant Algerian diaspora communities. French and European groups in particular, some set up expressly to support and represent this trans-national populace, feature prominently on both sides of the Mediterranean (Silverstein 2004, p. 227). And the flow of ideas and information they encourage and enable is facilitated by modern technology. Cheap mobile telephones and satellite televisions, and easy access to email and social media allow ordinary Algerians—especially those residing in the coastal towns and cities, where the majority live—to remain fully informed about what is happening in the rest of the world and, more crucially, gain access to additional information about and alternative interpretations of events in Algeria.

2.2 Leverage

European and North American governments have low leverage over their Algerian counterpart even though economic, intergovernmental, social, information and civil society ties between their respective countries have grown in number and strength over the past 30 years. According to Levitsky and Way, a regime's ability to withstand outside pressure (to the extent that it falls within the low leverage category) is determined by any one of three criteria: if it has a large economy (with a total GDP greater than US$ 100 billion); is a major oil producer (extracting more than 1 million barrels of oil per day in an average year); or possesses or has access to nuclear weapons (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 372). Algeria currently conforms to two of these criteria. The World Bank calculated the size of Algeria's economy in 2013 to be US$ 210.2 billion (World Bank 2015, p. 1). And the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimated the country's total average oil production in 2013 to be 1.8 million barrels per day (EIA 2014, p. 6).

Indeed, oil and gas are key enablers of the Algerian regime. The size of the country's proven reserves (12.2 billion barrels of oil and 159 trillion cubic feet of gas) (EIA 2014, p. 5, 10) and the possibility of further significant discoveries (two-thirds of Algeria's vast territory have yet to be properly explored) (EIA 2014, p. 5) mean that the country is well endowed with these valuable and strategically important resources. Indeed, the large size of these reserves (Algeria is Africa's highest gas and third highest oil producer) (EIA 2014, p. 1) makes the country a crucial energy provider. And its significance as such has only grown over the past 15 years because of ongoing instability in other key oil and gas producing regions and the Russian government's attempts to use its gas reserves to put political pressure on Europe.

Drawing on Ross's (2001) definition of the resource curse,[8] Algeria's oil and gas sales have undermined democracy and strengthened authoritarianism in three key ways. First, they have had a rentier effect that occurs when 'governments use their oil revenues to relieve social pressures that might otherwise lead to demands for greater accountability' (Ross 2001, p. 332).[9] Second, they have had a repression effect that occurs when 'governments spend more on internal security' to 'block the population's democratic aspirations' (Ross 2001, p. 335). And third, they have had a modernisation effect whereby, as a result of the economic path the country is set on due to its heavy reliance on its oil sector, 'cultural and social changes' (Ross 2001, p. 336) often critical to democratisation simply do not occur.

Algeria has exhibited all three effects. To begin with, it is a rentier state as it 'derive[s] a large fraction of … [its] revenue[] from external rents' and 'workers' remittances … [are] an important source of foreign exchange' (Ross 2001, p. 329). Second, since the early 1990s the military has enjoyed exponential budget increases (which have been paid for by oil money) and has consistently acted to curb Algerians' democratic rights.[10] And third, all previous attempts to diversify Algeria's economy have failed to develop any non-hydrocarbon sector to the same level as the oil and gas sectors.[11]

European and North American governments' leverage over their Algerian counterpart is further undermined by their competing foreign policy objectives for the country. The most significant tension lies not between Paris and Brussels, Madrid and Rome, London and Washington, which all broadly want the same things, but between two of the main strands common to each of their policies. The first of these is a desire to see democracy strengthened and civil and human rights better protected. All of these governments would like Algiers to be more democratic and respectful of its citizens' liberties. And the second is a desire for greater political stability, secure access to the country's oil and gas supplies, and the effective containment of the Islamist terror threat (Zoubir 2004, pp. 176–179).

This tension has long shaped Europe's and North America's dealings with the Maghreb, especially since the attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon on 11

[8] As Ross observes, 'many of the poorest and most troubled states in the developing world have, paradoxically, high levels of natural resource wealth' (Ross 2001, p. 328). Moreover, 'states with greater natural resource wealth tend to grow more slowly than their resource-poor counterparts … [and] are … more likely to suffer from civil wars' (Ross 2001, p. 328). To these two components of the resource curse, Ross adds a third, that 'oil and mineral wealth tends to makes states less democratic' (Ross 2001, p. 328).

[9] More specifically, the rentier effect can manifest itself in at least three different forms. It can lead governments to use their revenues 'to tax their populations less heavily or not at all' in order to dampen their demands for 'accountability from—and representation in—their government' (Ross 2001, p. 332); increase spending on patronage, 'which in turn dampens latent pressures for democratisation' (Ross 2001, p. 338); and 'prevent the formation of social groups that are independent of the state and … may be inclined to demand greater political rights' (Ross 2001, p. 335).

[10] By 2009 Algeria's defence spending was not only the highest in Africa but was also seven times greater than what it had been in 1992 (Perlo-Freeman 2012, p. 203).

[11] The most notable attempt to diversify Algeria's economy was the programme of industrialising industries pursued by President Boumedienne in the 1970s (Bennoune 1988, p. 121).

September 2001.[12] As a result, the EU has consistently failed to rigorously pursue the lofty ambitions set down in its various North Africa strategies.[13] Indeed, it has been all too willing to reach compromises with the region's various authoritarian regimes (Dennison 2013, p. 119). This much has been acknowledged by both the European Commission and the European Council in their latest strategy, the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity (PfDSP), launched on 8 March 2011 (Echagüe et al. 2011, pp. 329–330). The PfDSP departs from earlier strategies, most notably the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), by privileging popular demands for greater political rights and freedoms, and advocating the use of positive rather than negative conditionality to promote democracy in the region (Teti 2012, p. 267, 272).

Despite these changes, Europe's dealings with the Maghreb are still marked by inconsistency. Some of the key mechanisms with which the EU proposes to promote democracy are either under-developed or continue to under-perform (Dennison 2013, p. 120). And many EU states still pursue agendas that run counter to the one set down in the PfDSP and in ways that are at odds with those advocated by the EU (Echagüe et al. 2011, pp. 331–334). Their actions and importance to Algiers 'as energy clients, security partners and exporters of defence equipment and training' (Dennison 2013, p. 123) inevitably undermine the EU's own message and efforts. As a result, relations between European and North American governments and their Algerian counterpart remain dominated by energy and security concerns (Dennison 2013, p. 123).

Finally, Algeria does not have a black knight patron. Levitsky and Way define a black knight as a high-income country (per capita GDP of US$ 10,000 or more) or major military power (with an annual defence budget of more than US$ 10 billion) (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 372–372) that provides substantial bilateral aid amounting to at least 1 % of the recipient's total GDP. Black knights are usually extra-European and North American powers although France has, on occasion, played this role (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 41). In providing this aid, a black knight helps inure a regime against other outside influences. No country currently provides Algeria with sufficient bilateral aid to qualify as its black knight. France, for instance, one of the largest aid investors in the country, has committed € 217.2 million of aid since 2000, far less than Levitsky and Way's 1 % annual threshold (Agence Française de Développement 2014, p. 1).

2.3 Organisational power

The Algerian regime has high organisational power because of its discretionary control of the country's economy, medium party strength and, most crucially, high coercive capacity. According to Levitsky and Way, a regime's coercive capabilities can be classified high if it possesses a 'large, well-trained, and well-equipped security apparatus with an effective presence across the national territory … [including] spe-

[12] The restrictions President Clinton had imposed on the sale of certain weapons and other military equipment to Algiers' in response to its questionable human rights record were quietly lifted in the wake of the terror attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon (Le Sueur 2010, p. 106; Evans and Phillips 2007, p. 255).

[13] The EU's earlier strategies include the Mediterranean Partnership (1995), the European Neighbourhood Policy (2004), and the Union for the Mediterranean (2008) (Echagüe et al. 2011, p. 330).

cialised intelligence or internal security agencies with demonstrated capacity to penetrate civil society and monitor and repress opposition activities at the village and/or neighbourhood level across the country' (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 376).

Algeria has long had a large and politically influential military. The armed forces' current privileged position is mainly the result of the various counterinsurgency and counterterrorism measures introduced by successive governments from the early 1990s onwards.[14] Initially, Algeria's military was ill-equipped to fight a counterinsurgency campaign. Yet from the mid-1990s onwards, it gradually gained the upper hand. Specialist units were either established or expanded (Lowi 2005, p. 234). New weapons and equipment were procured. Training and doctrine were adapted and improved. Local militia forces were raised to guard isolated settlements (Lowi 2005, p. 235) and free up regular army units to pursue insurgents (Martinez 2004, p. 21). And by ruthless means, the country's political and military leaders gained a more complete and improved intelligence picture of the insurgency (Evans and Phillips 2007, p. 254).

These reforms have left Algeria with a large, well-funded, well-equipped, battle-hardened and politically influential military. Moreover, the presence of a small but committed rump of fighters with excellent links to *Al Qaeda* continues to furnish the regime with a compelling reason why it needs to maintain these forces at their current high level. Just as crucial, however, has been President Bouteflika's determination to keep them onside. In December 2010, his government announced it was giving most of the country's 170,000 police officers a 50% pay rise that would be backdated three years. And 12 months later, it announced a similarly generous deal for members of the armed forces raising some salaries by as much as 40% and backdating all increases by 3 years again (Volpi 2013, p. 111).

Less vital to the regime's organisational power is party strength. From independence until the autumn of 1989, the National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale, FLN) was Algeria's only legal party. And for much of that period, certainly from the late 1960s onwards, its strength was high. According to Levitsky and Way, a party's strength is determined by both scope and cohesion. A high scope party is a 'mass organisation that penetrates virtually all population centres down to village and neighbourhood level and/or civil society and/or workplace … [and engages in] significant grassroots activity—during and between elections—across the national territory' (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 377). And a high cohesion party is a 'single governing party that achieved power via violent conflict, including revolution or national liberation struggle in which much of the current leadership participated' (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 377).

For nearly 30 years, the FLN had high scope and high cohesion. It had launched the war of liberation and steadily confirmed its leadership of the anti-colonial campaign by either eliminating or incorporating other nationalist groups (Le Sueur 2005, p. 186; Evans 2012b, p. 217). All of the country's post-independence presidents, including those who have held office since 1989, have been members of the FLN, and

[14] The Islamist insurgency which gripped the country throughout this period grew rapidly from 2,000 fighters in 1992 to 27,000 in 1994 (Lowi 2005, p. 232).

two, Ben Bella and Mohamed Boudiaf, were among its founding fathers.[15] Indeed, it was the scale of the FLN's penetration of society, its familiarity to most Algerians, and unique and celebrated role in leading the country to independence that convinced President Benjedid that it would win the local, regional and parliamentary elections he ordered to be held in June 1990 and December 1991.

Yet since 1989, party strength has been medium. Again based on scope and cohesion, Levitsky and Way define a medium strength party as one that 'does not meet the criteria for high scope but possesses a national organisation that penetrates most population centres and is capable of carrying out election campaigns and fielding candidates across the national territory', and which is either 'an established party … that does not meet the criteria for high cohesion', or a 'new party ([which] has participated in fewer than two national elections) with evidence of shared ideology or ethnicity in a context in which that ideological or ethnic cleavage is predominant' (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 377–378).

None of the parties in Algeria today enjoy the advantages that the FLN once did. The FLN today is a national organisation and the inheritor of this celebrated name (as well as much of the baggage associated with it). The National Rally for Democracy (Rassemblement National Démocratique, RND) is also a national party but lacks deep roots as it has always been an establishment party, a top-down creation founded in February 1997 as a vehicle for President Zéroual and then President Bouteflika.[16] Indeed, Zéroual was its first secretary general and was succeeded by Ahmed Ouyahia, his one-time prime minister who served two more terms as premier under Bouteflika. Yet between them the FLN and RND offer the regime considerable reach. In the 2012 parliamentary election the FLN came first, winning 208 (out of 462) seats, and the RND second, winning 68 seats (Evans 2012a, p. 1).

Finally, the regime exercises significant control over Algeria's economy. According to Levitsky and Way, such discretionary influence can manifest itself either through the existence of a 'state-controlled mineral sector [that] accounts for more than 50% of export revenue' or a 'centrally planned economy that does not undergo large-scale privatisation' (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 378). The Bouteflika regime, like all its post-independence predecessors, is able to influence and shape the economy by both means. SONATRACH, the state operated hydrocarbon company, owns around 80% of all oil and gas produced in Algeria (EIA 2014, p. 4), while hydrocarbon sales abroad generate around 95% of the country's total export earnings (EIA 2014, p. 1).

From independence until the early 1980s, successive governments pursued explicitly socialist economic programmes that privileged central economic planning. Then with gathering speed from the early 1980s onwards, the regime pursued liberalisation and sought greater private and overseas investment. Yet despite these measures, the state remains a major economic actor because of its control over the crucial hydrocarbon sectors that generate around 60% of its total income (EIA 2014, p. 1). Moreover, in recent years, as the country's debt service ratio has fallen to more manageable

[15] The FLN was established in 1954 by nine men: Hocine Ait Ahmed, Ahmed Ben Bella, Larbi Ben M'Hidi, Mustapha Ben Boulaid, Mohamed Boudiaf, Rabah Bitat, Mourad Didouche, Mohamed Khider and Belkacem Krim (Ottaway and Ottaway 1970, p. 14n).

[16] Bouteflika stood as both the FLN and RND's candidate in the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections.

levels owing to the record high international oil and gas prices, President Bouteflika has strengthened national control of the economy, passing legislation in 2009 requiring all companies to be at least 51 % Algerian-owned (US Department of State 2013, p. 1).

3 Origins and development of the regime

The purpose of this section is to chart Algeria's transformation into a competitive authoritarian regime. From 1989 to 1992 Algeria had a multi-party system in which the best advantaged party, the FLN, repeatedly lost out to its rivals.[17] Then from January 1992 to November 1995, Algeria was an authoritarian regime as no presidential or parliamentary elections were held. And since November 1995, Algeria has been a competitive authoritarian regime as Presidents Zéroual and Bouteflika have allowed multi-party elections to take place for all levels of government but have ensured that regime-backed candidates and parties enjoy significant advantages over their rivals.

More specifically, Algeria's transformation has encompassed three main parts. The first has entailed the careful screening of participants. Those standing for election, and especially presidential candidates, are subjected to the closest scrutiny both in accordance with electoral law and beyond it. Mahfoud Nahnah, the veteran leader of the Movement for a Peaceful Society (Mouvement pour la Société de la Paix, MSP), was prevented from entering the 1999 presidential election because he could not provide evidence of having fought in the war of liberation. This remains the only occasion such a qualification has been enforced. And Ali Benflis, Bouteflika's former prime minister and secretary general of the FLN, was impeded in the 2004 presidential election when Bouteflika used the courts to delay and dilute his nomination by the FLN as its official candidate.[18]

This does not mean that genuine opponents are never allowed to participate. Nahnah ran in the 1995 presidential election and won around 25 % of the vote (it was this success that almost certainly led to his being excluded from the 1999 election). Said Sadi, the long-time leader of the Rally for Culture and Democracy (Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie, RCD) took part in the 1995 and 2004 elections (but boycotted the 1999 and 2009 votes). And Louisa Hanoune, leader of the Workers' Party (Parti des Travailleurs, PT) participated in the 2004, 2009 and 2014 elections. It is now established practice for the rules to be changed on an *ad hoc*, election-by-election basis to ensure the regime's preferred candidate wins.

Political parties are also closely controlled. The Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut, FIS) is still outlawed despite repeated calls from opposition

[17] In the local and regional elections held on 12 June 1990, the FLN retained control of just 487 municipal and 14 *wilaya* councils compared to the 853 and 32 taken by the FIS (Hill 2009, p. 135). Then in the parliamentary election held on 26 December 1991 it retained just 15 seats compared to the 188 won by the FIS and 25 taken by the Socialist Forces Front (Front des Forces Socialistes, FFS) (Hill 2009, p. 137).

[18] Benflis did eventually stand in the election as a FLN candidate. But as a result of Bouteflika's actions, the FLN split with part of it nominating Benflis and part of it Bouteflika (Layachi 2014, p. 146n).

groups and leaders for its re-legalisation.[19] The Movement for an Islamic Society (Al-Harakat li-Mujtama` Islamimi, HAMAS) and Islamic Renaissance Movement (Mouvement de la Nahda Islamique, MNI) have both been forced to change their names—to the Movement for a Peaceful Society and the Renaissance Movement (Mouvement de la Nahda, MN) respectively—to comply with article 42 of the 1996 constitution that forbids parties from appealing exclusively to specific religious, linguistic or racial communities (République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire 1996, Article 42).[20] And both Zéroual and Bouteflika have allowed and encouraged the establishment of new parties that, by participating in political life, have helped to legitimise the parameters set by Zéroual and Bouteflika. Moreover, the higher the number of parties the greater the chance the opposition vote will be split and thus the easier it becomes for Bouteflika and other regime politicians to be (re)elected.

The second part of Zéroual and Bouteflika's rehabilitation process has entailed aiding and abetting their preferred candidates and parties. In the run-up to the 2009 presidential election, Bouteflika, and the RND and FLN were advantaged in several significant ways. First, Bouteflika began campaigning earlier than he was permitted to (Freedom House 2011, p. 20). Second, his campaign was given not only more coverage but also more favourable coverage by the media than those of his rivals. The Algerian League for the Defence of Human Rights (Ligue Algérienne pour la Défense des Driots de l'Homme, LADDH) calculated that 88.5% of television and radio, and 27.6% of press coverage of the election focused sympathetically on him (Freedom House 2011, p. 20). Third, and in violation of electoral law, Bouteflika promised lucrative public contracts to private businessmen in return for their financial backing, making his campaign by far the best funded (Freedom House 2011, p. 20).

The third and final part of the rehabilitation process has been the manipulation of the votes themselves. Under Zéroual and Bouteflika, Algeria has had five presidential (1995, 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014) and four parliamentary elections (1997, 2002, 2007 and 2012), and three national referendums (1996, 1999 and 2005).[21] Some of these elections have been freer and fairer than others. The 1995 presidential and 2012 parliamentary ballots were two of the fairest. The 1997 parliamentary election was less fair, leading several opposition parties to file complaints with the Constitutional Council. And election monitors and opposition parties raised serious concerns about the conduct of the 1999, 2004 and 2009 presidential, and the 2002 and 2007 parlia-

[19] A high point in this pressure was the publication of the so-called Sant'Egidio Platform on 13 January 1995. The Platform was the outcome of a series of meetings between the leaders of the main opposition parties (FLN, FFS, MSP, PT and the Movement for Democracy in Algeria (Mouvement pour la Démocratie en Algérie, MDA) and those senior FIS figures not in prison at the Sant'Egidio religious community in Rome. As well as calling for the separation of powers, the re-establishment of a multi-party system, Tamazight to be given equal status with Arabic, and the government to foreswear the use of violence for political purposes, it also demanded that the ban on the FIS be lifted. Even though many of its objectives matched his own, President Zéroual summarily rejected the Platform because he saw it as a threat to his authority (Le Sueur 2010, pp. 66–67).

[20] This had been a provision of the 1989 constitution as well, but had not been enforced.

[21] The 1996 referendum was to approve a new national constitution (passed), the 1999 referendum to approve an amnesty for Islamist insurgents (Law of Civil Concord, passed), and the 2005 referendum to approve a second amnesty (Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, passed).

mentary elections. Indeed, so extensive was the malpractice witnessed by the EU, US, OSCE and UN during the 1999 and 2004 presidential elections that they all refused to send any observers to oversee the 2009 vote (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2009, p. 1),[22] which was also marked by widespread allegations of ballot box stuffing and thefts, repeat voting, and other irregularities (Freedom House 2011, p. 19). The conduct of the most recent 2014 presidential election has also been widely condemned by opposition parties and the defeated candidate, Ali Benflis (Aljazeera 2014, p. 1).

These iniquities undoubtedly helped fuel the various protests that were staged in Algiers and other towns and cities from December 2010 through to January 2012, and sporadically throughout 2013. The Algerian opposition bears noteworthy similarities to both its successful counterparts in Tunisia and Libya, and its less effective equivalent in Morocco, but is different from them all in at least one crucial respect. All of the region's protest movements sprang from surprising sources, as none of them were initially built around or led by an established opposition party (to the extent that such bodies were allowed to exist and operate in their respective political systems). Rather, these movements were more spontaneous coalescences of civil society groups. Moreover, Islamic organisations featured far less prominently in the early protests than they did in the political settlements forged afterwards.[23]

The protestors in Tunisia have achieved far more dramatic results than their comrades in either Morocco or Algeria and, in so doing, paved the way for yet more fundamental change. Ben Ali's departure and the subsequent outlawing of his party, the Democratic Constitutional Rally (Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique, RCD), on 6 February 2011, created an extraordinary political opening in which they can compete. And since then, they have been able to influence the various transitional governments that have assumed power, participate in the prolonged debate over the new constitution and shape the new political order that is being established.[24]

In contrast, the 20 February Movement—the broad coalition that came to lead the pro-democracy protests in Morocco—did not accomplish anything nearly as profound. Ousting the king, the main locus of power in the country, was never a popular or realistic objective. His endurance inevitably meant that the Movement was not presented with the same scale of opportunity as were the protestors in Tunisia. Moreover, the palace responded quickly and adeptly to the demonstrations. On 9 March 2011, just two and half weeks after the Movement was established, the king launched a royal commission to review the constitution and recommend ways in which it could be reformed.[25] The creation of the commission not only enabled the palace to regain

[22] Nevertheless the outcome of the 2009 election, which was widely questioned by both domestic monitors and opposition parties, was still accepted by Paris, Brussels, London and Washington. Of course concerns were raised and hopes for greater rigour and transparency in the future were voiced. But such doubts were made *sotto voce* and were not considered sufficiently serious to prevent either President Hollande or Prime Minister Cameron from paying historic and highly symbolic visits later on.

[23] The Islamist Justice and Development Party (Parti de la Justice et du Développement, PJD) and Ennahda have won legislative elections in Morocco and Tunisia respectively.

[24] The new constitution was overwhelmingly approved by Tunisia's Constituent Assembly on 26 January 2014.

[25] The new constitution was approved by referendum on 1 July 2011.

control of the debate over the constitution, but also allowed it to marginalise the Movement and re-establish the official opposition parties as the (approved) conveyors of the public's demands and grievances (Dalmasso and Cavatorta 2013, pp. 230–231). Although the 20 February Movement continues to organise protests, it is not nearly as large or threatening to the regime as it once was.

Ostensibly the protests in Algeria followed a similar pattern as those in Morocco. The early, spontaneous demonstrations soon came to be orchestrated and led by a body called the National Co-ordination for Change and Democracy (Coordination Nationale pour le Changement et la Démocratie, CNCD), an umbrella organisation comprised of a range of opposition political parties and civil society groups. And just as King Mohamed did, President Bouteflika responded by quickly undertaking a series of popular and highly symbolic reforms, including lifting the state of emergency that had been in place since January 1992, and promising to review and make changes to the constitution. Unlike in Morocco, however, the gradual decrease in the number of protests, along with the size and intensity of those that continued to be held, was not due primarily to the government's skilful appropriation of the demonstrators' agenda. Rather, it was because of popular trepidation born of recent, painful experience.

Indeed, from the moment the protests began, parallels with the Black October riots of 1988 were drawn in the press and elsewhere (Volpi 2013, p. 107). While these comparisons provided the security forces with a timely reminder to be on their best behaviour, they also drew attention to the deaths, disappearances, injuries, and suffering of the previous 20 years. During this period around 150,000 people were killed (Martinez 2004, p. 15) and thousands more simply vanished (Le Sueur 2005, p. 320). Arbitrary detentions, torture and summary executions were frequent. It was against this historic backdrop, therefore, that the Maghreb Spring protests took place in Algeria.

Conclusion

Algeria is a case of medium linkage, low leverage and high organisational power that together help explain the durability of competitive authoritarianism there. As such, it bears out Levitsky and Way's thesis on the importance of linkage and leverage, and leverage and organisational power. Algeria's medium linkage means that its political development is driven by domestic factors. And the regime's high organisational power means that it is well placed to withstand both opposition challenges and any pressure placed upon it by the EU and US. The regime's build-up and maintenance of its high coercive capacity has been greatly facilitated by the large revenues it has earned from its oil and gas sectors. And what pressure has been exerted by the West since the start of the Maghreb Spring has been compromised by the United States' and Europe's haphazard coordination of their foreign policy goals, and the pursuit of incompatible and competing objectives by the EU and individual European governments.

The paper makes three important and original contributions. It is the first to use Levitsky and Way's dimensions of linkage, leverage and organisational power to

structure an analysis of Algeria's recent political development. In so doing, it draws attention to the country's changed and changing relationship with Europe and North America. This relationship and Algeria's ability to neutralise, offset and withstand at least some of the democratising pressure placed upon it by Paris, Brussels, London and Washington is critical to explaining its evolution into a competitive authoritarian regime. Second, the paper extends Levitsky and Way's concepts to a country to which they have never before been applied and to a regime type (one in which the military holds tutelary power) that they purposely excluded from their choice of case studies in their 2010 book. The paper rejects the original limitation they impose by demonstrating the applicability of their dimensions to Algeria and other similar countries.

Third, the paper helps counteract the deficit of studies into Algeria over the past few years by explaining why Bouteflika's regime has endured while those of Ben Ali and Gadhafi have not. The critical difference between these regimes has been Bouteflika's high organisational power and ability to retain sufficient control over Algeria's large and effective military. Unlike its Algerian counterpart, the Tunisian army did not play nearly as prominent a role in securing independence. As a result, it has never commanded the same degree of political influence and popular prestige. Moreover, both Presidents Bourguiba and Ben Ali took care to exclude its officers from political life (Joffé 2011, p. 519). So when mass demonstrations broke out in many of the country's major towns and cities in late December 2011 and early January 2012, it refused to fire on the protestors as it had no great vested interest in preserving the regime. The burden of defending the government fell instead to the police and security services, which were quickly overwhelmed by the task (Joffé 2011, p. 519).

Relations between Gadhafi and the Libyan armed forces were even more strained. As the leader of the small group of army officers who ousted King Idris from power in 1969, Gadhafi understood only too well the military's importance to his regime's survival. To stop it doing to him what he had done to his predecessor, he placed strict limits on the activities in which its members could engage (Joffé 2011, p. 522). And to dilute its influence still further and offer him an alternative source of coercive power, he established a militia made up of Tuareg tribesmen from northern Mali. The suspicion and, at times, barely concealed contempt with which he treated his military, especially after its humiliating defeat by Chad's forces in 1987 (Joffé 2011, p. 522), ensured that many of its officers felt little loyalty towards him. This much was confirmed by the number of units that quickly sided with the rebels once the civil war began in February 2011. And the regime suffered further catastrophic desertions in July that year when around 3,000 Tuareg fighters quit Libya for northern Mali, taking all of their weapons, equipment and vehicles with them (Zoubir 2012, p. 454; Lounnas 2013, pp. 328–329). Inevitably, these defections greatly impaired the regime's ability to defend itself.

Finally, as well as possessing the means to survive, the Algerian regime also boasts the know-how and determination. The country continues to be governed by men (and a few women) who fought in the war of liberation. The wealth of experience this gave them for grinding out results has been added to by the long and ongoing struggle against the Islamist insurgents and terrorists. The importance of this experience is highlighted by Way (2011, p. 20), who observes that 'the existence or absence of a recent revolutionary struggle largely explains which communist regimes survived in

1989 and which did not. The ones that outlasted the end of the Cold War—China, Cuba, Laos, North Korea, Vietnam—were all led by veterans of revolutionary struggles'. Unlike the leaders of any other Maghreb country, Algerian leaders have successfully resisted two committed and capable foes. Thus they are well versed in doing what is necessary to ensure political survival.

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AUFSÄTZE

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERGLEICHENDE POLITIKWISSENSCHAFT

The limits of democratization through a regional hegemon: South African linkage and leverage and the skewed playing field in Lesotho party competition

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Abstract This article has two aims: First, it examines the effect of a *democratic* and *non*-Western regional hegemon on democratization processes in neighboring countries, applied to the case of South Africa and its influence on democratization in Lesotho. Second, it applies Levitsky and Way's framework to the case of Lesotho. The results of the analysis attenuate optimism about the potential of democratic non-Western regional hegemons to replace missing Western linkage and induce full democratization in neighboring countries. The analysis shows there is high linkage and leverage between South Africa and Lesotho according to Levitsky and Way's measurement. Yet the 2012 turnover through elections in Lesotho turns out to be a sign of unstable competitive authoritarianism, rather than an indication of an evolution towards full democratization, i.e. it is the result of high Western and South African leverage, low Western linkage, and low organizational power of the incumbent party. A qualitative assessment of linkage between South Africa and Lesotho shows that linkage between the two countries is not as dense as suggested by the measurement according to Levitsky and Way's criteria. This calls into question whether their measurement criteria for linkage actually reflect their own hypothesized role of linkage.

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Die Grenzen der Demokratisierung durch einen regionalen Hegemon: Die Verbindungen Lesothos mit seinem Nachbar Südafrika und die ungleichen Voraussetzungen im Parteienwettbewerb

Zusammenfassung Dieser Artikel hat zwei Ziele: Erstens untersucht er den Effekt eines demokratischen und nicht-westlichen Hegemons auf Demokratisierungsprozesse in Nachbarsländern, aufgezeigt am südafrikanischen Einfluss auf die Demokratisierung in Lesotho. Zweitens wendet er Levitsky und Ways Theorie im Fall Lesothos an. Die Resultate der Analyse dämpfen allzu starken Optimismus bezüglich des Potentials demokratischer, nicht-westlicher regionaler Hegemone, fehlende Verbindungen mit dem Westen wettzumachen und vollständige Demokratisierung in Nachbarsländern herbeizuführen. Die Analyse zeigt, dass gemäß Levitsky und Ways Messmethode starke Verbindungen zwischen der Regionalmacht Südafrika und dem kleinen Lesotho bestehen. Jedoch signalisiert der durch die Wahlen im Jahr 2012 herbeigeführte Machtwechsel in Lesotho instabilen kompetitiven Autoritarismus und nicht den Endpunkt einer Entwicklung hin zur vollständigen Demokratie. Der Machtwechsel ist folglich ein Produkt westlichen und südafrikanischen Drucks, geringer Verbindungen mit dem Westen und schwacher organisatorischer Kapazität der regierenden Partei. Eine qualitative Analyse der Verbindungen zwischen Südafrika und Lesotho zeigt, dass die Verbindungen zwischen den beiden Ländern nicht so dicht sind wie die Messung nach Levitsky und Ways Kriterien vermuten lassen würde. Dies wirft die Frage auf, ob Levitsky und Ways Messkriterien tatsächlich die von ihnen postulierte Rolle von Verbindungen zwischen kompetitiv-autoritären Staaten und demokratischen Hegemonen abzubilden vermögen.

Schlüsselwörter Südafrika · Lesotho · Autoritarismus · Demokratisierung · Außenpolitik · Wahlen

1 Introduction

The aim of this study is twofold: First, it examines the effect of a *democratic* and *non*-Western regional hegemon on democratization processes in neighboring countries, applied to the case of democratic South Africa and its influence on democratization in Lesotho.[1] Second, it applies Levitsky and Way's (2010) framework to Lesotho. The article analyzes whether linkage between the non-Western, democratic regional hegemon South Africa and its neighbor Lesotho can compensate for Lesotho's lack of linkage to the US and the EU 15 and lead to full democratization in Lesotho. After all,

[1] Lesotho is completely surrounded by South Africa. Lesotho has a population of 2 Mio. people, comparable to Namibia and Botswana in the region. Its area size is comparable to that of Belgium. The people of Lesotho, pronounced *Lesutu*, are called Basotho (*Basutu*). The singular is Mosotho (*Mosutu*).

Lesotho experienced its first real turnover by multiparty elections in 2012 and neutral observers such as Freedom House praised the peaceful turnover as Lesotho's final step to full democratization (Freedom House 1999–2013). I will examine whether this positive assessment of Lesotho's contemporary electoral regime is indeed justified and whether it can be attributed to the degree of linkage between Lesotho and the democratic regional hegemon South Africa.

The study applies Levitsky and Way's (2010) framework of analysis and their measurement criteria to analyze the role of linkage, leverage, organizational power, and regime type in the case of South Africa and Lesotho, and compares it with South Africa's influence in other neighboring countries in the region (please refer to the introduction of this special issue for a detailed discussion of Levitsky and Way's framework of analysis in the Sub-Saharan African context).

The analysis is organized as follows: First, I adapt Levitsky and Way's concept of linkage between the West and competitive authoritarian regimes to linkage between non-Western democratic hegemons and neighboring countries in their respective regions. Second, I analyze South Africa's linkage to and leverage of Lesotho during the 1990s according to Levitsky and Way's (2010, pp. 374–375) measurement of linkage and leverage. Third, I assess Lesotho's degree of organizational power during the 1990s according to Levitsky and Way's (2010, pp. 376–380) respective measurement. Fourth, the article traces the development of the regime type in Lesotho in connection with South African linkage and leverage from 1993 to 2012 analogous to Levitsky and Way's (2010, pp. 365–371) regime type measurement. Fifth, the article compares the successfulness of South African linkage and leverage to induce full democratization in Lesotho with its impact on democratization in Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Sixth, the article identifies two explanations for the relative unsuccessfulness of South African linkage and leverage at inducing regional democratization. Lastly, the article concludes by summarizing the main findings of the study.

Besides relying on secondary sources and Pan-African, South African or Basotho news portals, the analysis draws on field research and interviews conducted by the author in Lesotho in 2010.[2]

2 South African linkage and leverage and processes of democratization in the southern African region

According to Levitsky and Way (2010, pp. 23–26, 41), the degree of *linkage to the West*—the United States and the EU 15—explains whether competitive authoritarian regimes fully democratize over time or not (cf. the introduction of this special issue).

Linkage does not necessarily have to be Western. Levitsky and Way (2010, p. 50) point to cases in which linkage to important non-Western states blunts the impact of

[2] In 2010, I conducted interviews in Lesotho with ten high-ranking parliamentarians, ministers and party representatives of the three most important parties (both urban and rural backgrounds): Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) (3 interviewees), All Basotho Convention (ABC) (3), and Basotho National Party (BNP) (2), as well as two minor parties, National Independent Party (NIP) (1) and Lesotho Worker's Party (LWP) (1). Furthermore, the analysis relies on expert interviews with two representatives from local NGOs, a senior local journalist, and a representative of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC).

ties to the West: e.g., Malaysia's ties to the international Muslim community or Belarus and Ukraine's ties to Russia. Yet Levitsky and Way are silent on how high linkage to a *democratic*, non-Western regional hegemon like South Africa and its interaction with Western democratizing pressures influences the regime-type of related countries in a region. Their analysis of high-linkage cases that successfully democratized over time suggests that it is rather the *regional* component than the *international* component of Western hegemony that triggered democratization in high-linkage cases through geographical proximity. Nine of ten of Levitsky and Way's correctly predicted cases of full democratization democratized due to high linkage to a *regional* hegemon (the EU 15 in Eastern Europe and the US in the Americas) rather than an *international* hegemon (in the case of successfully democratizing Taiwan and its high linkage to the US).

Hence this article closes a gap in Levitsky and Way's analysis by investigating the democratizing potential of a non-Western *regional* and *democratic* hegemon such as South Africa. Lesotho, in turn, is selected as a particularly good dramatization of South Africa's attempts (or lack thereof) at regional democratization. Because of its unique geographic position and economic dependency (yet still a formidable country regarding population and area size), and its record of several multiparty elections since 1993, the potential for successful regional democratizing influence should be relatively high in Lesotho. If regional democratizing influences would fail even in Lesotho, chances for success should not be too high in other countries in the southern African region or in different world regions also within the sphere of influence of democratic regional hegemons such as Brazil or India. To put the case of Lesotho in perspective, a comparison will be drawn with an integrated assessment of the strength of South African democratizing influences in neighboring Swaziland and Zimbabwe (the former most similar to Lesotho and the latter the most prominent case of competitive authoritarianism in southern Africa).

During the golden decade of Western democratizing pressures after the end of the Cold War (Levitsky and Way 2010; Boix 2011), post-apartheid South Africa was in a formidable position to influence democratization processes of countries in its region. South Africa became the democratic and economic powerhouse in the region. Between 1995 and 2005, South Africa was the most democratic country in Sub-Saharan Africa alongside three African islands. Elections were free and fair, with an acceptably even playing field in electoral competition during that time (Freedom House 2013a; QoG 2013). South African foreign policy shifted dramatically from active and armed destabilization of its neighbors to active democracy promotion in the region (Rosenberg et al. 2004, pp. 378–381; Southall 2003, pp. 291–292). South Africa joined the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the organization's development goals were supplemented with an emphasis on democracy, good governance, and regional stability (van der Vleuten and Hoffmann 2010, pp. 750–751).

2.1 South African democratizing influences and the (competitive) authoritarian regimes in Lesotho, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe

A linkage- and leverage-assessment according to Levitsky and Way's (2010, pp. 372–375) measurement criteria shows that Lesotho is a particularly well-suited case to analyze the actual impact of South Africa's democratizing potential. Both

South African leverage over Lesotho and linkage between the two countries turns out to be higher than in other countries of the southern African region, such as Swaziland or Zimbabwe. Accordingly, South Africa's democratization attempts in the southern African region should be most successful in Lesotho. If they fail in Lesotho, it is unlikely that they would succeed elsewhere in South Africa's sphere of influence.

2.1.1 Linkage and leverage between South Africa and Lesotho

South African *leverage* is high in the case of Lesotho (as is leverage of the US and the EU 15 in Lesotho). Land-locked Lesotho is economically highly dependent on South Africa. The country features an extremely low-sized economy both in global terms as well as in comparison with its southern African neighbors.[3] By contrast, Swaziland, which is most similar to Lesotho with regard to area size and geographical position, used to have an average GDP almost double that of Lesotho's between 1990 and 2000, despite a population half Lesotho's size. Likewise, Lesotho was on average more aid dependent than the median country in Africa, whereas Swaziland is among the 10 least aid-dependent countries in Africa (QoG 2013). In 2000, foreign funding constituted more than half of Lesotho's national budget (Kabemba 2004, p. 40). Lesotho imports far more goods from South Africa than it exports and is highly dependent on migrant remittances from South Africa (Fischer Weltalmanach 2003, p. 498; Rosenberg et al. 2004, pp. 88, 347). Lesotho participates in a customs union with South Africa and pegs its currency to the South African rand. It is highly dependent on the revenues from that customs union and is therefore vulnerable to any changes in the agreement (afrol News 2013; Rosenberg et al. 2004, pp. 344–345).

Leverage needs *linkage* to substantiate external democratization pressures and to push it over the edge of superficial and "electoralist" pressures that do not go beyond the requirement of minimally free multiparty elections. Lesotho is an African case like any other regarding low linkage to Western powers (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 50–54, 236–237, 374–375). There is relatively strong donor involvement in Lesotho. The US, Ireland, and the EU are the largest donors, and the US became a major importer of Basotho textiles due to preferential access to the US market (Manoeli 2012; OECD 2011, pp. 11–12). Nonetheless, ties to the West are relatively low in terms of Levitsky and Way's linkage measurement (2010, pp. 374–375) and are comparable to other African countries. For example, there are only six diplomatic representations present in Lesotho, whereas countries in the region with a similar population size such as Namibia or Botswana host 31 and 19 diplomatic representations, respectively, and still belong to Levitsky and Way's group of medium/low linkage (Go Lesotho 2014; Namibweb 2014; Republic of Botswana 2014).

According to the four linkage measurement components of Levitsky and Way (2010, pp. 374–375)—(1) economic, (2) social, (3) communication, and (4) intergovernmental ties—*linkage between Lesotho and South Africa is high*. (1) In 1998, 90% of imported goods came from South Africa while 65% percent of Lesotho's exports went to South Africa. The joint Lesotho Highlands Water Project ties the two coun-

[3] Lesotho belongs to the lowest quartile in Sub-Saharan Africa and is the smallest economy in the SADC (World Bank 2009).

tries together because of Lesotho's need for electric power and South Africa's need for water. (2) Labor migration from Lesotho to South Africa has become so extensive over the last 100 years that it is difficult to obtain reliable numbers. More ethnic Basotho live permanently in South Africa than in Lesotho itself (Rosenberg et al. 2004, pp. 173, 246–250; Cobbe 2012). (3) South African radio and TV reach Lesotho, and internet access in Lesotho is slightly above the median of all Sub-Saharan African countries (Freedom House 1993–2000; QoG 2013). (4) Lesotho and South Africa share mutual membership in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) (Rosenberg et al. 2004, pp. 343–347). In sum, according to Levitsky and Way's measurement there was and still is both high leverage and high linkage between South Africa and Lesotho.

Despite these apparently favorable conditions for full democratization in Lesotho, the following sections show that South Africa did not fulfill its democracy-promoting promises in Lesotho. South Africa also failed to do so in the more difficult cases of Swaziland and Zimbabwe. South Africa's leverage effectively reinforced Western leverage to the degree that it pushed Lesotho from a military regime to a competitive and moderately authoritarian regime *without* tutelary powers; yet South African linkage did not manage to substitute for the lack of Western linkage and push Lesotho to full democratization. Hence despite its initially sincere intentions to serve as a regional democracy promoter, South Africa soon followed a stability-promoting—similar to the US in Egypt or the EU in the Middle East and North Africa—, and—if at all—"electoralist"-promoting foreign policy in the southern African region (Brownlee 2012; Youngs 2010).

2.1.2 South African democratizing influences and the evolution of the competitive authoritarian regime in Lesotho between 1993 and 2012

In accordance with the high degree of leverage by South Africa over Lesotho and the relatively high linkage between the two countries, South Africa's democracy-promoting undertakings were most extensive there. South Africa intervened prior to the re-introduction of multiparty elections in 1993, curtailed tutelary powers in Lesotho 1994 and 1998, and it mediated post-election conflict after the 1998 election, which led to election-related institutional change and temporary moderation of Lesotho's competitive authoritarianism. Nonetheless, the following analysis shows that democracy promotion did not go all the way. South African intervention did not effectively alter Lesotho's fundamental deficits in civil liberties, press freedom, state media access and systematic resource disparities between the incumbent party and opposition parties after the reintroduction of multiparty elections in 1993 until the most recent election in 2012.

Organizational power in Lesotho Lesotho was and is a case of low *organizational power* due to low *state coercive capacity* and medium *party strength*. In combination with low Western linkage and high leverage, unstable competitive authoritarianism would be Lesotho's most likely regime trajectory since the reintroduction of multiparty elections in 1993 until present (cf. introduction of this special issue), provided that we disregard its high linkage to democratic South Africa.

State coercive capacity was and is low in Lesotho. Only founded at the end of the 1970s, Lesotho's army remained small and underdeveloped. Equipment and training were poor, and control of the mostly inhospitable and mountainous national terrain was weak (Bardill and Cobbe 1985, pp. 130–131; Southall and Fox 1999; Rosenberg et al. 2004, pp. 17, 360–366; QoG 2013; World Bank 2009). After the first multiparty elections in 1993, the army was hostile to the newly elected Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) government and staged a successful coup against it after the 1998 elections. Only the subsequent South African-led SADC military intervention managed to restore the electoral regime.

Party scope and cohesion of the former authoritarian Besotho National Party (BNP) and the successful contender of the 1993 elections, the BCP, as well as the BCP's successor organization for the 1998 elections, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), were all medium according to Levitsky and Way's criteria (2010, pp. 377–378). Both the BNP and the BCP, and later the LCD, managed to field structures and candidates throughout the country, but were plagued by internal factionalism (Freedom House 1993–2000; Southall 1994, pp. 112–114; Southall and Fox 1999, pp. 675–676; Coplan and Quinlan 1997, p. 43; Rosenberg et al. 2004, pp. 19–20, 29–31, 130–131, 164–166, 371–372).

1993–1998: Tutelary Powers and South Africa's push for multiparty-elections in Lesotho During the 1970s and 1980s Lesotho was a de facto one-party state. Hegemonic BNP rule ended after a military coup in 1986 and resulted in unstable military rule. South Africa's pro-democratic push first played a role in Lesotho in 1991, when pressure from South African and Western donors—combined with high leverage over the heavily aid-dependent and economically South African-dependent country—forced the military regime to set up a new and democratic constitution (Southall 1994, p. 112; Coplan and Quinlan 1997, pp. 42–43). First multiparty elections were scheduled for 1993 and set the country on a track towards competitive authoritarianism. Initially, however, unelected "tutelary" powers such as the army, some police units, and the constitutional monarch, King Letsie III, severely restricted the authority of the 1993 elected BCP (Freedom House 1993–2000; Coplan and Quinlan 1997, pp. 42–46; Rosenberg et al. 2004, pp. 139–141, 359–366; Southall and Fox 1999; Kabemba 2004, pp. 40–41).[4]

Although the 1993 election process itself was considered free and fair by international observers, the playing field was skewed in favor of the former ruling BNP over the winning BCP (cf. Table 1 coding the various governments in Lesotho between 1993 and 2012 in line with Levitsky and Way's (2010, pp. 365–371) measurement of regime outcomes) (Freedom House 1993–2000; Southall 1994, p. 113; Southall and Fox 1999, p. 672). Leading up to the 1998 elections, in turn, the playing field was skewed in favor of the incumbent LCD to the disadvantage of the BNP and other opposition parties, while the election process itself was generally considered free and fair by international observers and experts (Freedom House 1993–2000; Southall and

[4] Levitsky and Way (2010) do not discuss why they exclude the case of Lesotho from their analysis. Amongst others, "tutelary" powers that stand outside the democratic regime should not be present (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 32–33, 365–366).

Table 1 Competitive authoritarianism in Lesotho between 1993 and 2012. (Source: For data sources cf. references in this section)

Government	Violations of free & fair election procedures	Violations of civil liberties	Uneven playing field	Tutelary powers	Regime type
Transitional military regime (1993)			X (1, 2)	X	CA
BCP/LCD (1993–1998)	X (4)	X (1)	X (2, 3)	X	CA
LCD (1998–2002)			X (2, 3)		CA
LCD (2002–2007)	X (4)	X (1, 3)	X (2, 3)		CA
LCD/DC (2007–2012)	X (4)	X (1, 2, 3, 4)	X (2, 3)		CA

CA competitive authoritarianism

X: Indicates presence of tutelary powers or occurrence of abuse in a particular dimension of CA according to Levitsky and Way's (2010, pp. 365–369) coding scheme: *Violations of free & fair election procedures* (4) = highly uneven access to media and resource. *Violations of civil liberties* (1) = frequent harassment of independent media for political reasons; (2) = serious political attack on the media; (3) = government engages in actions that restrict freedom of speech; (4) = serious attack on opposition figures. *Uneven playing field* (1) = politicized state institutions; (2) = uneven media access; (3) = uneven access to resources

Fox 1999). There were incidents of press freedom violations and a general incumbency bias regarding state media access and campaign resources (see respective codes in Table 1) (Freedom House 1993–2000; Southall and Fox 1999, pp. 678–679; US Department of State 2000).

The opposition alliance of the BNP and the old BCP claimed outright electoral rigging in the 1998 elections rather than pointing out flaws in the playing field of party competition. The rigging allegation caused considerable attention in South African and international media and led to the installation of a SADC commission tasked to scrutinize the conduct and results of the elections (Southall and Fox 1999, pp. 679–685). The commission rejected most of the opposition parties' complaints (Langa 1998, cit. in Southall and Fox 1999, pp. 681, 688).

Meanwhile, the opposition alliance demonstrated in the capital while BNP-associated junior ranks of the Lesotho Defense Forces (LDF) started a mutiny against their senior officers because they believed them to have sold out to the LCD. Lesotho became ungovernable, and the new LCD prime minister, Pakalitha Mosisili, had to ask the SADC for help. South African and Batswana troops ended the mutiny, and the LCD remained in power (Southall and Fox 1999; Elklit 2002; Southall 2003; Rosenberg et al. 2004, pp. xxxii, 20, 31, 166, 364–365).

Lack of full democratization in Lesotho after the South African 1998 Intervention The events around the 1998 elections and the subsequent involvement of the SADC and South Africa led to the effective disempowerment of previous "tutelary" powers in Lesotho, such as the security forces and the king. The more inclusive mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral system was introduced and both the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the election process in general were professionalized. However, substantial flaws in the playing field of party competition remained in place despite these improvements and prevented full democratization of Lesotho's regime (see Table 1) (Southall 2003, pp. 277–278; Rosenberg et al. 2004, pp. 120–122, 366).

As a result of heightened international attention during the 1998 crisis, Lesotho's politicians finally grasped the extent to which Western donors and South Africa could exercise leverage over their country. Both the political class and the security forces realized coups were no longer an acceptable means to power. The next elections needed to run as smoothly as possible to avoid losing donor money. Moreover, South Africa needed smooth elections in Lesotho to justify its intervention "ex-post" (cf. Southall 2003, pp. 281–282). Thanks to international and South African pressure, the "electoralist" norm finally took root in Lesotho. Accordingly, the professionally held and extensively observed elections under the new, more inclusive MMP electoral system in 2002 were a considerable success (Elklit 2002; Southall 2003).

Donors focused strongly on the smooth running of the 2002 elections in order to avoid another political crisis in Lesotho (Kabemba 2004, p. 43; Southall 2003, pp. 286–287). South Africa, in turn, made sure to keep a low profile overall and mainly provided background support to the immediate goal of stability and smooth elections. It thus refrained from pointing out less visible flaws in Lesotho's electoral regime. President Thabo Mbeki's low-key acclaim of the 2002 election success reflected South Africa's low profile and aversion to creating a precedent for South Africa's willingness to substantially intervene in the affairs of other southern African countries, such as Zimbabwe (Southall 2003, pp. 271, 285, 294).

In the same vein, a senior Basotho journalist argues that the 1998 intervention rather strengthened the incumbent LCD due to the abolishment of "tutelary" powers and the professionalization of the security forces, while efforts to level the playing field in party competition did not receive the same *rigeur* that would have in turn strengthened the opposition parties.[5] Accordingly, the playing field in party competition remained substantially skewed preceding the 2002 elections despite some improvements, which were owed to heightened regional and international attention after the 1998 crisis (see respective coding for the 1998–2002 government in Table 1). The elections resulted in an absolute majority for the LCD regarding vote share and 77 out of 78 constituency seats, while the BNP won 21 seats of the 40 compensatory PR seats (Rosenberg et al. 2004, pp. 20–21, 157–158; Southall 2003, pp. 284, 288–290).

After the relatively successful 2002 elections, installation of the more inclusive MMP electoral system and the effective abolishment of "tutelary" powers in Lesotho, Western and South African attention to Basotho politics decreased. Since the transfer of government from Thabo Mbeki to Jacob Zuma, South Africa had begun to experience increasing deficiencies in its own democratic regime including violations of press freedom and independence of the judiciary; this made the country all the more unlikely to press for full democratization in Lesotho or other countries in the region (Southall 2013, pp. 124, 127, 154–155, 202–209; Freedom House 1999– 2013, 2013a; QoG 2013). Accordingly, reports about violations of press freedom and unequal access to the media in Lesotho and other neighboring countries no longer reverberated strongly in South Africa. In Lesotho, domestic critics of incumbent abuses regarding press freedom and state media access could not support their claims by referencing South Africa. Instead, the reverse occurred: Incidences of press freedom violations and related legislation in South Africa began to support Lesotho's

[5] Interview conducted by the author in Maseru, Lesotho, July 2010.

government agencies and legislators in defending the status quo of restricted press freedom legislation and practices.

Accordingly, after the 2002 Lesotho elections, attempts by the governing LCD to skew the playing field increased again in terms of access to the state-owned media and campaign resources, as well as in the increasing use of libel and defamation laws with stiff penalties against independent media and journalists critical of the government (see respective coding for the 2002–2007 government in Table 1).

In advent of the 2007 elections, the governing LCD experienced another manifestation of its low level of cohesiveness. The former LCD minister of communications, Thomas Thabane, formed a new opposition party, the All Basotho Convention (ABC). Eighteen LCD MPs crossed the floor to the new ABC, causing a hung parliament and forcing Prime Minister Mosisili to call for early elections in February 2007 (Likoti 2008, pp. 155–156; Rosenberg et al. 2004, pp. 387–388). Early elections clearly disfavored the ABC, as the new party was only formed in October 2006 and had insufficient time to properly prepare its campaign.[6] This also resulted in little preparation time for the IEC and lower standards for the election organization in comparison with the 2002 elections.

Despite its cohesiveness problems and decreased voter support, the LCD managed to secure a two-thirds majority in parliament through the co-optation of a small former opposition party in combination with the use of a loophole in the constitution and the design of the MMP electoral system. The electoral result caused much confusion among the opposition parties, including the ABC and the BNP, which disputed the results and called for a general strike. Furthermore, Tom Thabane, the new leader of ABC, the strongest opposition party in parliament, was deprived of his status as "Leader of Opposition", a position that would have endowed him and his party with useful privileges and resources, and would have helped to attenuate the skewness of the playing field to some degree for the next elections in 2012.[7] Fears of a repetition of the post-1998 election crisis prompted the SADC to mediate the conflict (Elklit 2008). This led to another electoral reform in 2011 that made future manipulation of the MMP much more difficult (EISA 2013, pp. 10–12; Freedom House 1999–2013).

Hence, reforms again focused on the immediate electoral process and the electoral system rather than deficiencies in terms of campaign resources as well as state media access and press freedom. Accordingly, the playing field remained significantly skewed after the 2007 elections. In opposition to previous elections, there were even violent clashes between government supporters and opposition supporters in advance of the 2012 elections, and opposition politicians feared for their security. The government also tried to formally limit public meetings of the opposition (see respective coding for the 2007–2012 government in Table 1) (Freedom House 1999–2013, Makthetha 2012). In opposition to this, the 2012 electoral process itself saw further professionalization of the IEC. Voter education was expanded, and the IEC tried to level the access of opposition parties to the state media. Yet despite these efforts,

[6] Interview with high-ranking politician of the ABC in Maseru, Lesotho, July 2010 (cf. Elklit 2008, p. 14).

[7] Interviews with a political expert and representative of the IEC in Maseru, Lesotho, July 2010 (cf. Elklit 2008, Likoti 2009, US Department of State 2008, and EISA 2013, p. 10).

state media airtime remained heavily skewed in favor of the ruling LCD (EISA 2013, pp. 32–34; Freedom House 1999–2013).

In continuation of previous developments, low cohesiveness of the governing LCD manifested itself once more, just 3 months before the 2012 election. A power struggle with LCD Secretary General Mothetjoa Metsing forced Prime Minister Mosisili to leave the LCD with 45 LCD MPs and form a new party, the Democratic Congress (DC). The remainder of LCD MPs stayed with the LCD rump under the new leadership of Metsing and went into an opposition alliance with the ABC and the BNP (allAfrica 2012a, b; Freedom House 1999–2013). With only 3 months left, increasing alienation of former LCD voters due to the recurring splits and two former LCD party barons to front, Thabane of the ABC and Metsing of the LCD rump, the task proved difficult for Mosisili and the DC despite the considerably skewed playing field. As a result, the DC and Mosisili only secured 39% of the vote. The DC only received 48 seats in parliament, falling short of the necessary absolute majority of 61 seats (allAfrica 2012a; Nunley 2013). The ABC, LCD and BNP secured a total of 61 seats and agreed to form a coalition government under newly elected Prime Minister Thabane of the ABC (Sunday Express 2012; Nunley 2013). Accordingly, latent unstable competitive authoritarianism finally resulted in effective incumbency change and full-blown unstable competitive authoritarianism.

In sum, effective intervention and high South African and international leverage led to an improvement and professionalization of the electoral process after the 1998 post-electoral crisis. Yet the playing field in party competition remained substantially skewed regarding freedom of the press and state media access, and significant resource disparities remained in place. Post-apartheid South Africa's reluctance to appear too invasive in its regional foreign policy, together with diminished international and regional interest in Lesotho's politics following settlement of the post-1998 electoral crisis and successful 2002 elections under the newly introduced MMP electoral system allowed for continued deterioration of the playing field after 2002 (cf. Table 1). Waning interest in Lesotho's elections has also paralleled declining interest by South African media in the politics of its neighbor. According to a media coverage analysis of the 2012 Lesotho election by Makthetha (2012), only one South African news outlet sent a correspondent to Lesotho during the election. South African publications perceived Lesotho as a dependent rather than a co-dependent neighbor whose volatile politics could, as in 1998, lead to turmoil and force South Africa to intervene again.

Survival of CA or full democratization after incumbency change in 2012? As a consequence of decreasing South African and international interest and the concomitant decreased push for full democratization in Lesotho after the 2002 elections, the structures and institutional conditions for skewing the playing field in multi-party competition have remained in place after the 2012 incumbency change. Despite their importance for full democratization, these deficiencies do not receive much attention domestically, regionally, or internationally. After all, the actual members of the coalition government and the opposition politicians, including former Prime Minister Mosisili, formerly profited from the very same skewed playing field earlier in their political careers. Furthermore, the current coalition government is very fragile, with an absolute majority hinging on one seat. In such an environment, unpopular reforms

could risk the survival of the coalition (cf. Public Eye 2013). Accordingly, it is plausible that the new coalition government will not substantially level the playing field and might even find an uneven playing field useful to rely on in upcoming elections and/or when dealing with an eventually more critical press once the "honeymoon phase" has passed.

Preliminary evidence supports this pessimistic assessment: Although Prime Minister Thabane increased efforts to fight corruption, these efforts also allowed him to harass and eventually dispose of powerful leaders in the opposition-turned DC, such as Monyane Moleleki, official opposition leader in parliament. After assuming office, Thabane promised to focus on issues of good governance, stability and economic improvements but remained silent about abolishing opportunities for incumbency abuse regarding the playing field in future elections (Freedom House 1999–2013; Sunday Express 2012; Ntaote 2013). During the first year of the coalition government virtually no legislation was brought before parliament, let alone legislation intended to level the playing field (Tefo 2013). This is unsurprising given that Prime Minister Thabane was formerly an important member of the very same LCD government that halted legislation against the use of government resources for campaigns in the run-up to elections.[8]

2.1.3 South African democratizing influences and the (competitive) authoritarian regimes in Zimbabwe and Swaziland

Swaziland and Zimbabwe also experienced internal turmoil and even stronger domestic pressures for democratization than Lesotho during the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. However, in line with the comparatively lower level of economic leverage in the case of Swaziland and the low level of "symbolic" leverage in the case of Zimbabwe, South Africa was even more reluctant to intervene. The Zimbabwean political crisis that began in 2000 serves as an impressive example of the difficult and often contradictory South African position in regional foreign policy: Instead of openly criticizing, substantially pressuring, or even intervening after fraudulent elections and human rights abuses in Zimbabwe caused international outcry, South Africa chose a strategy of "quiet diplomacy" vis-à-vis the Zimbabwean regime. Such a discreet approach did not manage to alter the path of Zimbabwean competitive authoritarianism towards full democratization. South Africa was forced to act in this passive manner because important domestic and regional discourse would have considered more openly interventionist South African policies as complicity in Western "neo-colonial" behavior vis-à-vis Zimbabwe. Such a perception would have greatly weakened the regional acceptance of South Africa's hegemonic role in southern Africa (Graham 2006, p. 121; cf. Prys 2009, pp. 202–203).

Swaziland experienced internal threats towards the stability of its authoritarian regime during the 1990s, which opened up another opportunity for South Africa to deliver on its regional democracy-promoting promise. Although leverage of South Africa over Swaziland was and is considerably lower in comparison with leverage over Lesotho due to the stronger Swazi economy, Swaziland is nonetheless most similar to

[8] According to a representative of the IEC (interview in Maseru, Lesotho, July 2010).

Lesotho due to its very high linkage with South Africa. However, as with Zimbabwe, South Africa was reluctant to intervene. Despite his reputation as a stronger promoter of democracy than his successor (Thabo Mbeki), even Nelson Mandela only weakly criticized Swaziland's autocracy following violent pro-democracy demonstrations and strikes in 1996 (Matlosa 1998, pp. 323–326, 334–335; Freedom House 1999–2013).

2.2 The mitigated democracy-promoting potential of South African linkage in the southern African region

What explains the rather mixed record of South African democracy promotion in Lesotho and the southern African region? The analysis of the relatively extensive, but not fully successful South African interventions in Lesotho, and the relatively weak to almost nonexistent interventions in Zimbabwe and Swaziland points to two explanations of why high South African linkage did not turn into a higher degree of leverage beyond "quiet diplomacy" or "electoralist" conditionality: (1) South Africa's priorities in the region are stability and security, whereas democracy promotion is subordinated to these ends (cf. Southall 2003, pp. 291–294). (2) High linkage between South Africa and Lesotho measured according to the four linkage measurement components of Levitsky and Way (2010, pp. 374–375) does not trigger Levitsky and Way's (2010, pp. 45–50) democratization-promoting mechanisms. This calls into question whether Levitsky and Way's measurement actually reflects their hypothesized role of linkage. Also note that the analysis so far has shown that South Africa's democracy has itself displayed democratic deficiencies since 2005 and the transition period from the Mbeki era to the Zuma era (Freedom House 2013b, Southall 2013, pp. 154–155, 202–209), which makes it—at least since then—unlikely to demand the "full package" of democracy from its neighbors. However, even during the Mandela years, when intentions to promote full democratization in the region were sincere and South Africa's own quality of democracy still high, democratization promotion did not go all the way; neither in Swaziland in 1996, nor in the most "easy", i.e., the high-leverage case of Lesotho during the critical years of its regime development between the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1991 until its first MMP-election in 2002.

South Africa's unwillingness to fully deliver on its initial democratizing promises—even when its own quality of democracy was still very high—must be understood in the context of post-apartheid South Africa's role as a newly born democratic regional hegemon in southern Africa, surrounded by mostly competitive authoritarian or fully authoritarian neighbors.[9] Post-apartheid South Africa's regional hegemony is essentially dependent on the *regional acceptance* of South Africa's special role in the region. After the end of apartheid, South Africa reshuffled its identity as an "African state" to follow the unwritten law of "African solidarity" in international relations, and intends to avoid a repetition of the regional isolation of the apartheid years (van Aardt 1996, p. 115; cf. Prys 2009, p. 200; Freeman 2005, p. 150). Afri-

[9] As with Lesotho, Botswana is a case of competitive and moderate authoritarianism. Levitsky and Way consider Namibia a "borderline case[…] [between democracy and competitive authoritarianism] that arguably could be included in the sample" of competitive authoritarian regimes, but is "insufficiently authoritarian." Mozambique and Zimbabwe are clear-cut cases of competitive authoritarianism, and Swaziland's monarchy is fully authoritarian (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 33–34, 238–256).

can resistance to South Africa's leadership was already apparent during the Mandela era, with its strong pro-democracy policy in the region. Other African leaders did not support President Mandela's protest against the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa by the Nigerian military regime of Sani Abacha in 1995 (Freeman 2005, p. 149). Ample African criticism of South Africa after its 1998 intervention in Lesotho made South Africa more cautious, as it wanted to avoid all semblance of the old gunboat diplomacy of apartheid South Africa in the region (Wood et al. 2013, p. 534; Matlosa 1997, pp. 127–129).

After the Mandela years, South Africa's awareness of its limited abilities to influence politics in other African countries increased (Graham 2012; Alden and le Pere 2004, pp. 28, 72). Accordingly, South Africa downplayed the relative success and democracy-promoting aspect of its interventions in Lesotho after the 2002 Lesotho elections. It was also careful not to interfere in Lesotho's affairs beyond the elimination of the immediate causes of the 1998 post-election instability. Otherwise, its interventions could have been regarded by other competitive authoritarian regimes in the region as a South African attempt to lecture southern African states on proper democratic conduct. This would have further undermined the already tenuous acceptance of South Africa's leadership in the region (cf. Prys 2009, pp. 201–203; Southall 2003, p. 293–295).

The difficulty of combining post-apartheid South Africa's ambitions of a policy of African solidarity with a policy of democracy promotion in the region became most apparent during the Zimbabwean crisis. The governing ANC was and still is indebted to its southern African neighbors due to the price these countries paid as the result of their support for the ANC during apartheid. And as a former liberation movement itself, it would be domestically and regionally risky for the ANC to take a strong stance against the liberation movements turned parties that governed in Mozambique, Namibia, and Zimbabwe (cf. Southall 2003, p. 294; Prys 2009, pp. 195, 202; Freeman 2005, pp. 158–160). Strong South African intervention against Mugabe, a former ally in the fight against white minority rule and oppression, and the complete breakdown of the Zimbabwean state could have had a damaging effect on the social and economic viability of Zimbabwe's neighbors, thus endangering post-apartheid South Africa's leadership in the region.

Without pressing for more substantial reforms leading to full democratization, South Africa used its leverage to stop post-Cold War military coups and chaos in Lesotho and restore the "electoralist" regime it helped establish in the first place. In doing so, South Africa's priority was to deliver the message to other southern African neighbors that it does not accept military coups as a means to gain power in its own "backyard", while at the same avoid interference in Lesotho's affairs beyond even electoralist pressure. South Africa also wanted to secure its vested interest in Lesotho as an important water provider (Prys 2009, p. 208; van der Vleuten and Hoffmann 2010, p. 752). Hence as long as competitive authoritarianism provides regime stability and a minimal semblance of democratic legitimacy—which is the case in the majority of South Africa's neighbors—it serves South Africa's regional hegemony and interests more than weakening the stability of its neighbors through more intrusive democracy promotion, which would endanger its own self-perception of an "African state" that follows a policy of African solidarity.

Admittedly, Swaziland as the last absolute monarchy in Africa remains a serious stain in democratic South Africa's immediate neighborhood. Yet contrary to most authoritarian regimes in Africa at the end of the Cold War, the Swazi king and his royalist entourage in Swaziland found themselves in a comparatively better position vis-à-vis both external leverage and internal threats to their rule. They were able to successfully delay demands for multi-party elections until the third wave of democratization in Africa lost momentum (Booth 2000, pp. 17–38). In comparison to Lesotho, the Swazi crisis was not as severe, as it could have threatened South Africa's security concerns and interests to the degree that an effective intervention would have been worth the risk.

In sum, despite variations in the degree of South African interventions, the examples of Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Swaziland can all be interpreted as South Africa's emphasis on regional stability over more interfering democracy promotion (cf. Prys 2009, p. 200; Graham 2006, p. 120).

Although according to Levitsky and Way's measurement criteria communication ties between South Africa and Lesotho are high and should lead to their democracy-promoting mechanisms, a more qualitative assessment of media and information flows between Lesotho and South Africa shows they instead resemble a one-way street. Basotho citizens are well informed about politics in South Africa due to extensive South African media penetration, while the South African media was and is rather ignorant about political events in Lesotho apart from the 1998 crisis. Levitsky and Way do not explicitly measure civil society and professional ties in their operationalization of linkage (2010, pp. 43–50, 374–375), and intergovernmental linkage is measured in a rather narrow manner through mutual membership in regional organizations, however these three dimensions feature prominently in their conceptualization and causal mechanism. In the case of South Africa, South African NGO activity is focused on domestic issues rather than cross-boarder issues, and intergovernmental penetration does not reach the extent that could be imagined due to the special geographical position of Lesotho in South Africa and the mutual membership in SADC and SACU. Lastly, South Africa dominates the small tertiary sector and the business and finance community in Lesotho's capital, Maseru.[10] It is therefore unlikely for South Africa to sanction the Maseru business community for its tacit consent with the Lesotho government's skewing of the playing field in party competition. Hence the external costs of government abuse in Lesotho are not as high as in Eastern European or American cases, which explains why there are no large domestic constituencies for democratic behavior in Lesotho and no electoral opportunities for potential reformers in the country.

In sum, one-sided informational flows, a South African dominated business community in Maseru, and relatively weak intergovernmental penetration diminished the chance for Levitsky and Way's (2010, pp. 43–50, 374–375) democracy-promoting mechanisms to come into play. This begs the question of whether their measurement components truly reflect their six dimensions and three democratization-promoting mechanisms of linkage.

[10] Information in this section is based on personal observation during field research and interviews with political experts in Maseru, Lesotho, in July 2010.

3 Conclusion

This study contributes to our understanding of linkage to a *democratic*, non-Western regional power and its potential to influence the regime type of countries in its region. The analysis of the democratizing impact of South African linkage and leverage in the southern African region attenuates optimism about the strength of such regional influences to replace missing Western linkage and induce full democratization in neighboring countries. Chances for democratization in Swaziland and Zimbabwe have decreased since the 1990s. And the playing field in party competition remained skewed even in Lesotho, where conditions for full democratization through South African linkage were most formidable during the window of opportunity between 1993 and 2002.

A first explanation for the relative unsuccessfulness of South African democracy promotion in the region can be found in South Africa's foreign policy priority of "African solidarity" that attempted to secure the fragile acceptance of its regional hegemony and took precedence over its initially sincere policy of democracy promotion. This finding suggests that rising regional hegemons might be particularly bad at democracy promotion in their sphere of influence—such as South Africa in Africa, Brazil in Latin America, and India on the Indian subcontinent—because in contrast to global hegemons (such as the US) that can base their hegemony on their overwhelming military and economic dominance, rising regional hegemons are more fragile and reliant on regional acceptance of their hegemony. Future research should examine similar cases of non-Western regional hegemony and their chances of influencing the regime type of countries in their region, i.e., Brazil and India, to further substantiate the findings of this study.

A second explanation for the relative unsuccessfulness of regional democracy promotion can be found in the fact that high linkage between South Africa and Lesotho, according to Levitsky and Way's (2010, pp. 43–50, 374–375) measurement components of linkage, is—in a more qualitative assessment of linkage between the two countries—not as dense as suggested. This begs the question of whether Levitsky and Way's (2010, pp. 43–50, 374–375) measurement components of linkage truly reflect their six dimensions and three democratization-promoting mechanisms of linkage.

In the case of Lesotho and its recent 2012 elections, the study also shows that incumbency change through elections does not necessarily lead to full democratization. Instead, Lesotho's competitive and moderately authoritarian regime followed the path of unstable competitive authoritarianism after 1993 until incumbency change in 2012. Accordingly, the improved *Political Rights* rating due to incumbency change in the 2012 Lesotho elections demonstrates a general turnover bias in Freedom House ratings. Incumbency change through the ballot box is automatically rewarded without sufficient attention to the playing field conditions that were present in advance of such elections. This finding contributes to recent research on the mixed effects of electoral turnover on democratization of competitive authoritarian regimes in Africa (Wahman 2014).

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Competitive authoritarianism in Uganda: the not so hidden hand of the military

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Abstract This paper draws on the notion of "coercive power" as developed by Levitsky and Way (Competitive authoritarianism: hybrid regimes after the cold war, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010) to argue that the incumbent regime in Uganda, the National Resistance Movement under President Yoweri Museveni, offers a particularly interesting case of competitive authoritarianism. Using empirical data, the paper extends Levitsky and Way's scope of analysis to include contemporary Uganda, which has vital characteristics of both democracy and authoritarianism. The paper provides a fresh insight into the hitherto lesser-analyzed "trinitarian" interplay whereby President Museveni, the military and the ruling party essentially function as one and the same. The paper singles out the incumbent regime's coercive capacity as the most instrumental factor that explains its continued stability. Subsequently, the paper elucidates the symbiotic coercive strategies that are applied to systematically resist opposition challenges.

Keywords Coercive power · Competitive authoritarianism · Military · Museveni · Uganda

Introduction

Since its independence from the British in 1962, Uganda, like many African countries, has experienced a turbulent sociopolitical history dominated by violent authoritarian regimes such as those of the infamous Idi Amin (in the 1970s) and Milton Obote (in the 1980s). In January 1986 the incumbent regime, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) under Yoweri Museveni, assumed power after winning a 5-year

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guerrilla war. This episode marked Africa's first successful overthrow of a regime by a locally-based guerrilla movement (Kasozi 1994, p. 175; Hills 2000, p. 91).

Following its military victory, the NRM curtailed political parties and introduced what it called "no-party democracy" or the movement system, which was presumably "broad-based", "all-inclusive" and premised on the principle of individual merit (Mugaju and Oloka-Onyango 2000, p. 1; Tripp 2004, p. 7; Lindemann 2011, p. 395). The key element of this system was that political competition and elections were held strictly between individual candidates as opposed to political parties (Carbone 2008, pp. 22–23). The no-party democracy system improved the quality of politics as well as levels of political participation and civil liberties (Wapakhabulo 2000, pp. 79–94; Rubongoya 2007, p. 24; Carbone 2008, p. 23), though it inhibited aggregated political competition (Carbone 2003, p. 487; Hickey 2005, p. 998; Girke and Kamp 2011, p. 53). Kasfir (2000, pp. 75–76) argues that this system was instrumental in providing the NRM with an important resource to legitimize its rule for a substantial period of time, which also led to considerable social and economic benefits for the country. For 19 years (1986–2005), multiparty politics remained banned as the NRM strengthened its grip on power. The regime's discourse stated that multiparty politics polarize the population and perpetuate violence based on religious and ethnic sectarianism (Kasfir 1998, p. 60; Museveni 2000, p. 245; Hickey 2005, p. 998; Rubongoya 2007, p. 25).

At the same time, Western powers hailed Uganda as the cherished child of Africa and viewed President Museveni as one of a "new breed" of African leaders (Mamdani 2001, p. 276; Oloka-Onyango 2004, pp. 29–52; Tripp 2004, p. 3; Schlichte 2008, p. 371). Uganda developed close relations with the Western world, and became a strategic ally of the United States in particular (Carbone 2008, p. 61). President Museveni even hosted two serving American presidents: Bill Clinton in March 1998 (see Hofmeier 1999, pp. 320–321) and George W. Bush in July 2003 (see Steiner 2004, p. 327).[1] Tangri and Mwenda (2010, p. 46) have written that for the United States and United Kingdom, Museveni has been a crucial partner in combating terrorism in the East African region. Uganda's closer relations with the West in the post-Cold War era developed during the same period in which the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa was under immense pressure to democratize according to the paradigm of liberal democracy (see Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 237–308).

The incumbent regime has attracted an array of interesting descriptions. Rukooko (2005, p. 228) calls it a "militarized democracy". Kalinge-Nnyago describes it as a disciplined military regime that simply replaced another undisciplined military regime (see Kagoro 2015, p. 97). [2] Tripp (2004, pp. 3–26) states that the regime is a classic case of the softening nature of authoritarianism. This paper draws on Levitsky and Way's (2010) framework to understand the NRM as a competitive authoritarian regime. Levitsky and Way argue that such regimes, which proliferated in the post-Cold War era, combine competitive elections with serious violations of democratic procedure.

[1] In February 2009 Uganda also became a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (see Africa Yearbook 2009, p. 415).

[2] See also http://www.opendemocracy.net/author/omar-d-kalinge-nnyago. Accessed 23.06.2012.

Scholars (Tripp 2004, 2010; Rubongoya 2007; Carbone 2008; Tangri and Mwenda 2010) have shown in various ways that the NRM's coercive capacity has aided profoundly in maintaining its grip on power for nearly 3 decades. What this paper provides is a fresh insight into the lesser-analyzed "trinitarian" constellation in which President Museveni, the military and the NRM party essentially function as one and the same. The paper underpins that this triad interplay makes Uganda a particularly interesting case of competitive authoritarianism and its analysis a valuable contribution to this special issue on competitive authoritarianism and democratization in Africa. The term "trinitarian" used here stems from an interview with an academic at Makerere University who likened President Museveni, the military and the NRM party to the Christian doctrine of the "Trinity" where God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy Spirit are three and one at the same time.[3]

Moreover, the paper extends the scope of Levitsky and Way's (2010) analysis to Uganda, which the authors exclude from their sample of the 14 African case studies of competitive authoritarian regimes on the basis that between 1990 and 1995 the country held no presidential elections and had banned political parties.[4] Levitsky and Way, however, suggest that post-1995 Uganda might be characterized as a competitive authoritarian regime (2010, p. 32, footnotes 167 and 171). Thus this paper develops the idea of Uganda as a competitive authoritarian regime based on extensive empirical material derived from field research conducted in Uganda between April and August 2009, January and April 2011, and January and March 2012.[5]

To a limited extent, dynamics such as the discretionary control of state resources, weakness of the opposition and Levitsky and Way's (2010, pp. 40–54) notions of "Western leverage" and "linkage to the West"[6] may be used to explain the NRM's robust capacity to resist threats to its power. In fact, for the majority of his presidency, Yoweri Museveni has faced limited Western pressure to democratize. A number of scholars have illustrated that the West has held Uganda to different standards compared to many other African countries by paying little attention to the political nature of Museveni's regime, while at the same time pouring substantial amounts of financial resources into it (Tripp 2004, pp. 19–21; Mwenda and Tangri 2005, p. 452; Carbone

[3] Interview, academic X2, Kampala, 15 April 2009.

[4] One should keep in mind that Levitsky and Way (2010, p. 4) examine the trajectories of 35 regimes that were or became competitively authoritarian between 1990 and 1995. In Africa, the countries analyzed include Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Levitsky and Way 2010, Chap. 6).

[5] The data used in this paper is part of the PhD project "Militarization in post−1986 Uganda: Politics, Military and Society Interpenetration" that was concluded at Bayreuth University in April 2013. Four qualitative techniques of data collection were used: in-depth interviews (102 semi-structured interviews with military officers, intelligence officers, politicians, journalists, academics and ordinary people were conducted), focus group discussions, occasional observation and document review (especially newspaper reports). Given the sensitivity of the subject, the majority of interviewees requested anonymity.

[6] Levitsky and Way define Western leverage as the regime's susceptibility to Western pressure to democratize, and linkage to the West as the density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, and social) and cross-border flows (of capital, goods and service and information) among particular countries and the United States, Western Europe and Western-dominated multilateral institutions (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 40–46). Levitsky and Way (2010, p. 53) maintain that where leverage and linkage are both high, authoritarianism is least likely to survive because external pressure to democratize is consistent and intense. Uganda is characterized by both low leverage and low linkage.

2008, p. 61; Tangri and Mwenda 2010, pp. 34–47). The preceding dimensions notwithstanding, this paper examines the trinitarian Museveni-military-NRM constellation and subsequently the capacity to utilize the military and paramilitary structures as the most prevailing factor behind Uganda's sustained competitive authoritarian regime. As Tangri and Mwenda note, "the military and security forces have been the bedrock of Museveni's power" (2010, p. 44). This paper details how the balance of power in the military has tilted the political field in favor of the NRM and has in part facilitated Yoweri Museveni's victories in the four presidential elections (1996, 2001, 2006 and 2011) in which he has competed.[7]

1 Conceptual reflections: competitive authoritarianism and coercive power

Levitsky and Way (2010) propose:

> Competitive authoritarian regimes are distinguished from full authoritarianism in that constitutional channels exist through which opposition groups compete in a meaningful way for executive power. Elections are held regularly and opposition parties are not legally barred from contesting them. Opposition activity is above ground … What distinguishes competitive authoritarianism from democracy, however, is the fact that incumbent abuse of the state violates at least one of the three defining attributes of democracy: (1) free elections, (2) broad protection of civil liberties, and (3) a reasonably level playing field. (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 7)

Coercive capacity is one of the central features for the stability of competitive authoritarian regimes. The greater the coercive capacity to contain or disorient the opposition, the greater the chance that a competitive authoritarian regime survives (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 57). According to Levitsky and Way (2010, pp. 57–59), competitive authoritarian regimes may instrumentalize security forces to engage in high-intensity and/or low-intensity acts of suppression. In the former, security forces engage in explicit acts of suppression such as shooting into opposition crowds, curtailing renowned opposition figures, breaking political demonstrations, and partisanship during elections. In the latter, security forces rely on less visible, subtler suppressive strategies including surveillance of the opposition, and recruitment of an elaborate network of informants and agents. Whereas high-intensity coercion is often applied to deal with immediate and highly threatening opposition challenges, low-intensity coercion is normally intended to prevent such challenges from emerging in the first place (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 58).

Levitsky and Way (2010, pp. 58–61) advance that coercive capacity may be measured from two perspectives: scope or cohesion. Whereas scope considers the effective reach of the state's coercive apparatus, cohesion reflects the level of compliance within the state's security apparatus. Particularly, scope denotes the size and qual-

[7] In a *de facto* sense, it is in Uganda almost impossible to functionally and ideologically separate the military from other security forces, including the police and intelligence agencies. The organisations exchange personnel amongst their structures and share a historical origin rooted in the 1981–1985 guerrilla war.

ity of the security apparatus directly responsible for domestic order. This apparatus includes the military, police, intelligence and paramilitary outfits (see Mann 1984; Weitzer 1990, p. 3). On the other hand, Levitsky and Way propose that the highest levels of cohesion depend on the existence of at least one of the following factors: shared ethnic identity, shared ideology, and solidarity based on participation in violent struggles. These factors can be observed in the NRM's security apparatus. The regime came to power through a violent armed struggle dominated by President Museveni's ethnic group, the Banyankole (Kasfir 2000, p. 63; Carbone 2008, pp. 46–47).

Empirically, as elaborated in subsequent sections, contemporary political trends in Uganda strongly suggest that the incumbent regime resonates with Levitsky and Way's framework of competitive authoritarianism and that the threefold trinitarian constellation is a key factor for its continuance. Since 1996 Uganda has held regular presidential elections in which the opposition has seen significant results (see Tangri and Mwenda 2010, p. 34; Girke and Kamp 2011, pp. 49–51; Gibb 2012, p. 460). Between 1996 and 2006 for instance, President Museveni's vote decreased from 75 to 59% (Girke and Kamp 2011, p. 54). In 2006 the opposition received a combined vote of 40% (Tangri and Mwenda 2010, p. 40), although this number decreased to 31.6% in the last presidential elections held in 2011 (Girke and Kamp 2011, p. 50).[8] In addition, the opposition largely operates in the open and maintains significant presence in the national assembly.[9] In some areas the opposition wins elections with wide margins. Historically, as Gibb (2012, p. 459) notes, the opposition has had more success in cities and in northern Uganda. Although the NRM won with 56.6% in the 2011 elections in northern Uganda, it had lost all prior elections in that region in 1996, 2001 and 2006 (Van Acker 2004, pp. 353–354; Rubongoya 2007, p. 83). Though Museveni won nationally with 74.2% of the total votes cast in the 1996 elections, his rival Paul Ssemogerere enjoyed massive support throughout most of the north, scoring 90% in some areas (Hause 1999, pp. 621–641). This trend did not change in the 2001 and 2006 elections when Museveni lost to Kizza Besigye, Uganda's main opposition leader, by a wide margin in most districts in the north (Rubongoya 2007, p. 84).

Opposition leaders and other regime critics are relatively free to express their opinions in both print and electronic media, especially in the capital Kampala. Despite some isolated government attacks on the media, the industry remains relatively free.[10] In an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) on 28 May 2014, Kizza Besigye stated he would not categorise the NRM as an entirely authoritarian regime.[11] In that sense, the NRM is not a full authoritarian, but a competitive authoritarian regime.

[8] See the official results at http://www.ec.or.ug/Elec_results/2011_Pres_dis.pdf. Accessed 07.07.14.

[9] For details see http://www.ec.or.ug/docs/Elected%20MPs%202011%20General%20Elections.pdf. Accessed 04.12.13.

[10] Some of the attacks on the media include the 1 week closing of the *Daily Monitor* and the *Redpepper* in May 2013 for publishing renegade General David Sejusa's writings that alleged President Museveni had planned to systematically assassinate high ranking officers in the army who opposed Museveni's plan to anoint his son as his automatic successor.

[11] See http://www.observer.ug/news-headlines/32160–amin-museveni-are-the-same-besigye. Accessed 19.02.15.

The regime has instrumentalized the military and paramilitary organs to profoundly tilt the political field in its favor, an aspect that is particularly externalized at times when competitive stakes are high such as during presidential elections. To resist opposition challenges, the NRM has constructed elaborate security structures and has at the same time maintained its effective command and control.

Since 1986 the NRM's power has been challenged militarily by over seven rebel groups, including Joseph Kony's cult-like group, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) (Prunier 2004, pp. 359–383; Rubongoya 2007, p. 82; Rodríguez 2009; Lindemann 2011, pp. 387–416).[12] There are claims that the NRM intentionally sustained some of the rebellions, especially the LRA, for purposes ranging from forestalling organized political opposition from emerging in the north and maintaining a large defense budget, to schemes by senior officers to turn the wars into a money-making venture, to which President Museveni turned a blind eye (Carbone 2008, pp. 74–76; van Acker 2004, p. 343; Rodríguez 2009, pp. 88–89).[13] These challenges may be seen as undermining the NRM regime's control and the strength of its coercive capacity, yet the regime managed to largely confine these rebellions to the periphery, especially in the northern part of the country. Moreover, none of the rebel groups can be said to have substantially controlled a particular territory at one time but used mostly hit-and-run tactics on weak targets, especially civilians in remote villages. In that sense, none of these groups can be considered to have had a profoundly threatening effect on the regime's power. Since the LRA rebels were forced out of Uganda in 2006 there have been no confirmed reports of rebel attacks within the confines of the country's territory (Lindemann 2011, p. 388; see also BBC News, Uganda country profile, June 2014). To that end, the NRM regime, led by President Yoweri Museveni, has largely been able to maintain power for nearly 3 decades, based on a high level of coercive capacity grounded in the trinitarian constellation.

2 The effective reach of the military and paramilitary structures

Levitsky and Way (2010) reason that scope is vital in the implementation of low-intensity coercion:

> Systematic surveillance, harassment, and intimidation require an infrastructure capable of directing, coordinating, and supplying agents across the national territory. Where such an infrastructure is absent or ineffective, incumbents' ability

[12] Other rebel groups include the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA), the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), the Uganda People's Army (UPA), the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), and the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF). The LRA has committed countless human rights abuses such as abduction of innocent children, turning underage girls into sex slaves, raping, burning people alive, pillaging, and performing body mutilation and maiming (see Van Acker 2003, pp. 34–37; Worden 2008, pp. 1–8).

[13] Interview, intelligence officer X2, Kampala, 22 January 2011 and interview, military officer X2, Kampala, 16 April 2009; Both indicated that some of the money budgeted for the war in northern Uganda would be channeled to carry out political work for the NRM elsewhere in the country. Between 1988 and 2007, for example, the defense budget grew from US$ 69.2 million to US$ 237 million (see Tripp 2010, p. 140; Kagoro 2012, p. 13).

> to monitor and check grassroots opposition activity is limited. (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 59)

From its inception and throughout the guerrilla war that brought it to power, the NRM was a politically weak but militarily strong organization (Mwenda 2007, p. 28; Kagoro 2012, p. 7). Prior to launching the guerilla war, NRM leader Yoweri Museveni ran as a presidential candidate in the 1980 elections and scored insignificant results. His then party, the Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM), only managed to win one out of 126 total parliamentary seats, despite fielding 82 candidates across the country. Museveni himself lost in his home constituency (Ingham 1994, p. 174; Karugire 1996, pp. 98–114). While seizing power in 1986, Museveni largely utilized the military wing as the guarantor of his power and political order (Mudoola 1991, p. 241). In fact, some scholars have argued that the NRM's shallow political base was the reason behind the banning of multiparty politics between 1986 and 2005 (see Omara-Otunnu 1998, p. 410; Tripp 2004, p. 8).

However, the NRM could not openly present the military wing as a senior partner of the political wing. To gain international legitimacy and to some extent legitimize its position domestically, the NRM government chose to put forward civil political structures that concealed the power of the military and paramilitary structures (Kagoro 2012, pp. 7–11). In what Rubongoya (2007, p. 4) calls the *modus vivendi* of a police state, the civil political structures were circumvented and undermined by parallel military and paramilitary structures from the lowest unit of state administration, Local Council I (LC1), to the central government.

Under the current political dispensation, Uganda has three fully fledged civil political tiers of governance: the national level, which includes two elected branches of government (an executive branch headed by the president and a legislative branch headed by the speaker); the district level, headed by an elected LC5 chairperson; and sub-counties, headed by an elected LC3 chairperson. These tiers have a corporate status and can make binding decisions within their areas of jurisdiction (Makara 1998, p. 43). LC1 and LC2 are administrative units without corporate status. It is worth pointing out that the LC4 structure, which maintains a corporate status, is only found in 22 districts (of 111 total districts) that have urban centers graded as municipalities (see the 1995 Uganda constitution, Chap. 12, article 176).[14]

The majority of the interviewees drawn from local administration structures acknowledged that although the central government has ceded some powers to their units through decentralization, it still exerts considerable influence when the political stakes are high, such as during general elections. Uganda is comprised of 111 districts and one city (Tier 2 of governance),[15] and for each district the constitution grants the president authority to appoint the Resident District Commissioner (RDC) as his representative (see the 1995 Uganda constitution, Chap. 11, article 203). Some scholars (Rubongoya 2007, p. 103, 171; Carbone 2008, p. 83; Manyak and Katono 2010, pp. 14–15; Kagoro 2012, p. 7) maintain that the democratically elected local councils

[14] Also see the Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Local Government, http://www.molg.go.ug/index.php/local-governments. Accessed 15.08.12.

[15] For details see http://www.molg.go.ug/index.php/local-governments. Accessed 02.07.14.

are subordinate to the RDCs, especially on matters that may have a fundamental effect on President Museveni's power. A good number of RDCs are former soldiers or members of parliament, others are NRM stalwarts who have failed to gain an elected office, and some fought alongside Museveni in the 1981–1985 guerilla war (Manyak and Katono 2010, p. 15). Besides the RDC, other security structures also reinforce the coercive capacity of the NRM at the district level. These structures include the District Internal Security Officer (DISO), the District Police Commander (DPC), and the head of the military unit at the district level (Kagoro 2012, p. 9).

Each district is subdivided into sub-counties (Tier 3) and at this level, the regime has deployed the Gombolola Internal Security Officer (GISO) paramilitary structure to counterbalance the power of the democratically elected political head of the unit, the LC3 chairperson. The GISOs are appointed and deployed by the Director General of Internal Security Organization (DG ISO)[16] to oversee security. The GISOs operate in areas well known to them: They are mostly appointed to their areas of birth or where they have lived for a good part of their lives. They speak the language of the locals and know people by their names, families and political inclination. Moreover, GISOs are mandated to recruit a number of security agents to streamline their operations.[17] There are 1385 sub-counties in Uganda, each with a fully-fledged GISO structure.[18]

The sub-counties are subdivided into parishes (Tier 4), which are headed by an LC2 chairperson elected through an electoral college system comprised of all LC1 executive members that constitute a given parish. At this level, the NRM's coercive capacity is extended through the Parish Internal Security Officer (PISO) structure, which is active especially in those areas affected by insecurity such as northeastern and northern Uganda.[19] The last unit of state administration, LC1 (village) is headed by an elected LC1 chairperson.[20] The LC1 chair, together with the LC1 secretary of defense and a selected defense committee are charged with running the village's security (Baker 2005, pp. 19–41; Kagoro 2012, p. 9). The 1997 Local Government Act stipulates the functions of the two administrative units of LC1 and LC2 to include the maintainance of law, order, and security, and to recommend persons in their area of jurisdiction who can be recruited into the army, the police, and the Local Defense Units (LDUs). In essence, LC1 and LC2 structures perform both political and security roles.

All aforementioned security structures are obliged to serve the interests of the president and the NRM party in general, consequently strengthening the trinitarian interplay (Kagoro 2012, pp. 7–11). The Table 1 below further illustrates the effective

[16] The DG ISO is in charge of the country's internal security and is a direct appointee of the president.

[17] Interview, intelligence officer X3, Wakiso, 28 Febraury 2011.

[18] For details see http://ec.or.ug/docs/registration%20statistics2011.pdf. Accessed 02.07.14.

[19] There are a total of 7411 parishes in the country, for details see http://ec.or.ug/pollingstatn.php. Accessed 02.07.14.

[20] However, LC1 elections have not been held since 2001 on account of a lawsuit brought by the leading opposition party, the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC). The lawsuit contests the FDC's legitimacy in the framework of multiparty politics that was re-introduced in 2005. This has resulted in LC1 chairpersons governing their villages from 2001 to the present without elections (see Gibb 2012, p. 458). There are a total of 57,789 LC1 units (villages) in Uganda.

Table 1 Security structures vis-à-vis civil political tiers. (Source: author's own compilation)

Level	Civil political structure	Security structure	Modes of effecting coercive power
Tier 2	District: headed by an LC5 elected through universal adult suffrage	Regime appointed: RDCs DISOs, DPCs and head of a military unit at the district	RDCs are an extension of the regime and a mechanism for keeping the district structure in line with the NRM's prerogatives[a]
			Oversee security, assess and restrain opposition activities, and can veto the LC5s' decisions[b]
			Recruit and maintain agents/informants throughout the district
			Mobilize and campaign for NRM during elections
Tier 3	Sub-county/gombolola: headed LC3 elected through universal adult suffrage	GISO	GISOs sit at sub-county headquarters and are entitled to attend LC3 council meetings
			GISOs are appointed to their areas of origin. Speak the same language and know potential supporters of the opposition
			Mobilize and campaign for NRM during elections[c]
Tier 4	Parish: headed by an LC2 chairperson elected by an electoral college comprised of all LC1 executive members that form the parish	PISO LC2 doubles as a security structure	Provide an extra layer of regime security in areas of insecurity
			Replicate the duties of the GISO at the parish level
			LC2 assists in maintaining law, order and security
			LC2 recommends recruits for the army and police
Tier 5	Village: headed by an LC1 chairperson elected through universal adult suffrage	LC1 doubles as a security structure	Strong reference points for the military/security institutions
			Tasked by RDCs, DISOs, GISOs and other security agencies to gather security related information
			LC1 assists in maintaining law, order and security
			LC1 recommends recruits for the army and police

RDC resident district commissioner, *LC* local council, *DISO* district internal security officer, *GISO* gombolola internal security officer, *PISO* parish internal security officer

[a]For details see (Rubongoya 2007, p. 103, 171; Carbone 2008, p. 83; Manyak and Katono 2010, pp. 14–15)

[b]Interview, RDC X1, northwestern Uganda, 29 January 2011 and interview, RDC X2, northern Uganda, 5 February 2011

[c]An interview with a senior intelligence officer X1 held in Kampala on 20 January 2011 revealed that in the 2011 general election, for example, GISOs were tasked with compiling a list of NRM supporters and prominent opposition supporters in their areas. Thirty people were selected from each of the country's 57,789 villages to mobilize votes for the NRM. In some cases, these people were encouraged to recruit prominent figures sympathetic to the opposition to mobilize for the NRM, disempowering the capacity of the opposition. This is a classic example of low intensity coercion as understood by Levitsky and Way (2010, pp. 56–59)

reach of the military and paramilitary structures with respect to the NRM's coercive capacity.

Besides the official security structures, several other non-statutory coercive units and paramilitary groups operate on an ad hoc basis (Schlichte 2005, pp. 101–103; Mwenda 2007, p. 32; Tripp 2010, p. 139; Kagoro 2012, pp. 1–3).[21] A classic example is the November 2005 bail hearing of leading opposition leader Kizza Besigye and

[21] These include: 3K Brigade, Amuka Boys, Arrow Boys, Black Brigade, Black Mamba, Blue Cobra, Elephant Brigade, Kibooko Squad and Red Brigade.

his 13 co-accused. Over 30 paramilitary men wearing all black (t-shirts and jeans) and wielding machine guns, better known as the "Black Mambas", were deployed to surround and intimidate the high court during the hearing (Mwenda 2007, p. 26; Rubongoya 2007, p. 195, 225; Carbone 2008, p. 84).[22]

Besigye has complained, "We all contribute to the salaries of civil servants; they thus should not be partisan. But RDCs, GISOs and DISOs among a long list of civil servants act as if they work for NRM" (see Kagoro 2015, p. 179). After the 2001 elections, Besigye petitioned the supreme court and accused the RDCs, DISOs, GISOs and LC officials, among others, of participating in acts of violence and harassment against his supporters. The supreme court found the accusation to be truthful but did not move to annul the election results (Tangri and Mwenda 2010, p. 35).[23] On the flip side, however, the multiple security structures have increased the presence of the state at the periphery and have improved the government's capacity to govern, which past regimes had failed to achieve. Yet Skocpol (1973, 1979) would remind us that strong states can also enhance autocratic stability.

Based on Levitsky and Way's (2010, pp. 238–251) analysis of Zimbabwe and Mozambique, the extensive reach of the NRM's security forces is comparable to those of the two countries. In different ways and to varying degrees, the NRM's security apparatus shares similarities with those of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) which also, especially in Zimbabwe, have penetrated state structures at all levels. Like ZANU and FRELIMO, the NRM's history is rooted in a violent liberation struggle. And coincidently, NRM leader Yoweri Museveni was trained militarily by FRELIMO (Museveni 1997, pp. 28–31). Museveni described his experience with FRELIMO by explaining, "We found that Frelimo had evolved a good system of organizing the population in branches and neighbourhood committees similar to those we were later to introduce in Uganda as Resistance Councils and Committees" (Museveni 1997, p. 30).[24]

3 The military and the ruling party: two sides of the same coin

Although the armed wing of the NRM, the National Resistance Army (NRA), was nationalized and renamed the Uganda Peoples' Defense Forces (UPDF) after the promulgation of the 1995 constitution, the army and the party are inextricably connected. For a start, political leaders including President Museveni doubled as military field commanders during the struggle for power, and the military wing was considered superior to the political wing (Kategaya 1990, pp. 256–257; Kasfir 2002, p. 2; Mwenda 2007, p. 27). The military has continued to play a central role and appears to be a core constituency of the NRM government (Rubongoya 2007, p. 90; Car-

[22] Fearing reprisal, Besigye and his co-accused opted to return to prison despite having been granted bail by the court.

[23] After the 2006 elections, Besigye made a similar petition (Tangri and Mwenda 2010, p. 35).

[24] Resistence Councils (RCs) were renamed Local Councils (LCs) following the promulgation of the 1995 Uganda constitution.

bone 2008, p. 20; Tangri and Mwenda 2010, p. 44). Moreover, President Museveni doubled as Minister of Defense for 15 years (1986–2001) and remained a serving soldier for 18 years (1986–2004) of his presidency (Africa Confidential 14.05.2004; Carbone 2008, p. 46). And although President Museveni relinquished his position as Minister of Defense in 2001 and "retired" from the army in 2004, he remains a *de facto* serving member of the army (Tangri and Mwenda 2010, p. 44).

A number of noteworthy cases can be used to illustrate the intimate relationship between the military and the NRM. First, the 1995 Uganda constitution allows the military to elect ten serving officers to represent the military constituency in the national legislative assembly (Carbone 2008, p. 44; Gibb 2012, p. 458). In practice, the army representatives enhance the numbers of the ruling party in parliament. The army MPs are under strict orders to toe the NRM party line, and those who have acted otherwise have been recalled and punished (Rubongoya 2007, p. 169; Muhumuza 2009, p. 35).[25]

Second, several senior military officers, including President Museveni, have on several occasions made public declarations to the effect that the military cannot allow the opposition to take power. The following examples merit mention:

- In the run up to the 1996 presidential elections, Major General Kahinda Otafiire, then Minister of State for Security, publically asserted that if anyone except Museveni won the presidential elections, the newcomer would be overthrown within 24 h (Hills 2000, p. 93).
- In the 2001 elections, Brigadier Henry Tumukunde reminded voters that, irrespective of whom they vote for, President Museveni would still rule because they (the NRM) had guns (Tangri and Mwenda 2010, p. 44).
- In September 2008, General Aronda Nyakairima, then Chief of Defense Forces, explicitly declared, "We [the military] liberated this country in 1986 and we shall not allow bad characters to come back to power, we will fight all these forces [the opposition]" (Muhumuza 2009, p. 36; Tangri and Mwenda 2010, p. 44; Kagoro 2015, p. 115).[26]
- In January 2013, President Museveni, Minister of Defense Crispus Kiyonga, and Chief of Defense Forces General Aronda Nyakairima each made a bold pronouncement that the army could intervene (carry out a coup) if the country's parliament continued to challenge the powers of the executive (see Kagoro 2015, p. 115).[27]

[25] For example, when army MP Brigader Henry Tumukunde appeared on two Kampala-based radio stations making critical remarks about the army and the state of governance in the country, he was put under military detention for over a year and faced court martial hearings in military court for spreading harmful propaganda and breaching army codes. Another notable case was Colonel Fred Bogere, who as an army MP in the 7th Parliament (2001–2006) refused to support raising the presidential term limit (to allow President Museveni to continuously run for presidency). Colonel Bogere has been largely pushed out of the public sphere and has never been deployed or given any assignment since then.

[26] General Aronda made these comments in the course of addressing newly trained officers at Mubende barracks (central Uganda).

[27] See also http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Parliament-summons-Gen–Aronda–Kiyonga-over-coup-talk/-/688334/1677506/-/na2yh1z/-/index.html. Accessed 19.02.2015.

These statements, among others, exemplify the strong hand of the military within the trinitarian arrangement in the Ugandan political landscape. Moreover, former Minister of Local Government, Bidandi Ssali, once revealed, "I had the privilege, then, of being in one of the top NRM meetings where the army vowed not to accept Besigye to take over power if he won the elections; so, that meant there could be bloodshed again" (see Kagoro 2015, pp. 115–116).[28] This can be read as a clear indication that the incumbent regime is less likely to relinquish power in an electoral defeat. Moreover, elections are preceded by strategic reshuffles in the military to ensure unquestioned loyalty to the incumbent regime (see Economist Intelligence Unit, Uganda Country Report, January 2004).

Third, in all four presidential elections since 1996, the military has been explicitly involved in electoral malpractice and misconduct such as openly campaigning for President Museveni (Mwenda and Tangri 2005, p. 460), harassment of the opposition, manning of polling stations, staffing ballot boxes, and directing people on how to vote "wisely" (see Veyel 2007, p. 387; Rubongoya 2007, p. 150; Muhumuza 2009, p. 35; Tangri and Mwenda 2010, p. 35).[29]

In what Levitsky and Way (2010, pp. 56–59) would classify as high-intensity coercion, the NRM has used the military to perform several acts of overt violence against the opposition during elections. Though limited violence occurred in the last general elections of 2011, all previous elections were marred by heightened military intimidation and violence (Girke and Kamp 2011, p. 51; Gibb 2012, pp. 458–461). In the 2001 elections, for example, the military was involved in electoral violence ranging from firing live ammunition at opposition supporters and deliberately crashing vehicles into anti-NRM crowds to defacing opposition candidate Kizza Besigye's campaign posters (Rubongoya 2007, p. 150). In the 2006 elections, Lieutenant Ramathan Magala shot live ammunition into a crowd of Besigye's supporters at Bulange Mengo in Kampala, killing two and injuring others (Gloppen et al. 2006, p. 21).

In the same 2006 elections, the Military Court Martial accused Besigye of possession of illegal arms and for having connections with the "shadow" People's Redemption Army (PRA) rebel group. Besigye later spent most of the 2006 campaign period between court and Luzira prison (Veyel 2007, p. 387; Mwenda 2007, p. 26; Gibb 2012, p. 461). Mwenda (2007, p. 26) points out that when supporters of Besigye attempted to stage a demonstration, the military crushed it with tanks and armored personnel carriers, killing three people. Every general election including the most recent in 2011 has seen heavy military deployment on a regular basis, especially in the capital Kampala. Political analysts believe that the heavy military presence during elections is a symbolic display signaling what awaits those who intend to vote or demonstrate against the NRM (see Girke and Kamp 2011, p. 53 Kagoro 2013, p. 40).

Besides the military, the civil police force has also been synchronized with the incumbent regime. Since the early 2000s, President Museveni has been systematically building an ideological and functional bond between the police and the military. A number of military officers have been deployed within the police force, and since

[28] Bidandi was once a strong ally of President Museveni and served in several cabinet positions before their disagreement in 2005 on the issue of raising the presidential term limits.

[29] See also *The Economic Intelligence Unit* (EIU), Uganda Country Report, January 2004.

2001 the police has been and continues to be headed by military generals (see Hills 2007, pp. 409–410; Rubongoya 2007, p. 224; Mutengesa and Hendrickson 2008, p. 51). Consequently, the police and the military have been used jointly to curtail anti-NRM demonstrations. For instance, in September 2009 the military and police shot live bullets into crowds of pro-Buganda demonstrators, leaving 27 people dead and hundreds injured (Veyel 2010, p. 412).[30] In April and May 2011, dozens of people were shot dead and hundreds injured by the joint police-military operation to contain the "walk-to-work" demonstrations that were being led by opposition leader Kiiza Besigye.[31] At one of those demonstrations, the police-military operatives brutally arrested Besigye after pepper-spraying his eyes, shooting his arm, and using hammers and guns to smash the windows of his car (see Gibb 2012, p. 461).

Moreover, in August 2013, the Ugandan Parliament passed the Public Order Management Bill—later signed into law by President Museveni in September 2013—despite broad criticism by opposition politicians, religious leaders, and domestic and international civil society organizations (see Kagoro 2014, p. 114). This act gives police discretionary authority to veto gatherings of as few as three people in public to deliberate political issues. To organize a public meeting, police must receive written notice 7 days in advance.[32] One can thus argue strongly that through its close connection to the military, the police has been co-opted into the trinitarian arrangement.

The closeness between the security forces and the NRM is neither surprising nor unique. As Levitsky and Way (2010, pp. 238–251) demonstrate, the trajectory between the ruling parties and the security forces in both Zimbabwe and Mozambique has followed a similar pattern. As in Zimbabwe and Mozambique, the security forces in Uganda—an offshoot of the 1981–1985 guerrilla war—have maintained strong solidarity with the ruling party.

4 Cohesion of the military: the president's overbearing command and control

For coercion to be effective, Levitsky and Way (2010) argue:

> Subordinates within the state must reliably follow their superiors' commands. Where cohesion is high, incumbents can be confident that even highly controversial or illegal orders … will be carried out by both high-level security officials and rank-and-file soldiers …. (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 59–60)

Empirical evidence suggests that Museveni's position vis-à-vis the military is unassailable and his stature over it seen as natural. This dimension has enabled him to retain the effectiveness of his coercive capacity. One should keep in mind that the NRM and the military that form the core of the incumbent regime were personally nurtured by President Museveni from the early 1970s to the emergence of the NRM party as a major political force in Uganda. Museveni's extensive authority is aug-

[30] Buganda (in central Uganda) is a traditional kingdom headed by the Kabaka (king).

[31] The demonstrations were organized in protest against rising food prices, fuel prices and alarming levels of inflation in Uganda.

[32] See Article 19, Uganda: Public Order Management Act, October 2013.

mented by additional wide-ranging powers derived from the constitution. He is the commander-in-chief as well as chairman of most of the organs of the national security system, which include the National Security Council, the Military High Command and the Defense Forces Council (Mutengesa and Hendrickson 2008, pp. 43–44; Kagoro 2012, p. 11). A senior military officer indicated that these historical and contemporary realities have made it possible for President Museveni to enjoy overarching influence over the army for political ends.[33]

In a similar vein, Rubongoya claims that "the primary goal of the Uganda People's Defense Forces (UPDF) is to serve and promote the interests and survival of the NRM and the political fortunes of President Museveni" (2007, p. 172). Some observers have implied that the army displays unflagging loyalty to President Museveni, who has personalized control over it (Tangri and Mwenda 2003, p. 540; Carbone 2008, p. 46). Tangri and Mwenda (2010, p. 44) highlight that the president himself has on several occasions told Ugandans that the UPDF is his army and it would not accept the leadership of someone else, especially not Museveni's rival Kizza Besigye. The president has maintained a strong grip on the military by appointing and promoting loyal cadres to top positions while purging the disloyal and the fence-sitters (Muhumuza 2009, p. 35).

As Levitsky and Way (2010, pp. 58–61) propose, a shared ethnic identity is a critical factor in maintaining the highest levels of cohesion. Similarly, the military's personal loyalty to President Museveni has been consolidated by the shared ethnic background of the top echelon of the army (Kasfir 2000, p. 63; Carbone 2008, p. 46; Tangri and Mwenda 2010, p. 44). The top positions in the military have been dominated by the Banyankole, Museveni's ethnic group (Mwenda and Tangri 2005, p. 460; Tangri and Mwenda 2010, p. 44; Lindemann 2011, pp. 401–404). For instance, 10 of the 15 lifelong members of the Defense Forces Council and 5 of the 6 members of the High Command, the army's highest organ, are Banyankole (Carbone 2008, pp. 46–47). For more than 25 years of Museveni's presidency, all five full generals—including President Museveni and his younger brother, General Salim Saleh—have been Banyankole. And Banyankole have predominantly held the position of CDF, the highest position in the army.[34] It should be noted that the same top echelon is dominated by those officers who participated in the guerrilla war that brought Museveni to power.

The president has also appointed his inner family members to sensitive positions in the military. His younger brother, General Salim Saleh, served as the first army commander when Museveni assumed power in 1986 and is currently the senior advisor on military affairs. Though General Saleh is a "retired" officer, he is thought to wield substantial influence in the army and as the silent power always at his brother's side (see Kagoro 2015, p. 128). In February 2010, the Presidential Guard Brigade (PGB), which was considered to have been the most lethal with the largest formation, most immense fire-power, best-trained and best-paid force in the country (Car-

[33] Interview, military officer X2, Kampala, 16 April 2009.

[34] Ironically, Uganda is a country of more than 60 ethnic groups. For details see Uganda bureau of statistics official figures at http://www.ubos.org/onlinefiles/uploads/ubos/census_tabulations/centableB10.pdf. Accessed 12.01.12.

bone 2008, p. 47; Tangri and Mwenda 2010, p. 44) was fused into the previously smaller Special Forces and placed under the command of President Museveni's son, Brigadier Muhoozi Kainerugaba. The force remains the most privileged branch of the military, consisting of commandos, paratroops, air force, artillery, armored brigade, motorized infantry and mechanized regiments, and it is estimated to be 12,000 strong (Tangri and Mwenda 2010, p. 44).[35] Aside from protecting his father's power, Brigadier Muhoozi's rise in the military has generated debate that he is being prepared to assume the presidency (see Kagoro 2015, p. 130).

As a strategy, applying ethnic exclusiveness at the core of the security forces is neither new nor limited to Uganda. As Roessler (2011, pp. 312–314) has argued, it has been applied by many leaders, especially in Africa, to eradicate perceived enemies and forestall possible coups. Roessler (2011, p. 302) adds that although ethnic exclusion increases the risk of societal rebellion and civil war, it significantly reduces the likehood of executing a successfull coup. Civil-military relations scholars maintain that President Museveni has continued to meddle in and manipulate the affairs of the military to ensure that the institution remains an integral political power base for his regime (see Enloe 1980, p. 10; Huntington 1985, pp. 83–84; Decalo 1998, p. 19; Meiken 2005, p. 10). Indeed, Museveni's overbearing command and control and ethnic exclusiveness at the core of the military has helped him to maximize power and stabilize the trinitarian constellation. He has used the military to achieve two mutually interdependent results: curtail the opposition and coup-proof his power.

Conclusion

Though Levitsky and Way exclude Uganda from the African case studies analyzed, they suggested that post-1995 Uganda might fit their framework of competitive authoritarian regimes. From the observations presented in this paper, it clearly emerges that the scholars' proposition was accurate. As illustrated, empirical evidence underscores that the NRM, the incumbent regime in Uganda, is competitive authoritarian. Since ascendance to power in 1986 the regime has moderately improved the governing capacity of the state, preserved sociopolitical order and enhanced socioeconomic development, yet has simultaneously instrumentalized the military and paramilitary structures to entrench itself and President Museveni in power. Despite having been challenged militarily by over seven rebel groups, the NRM used its coercive capacity to confine all rebellions to the periphery and later defeat them. As in the 14 African cases of competitive authoritarianism that Levitsky and Way (2010, Chap. 6) analyse, Uganda is characterized by both elements of democracy and authoritarianism. The country has some levels of constitutionalism and conducts regular presidential elections in which the opposition, operating above the ground, scores significant results.

While other dimensions such as discretionary control of state resources, weakness of the opposition and Levitsky and Way's notions of Western leverage and linkage to the West can to some limited extent be used to explain the NRM's robust capacity to

[35] Interview, investigative journalist X2, Kampala, 12 March 2011; interview, military officer X3, western Uganda, 13 February 2011; interview, military officer X4, Kampala, 18 January 2012.

resist threats to its power, it has been demonstrated that the regime's coercive capacity is the most prevailing factor. The paper has built on Levitsky and Way's (2010) framework of coercive capacity, measured from the perspective of scope and cohesion, to draw attention to the less-analyzed yet fundamentally consequential relationship between President Museveni, the military and the NRM. It has been illustrated that the coercive capacity that has sustained the competitive authoritarian regime for nearly 30 years and counting is grounded in the trinitarian (Museveni-military-NRM) constellation. Considering Levitsky and Way's (2010, pp. 238–251) analysis of Zimbabwe and Mozambique, the scope and cohesion of the NRM's coercive capacity is neither surprising nor unique, but it is certainly an aspect common to regimes with histories rooted in violent military struggles.

The NRM regime has used its coercive capacity to engage in both high- and low-intensity acts of suppression, reflecting the triad constellation described in this paper. First, the regime has deployed military and paramilitary structures as counterweights to democratic political structures at all levels. Second, the ruling party and the military are two sides of the same coin and the latter is the primary political base of the former. Third, the incumbent president has retained overarching command and control of the military for political ends. In sum, the balance of power in the military and paramilitary structures has fundamentally tilted the political competitive field in favor of the incumbent regime. This balance has enabled President Museveni to easily curtail opposition challenges and, in part, win all of the four elections (1996, 2001, 2006 and 2011) in which he has thus far competed.

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Authoritarian stability across space: the case of Tanzania

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Abstract The end of the Cold War witnessed the proliferation of competitive authoritarian regimes in the third world and more particularly in Africa. Levitsky and Way, the founders of the concept "competitive authoritarianism", maintain that although elections have regularly been held, their typical feature remains a blending of competition with varying degrees of authoritarianism. Yet, in their competitive authoritarianism trajectories, the United Republic of Tanzania is considered stable authoritarian. This article advances two arguments: (a) Tanzania, as a union of two countries, Tanganyika and Zanzibar, exhibits a case where organisational party strength varies across territory, thereby affecting electoral competitiveness and manipulation by the ruling regime, and (b) as a consequence, Levitsky and Way do not effectively capture the linkage and leverage factors concerning Tanzania.

Keywords Tanzania · Authoritarianism · Zanzibar · Elections

Introduction

Competitive authoritarian regimes proliferated after the end of the Cold War. In these regimes, incumbent abuse of the state violates at least one of three defining attributes of democracy: (i) free elections, (ii) broad protection of civil liberties, and (iii) a reasonably level playing field (Levitsky and Way 2010). Yet authoritarianism varies across space. In this article, I engage Levitsky and Way's description of Tanzania's stable competitive authoritarianism. I note that the United Republic of Tanzania—as a union of two countries, Tanganyika and Zanzibar—exhibits a case where organ-

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isational party strength varies across territory and thereby affects electoral competitiveness and manipulation by the ruling regime. It should be noted that as a united republic, elections in Tanzania are held at two levels, that is, elections specific to the United Republic as a whole, popularly known as "Union elections" and those that are only limited to Zanzibar. In either case, however competitive the previous elections have been, they remain unfair. As a result of variation in authoritarianism in Tanzania, the linkage and leverage factors discussed by Levitsky and Way are not captured effectively. To accomplish this endeavour, this article is divided into six main sections: the introduction, Tanzania's political context, elections in Zanzibar, Union elections, linkage with the West, and the conclusion.

1 Tanzania's political history

Tanzania is a united republic. It consists of two formerly sovereign states: mainland Tanzania (the Republic of Tanganyika before unification) and the Zanzibar Archipelago (the People's Republic of Zanzibar before unification). Like most African countries, both the Republic of Tanganyika and the People's Republic of Zanzibar achieved independence under a multiparty political system. Tanganyika obtained independence on 9 December 1961 and became a republic in 1962. Between 1962 and 1965, it was a de-facto one party state. This means that in the early 1960s, even before Tanzania adopted a single party constitution, there had been earlier moves to restrict space for popular political participation. Among such moves were the invocation of the colonial deportation dissidents, the enactment of the Preventive Detention Act in 1962; the curtailment of independent trade union activities and their centralization under the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA); the abolition of the administrative roles of traditional chiefs; the centralization of cooperative societies under the Co-operative Union of Tanzania; and the undercutting of the power of district councils by bringing them under the direct control of the Minister of Local Government. All centralized organizations were collectively brought under the tutelage of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and designated mass organizations of the party. Zanzibar, on the other hand, received its independence on 10 December 1963 and a coalition of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) and the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP) formed the government. Other parties existing at that time included the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) and the Umma Party. On 12 January 1964 a segment of Africans waged a successful revolution and the elected government was overthrown. On 26 April 1964 Tanganyika and Zanzibar united to form the United Republic of Tanzania.

With the inauguration of the interim constitution on 10 July 1965, however, Tanzania became both a *de jure* and *de facto* one party state. Only two political parties existed constitutionally, namely TANU on the Tanzanian mainland and the ASP in Zanzibar. Other political parties were banned. Article 3(1) of the Interim Constitution of 1965 stated, "There shall be one political party in Tanzania" (p. 7). Section (2) of the same article provided categorically that "until the union of the Tanganyika African National Union with the Afro-Shiraz Party (which United Party shall constitute the one political party), the Party shall, in and for Tanganyika, be the Tanganyika African

National Union and, in and for Zanzibar, be the Afro-Shiraz Party" (p. 7). Section (3) provided further that all political activities in Tanzania, apart from that of the organs of the state of the United Republic of Tanzania and Zanzibar, should be conducted by or under the auspices of the party. This was the period when civil societies were suffocated, political parties banned, and the parliament reduced to a rubber-stamping machine for the decisions made by the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the party. It was also the period where almost all public institutions were politicized, from the civil service to the security forces: Young peoples' organizations became the Youth League; women's organizations became the party's Women's League. These changes were implemented under the justification of unity, development and Africanization (TANU Annual Report 1965). Yet on 3 June 1975, the National Assembly made constitutional amendments that declared the party supreme in law as well as practice. Article 3(3) of the Interim Constitution of 1965 provided that all activity of the organs of the state of the United Republic of Tanzania should be conducted under the auspices of the party. This was a climax whereby all state organs were placed under party authority. Thus the party was the final authority in the country.

On 5 February 1977, TANU and the ASP merged to form the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party. The supremacy clause was retained in the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) of 1977. Article 10(1) of the URT constitution and Article 5(2) of the constitution of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar of 1984 provided categorically for the supremacy status. This political development completely eroded the powers of the various branches of government, as the party was to subsequently make all important decisions and policies in the URT.

This background indicates that the URT was a single party state constitutionally from 1965 to 1992, i.e. approximately 30 years. In 1992, it became a multiparty state. This was due to both internal and external factors. Between the 1970s and 1980s, Tanzania experienced economic crisis triggered by factors such as the oil crisis of 1973, the 1978/1979 Kagera War between Tanzania and Uganda, the 1977 collapse of the East African Union, and persistent drought conditions. To address its economic crisis, the country approached the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and the international donor community. The international financial institutions (IFIs) initiated the Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP) packages that required political and economic liberalization as well as devaluation of currency, among other things. This phenomenon was compounded by the collapse of the Socialist Bloc in 1989 upon which other countries had relied for some assistance. It was against this background that the CCM and its government set off on the road to a multiparty system. However, it must be noted that Tanzania experienced a top down transition (Hyden 1999), imposed transition (Bakari 2001; Pinkney 2003), and very specifically a CCM-controlled "democratic" transition (Baregu 2003). In 1991 the Presidential Commission was formed, headed by Chief Justice Francis Nyalali, to determine whether Tanzania could adopt a multiparty system or otherwise. The Commission suggested a number of significant changes to the country's legal system to pave the way for multiparty democracy. However, the government decided to adopt only a select few of the proposed measures, leaving the philosophy and content of the constitution in place to uphold the single party order. Since the early 1990s, the political opposition has called for a comprehensive constitutional review, including

the appointment of an independent commission to examine all aspects of the constitution (Hyden 1999, p. 147). This transition path gave the CCM the monopoly over the process to determine the transition pace, design the rules of the game, and to in general own and benefit from it. A de-linking of the party from the state of the previous authoritarian regime is yet to happen. The power of the state in Tanzania remains closely linked to that of the ruling party. Evidently, the state is in the pocket of the ruling party (Hyden and Mmuya 2008, p. 111). Thus the new pluralist system inherited "a wrong constitution suited to a monolithic system" and "the writing of an entirely new constitution rather than patching up the one-party constitution as the CCM government has been doing" was needed to reinvigorate democracy (TEMCO 1997, p. 12). Although in 2011 Tanzania started to write its new constitution, the process and content of the draft constitution are firmly controlled by the ruling party and its government (Mandi 2013; Bakari and Makulilo 2014).

2 Explaining Tanzania's authoritarian stability

In their methodology, Levitsky and Way (2010) stress the importance of using a case analysis. They state that "intensive case analysis yields greater measurement validity than is possible in most large-n cross-national studies" (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 35). They further posit that "detailed case studies allow us to examine and test for causal relationships in a way that large-n cross-national studies generally fail to do" (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 35). It is for this reason that Levitsky and Way (2010, pp. 251–254) cover Tanzania. Nonetheless, the most critical omission in their coverage is that they do not explicitly state that Tanzania is a United Republic comprising of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. This United Republic is the only one to survive in Africa, having reached its 50-year anniversary in April 2014. By overlooking this fact, most of what Levitsky and Way present is simply generalisation. Although they use terms such as the "autonomous island of Zanzibar" and the "mainland" (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 253), these terms do not in any way signify the United Republic. Election results for the President of Zanzibar and for members of the House of Representatives are not presented. It is against that backdrop that Levitsky and Way erroneously conclude that "the CCM was not seriously challenged after 1995, despite relatively low levels of repression" (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 254). And therefore, the observation that the CCM is a hegemonic party in Tanzania (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 254) needs to be qualified. While that statement can hold true for the United Republic, it is not the same for Zanzibar. For the same reasons, electoral politics in Zanzibar is very complex. As such it is difficult to appreciate the depth of analysis by Levitsky and Way as an "intensive case analysis" or a "detailed case study".

Similarly, Tanzania is a case of competitive authoritarian stability rooted in governing party strength (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 251). Specifically, Levitsky and Way (2010, p. 306) classify Tanzania as a case of low linkage, medium high organizational power, and high leverage, resulting in the prediction of stable authoritarianism. This state of affairs makes the country a persistent case of a de facto state-party in which the playing field is skewed in favour of the ruling party (Makulilo 2008; Levitsky and Way 2010). State-party in this context refers to a political party that

survives and operates solely by relying on the coercive instruments and resources of a state (Shivji 1991; Makulilo 2008). That party suffocates political space for other actors to play their roles effectively. The state-party can either be in a *de jure* or *de facto* category, and in some cases in both forms. In *de jure*, a party is made the state-party by law and derives its authority from there, as opposed to a party that derives its legitimacy from and as a part of the civil society. Such a party increasingly and frequently begins to depend on the use of coercion, which is a characteristic per excellence of the state, rather than persuasion, which is a characteristic of an organization of the civil society (Shivji 1991, p. 2). In contrast, a state-party is regarded as *de facto* when the marriage between the party and the state is visible in practice (Makulilo 2008, pp. 29–30). Thus, the properties of this regime often constitute a midpoint between authoritarianism and democracy, consequently leading to an uneven playing field that militates against the survival of opposition parties (Chu 1999, p. 62). Arguably, the project of consolidating the state-party also requires a takeover of the public sector. While this kind of regime conducts regular multiparty elections at all levels of government, violation of basic democratic standards occurs in serious and systematic ways (Schedler 2010, p. 69).

Nonetheless, the presentation of the strength of the CCM by Levitsky and Way is too narrow. The authors simply rely on the "10 House Cells"[1] to demonstrate the strength of the party (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 252). This observation has two limitations: Firstly, it should be mentioned that after the introduction of the multiparty system in 1992, the 10 House Cells weakened progressively. It is no longer a strong element of party organisation and grassroots presence. Secondly, it assumes the strength of the ruling party is uniform countrywide, which is not the case. It has been established that sub-national authoritarianism is a fact of life in most democracies in the developing and post-communist world (Gibson 2005; O'Donnel 1993; Fox 1994; Hagopian 1996; Cornelius et al. 1999).

According to Freedom House (2014), Tanzania became an electoral democracy after the 2010 general elections and with a score of three is on the border of being classified as a free country. This makes Tanzania one of the few competitive authoritarian regimes in Africa to democratize. This is noteworthy given that Levitsky and Way were pessimistic about the democratization potential of Tanzania. Nonetheless, the authors had difficulty in defining "stability" in their "authoritarian stability" by simply relying on the frequencies the regime survives on power without paying due attention to the margin of its proportional votes. But the fact is that the popular votes for the ruling party in both mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar are in a state of decline (Makulilo 2014a), hence casting doubt on the "authoritarian stability". More so, in mainland Tanzania the ruling party is relatively comfortable with not using substantial manipulation to win elections. Thus Levitsky and Way did not distinguish between mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar. The Freedom House has at least recognised the variations in multiparty democracy in both parts of the United Republic. In a more emphatic way, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) country report on Tanzania distinguishes between democratic politics in mainland Tanzania and the United Republic as a whole. On the mainland (Tanganyika), government leaders are

[1] These are the smallest organs of the ruling party. They constitute 10 houses that are under one leader.

chosen in generally free, but not entirely fair, elections. In contrast to the mainland, general elections in Zanzibar have been neither free nor fair. Until 2010, general elections in Zanzibar were neither free nor fair, and the government lacked democratic legitimacy. Although opposition parties and civic groups were able to organize and articulate their interests, as groups they were repressed by the state, sometimes on a massive scale (BTI 2014). Thus, although Levitsky and Way (2010, pp. 251–254) mention Zanzibar in their case study of Tanzania, they pay insufficient attention to the radically different dynamics in Zanzibar and the United Republic.

It must be noted that organisationally, the ruling party in Zanzibar has historically been weaker. This situation became more critical especially after the return of multiparty democracy in 1992. It is this fact that makes the party more prone to resort to violence to maintain power than on the mainland. This is what Andreas Schedler has called "the menu of manipulation" (Schedler 2010). In other words, when Levitsky and Way classify Tanzania as a case of medium high organizational power, this may be true for the Union but not for Zanzibar. This point will be discussed in due course using Levitsky and Way's (2010, pp. 376–380) coding scheme for the United Republic as a whole and Zanzibar separately. Consequently, competitive authoritarianism in the Union looks very different from that on Zanzibar. In the United Republic, the CCM is unassailable, enjoying a comfortable position. Therefore, it can afford the kind of "strong state democratization" that Dan Slater (2012) has discussed in his various publications on Southeast Asia (meaning that a dominant authoritarian party democratizes because it considers itself safe from electoral competition). As a consequence of these different dynamics, the United Republic as a whole is now more democratic than Zanzibar individually, pointing to the need of a more differentiated measure of democracy that allows for sub-national differences.

As a United Republic of two countries, Tanganyika and Zanzibar, Tanzania would require an examination of these units as separate entities. Although Levitsky and Way (2010) acknowledge that organisational power of the incumbent party varies, they did not apply it to understand sub-national authoritarianism. They posit that organisational power is highest where both states and parties are strong such as in Zimbabwe, Taiwan, Malaysia and Nicaragua. In their analysis, the authors further put forth that Tanzania exhibits combinations of a strong governing party but a relatively weak state (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 68). Likewise, they maintain that authoritarian stability depends on opposition strength. Thus, according to Levitsky and Way (2010, p. 69): "Where opposition forces mobilise large numbers of people for elections or protest movements, incumbents must employ more nakedly autocratic means to retain power (e.g., steal elections or crack down violently on street protest), which then erode public support, generate tension within the regime elite, and risk international punitive action." In the next sections, I present the electoral politics of both Zanzibar and the United Republic to engage the omissions made by Levitsky and Way. That means understanding the variability of authoritarian stability for Zanzibar and United Republic elections respectively.

3 Elections in Zanzibar: strong opposition vs. strong governing party

To understand the organisational power of the ruling party in Zanzibar, it is imperative to revisit Zanzibar's political history. Zanzibar consists of two islands, Unguja and Pemba. In terms of size, Unguja occupies 63 % and Pemba 37 % of the combined total area of 2232 km^2. The government headquarters is located in Unguja. According to the 2012 census, Zanzibar has a multiracial population of about 1,303,569 with a distribution of 58 % in Unguja and 42 % in Pemba. On 10 December 1963 the country received independence from British colonial control based on a multi-party system. A coalition between the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) and Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZNPP) formed the government. Other parties existing at that particular time were the Afro-Shiraz Party (ASP) and Umma party. On 12 January 1964 a segment of Africans waged a successful revolution and the elected government was overthrown. On 26 April 1964 Tanganyika (mainland Tanzania) and Zanzibar unified to form the United Republic of Tanzania. From the outset, Zanzibar politics was racial in nature. The ZNP was an Arab-based party, the ASP African-based, the ZPPP Pemba- and Shiraz-based, and the Umma party associated with Chinese and Cuban political orientations. At that time, however, the Arabs owned a lion's share of the economy. These divisions informed the pre-independence elections as well. Table 1 below summarizes such divisions:

The above table shows clearly that no party won the needed absolute majority to form a government. But it is important to note that the ASP was dominant in Unguja while the ZNP was dominant in Pemba. It was this fact that made it necessary for the ZNP/ZPPP coalition to form a government in 1963. The ASP perceived this government as an independent Arab government that did not represent Africans. This factor led to the 1964 revolution. The post-revolution government therefore isolated Pemba in all aspects of life i.e. in political, social and economic terms. Indeed, Pembans are marginalised. Such politics of exclusion resurfaced during the multiparty era in 1992. It can be argued that polarisation between the Unguja and Pemba islands, coupled with the politics of ethnicity and regionalism, has been instrumental in ensuring that the Civic United Front (CUF) retains Pemba as its sole base while the CCM maintains strong roots in Unguja. For that reason the CCM's organisational capacity to repress the CUF in Zanzibar is relatively weak compared to the United Republic elections, as shall become apparent in due course.

It is evident that the aforementioned context kept the ruling party in Zanzibar from developing a strong countrywide political base. The ASP was founded on 5 February 1957 after the merging of two ethnic associations, the African Association formed in

Table 1 Pre-independence elections in Zanzibar. (Source: compilation from Bakari 2001; Lofchie 1963; Campbell 1962)

Year	ASP	ZNP	ZPPP	Muslim league	UMMA	Total seats
1957	5	–	–	1	–	6
January 1961	10	9	3		–	22
June 1961	10	10	3		–	23
July 1963	13	12	6		–	31

1934 and the Shirazi Association formed in 1938. The party was quite weak since it did not have an office and meetings were thus conducted in members' private residencies. The party had serious internal problems of leadership and divisive factions (Afro-Shirazi Party 1974). In terms of organisational structure, the ASP had the congress as its highest and most powerful organ of the party, followed by the NEC. Below the NEC were two parallel organs: the Revolutionary Council with several departments (e.g. army, police, security, agriculture and education) and the Central Committee (composed of several departments such as youth, central and women). Below the Central Committee were regional, district, ward and branch levels (Afro-Shirazi Party 1972). It is important to understand that the ASP was strong in three regions of Unguja while the ZNP was strong in the two regions of Pemba. Although from 1965 to 1977 the ASP was the only political party to survive constitutionally, it could not manage to attract people from Pemba to join. The situation did not change with the merging of the ASP and TANU to form the CCM in 1977. The CCM in Zanzibar enjoys a relatively autonomous structure from the national party, whose headquarters is based in Dodoma.

The United Republic has further exacerbated the polarisation between Pemba and Unguja. The unification of Tanganyika and Zanzibar is interpreted as a protection of Unguja and for that matter the *1964 Revolution*. Serving the politics of memory, in every election the CCM maintains *Mapinduzi Daima* (revolution forever). It is important to note that the United Republic government normally sends heavy troops to Zanzibar to ensure a CCM victory. All vital offices such as the radio, national television, state house, seaport, and airport are guarded by the military throughout the entire election. At the national level, the CCM usually imposes a presidential candidate in Zanzibar. It is on this basis that Zanzibaris—especially those in the opposition parties—desire a union of three governments, in contrast to the present one of only two governments. Zanzibaris particularly from the opposition parties believe that this kind of union would end the dominance of the United Republic government over Zanzibar, allowing Pemba to compete with Unguja as an equal. Several attempts have been made since the 1980s to bring about the union of three governments. As Tanzania is currently writing its new constitution, a process that started in 2011 and the proposed constitution is still waiting for a referendum, the union of three governments has remained a critical issue. However, the CCM remains strictly against it.

Though the CCM has remained in power in Zanzibar since the inception of multipartism in 1992, it has consistently faced stiff opposition from the main opposition party, the CUF. The margin of victory between the CCM and the CUF has in most cases varied slightly. Since 1992, Zanzibar has conducted four general elections (in 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010). The CCM won each of these elections. In 1995 the CCM received 50.2% of the total valid votes and the CUF 49.8%. In 2000 the CCM received 67.04% and the CUF 32.96%. The Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO) described the 2000 elections as "aborted" and international election observers labelled it "a sham" due to open rigging, manipulation, and violence. In 2005 the CCM received 53.2% and the CUF 46.1% of the total valid votes. Yet in 2010 the CCM obtained 50.1% and the CUF 49.1%, which made it difficult for one political party to rule Zanzibar. This culminated in a change to the constitution of Zanzibar prior to the 2010 elections to allow for the formation of a government of

national unity. Although elections in Zanzibar have been highly competitive, they have not been free and fair. In the next sections, I show how the ruling party has been able to resort to what Andreas Schedler (2010) refers to as a "menu of manipulation" to remain in power. Hence, the focus is on what exactly the ruling party does during elections: on voting rights, election management, police brutality, and the media. These are simply a few aspects that demonstrate this corrupt state of affairs.

3.1 Violation of civil liberties

Voting rights in Zanzibar are highly controversial and exclusive. Indeed, since the inception of a multiparty system in 1992, mechanisms have been designed by the ruling party and its government to ensure that members and supporters of the CUF are systematically disenfranchised. The critical question is therefore who is eligible to vote in Zanzibar. Article 7(1) of the 1984 Constitution of Zanzibar states that every Zanzibari who has reached the age of 18 is entitled to vote in elections held in the country. Section 3(1)–(4) of Legislative Act No. 5 of 1985 defines a Zanzibari. According to this provision, a Zanzibari must be a person who fulfils one of the following qualifications: resided in Zanzibar prior to 12 January 1964; was born in Zanzibar and has at least one Zanzibari parent; is a Tanzanian citizen after 26 April 1964 and has not lost such citizenship; or has acquired citizenship by neutralization. These conditions are also stated in Sect. 12(1) of the Zanzibar Election Act No. 11 of 1984 (hereafter the Election Act). The spirit of the cited statutes is that for one to vote, one must have attained the age of maturity and must be a citizen. I contend that these conditions alone do not disenfranchise potential voters (Bakari and Makulilo 2012).

However, since 1995 a restriction on registration has been imposed that requires a minimum 5-year residence on the islands. This restriction remained in place after the 2000 general elections, but with some modifications. Section 12(2) and (3)(ii)(a)–(e) of the Election Act as amended by Act No. 12 of 2002 changed a criterion of residence. According to this provision, a resident is one that resides permanently in a constituency, and has lived there for a period of at least 36 months consecutively prior to the registration day. Exception is accorded to students, security officers, government employees and people who serve in international organizations. After 2005, stringent measures were taken by law [Sect. 12(1) of the Zanzibar Election Act 1984] requiring a potential voter to carry an identity card issued under the Legislative Act No. 7 of 2005. To get the Zanzibar identity card (ZAN ID), however, one must produce a birth certificate that costs 2500 TZS (approximately US$ 1.50) and an introduction letter from the street or village executive officer (*Sheha*).

It should be noted that voter registration is highly contested and usually politicized around the two major political parties, the CCM and CUF. Admittedly, the CCM and its government dominate the process of defining who is an eligible voter mainly to the CCM's own advantage (Bakari and Makulilo 2012). The requirement of a Zanzibar identity card has posed two critical problems with regard to franchising. One is that the whole process of securing the identity card is relatively expensive. TEMCO (2009, p. 4) estimates the total cost in the region to be 32,000 TZS (approximately US$ 22) plus time consumption, i.e., a couple of days needed for a follow up appointment to receive the card. Thus in a way, potential voters have to buy their right to

vote. Second, the *Shehas* who initially issue a letter of introduction as a first step towards registration are die-hard CCM cadres. To be specific, at the *Shehia* (village) of Machui in the Unguja South region, the *Sheha* was simultaneously the CCM branch publicity secretary (TEMCO 2010, p. 4).

Before the 2010 general elections, the Permanent Voters Register (PVR) was first updated. In Zanzibar, the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) organised this procedure in two stages between July 2009 and May 2010 with a voter education campaign through radio, TV and the press to encourage eligible voters to register. However, only 407,658[2] registered as voters, a 20 % reduction from the 507,225 who registered in 2005. This was a drop of 100,019 voters. Yet the actual number of those who possessed a ZAN-ID before the 2010 elections was 562,008. It is very clear from these figures that 154,350 Zanzibaris who possessed a ZAN-ID did not register as voters (Zanzibar ID Office 2010). The above phenomenon was contrary to the United Republic elections. In those elections, the only critical problem was the voter turnout rate for both the presidential and parliamentary elections. This was the lowest in Tanzania's electoral history. Of the 20,146,119 registered voters for the presidential elections only 8,626,283 (42.8 %) voted on election day, and 20,298,394 voters were registered for the parliamentary elections but only 8,626,283 (42.2 %) turned out to vote (NEC 2011).

3.2 Biased referees

In assessing the independence and impartiality of the ZEC, four criteria must be considered: inclusive procedures for nominating commissioners; the security of tenure by commissioners; an independent budget deliberated by the legislature; and private staff to manage elections. Assessing the ZEC alongside the outlined criteria, it is extremely hard for the commission to pass the test of independence and impartiality (Makulilo 2011; TEMCO 2011b). The CUF has consistently protested against the ZEC on the grounds that it is not independent and impartial. In contrast, the ZEC has enjoyed the trust of the ruling party. Despite the restructuring of the ZEC following "Muafaka II"[3] and the inclusion of representatives from the CCM and CUF political parties, the ZEC has yet to enjoy the trust of opposition parties. In one incident, the CUF demanded the immediate disbandment of the ZEC and NEC before the 2010 general elections on the grounds that they were not independent and impartial (*The Guardian* 01.10.2010). Similarly, through its letters CUF/HQ/ZEC/037/010/056 of 18 October 2010 and CUF/HQ/KR/MU/030/59 of 30 October 2010 to the ZEC and other key stakeholders, the CUF expressed concern regarding election rigging by the ZEC in favour of the ruling party. It is also important to note that once the ZEC declares a presidential candidate as duly elected, no court can challenge such a declaration.

[2] A further 44,406 voters were registered to vote in the United Republic elections but not in Zanzibar elections.

[3] Reconciliation accord of 2001.

3.3 Voter intimidation

Security forces deployed during elections are heavy. These include the police, military, and SMZ Special Forces. Some of them work with bias against the opposition parties. There are also some allegations that the security forces normally register as voters in favour of the ruling party. In the 2005 general elections the situation was more critical (TEMCO 2006, pp. 226–233). In 2010, the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) stated that the role of security forces on election day should be revised, particularly in Zanzibar where there was an extremely high level of security displayed prior to and during the elections. When combined with ominous police presence at some polling stations, such a presence and display of force certainly does not contribute to a tranquil atmosphere on election day (EU EOM 2010).

One of the most deadly incidences since the establishment of the multiparty system in Zanzibar occurred in 2001 (Makulilo 2011). On 26 and 27 January 2001, the CUF organized a countywide demonstration following the disputed 2000 elections. The demonstrations were severely and harshly dealt with by police, which lead to bloodshed. An official government report from 4 November 2002 revealed that 31 people were killed and 290 wounded. Hundreds more left for Kenya to seek refuge. Prior to the 2005 elections, three people were killed, one of them a member of a para-military unit led by Major Ayoub Mohamed. This occurred during the registration of voters. Moreover, incidences of setting fire to or bombing government buildings, ruling-party offices and churches occurred quite frequently in various parts of Zanzibar (TEMCO 2006, pp. 226–233). Unlike in the past where the CUF disputed election results that culminated in intense conflicts and deaths, the 2010 elections were relatively peaceful. It should be acknowledged that the 2010 elections were preceded by peaceful reconciliation between the CUF and CCM—popularly known as *Maridhiano*—with the effect of forming the Government of National Unity (GNU).

3.4 Access to media

In Zanzibar the situation is worse for free media than on the mainland, though there are indications of improvement. Media outlets operating in Zanzibar fall under Zanzibar law and the jurisdiction of the semi-autonomous Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar. The opening of the island's media sector has been partial and the press remains smaller, less independent, and less vibrant than on the mainland. Television in Zanzibar is under government control, as is the radio station Sauti ya Tanzania-Zanzibar (STZ) and the newspaper Zanzibar Leo. The small private radio stations and newspapers that exist often maintain close connections to ruling party politicians. During elections, the ruling party enjoys a relatively large share of media coverage. This has been the practice especially of the state-owned media since the inception of multiparty democracy. For instance, in October 2000, the STZ gave the CCM 67% of its total media coverage. The Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA 2005, pp. 3–4) shows that Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam (RTD) and STZ allotted 105,971 s of airtime to the CCM while the CUF, the next largest party, received 31,557 s. Similarly, Tanzania Television (TVT) and Zanzibar Television (TVZ) allotted the CCM 114,475 s of airtime, followed by CHADEMA with 22,287 s. Despite an established

code of conduct, the general perception during the 2010 elections was that both state-owned and private media primarily paid attention to the two major parties, namely the CCM and CUF. However, opposition parties perceived the state-owned media as biased in favour of the CCM (TEMCO 2011a, p. 76).

4 Union elections: weak opposition vs. strong governing party

The ruling party in mainland Tanzania differs from that in Zanzibar. Historically, TANU was a mass party that drew support countrywide in the struggle for independence. Organisationally, it was present countrywide. During the independence elections of the 1960s, TANU won all seats and had a landslide victory in terms of the popular votes. Hence from 1961 to 1965 TANU was the dominant party. Opposition political parties were extremely weak. With the establishment of the one party system in 1965, TANU was further consolidated. By the time TANU and ASP merged to form CCM in 1977, the ruling party had already developed a strong base. Hence, with the top-down transition from a single party system to multiparty system in 1992, the ruling party was able to steer the transition process in its favour. Since then, the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) has conducted four general elections i.e. in 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010. In 1995 the ruling CCM party obtained the popular vote of about 60% (opposition camp 40%), in 2000 the party obtained 71% (the opposition about 29%), in 2005 the ruling party scored 80% (opposition 20%) and in 2010 the party obtained about 60% (opposition 40%). Raphael (2011) has extensively noted that the opposition parties in Tanzania are weakly institutionalised. This implies also that they are not present countrywide. During elections, most of them do not manage to field candidates in 50% of the 239 constituencies. In the following sections, I examine factors that explain how the ruling party has persisted without resorting to severe repression of the opposition.

4.1 Biased referees

Effective management of electoral systems requires institutions that are inclusive, sustainable, just and independent. It includes, among other things, electoral management bodies (EMBs) that have the legitimacy to enforce rules and assure fairness with the cooperation of political parties and citizens (Elklit and Reynolds 2005). As main referees of elections, EMBs should be impartial and autonomous from any interested parties in a given election. In Tanzania, general elections are managed solely by the National Electoral Commission (NEC). The commission is vested with constitutional powers to register voters, nominate candidates, manage campaigns, manage voting and counting, and to declare results. However, stakeholders perceive the NEC as dependent and biased. The commissioners are unilaterally appointed by the president of the United Republic and can be dismissed by the same at his or her discretion. Interestingly, the president of the United Republic is always the chairperson of the ruling party and at some point he or she simultaneously runs as a presidential candidate during elections. In its report for the 1995 general elections, TEMCO (1997, p. 137) posed the question of whether the NEC was independent. The

NEC responded to this question by arguing that "ideally, Article 74(7) and 74(11) of the Union Constitution purports to accord an independent status to the NEC at least at national level … Practically, however, the NEC does not pass the basic tests of an independent institution" (p. 137). TEMCO advanced four reasons to support its doubt that the NEC functions independently: Firstly, appointments of NEC commissioners are made by the incumbent president, who is incidentally also the chairperson of the party in power; secondly, appointees to the NEC have no guarantee of tenure because the president can revoke their appointments discretionally; thirdly, neither the constitution nor the Election Act secures funds for use by the NEC; and fourthly, the NEC does not have its own staff at the regional and constituency levels. Rather, it relies on staff of local governments who in most cases are CCM cadres. TEMCO (1997, p. 193) concludes "and how could the National Electoral Commission (NEC) delink itself from CCM given its composition, manner of its appointment, reliance on CCM government discretionary funding, and even more compromising, reliance on borrowed government personnel, most of whom were believed to be (or to have been in the immediate past) CCM members." The report of the Commonwealth Observer Group (2010) also stresses the importance of having an independent and impartial electoral commission.

4.2 Voter intimidation

Voter intimidation concerns national security. The CCM considers itself a party of peace, unity and tranquillity. It regards opposition parties as agents of violence. During campaigns, the CCM has consistently and persistently preached that opposition should not be elected since they stand for politics of violence. This practice was more evident during the 1995 elections. CCM leaders preached to the general public that if opposition parties were elected, wars would break out reminiscent of those in Rwanda, Burundi and Angola. For example, in the case of the *Attorney-General and Two Others v. Aman Walid Kabourou (1996)* the CCM's behaviour towards threatening people was revealed. In this case, then CCM Chairman and President of the United Republic of Tanzania Ali Hassan Mwinyi; then CCM Secretary General Horace Kolimba; then CCM National Publicity Secretary Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru; and then Minister of Home Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister Augustino Lyatonga Mrema (MP) uttered statements that if opposition parties were elected, the country would experience wars similar to those in Rwanda and Burundi. The court ruled that such statements were made with ill intention against opposition parties and in favour of the ruling party. Yet the CCM widely used films on genocide in Rwanda and Burundi to threaten Tanzanians so that they would reject opposition parties (TEMCO 1997). In the 2010 elections, CCM Chairman and presidential candidate Jakaya Kikwete uttered similar statements, threatening people against voting for the opposition. On 25 August 2010 in Bukoba, Kikwete stated,"*Mkituchagua tena nchi hii itakuwa baridiii kushinda maji ya mtungi*."[4]

[4] Translation: "If you elect us, this country will be peaceful." *Tanzania Broadcasting Company* (TBC1). News. 25.08.10 at 8.00 pm.

Similarly, the police have always acted in favour of the ruling party. In 2000, for example, TEMCO observed that the then incumbent president Benjamin Mkapa, CCM Chairman and presidential candidate for the same party used a police helicopter for campaigns. The same was done by his predecessor, President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who campaigned in Kigoma (TEMCO 2001, pp. 86–87). In 2010, a joint statement made halfway through the campaign period by the Tanzania People's Defense Forces (TPDF) and the police—warning those who intended to cause violence that their forces were ready to make sure such events would never happen—raised questions about the neutrality of the security forces. Although intervention by security forces in favour of a peaceful and orderly electoral process is common practice, such an unprecedented statement surprised the opposition candidates and other stakeholders who considered it inappropriate at a time when state institutions—and security forces in particular—are to remain neutral and not get involved in electoral affairs (EU EOM 2010).

4.3 Access to media

Despite the fact that the 1985 Elections Act requires the public media to distribute airtime and coverage equally among all political parties and candidates, this has not been the case in practice. It is clear that since the introduction of the multiparty system, the CCM has enjoyed favourable airtime and coverage in public media outlets such as the National Television (TVT), Television Zanzibar (TVZ), Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam (RTD), Radio Zanzibar (STZ), the Daily News, Sunday News and Zanzibar Leo. In the case of *The Attorney-General v. Aman Walid Kabourou*[5] following the Kigoma by-election, the Tanzania Court of Appeal held that the "CCM was given more airtime on Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam than were given other political parties, and its broadcasts generally were biased in favour of the CCM candidate, such that it must have influenced the by-election results in favour of the CCM candidate" (p. 158). This tendency repeated itself in the first general elections of 1995. Various media reports noted that the CCM enjoyed a lion's share of airtime and coverage in the public media. The situation did not change in the 2000 elections. In its report on the media and elections, the Media Council of Tanzania (MCT) states that the media was biased in favour of the CCM. For example, in October RTD gave the CCM and its candidates 91% of the total coverage while the STZ gave the CCM 67%. In September, TVT gave the CCM 96% of the total coverage and between 17 and 30 September, it gave CCM presidential candidate Benjamin William Mkapa 100%.[6] The Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA)[7] reports that in the 2005 election, RTD and STZ allotted 105,971 s of airtime to the CCM while the next largest party, the CUF, received only 31,557 s. Similarly, the TVT and TVZ allotted the CCM 114,475 s of airtime, followed by CHADEMA with 22,287 s. This pattern remained nearly the same during the 2010 general elections (Synovate 2010).

[5] [1996] T.L.R 156.

[6] See the Media Council of Tanzania (MCT), Media Monitoring Report of 2000 Elections, p. 66.

[7] See the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), Tanzania Election Media Monitoring 2005 Report, pp. 3–4.

4.4 Incumbent abuse of state resources

State personnel such as the regional commissioners (RCs), district commissioners (DCs), division secretaries (DSs), division officers (DOs), ward executive officers (WEOs), and village executive officers (VEOs) are supposed to serve political parties equally. However, since the advent of multipartism in Tanzania, such government personnel have been essential to the survival and victory of the ruling party. This was also the typical arrangement during the single party era; it has apparently remained a distinctive feature of the current democratic landscape in Tanzania. In each of its reports, TEMCO has been very clear and bold in expressing its partisanship towards the ruling party. And there is no sign of improvement: TEMCO forces government heads of departments, returning officers, the police force, and citizens to vote for the ruling party (TEMCO 1997, 2001, 2006, 2011a). To be specific, in its report for the 2005 elections, TEMCO made strong statements about the regional and district commissioners as well as divisional secretaries that summarise the involvement of these personnel in elections in favour of the CCM:

> They are "politicised" public servants whose appointment by the President is based on demonstrated loyalty to the ruling party. Thus these people cannot avoid acting in a partisan way during elections and even in the inter-election period. They mobilize voters on behalf of the ruling party and in many different ways facilitate campaigns of candidates of the ruling party using state resources (vehicles, security personnel, etc.). This area was controversial in 1995 and 2000, and remained unchanged in 2005. This is a systemic problem, and it will be difficult to have a level political playfield in Tanzania without finding a way of making these powerful people in the regions, districts and divisions act impartially. (TEMCO 2006, p. 168)

For the WEOs and VEOs, TEMCO strongly noted: "These are supposed to be appointed on 'merit' rather than 'loyalty' to the ruling party" (TEMCO 2006, p. 168).

5 Interrogating the link with the West

Levitsky and Way (2010, p. 251) posit that Tanzania is a case of combined low linkage and high leverage. They put forth that CCM dominance was reinforced by a relatively permissive international environment whereby Western donors applied little democratising pressure once multiparty rule was in place. Thus Western forces are taken as the primary drivers of democratic processes. While it is a fact that Western powers played a significant role in the democratization process in Africa and in other parts of the less developed world, using structural variables alone does not adequately capture the reality (Tolstrup 2013). In engaging the linkage and leverage factors as proposed by Levitsky and Way (2010), I advance two arguments. My first argument is that based on the fact that Tanzania is a United Republic, it is difficult to generalise that the country combined both low linkage and high leverage. This is so because Zanzibar as a country is not able to enter into international agreements on

its own (see the 1977 URT Constitution). Yet having its own government allows the country to relatively autonomously run its own internal affairs, particularly on issues related to development and politics. Thus it is safe to hold that Zanzibar is "insulated" from Western linkage and leverage. On the other hand, it is possible to discuss the issue of linkage in relation to the United Republic government, which is recognised internationally as a sovereign state. It is important to understand that the government runs the affairs of the United Republic as well as matters confined to mainland Tanzania (then Tanganyika). The Union has been a subject of debate for about 5 decades with regard to the distribution of power and resources between Tanganyika and Zanzibar. My second argument is that the role of "gatekeeper elites" is key to explaining the influence of external actors on democratization (Tolstrup 2013). Irrespective of the political structures, elites may sometimes choose to adopt certain policies and decisions as long as these serve their interests. For example, the late Mwalimu Julius Nyerere resisted privitising the economy. Yet his successors, former Presidents Ali Hassan Mwinyi and Benjamin Mkapa, positively liberalised the economy as a result of Western pressure.

Another dominant and noteworthy trend is the rise of China and its increasing economic and socio-political relations with Africa. China does not impose stipulations of "good governance" and as such many African countries—including authoritarian regimes—welcome Chinese investment (Makulilo 2014b). Thus China is yet another force that challenges the dominance of Western Europe and the United States. Given this, the future tendency is that ruling regimes in Africa will turn to alternative "donors" to survive. For example, Tanzania has not only received presidents from the US such as George Bush Jr., Barack Obama and Bill Clinton, but also presidents from China namely Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, as well as Chinese Vice President Li Yuanchao.

Conclusion

The concept of "competitive authoritarianism" is a post-Cold War phenomenon that dates back to a time when Western hegemony was the only game in town. In their authoritarianism trajectories, Levitsky and Way consider Tanzania "a stable authoritarianism". They contend that such authoritarian stability is rooted in governing party strength. This implies that organisational power varies across space. However, Levitsky and Way overlooked the political landscape of Tanzania as a United Republic consisting of Tanganyika (mainland Tanzania) and Zanzibar. Had the authors regarded this fact, they would have treated the two states as separate entities. By doing so they would have captured the sub-national authoritarianism in relation to variability of the strength of the governing party. This would have helped them assess variations in democracy across sub-national units of Tanzania by measuring the actual power dynamics at work in sub-national political systems (Gibson 2010, p. 4). Similarly, Levitsky and Way could have studied opposition party strength across space. They posit that when opposition forces are strong, the governing party tends to apply autocratic means of survival. In that case one would have expected to see the ruling CCM party acting differently in Zanzibar and during the United Republic elections. In the

former, the main CUF opposition party is strong and the polarization between Unguja and Pemba make it possible for the CCM to manipulate elections, as was the case in the 1995, 2000 and 2005 general elections. During Union elections, the ruling party remains relaxed, as the opposition parties do not constitute a real or potential threat to the CCM. Hence, by combining Zanzibar and Union elections and treating the two as one (i.e. Tanzania), Levitsky and Way's analysis distorts the political reality in Tanzania. Likewise, the linkage and leverage factors function differently in the two countries. This is due to the fact that Zanzibar is not a sovereign state and as such it has to interact with the external actors through the United Republic. It is for that reason that Zanzibaris look at Tanzania mainland as an exploiting partner.

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AUFSÄTZE

Citizen wellbeing in African competitive authoritarian regimes

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Abstract Africa's political landscape has changed profoundly over the past two decades. The crisis of many military and single-party regimes led to the widespread adoption of reforms that, in many countries, stopped short of full democratization but opened the way to the institutionalization of limited forms of political competition. While it is now evident that competitive authoritarianism is not a transitory phenomenon, it is less clear whether formal democratic institutions may nonetheless have a beneficial effect. Specifically, yet to be evaluated is the ability of these democratic institutions to shape government commitment to improving the wellbeing of citizens in an environment deeply affected by neo-patrimonial practices, such as African politics. This article presents the findings of one of the first inquiries into the socioeconomic consequences of competitive authoritarianism. Our main conclusion is that electoral mechanisms do favour some social improvements even within the context of an authoritarian setting.

Keywords Competitive authoritarianism · Social welfare · Democratization

Introduction

The "third wave of democratization" (Huntington 1991) finally reached the shores of Africa in the early 1990s. The call of free multi-party elections between 1990 and 1994 in 26 African countries represented the premise for the spread of democracy across the continent. Yet with limited exceptions, it quickly became clear that similar

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expectations were resting on thin foundations. An Africa-wide democratic revolution was far from underway. Contrary to the sequence theorized by Huntington, however, the partial failure of Africa's democratic experiments did not represent an *ebb*. Instead of abating, many of the new multiparty regimes survived. In some of these cases, the introduction of democratic institutions represented nothing more than a new window dressing (cf. Schedler 2006). In many others, a relatively large degree of political competition was allowed, albeit this typically took place under the medium/long-term reign of the same party—be it the former single party such as the Kenya African National Union, or a brand new one such as the Movement for Multi-party Democracy in Zambia (since 1991) and the People's Democratic Party in Nigeria (since 1999).

The debate on competitive authoritarianism has recently seen rapid development. Researchers have studied the origins of this relatively new phenomenon (Levitsky and Way 2002; Ottaway 2003), theorized about its functioning (Brownlee 2007; Gandhi 2008), and analyzed its ability to endure (Epstein et al. 2006; Hadenius and Teorell 2007; Howard and Roessler 2006; Brownlee 2009; Levitsky and Way 2010). To date, however, attention has rarely focused on the consequences this hybrid form of political regime may have for the material living conditions of citizens. From a citizen's point of view, does living under competitive authoritarianism make a difference? If so, how do competitive authoritarian institutions influence government commitment and capacity to improve the wellbeing of citizens? Beyond their academic relevance, addressing similar questions within the African context sheds light on issues of more substantive interest. As Levitsky and Way (2010) documented, by the mid-1990s competitive authoritarianism became one of the prevailing patterns of governance in the continent. And according to the trajectory theorized by the two authors, this is unlikely to represent a transitory phase. Yet competitive autocracies—such as Rwanda, Ethiopia, or Mozambique—are also growing faster than many of their neighbours. It is thus important to evaluate the extent to which these regimes are able to translate growth rates into actual improvements in the quality of life for all, as it may have important implications for the trajectory these regimes follow in the next decade. Similar improvements may in fact lay robust foundations for future democratization, thus leading to a revision of Levitsky and Way's theoretical framework.

This article is one of the first inquiries into the socioeconomic consequences of competitive authoritarianism. The first section illustrates our theoretical framework and formulates two hypotheses. We argue that, under competitive authoritarianism, democratic and authoritarian institutions tend to mitigate their respective effects on government incentives and ability to improve social welfare. Accordingly, where the wellbeing of citizens is concerned, competitive autocracies lie in an intermediary position between full authoritarianism and genuine democracy. The next section presents the results of a time-series cross-sectional analysis that uses as dependent variables four alternative indicators of welfare. To highlight the link between empirical evidence and theory, the discussion of our findings is supported by qualitative illustrations drawn from case studies of Benin, Ghana and Mali. The last section discusses our conclusions.

1 Competitive mechanisms in authoritarian settings: theory and hypotheses

Competitive authoritarian regimes are hybrid regimes that share institutional features of both democracy and authoritarianism. In these regimes, formal democratic institutions coexist with persistently authoritarian informal practices of governance. They differ from full-autocracies, because "formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power", and "opposition parties use democratic institutions to contest seriously for power" (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 5). They differ from democracies, because "the playing field is heavily skewed in favour of incumbents" (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 5).

Our approach is comparative. We focus on the core institutional attributes (formal and informal) of competitive authoritarian regimes, highlight the differences with democracy and full authoritarianism respectively, and examine the implications of these differences on government commitment and capacity to improve social welfare. The point of departure is three assumptions: (1) in order to pursue his or her own interest (whatever it may be), the leader of a government faces two interrelated priorities, that is to hold office and to gain the support, loyalty and cooperation of society; (2) meeting citizen needs is one viable strategy to achieve these goals; (3) the relative cost of this option depends on the institutions of a political regime.

In this regard, democratic and non-democratic regimes differ in two fundamental aspects. Authoritarianism hampers communications and, regardless of the formal method of leadership selection, invariably qualifies as the rule of the few over the many. The problems of communication between government and society are mutual and derive from the lack of institutionalized channels through which the actual willingness of the former to listen and the preferences of the latter can be signalled. Given the high level of arbitrariness and the frequent resort to repression, citizens are reluctant to reveal their dissatisfaction (Wintrobe 1998). Another condition shared by any autocrat is the relatively small number of supporters whose compliance is needed. Contrary to democratically elected leaders who need to fulfil the demands of a majority, incumbent dictators enjoy an advantage over any challenger. They can maintain power by making a small group of key actors better off than other citizens (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). These structural conditions of authoritarian politics make investment in citizen wellbeing costly and inefficient. The information deficit faced by an authoritarian government thwarts implementation of public policies on target. The most efficient strategy to buy off the loyalty of a relatively small number of key supporters, in turn, is to invest state revenues in private goods that can be distributed on an exclusionary basis. Therefore, authoritarian politics seems to distort the incentives that rulers in democratic countries face vis-à-vis the provision of public goods such as education and universal healthcare. While democrats find investments in these sectors a cost-effective strategy to seek re-election, this is not the case for an autocrat.

According to Levitsky and Way (2010, p. 13) competitive authoritarian regimes essentially represent a (new) subtype of non-democratic rule. Despite the presence of formal democratic institutions, the unevenness of the playing field significantly reduces the actual size of the winning coalition necessary to keep an incumbent leader in power. Thus our first hypothesis is:

Hp1 Competitive autocracies provide less social welfare, and in a less efficient way, than democratic regimes.

Yet competitive autocracies differ from other forms of authoritarian rule. We argue that the institutional attributes distinguishing competitive autocracies from other forms of authoritarianism—a limited level of political competition resulting in multi-party (free) elections and representation of opposition parties in the legislative body—modify the incentives faced by a political leader that aspires to stay in power. Specifically, they make the provision of improved social services and, more generally, efforts to improve citizen wellbeing a potentially attractive option. A first part of the mechanism concerns authoritarian competitive elections and overcoming the information deficit that traditionally affects authoritarian politics. Periodic multi-party elections may represent an efficient means to collect information about citizen preferences, priorities and needs (Magaloni 2006). Voting in a competitive autocracy for an opposition party that runs elections according to the rules of the game can hardly contribute to defeat of the incumbent government. Yet it is neither meaningless nor—at least in most cases—dangerous. Citizens can use their vote to reveal their dissatisfaction at a relatively low cost. A second dynamic is triggered by authoritarian multi-party legislatures, and refers to overcoming the communication gap between rulers and ruled. Elected legislatures, in which opposition parties are represented, may serve as a forum for the government and different sectors of civil society to discuss and exchange policy concessions for compliance (Gandhi 2008).

Contrary to other dictators, leaders in competitive authoritarian regimes do have the necessary instruments to efficiently invest in social policies. To the extent that autocrats find it convenient to meet part of their citizens' demands to solicit cooperation and support, the democratic component of these hybrid regimes may exert a compensatory effect. Specifically, it may "correct" for some of the distortions deriving from the authoritarian dimension. Our second hypothesis is thus:

Hp2 Competitive autocracies provide more social welfare, and in a more efficient way, than other non-democratic regimes.

In conclusion, our argument suggests that, where the wellbeing of citizens is concerned, competitive autocracies lie in an intermediary position between full authoritarianism and genuine democracy. Because the skewed playing field reduces the threats coming from opposition parties, competitive authoritarian leaders face weaker incentives to invest in public goods than democratically elected rulers. Yet fulfilment of citizen demands has potential returns for a leader that go beyond defeating a challenger, such as expanding the social basis of the regime and gaining cooperation from broader sections of society. Hence, by providing information and dialogue, limited political competition generates new opportunities for an autocrat and new incentives for him to invest in citizen wellbeing.

2 Relating competitive autocracies to welfare improvements

We test our hypotheses by means of a time-series cross-sectional analysis (TSCS), working on a sample of 45 Sub-Saharan countries—excluding states with less than

500,000 inhabitants—observed from 1980 to 2008. Newly independent countries (e.g. Eritrea and Namibia) have been observed since the year of their international recognition. The full dataset consists of 1,282 observations. Regime periods that lasted less than 3 years are considered transitional cases and have been excluded from the analysis (about 2 % of the whole sample).

2.1 Independent variable

Following Levitsky and Way we classify political regimes as democratic, competitive, or full authoritarian. While the work of the two authors remains our point of departure, the use in TSCS analysis of a concept that was originally conceived within the framework of a qualitative research design raises challenges.

Levitsky and Way only provide a list of 14 competitive authoritarian regimes that existed between 1990 and 1995. These are: Benin (1990–2006), Botswana (1966-present), Cameroon (1991-present), Gabon (1990-present), Ghana (1991–2000), Kenya (1991-present), Madagascar (1989–1993, 1997-present), Malawi (1993-present), Mali (1992–2002), Mozambique (1992-present), Senegal (1976-present), Tanzania (1992-present), Zambia (1990-present) and Zimbabwe (1980-present). We know that three cases—Benin, Ghana and Mali—democratized. With relative accuracy, it can also be assumed that all of the competitive authoritarian regimes listed by Levitsky and Way were full authoritarian before the institutionalization of limited political competition. In time-series cross-sectional language, this would result in a sample of 419 country-year observations classified as follows: 132 full authoritarian regimes, 271 competitive autocracies, 16 democracies. Yet simply focusing on these 14 countries implies the adoption of a purely diachronic research design. We would only be able to observe whether citizens of countries that were almost invariably ruled by some form of full authoritarianism until the end of the 1980s (Botswana and Senegal being the exceptions) have experienced improvements in their living conditions since political competition was introduced in the early 1990s. This is a much too limited, biased perspective for quantitative analysis. We need cross-country variations and have thus expanded our sample to include all African countries by updating Levitsky and Way's dataset.

Given the difficulties of collecting the data and information necessary to follow the two authors' guidelines (2010, pp. 365–368), we opted for an alternative strategy. The three regime categories have been operationalized by using disaggregated variables from some of the most commonly used datasets in democratization studies. We first distinguish democratic and competitive authoritarian regimes from full dictatorships by following the same criteria used by Cheibub et al. (2010) to identify countries that formally abide by the rules of procedural democracy, regardless of actual occurrence of executive turnover. We then distinguish between competitive autocracies and democracies using Freedom House and Polity IV data. Specifically, we consider the playing field fairly level when political rights and civil liberties are moderately protected (i.e. 3 or better in both Freedom House indices) and execu-

Fig. 1 Africa's competitive autocracies (2008). (Source: own coding, based on Cheibub et al. 2010; Freedom House; Polity IV)

tive authority is meaningfully constrained (i.e. 5 or better in Polity IV's "XCONST" scale).[1]

This operation of course leads to a few divergences from Levitsky and Way's original sample. In country years, our indicator correctly classifies about 61% of their cases (see Appendix for a complete list). When our indicator disagrees with the two authors' classification, it is mainly because we consider a regime democratic rather than competitive authoritarian (e.g. Benin, Botswana, Malawi and Mali). With reference to the 1990–1995 period, our indicator records about six additional cases, including Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire and Niger. While not perfect, our measure has the merit of being easily replicable and, most importantly, allows for identification of competitive authoritarian cases that were possibly overlooked by Levitsky and Way either because they collapsed before 1990 (e.g. Uganda) or because they were established after 1995 (i.e. Burundi, Chad, Congo-Kinshasa, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda and Togo) (see Fig. 1).

2.2 Dependent and control variables

As dependent variables, two indicators of socioeconomic development (primary completion rate and life expectancy) and two indicators of health spending (percentages of gross domestic product and shares of public budgets) have been selected. By looking at the performance of a country in the education and health sectors, we aim

[1] We are aware of contributing to the proliferation of alternative ways of moving from degrees to types (Bogaards 2010). Rather than dismissing past works, however, we build on them. When we combine FH and P4 scores, for instance, we are following Howard and Roessler (2006). Likewise, our focus on the sub-components of existing indices echoes Doorenspleet (2000). Finally, we would like to stress that by choosing the logical operator AND to aggregate the selected sub-components, we are setting rather demanding criteria for democracy (cf. Diamond 2002).

to observe improvements in the actual capacity of governments to deliver wellbeing through the adoption of social welfare policies. The alternative measures of spending, in turn, capture two different aspects of the commitment of a government to meet citizen needs: an actual increase in the level of investment and the reallocation of state revenues from private to public goods.[2]

The base specification of the regression model common to all dependent variables analyzed includes the main independent variable and a variable measuring regime duration. Regime duration refers to the incremental number of consecutive years a given regime has been in place. We think that all polities "are subject to the liability of newness" (Gerring et al. 2005, p. 330) and thus expect the consolidation of a political regime to have a positive effect on welfare programmes, regardless of its democratic or authoritarian nature. Models relative to outputs also control for two factors (economic wealth and the urban-rural population divide) that we consider of primary importance where welfare policies are concerned. National income accounts for both the demand and supply of social welfare. On the one hand, wealthier citizens are typically more attentive to the quality of public services (Lake and Baum 2001). On the other hand, wealthier countries are better equipped to provide them (Brown and Hunter 2004; Stasavage 2005; Ghobarah 2004; Mulligan et al. 2004). The share of a country's population living in urban areas, in turn, may significantly affect government capacity to extend social welfare programs to a larger number of citizens (Lake and Baum 2001; Keefer 2005). In the analysis of primary education, a measure of ethnic fractionalization is included. Basic schooling programs can be unevenly directed at different segments of a society. Ethnicity in deeply divided societies frequently results in political marginalization of minorities, discrimination and unequal access to public services (Ghobarah et al. 2004). The analysis of life expectancy at birth focuses instead on the geographical position of a country. Concerning the health of citizens, countries with a tropical climate usually find themselves in worse condition. Economic growth represents one of the major constraints on government spending decisions, although its effects are rather controversial and it is difficult to forecast a positive or negative sign associated with this variable (Brown and Hunter 2004; Rudra and Haggard 2005). Public expenditures in the healthcare sector are also likely to be affected by rapid population growth, caused either by a country's demographic boom or an indirect consequence of migration (Frey 1999). Finally, the level at which a country's economy depends on hydrocarbons is negatively related to the amount of state revenues invested in citizen wellbeing.

Additional control variables whose effects have been tested throughout the different models are: external development assistance (Stasavage 2005), openness to trade (Gandhi 2008), external debt (Rudra and Haggard 2005), British colonial past (Mulligan 2004), and involvement in an ongoing war (Vollmer and Ziegler 2009).

[2] Data on spending is only available from 1995 onwards. We do not include education spending in our variables because of the poor data quality.

2.3 Analysis

The analysis has been performed using a simplified version of the error correction model (ECM). The ECM regresses the change (i.e. the first difference) in the dependent variable on its lagged level, as well as the lagged levels and changes of all the independent variables included in model specification. The ECM presents several advantages. First, it lets the analyst deal with non-stationary dependent variables, i.e. variables that do not follow a mean reverting trend. Second, it allows for a more sensible treatment of dynamics—notably the distinction between short- and long-term effects—, which improves our ability to link theory and quantitative analysis (de Boef and Keele 2008). Since heteroscedasticity has been detected, coefficients have been estimated through the ordinary least squares method and panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs) have been computed as recommended by Beck and Katz (1995).

The robustness of findings has been assessed by several robustness checks. Each analysis has been replicated using different lags of time. Given the strongly inert nature of development indicators, allowing the estimation process to cover spans of time longer than 1 year may shed light on the existence of effects that would have otherwise been missed. Accordingly, levels and changes of each variable have also been computed based on 2- and 5-year lags. An important source of concern when performing TSCS analysis derives from the pooling of units representing countries observed at different points in time. Inclusion of country-fixed effects limits the risk of missing important characteristics that may confound the analysis. Likewise, one time-fixed effect has been added, namely a dummy variable indicating if a given observation refers to the post-1989 period. By doing so we assess whether the positive effect of competitive authoritarianism is boosted by the prevalence of full-authoritarianism in Africa during the 1980s, the so-called lost decade for development.[3] Control variables have been omitted from the fixed-effects model for two main reasons. On the one hand, this model does not allow estimation of time-invariant variables (Bell and Jones 2015), such as ethnic fractionalization, oil dependence and tropical climate. On the other, inclusion of fixed effects results in a dramatic reduction of degrees of freedom and limits the explanatory potential of the estimated model (Barro 2012). Finally, the analysis has been replicated on a larger and on a smaller sample of countries. First, the analysis has also been extended to North African countries, including full authoritarian regimes such as Morocco and Egypt that have reached relatively high standards of living. Second, we limited our attention to Levitsky and Way's cases of competitive authoritarianism. As anticipated, we consider this strategy flawed in many respects. Our aim is merely to rule out the concern that it would lead to opposite conclusions.[4]

[3] In the fixed effects model heteroscedasticity has been tackled by computing robust standard errors using a Huber/White estimator of variance.

[4] This latter analysis has been run only on indicators of outputs due to data availability (cf. footnote 2).

Table 1 Summary of findings. (Source: Dependent variables are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators)

Dep. Var.	Hp.1	Hp.2
1ary completion	*Accepted*	*Accepted*
Life expectancy	*Accepted*	*Accepted*
Spending (% budget)	*Rejected*	*Accepted*
Spending (% GDP)	*Rejected*	(Rejected)

2.4 Findings

Full regression outputs are presented in the appendix. Table 1 below summarizes findings. Bold type is used when conclusions are robust to most checks performed. Uncertain conclusions are in parentheses. Overall, the analysis confirms our expectations, although a few important caveats are needed.

For the first hypothesis, the empirical analysis detected evidence of a difference between competitive authoritarian and democratic regimes only where the actual performance in the sectors of education and healthcare is concerned. Somewhat surprisingly, however, no significant difference was found in terms of spending. Democracies' better socioeconomic performance is achieved at virtually no additional cost (see conclusions for a thorough discussion). In both cases, results are robust to cross-model validation.

As demonstrated by higher rates of pupils attaining fifth grade, democracies implement better universal schooling programs than competitive authoritarian regimes. The positive effect associated with democratic politics is evident both in the short- and in the long-term. The institutionalization of democracy is expected to bring an immediate benefit: a 2% rise in the rate of primary school completion.[5] Yet the full effect is best seen in the long run, where this percentage can reach 17.5.[6] This is the estimated difference in the performance of democratic and competitive authoritarian regimes after more than 20 years of rule. While these findings are confirmed by most counter-analyses, it should be noted that, when we only focus on the 14 cases identified by Levitsky and Way, the difference disappears. Democracies are also found to provide their citizens with better healthcare services than competitive autocracies. Yet in this case, the positive effect, which amounts to an approximately 3-year longer life expectancy at birth, is only evident in the medium to long term. Interestingly, when the analysis also includes North African countries, estimated differences are no longer significant. This mirrors the high performance of Tunisia: After the introduction of limited political competition, the country reached the highest life expectancy of the entire continent in less than a decade. The mean difference between competitive and full authoritarianism in Tunisia is about 5 years.

Moving to the second hypothesis, expectations have been strongly confirmed in the case of outcomes and, albeit in a weaker way, also in terms of spending. We consider this the most interesting finding of the present study. Competitive autocracies

[5] In ECM the short-term effect of a given variable corresponds to the coefficient associated with its delta.

[6] The full long-term effect of a given variable is computed as the ratio between the coefficient of its lag and the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable.

do outperform their full authoritarian counterparts. Governments in these regimes appear to take the wellbeing of citizens into higher consideration than do traditional dictators.

Similar conclusions are corroborated by empirical evidence in both sectors under examination. Competitive authoritarian regimes display higher primary school completion rates, although no significant instantaneous effect is associated with a transition from full to competitive authoritarianism. The difference in fact divulges over a rather long timespan, thus confirming the highly inertial nature of the dynamics involved in the relationship between politics and human development. According to the ECM estimates, it would take several decades to observe the full effect—an increase of more than 58 %—of being ruled by a competitive authoritarian regime.[7] After 5 years the estimated effect amounts to + 8.3 %, and to + 15.7 % after 10 years. It should be noted that the FE model confirms these findings but produces significantly lower estimates (+ 31 %). The same applies in the case of models using 2-year (+ 40 %) and 5-year (+ 39 %) lags. Results from the analysis of life expectancy go in the same direction. Citizens of African competitive authoritarian regimes live on average 6 years longer than citizens of African dictatorships. Once again, this gap is evident mainly in the long run, although also a smaller positive transition effect (ranging from 0.04 to 0.2, depending on the length of the lag used) has been detected. Also in this case, inclusion of country- and time-fixed effects substantially reduces the magnitude of the regime effect. The analysis of spending tells a more complex story. It is evident that competitive authoritarian institutions generate incentives for a government to devote a larger share of its budget to a public good such as healthcare. In the long term, rulers' commitment to social welfare results in investments of about two or three points higher than in a full authoritarian regime. Yet it is less clear whether the same rulers are willing to raise the amount of resources invested as a percentage of national income. More often than not, in fact, the analysis has failed to highlight a significant difference.

With regard to control variables, when their relevance is confirmed, results are consistent with expectations. Regime consolidation has a positive effect on most of the dependent variables scrutinized, and the same tends to apply to economic wealth. As expected, economic growth is a significant predictor of public spending on health, but the sign is negative, suggesting that the increase in health expenditure is countercyclical vis-à-vis the economic performance of a country. Spending is also influenced by demographic pressure. Social welfare programs launched by African governments appear more successful—that is, better able to reach a larger number of citizens—when larger shares of a country's population live in urban areas. In the short term, however, an increase in urban population has a negative effect on life expectancy. This result is likely driven by the worse health condition of migrants moving to African towns from rural areas. As regards the three time-invariant factors included in the analyses, all display a negative sign. Ethnic fractionalization hampers achievement of the goal of universal primary schooling. Tropical climate negatively affects the mean

[7] The high absolute value of this estimate can be explained by the fact that it refers to Africa, a largely underdeveloped continent. This is confirmed by the several cases in which these percentages exceed 100, following the launch of universal basic schooling programs involving thousands of overage children.

life expectancy of a country's population. Revenues from oil are associated with lower spending on public goods. Finally, development assistance has a positive effect only on education output, openness to trade has a similar impact on the healthcare sector, highly indebted countries tend to spend less on public goods, and having been ruled by the British during the colonial era tends to have a positive effect on most indicators of welfare.

3 Revenge of transitology?

Our findings point to a degree of continuity in the impact of Africa's political regimes on social outcomes. Figure 2 shows this visually with primary completion rates and life expectancy at birth: To put it simply and bluntly, democracies do better than competitive authoritarian regimes, which in turn do better than fully authoritarian regimes. This continuity is somewhat in line with a "transitological" interpretation of regimes and regime change. While Levitsky and Way would hardly subscribe to such a reading of events, the three Sub-Saharan countries that they consider "deviant" cases—i.e. countries that, after adopting the features of CAs at the beginning of the 1990s, went on to democratize in the following decade, namely Ghana ("democratic" since 2000), Mali (since 2004) and Benin (since 2006)—are good examples of how gradual political change went hand in hand with welfare progress.

Benin underwent a key political transition in 1991, when Mathieu Kérékou's long-standing rule gave way to the introduction of multiparty elections. In Levitsky and Way's assessment, political change in Cotonou fell short of democratization. The two authors downplay the depth of change as mere "pluralism by default" (2010, p. 292) and deem the country competitive authoritarian until 2006, when the election of Yayi Boni ended a period dominated by the rivalry between Kérékou and Nicéphore Soglo. At the outset of Benin's transition from full authoritarianism in 1990, education suffered from many weaknesses, including extremely low primary and sec-



Fig. 2 Comparing regimes' welfare performance. (Source: World Development Indicators; Cheibub et al. 2010; Freedom House; Polity IV. Note: Graphs have been obtained by regressing each dependent variable on its original model specification, save the regime type and duration variables. Residuals have been taken and plotted with regime type on the x-axis)

ondary enrolment and completion rates. As political transformation progressed, however, change in the education sector followed. In late 1990, education issues gained central political ground when a national conference on education was convened (the États Généraux de l'Education), while a new constitution recognized education as an individual right and made primary schooling compulsory. This helped reverse the deterioration that the sector had experienced during the 1980s. For example, public spending on education gradually increased and by 2006 reached twice its 1992 level. Meanwhile, school fees were gradually eliminated, starting in 1997 with girls living in low-access rural areas. By 2006, primary and pre-primary school fees were eliminated for all children. Electoral competition was particularly instrumental in the elimination of tuition fees (cf. Harding and Stasavage 2014). In turn, free access produced impressive achievements in primary school enrolment, which increased fourfold between 1989 and 2009, with one of the world's fastest rates of growth for that period. While donor funding and local engagement were crucial to these accomplishments, the key driver of change was the greater political priority given to education by elected governments under the new multiparty regime (Engel et al. 2011).

One of the world's poorest countries, Mali faces enormous challenges in educating its youth. Quality is a particular concern, as "only 23 % of Malian adults—and only 29 % of Malians aged 15 to 24—can read and write … the lowest adult literacy rate anywhere in the world" (Pearce et al. 2009, p. 7). Yet a number of observers also point to marked improvements in the delivery of education after democratic rule was introduced (Pearce et al. 2009, p. 7; cf. Bender et al. 2007, p. 1). Since 1991, for example, education policy forums have been held that have adopted the World Declaration on Education For All, marking "a turning point for Malian education" (Bender et al. 2007, p. 9). Meanwhile, student protests raised pressure on the elected government to broaden access to secondary and tertiary education. By the late 1990s, president Alpha Oumar Konaré had expanded education funding and obtained donor support for a sector-wide reform program (Prodec 2001–2010) aimed at increasing primary enrolment from 50 to 95 %, as well as improving quality and decentralization (Bender et al. 2007, p. 10). While education in Mali remains plagued by large challenges, primary school enrolment increased from 21 % in 1990 to 61 % in 2008, and a new workforce of educators flowed into the system with the recruitment of 20,000 additional teachers within a decade.

Education policy has not been the only social policy concern for Africa's newly elected governments. Health became a hot topic in Ghana as politics transformed with the introduction of competitive elections in 1992. More clearly than elsewhere on the continent, a two-party system emerged in which the incumbent National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the opposition of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) vied for power. The space for free media and civic associations also liberalized. Under this new political constellation, the saliency of popular demands and the incentives for social reforms came to play an increasingly important role in the country's politics. Public health, in particular, became the object of voter pressure for change. Under the system introduced by the military regime in the late 1980s, Ghanaians were required to pay fees for health services at point and moment of use so that the state could recover a portion of the costs for care. The scheme, nicknamed "cash-and-carry", was widely resented and the NPP opposition was quick to exploit voter demands for

reform. This forced the ruling NDC to begin considering health reform in the late 1990s. While the 2004 reform that eventually introduced a national health insurance scheme was only adopted after the NPP came to power, the roots of the reform were clearly in the two-party competition that had unfold during the previous decade. Ultimately, it is difficult to overestimate the relevance of electoral contests in accounting for the implementation of Ghana's health reform (Carbone 2011).

Conclusions

This paper set out to evaluate the consequences that the diffusion of competitive authoritarianism in Africa during the past decades produced on the wellbeing of citizens. We began by discussing whether and how the institutional environment typical of these regimes shapes government commitment and ability to promote social welfare. We then tested our hypotheses. We conclude by summing up our argument in light of empirical findings.

Africa's competitive autocracies do outperform their full authoritarian counterparts in terms of welfare development. Interestingly, while the difference is evident in the analysis of the actual performance of these regimes, the more nuanced findings produced by the analysis of spending decisions calls for an ex post refinement of the proposed argument. In competitive authoritarian regimes a larger share of the government budget is devoted to the healthcare sector. Consistent with our theory, therefore, limited competitive institutions prove sufficient to reorient decision-makers' priorities toward public goods such as healthcare services. Yet rulers in these regimes do not necessarily invest a larger share of national wealth in this sector. This latter piece of evidence indirectly confirms that observed improvements in the living conditions of citizens derive mainly from a more efficient allocation of resources. This, we suggest, results from the enhanced communication between government and society that is associated with the introduction of formal democratic institutions. Our second conclusion is that African democracies show even better socioeconomic performance and apparently achieve these results by investing about the same amount of resources spent by competitive autocracies. This part of the analysis is important because it highlights the limits of limited competition. What distinguishes the two regime types (unevenness of the playing field) may also explain the weaker incentives and the lesser ability that competitive authoritarian leaders have in promoting citizen wellbeing, and in implementing successful policies more generally.

Thus where citizen wellbeing is concerned, competitive authoritarianism lies in an intermediary position between full authoritarianism and genuine democracy (see Fig. 2). We offer a transitological interpretation of these findings. Competitive authoritarianism in Africa emerged in the early 1990s from the crisis of other traditional forms of dictatorship as an undesired side effect of the third wave of democratization. Although Africa did not experience a full democratic revolution, our research shows that institutionalization of limited forms of political competition nonetheless caused significant improvements in the material living conditions of many African citizens. The substantive import of this relatively good news is limited, however,

since the analysis also shows that fuller democratization, besides obvious benefits in terms of freedom, would have brought even larger welfare improvements.

These conclusions open quite interesting scenarios for the continent—scenarios that may even lead to a revision of Levitsky and Way's theoretical framework. According to the two authors, African competitive autocracies are virtually doomed to remain non-democratic in a more or less stable way. Given the relative weakness of linkages to the West, the pervasiveness of neo-patrimonial practices and widespread underdevelopment, Africa's competitive autocracies are least likely to democratize. Depending on a country's level of economic dependence (leverage) and the organizational power its ruling elites can count on, these regimes may oscillate between consolidation and persistent instability, but they are invariably expected to remain authoritarian. We contend that much will depend on the political implications of the relatively good socioeconomic performance of these regimes. To the extent that improvements in education and health sectors strengthen autocrats' tenure, we will hardly see a new African wave of democratization in the near future. With the blessing of modernization theorists, however, socioeconomic achievements may also lay foundations for sustainable democracy. Levitsky and Way—who have the merit of calling attention to the international context, whose role has often been overlooked—do not take this element into account. The only domestic factor they consider is authoritarian elites' organizational power. Yet the very inadequacy of factors such as linkage, leverage and organizational power to explain Benin, Ghana and Mali's democratic transitions suggests that other factors have been underestimated. While the issue deserves further examination, the deepening of the process of democratization in these countries could be related to progress in terms of social welfare experienced during their competitive authoritarian phase.

Competitive authoritarianism can hardly be considered a preparatory stage on the way to full democratization (cf. Lindberg 2006). Given the positive returns in terms of (human) development associated with its institutionalization, however, it may indirectly favour the successful conclusion of a democratic transition. Thus the same cases that are deviant according to the theory proposed by Levitsky and Way may turn out to be exemplary cases of a slightly different story.

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4 Appendix

4.1 Political regimes in Africa 1980–2008*

4.1.1 Competitive autocracies

Algeria 1997–2008; Angola 1993–1996; Burkina Faso 1992–2008; Burundi 2005–2008; Cameroon 1992–2008; Central African Republic 1993–2002; Central African

Republic 2005–2008; Chad 1997–2008; Comoros 1992–1994; Comoros 2004–2008; Congo (Kinshasa) 2006–2008; Congo (Brazzaville) 1994–1996; Congo (Brazzaville) 2002–2008; Cote d'Ivoire 1990–1998; Egypt 2005–2008; Equatorial Guinea 1996–2008; Ethiopia 1995–2008; Gabon 1993–2008; Gambia 1981–1986; Gambia 1997–2008; Ghana 1993–1996; Guinea 1995–2007; Guinea-Bissau 1994–1997; Guinea-Bissau 2000–2002; Guinea-Bissau 2005–2008; Kenya 1992–2002; Kenya 2007–2008; Liberia 1997–2000; Liberia 2006–2008; Madagascar 1993–2002; Madagascar 2006–2008; Malawi 2001–2008; Mauritania 1992–2004; Mozambique 1994–2006; Niger 1993–2003; Nigeria 1999–2008; Rwanda 2003–2008; Senegal 1980–2001; Sierra Leone 2002–2006; Sudan 1986–1988; Tanzania 1995–2008; Togo 1994–2008; Tunisia 1999–2008; Uganda 1980–1984; Uganda 2006–2008; Zambia 1993–2007; Zimbabwe 1980–2008.

4.1.2 Democracies

Benin 1991–2008; Botswana 1980–2008; Gambia 1987–1993; Ghana 1997–2008; Kenya 2003–2006; Lesotho 2002–2008; Madagascar 2003–2005; Malawi 1994–2000; Mali 1995–2008; Mauritius 1980–2008; Mozambique 2007–2008; Namibia 1990–2008; Niger 2004–2006; Nigeria 1980–1982; Senegal 2002–2008; South Africa 1994–2008.

4.1.3 Full autocracies

Algeria 1980–1996; Angola 1980–1992; Angola 1997–2008; Benin 1980–1990; Burkina Faso 1980–1991; Burundi 1980–2004; Cameroon 1980–1991; Central African Republic 1980–1992; Chad 1980–1996; Comoros 1980–1991; Comoros 1995–2003; Congo (Kinshasa) 1980–2005; Congo (Brazzaville) 1980–1991; Congo (Brazzaville) 1997–2001; Cote d'Ivoire 1980–1989; Cote d'Ivoire 2002–2008; Djibouti 1980–2008; Egypt 1980–2004; Equatorial Guinea 1980–1994; Eritrea 1993–2008; Ethiopia 1980–1994; Gabon 1980–1992; Gabon 1994–1996; Ghana 1981–1992; Guinea 1980–1994; Guinea-Bissau 1980–1993; Kenya 1980–1991; Lesotho 1980–2001; Liberia 1980–1996; Liberia 2001–2005; Libya 1980–2008; Madagascar 1980–1992; Malawi 1980–1993; Mali 1980–1990; Mauritania 1980–1991; Morocco 1980–2008; Mozambique 1980–1993; Niger 1980–1992; Nigeria 1983–1998; Rwanda 1980–2002; Sierra Leone 1980–2001; Somalia 1980–1990; South Africa 1980–1993; Sudan 1980–1985; Sudan 1989–2008; Swaziland 1980–2008; Tanzania 1980–1994; Togo 1980–1993; Tunisia 1980–1998; Uganda 1985–2005; Zambia 1980–1990.

Notes: Only regimes that lasted 3 years or longer are listed. Regime periods are left-censored.

Table 2 Descriptive statistics

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Std. dev. (within)	Min	Max	Years (obs per y)	Countries	Source
1ary school completion (% cohort)	848	52.297	24.696	10.653	5.671	124.122	1980–2008 (16–36)	49	World Bank
Life expectancy at birth (years)	1427	52.577	8.106	3.470	26.818	74.329	1980–2008 (48–50)	50	World Bank
Health spending (% GDP)	676	2.257	1.101	0.639	0.003	6.380	1995–2008 (48–49)	49	World Bank
Health spending (% budget)	677	8.857	3.696	2.323	0	26.898	1995–2008 (48–49)	49	World Bank
Population growth (annual %)	1427	2.553	1.176	1.044	−7.533	9.770	1980–2008 (48–50)	50	World Bank
Population young (< 14)	1427	6123926	8551933	1984850	96497	6.45E+07	1980–2008 (48–50)	50	World Bank
Population in urban areas (% tot)	1427	34.494	16.824	4.611	4.339	84.900	1980–2008 (48–50)	50	World Bank
Openness to international trade	1421	63.3	35.565	17.804	1.16	243.48	1980–2008 (48–50)	50	Penn World Table
Total debt service (%GNI)	1266	5.301	9.658	8.62	0.007	208.097	1980–2008 (39–47)	47	World Bank
Official development assistance and aid	1414	5.99E+08	7.73E+08	5.48E+08	−1.87E+07	1.24E+10	1980–2008 (47–50)	50	World Bank
Economic growth (GDP, annual %)	1343	3.558	7.548	7.161	−51.030	106.279	1980–2008 (38–50)	50	World Bank
Income (GDP pc, PPP)	1421	2179.623	3008.727	981.477	160.8	20206.72	1980–2008 (47–50)	50	Penn World Table
Involvement in an ongoing war	1427	0.083	0.276	0.220	0	1	1980–2008 (48–50)	50	UCDC PRIO
British colonial past	1427	0.358	0.479	0	0	1	1980–2008 (48–50)	50	Easterly 2001
Tropic country	1427	0.817	0.386	0	0	1	1980–2008 (48–50)	50	Easterly 2001
Oil producer	1427	0.121	0.327	0	0	1	1980–2008 (48–50)	50	Przeworski et al. 2000
Ethnic fractionalization	1427	0.644	0.240	0	0.039	0.930	1980–2008 (48–50)	50	Alesina et al. 2003

Overall size of the dataset: 1,427 observations (700 for variables available since 1995)

Maximum, coverage: 50 African countries (45 Sub-Saharan countries); 29 years

Table 3 Primary completion rate

	PCSE (1y.lagged)		PCSE (2y.lagged)		PCSE (5y.lagged)		FE (no c.v.)		PCSE (including N-Afr.)	
	Hp1	Hp2	Hp1	Hp2	Hp1	Hp2	Hp1	Hp2	Hp1	Hp2
L.dep.var.	−0.065	−0.036	−0.126	−0.085	−0.248	−0.245	−0.172	−0.098	−0.063	−0.040
	(0.026)**	(0.020)*	(0.040)***	(0.033)***	(0.063)***	(0.042)***	(0.096)*	(0.031)***	(0.025)**	(0.019)**
L.CA	−1.151	2.101	−1.855	3.412	−3.169	9.653	−3.211	3.054	−0.752	2.290
	(0.649)*	(0.588)***	(1.050)*	(0.942)***	(1.898)*	(1.622)***	(1.379)**	(0.720)***	(0.556)	(0.593)***
D.CA	−2.303	1.803	−3.216	2.398	−3.415	7.532	−4.902	1.544	−2.121	1.899
	(1.096)**	(1.639)	(1.307)**	(1.752)	(1.655)**	(2.118)***	(1.194)***	(0.979)	(1.066)**	(1.574)
L.Duration	0.021	−0.021	0.000	−0.054	−0.042	−0.131			0.011	0.011
	(0.068)	(0.027)	(0.095)	(0.037)	(0.125)	(0.066)**			(0.058)	(0.021)
D.Duration	0.051	0.039	0.052	0.025	0.204	0.109			0.017	0.045
	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.083)	(0.075)	(0.096)**	(0.087)			(0.056)	(0.055)
L.GDP(log)	−0.795	0.313	−0.587	0.132	−1.432	0.385			−0.809	0.220
	(0.704)	(0.692)	(1.108)	(0.832)	(1.837)	(0.981)			(0.671)	(0.723)
D.GDP(log)	3.707	0.492	3.325	−0.579	0.477	−0.034			3.928	1.398
	(6.238)	(3.017)	(5.551)	(3.581)	(2.888)	(2.338)			(6.184)	(2.981)
L.Urban pop.	0.031	−0.010	0.060	0.008	0.141	0.075			0.047	0.006
	(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.045)	(0.025)	(0.079)*	(0.037)**			(0.028)*	(0.017)
D.Urban pop.	0.646	0.064	0.511	0.075	0.496	0.194			0.841	0.417
	(0.828)	(0.599)	(0.490)	(0.448)	(0.250)**	(0.291)			(0.808)	(0.572)
L.Ethnic fract.	−2.232	−2.332	−4.809	−5.796	−8.321	−15.632			−3.213	−3.014
	(1.734)	(1.103)**	(1.550)***	(1.334)***	(3.399)**	(2.073)***			(1.174)***	(1.071)***
L.Post'89							0.367	0.143		
							(0.840)	(0.400)		
_cons	11.724	1.502	15.884	7.125	31.968	15.855	12.939	3.860	11.634	1.713
	(4.074)***	(4.267)	(6.259)**	(4.797)	(10.870)***	(5.527)***	(5.118)**	(1.241)***	(3.935)***	(4.527)
N	305	491	285	439	257	356	305	491	323	581

Standard errors are in parentheses. The regime reference (omitted) category is democracy in the analysis of hpl and full authoritarianism in the analysis of hp2

*$p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$

Table 4 Life expectancy

	PCSE (1y.lagged)		PCSE (2y.lagged)		PCSE (5y.lagged)		FE (no c.v.)		PCSE (including N-Afr.)	
	Hp1	Hp2	Hp1	Hp2	Hp1	Hp2	Hp1	Hp2	Hp1	Hp2
L.dep.var.	−0.009	−0.012	−0.019	−0.026	−0.049	−0.063	−0.024	−0.032	−0.008	−0.010
	(0.001)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***	(0.004)***	(0.007)***	(0.011)***	(0.003)***	(0.008)***	(0.001)***	(0.002)***
L.CA	−0.028	0.074	−0.064	0.156	−0.183	0.380	−0.029	0.042	−0.016	0.078
	(0.011)**	(0.009)***	(0.023)***	(0.018)***	(0.055)***	(0.051)***	(0.034)	(0.020)**	(0.011)	(0.009)***
D.CA	−0.021	0.041	−0.046	0.092	−0.128	0.212	−0.057	0.002	−0.013	0.033
	(0.017)	(0.016)**	(0.030)	(0.023)***	(0.066)*	(0.043)***	(0.033)*	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.018)*
L.Duration	0.004	0.001	0.009	0.002	0.020	0.003			0.004	0.002
	(0.001)***	(0.000)**	(0.002)***	(0.001)*	(0.005)***	(0.002)			(0.001)***	(0.001)***
D.Duration	0.005	0.001	0.010	0.002	0.026	0.005			0.004	0.000
	(0.001)***	(0.001)	(0.002)***	(0.002)	(0.005)***	(0.003)*			(0.001)***	(0.002)
L.GDP(log)	0.010	0.020	0.026	0.045	0.084	0.123			0.009	0.018
	(0.007)	(0.008)**	(0.014)*	(0.017)***	(0.032)***	(0.045)***			(0.007)	(0.008)**
D.GDP(log)	−0.017	−0.115	−0.039	−0.185	−0.107	−0.228			−0.009	−0.077
	(0.052)	(0.098)	(0.062)	(0.100)*	(0.073)	(0.085)***			(0.052)	(0.095)
L.Urban pop.	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.003			0.001	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)**	(0.001)	(0.001)*	(0.002)	(0.002)			(0.000)	(0.000)***
D.Urban pop.	−0.040	−0.017	−0.043	−0.019	−0.053	−0.022			−0.037	−0.006
	(0.017)**	(0.010)*	(0.015)***	(0.009)**	(0.013)***	(0.009)**			(0.016)**	(0.010)
L.Tropic	−0.058	−0.011	−0.120	−0.022	−0.222	−0.009			−0.096	−0.058
	(0.028)**	(0.025)	(0.052)**	(0.050)	(0.100)**	(0.128)			(0.025)***	(0.018)***
L.Post'89							0.064	0.086		
							(0.044)	(0.023)***		
_cons	0.478	0.435	0.967	0.877	2.273	2.063	1.257	1.518	0.458	0.358
	(0.071)***	(0.076)***	(0.140)***	(0.153)***	(0.322)***	(0.357)***	(0.201)***	(0.399)***	(0.068)***	(0.065)***
N	560	1,032	552	991	530	866	560	1,032	586	1,166

Standard errors are in parentheses. The regime reference (omitted) category is democracy in the analysis of hp1 and full authoritarianism in the analysis of hp2

*$p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$

Table 5 Health spending (% budget)

	PCSE (1y.lagged)		PCSE (2y.lagged)		PCSE (5y.lagged)		FE (no c.v.)		PCSE (including N-Afr.)	
	Hp1	Hp2	Hp1	Hp2	Hp1	Hp2	Hp1	Hp2	Hp1	Hp2
L.dep.var.	−0.188	−0.166	−0.320	−0.262	−0.592	−0.477	−0.427	−0.490	−0.180	−0.157
	(0.062)***	(0.055)***	(0.094)***	(0.084)***	(0.113)***	(0.111)***	(0.109)***	(0.097)***	(0.059)***	(0.052)***
L.CA	−0.230	0.377	−0.354	0.827	−0.882	1.789	0.743	1.614	−0.213	0.347
	(0.241)	(0.226)*	(0.338)	(0.320)***	(0.541)	(0.595)***	(1.005)	(0.581)***	(0.221)	(0.214)
D.CA	−0.087	0.210	−0.070	0.798	0.163	2.642	0.456	0.962	−0.067	0.241
	(0.427)	(0.458)	(0.436)	(0.452)*	(0.447)	(0.581)***	(0.793)	(0.608)	(0.413)	(0.458)
L.Duration	0.007	0.010	0.041	0.022	0.133	0.085			0.004	0.004
	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.021)*	(0.015)	(0.031)***	(0.021)***			(0.016)	(0.008)
D.Duration	0.009	−0.011	0.021	−0.012	0.082	0.032			0.009	−0.004
	(0.031)	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.027)***	(0.033)			(0.021)	(0.023)
L.Ec. growth	0.029	0.031	−0.014	0.008	0.036	0.052			0.031	0.028
	(0.042)	(0.035)	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.076)	(0.054)			(0.041)	(0.034)
D.Ec. growth	−0.014	−0.015	−0.013	−0.001	0.031	0.038			−0.013	−0.015
	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.047)	(0.039)	(0.064)	(0.054)			(0.043)	(0.033)
L.Pop. growth	0.251	0.079	0.759	0.279	1.702	0.920			0.193	0.085
	(0.213)	(0.189)	(0.309)**	(0.241)	(0.301)***	(0.253)***			(0.151)	(0.165)
D.Pop. growth	1.282	0.289	1.248	0.430	1.047	0.394			1.152	0.285
	(0.627)**	(0.338)	(0.575)**	(0.281)	(0.409)**	(0.311)			(0.609)*	(0.332)
L.Oil exp.	−0.904	−0.742	−1.481	−1.135	−2.657	−1.936			−0.699	−0.615
	(0.373)**	(0.274)***	(0.549)***	(0.397)***	(0.459)***	(0.499)***			(0.288)**	(0.191)***
_cons	1.399	0.992	1.658	1.228	1.623	0.302	3.776	3.365	1.460	0.972
	(0.637)**	(0.632)	(0.957)*	(0.948)	(1.000)	(1.003)	(1.246)***	(0.847)***	(0.605)**	(0.573)*
N	400	421	370	385	283	280	400	421	426	481

Standard errors are in parentheses. The regime reference (omitted) category is democracy in the analysis of hp1 and full authoritarianism in the analysis of hp2. The analysis starts in 1995

*$p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$

Table 6 Health spending (% GDP)

	PCSE (1y.lagged)		PCSE (2y.lagged)		PCSE (5y.lagged)		FE (no c.v.)		PCSE (including N-Afr.)	
	Hp1	Hp2	Hp1	Hp2	Hp1	Hp2	Hp1	Hp2	Hp1	Hp2
L.dep.var.	−0.066	−0.064	−0.114	−0.113	−0.252	−0.175	−0.238	−0.296	−0.063	−0.059
	(0.040)*	(0.039)*	(0.069)*	(0.069)	(0.092)***	(0.091)*	(0.047)***	(0.044)***	(0.037)*	(0.036)*
L.CA	−0.055	0.022	−0.079	0.130	−0.136	0.300	0.060	0.332	−0.049	0.017
	(0.076)	(0.052)	(0.113)	(0.080)	(0.190)	(0.132)**	(0.187)	(0.121)***	(0.072)	(0.050)
D.CA	−0.022	−0.040	−0.058	0.065	0.153	0.533	−0.022	0.174	−0.015	−0.035
	(0.113)	(0.133)	(0.120)	(0.152)	(0.151)	(0.170)***	(0.145)	(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.131)
L.Duration	0.001	0.004	0.007	0.010	0.045	0.032			0.001	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.004)**	(0.009)***	(0.006)***			(0.005)	(0.002)
D.Duration	0.003	−0.001	−0.002	−0.004	0.013	0.001			0.002	−0.001
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)			(0.006)	(0.005)
L.Ec. growth	−0.003	−0.001	−0.012	−0.009	−0.016	−0.008			−0.002	−0.002
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.013)			(0.006)	(0.005)
D.Ec. growth	−0.009	−0.007	−0.010	−0.004	−0.007	0.001			−0.009	−0.008
	(0.005)*	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.011)			(0.005)*	(0.004)*
L.Pop. growth	0.014	0.008	0.060	0.042	0.257	0.148			0.005	0.009
	(0.035)	(0.027)	(0.054)	(0.036)	(0.059)***	(0.056)***			(0.026)	(0.023)
D.Pop. growth	0.289	0.072	0.299	0.107	0.269	0.141			0.270	0.072
	(0.130)**	(0.054)	(0.113)***	(0.048)**	(0.079)***	(0.064)**			(0.130)**	(0.053)
L.Oil exp.	−0.135	−0.080	−0.146	−0.110	−0.393	−0.254			−0.104	−0.072
	(0.082)	(0.068)	(0.092)	(0.064)*	(0.129)***	(0.111)**			(0.071)	(0.055)
_cons	0.233	0.129	0.330	0.122	0.072	−0.163	0.565	0.448	0.247	0.147
	(0.153)	(0.103)	(0.288)	(0.171)	(0.379)	(0.220)	(0.166)***	(0.120)***	(0.153)	(0.098)
N	399	420	369	384	283	279	399	420	425	480

Standard errors are in parentheses. The regime reference (omitted) category is democracy in the analysis of hp1 and full authoritarianism in the analysis of hp2. The analysis starts in 1995

*$p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$

Table 7 Replication of Levitsky and Way (2010)

	1ary completion rate		Life expectancy	
	Hp1	Hp2	Hp1	Hp2
L.dep.var	−0.005	−0.028	−0.014	−0.012
	(0.025)	(0.035)	(0.002)***	(0.002)***
L.CA	−1.455	3.337	−0.078	0.125
	(0.964)	(0.870)***	(0.022)***	(0.020)***
D.CA	−0.792	−0.493	−0.096	0.140
	(1.618)	(13.324)	(0.033)***	(0.146)
L.Duration	0.076	0.023	0.004	0.004
	(0.051)	(0.065)	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
D.Duration	0.259	0.054	0.004	0.005
	(0.085)***	(0.467)	(0.001)***	(0.005)
L.GDP(log)	−0.144	0.658	0.025	0.026
	(1.342)	(1.501)	(0.011)**	(0.010)***
D.GDP(log)	5.435	−6.334	−0.203	−0.112
	(6.677)	(5.690)	(0.125)	(0.089)
L.Urban pop.	−0.067	−0.041	0.000	−0.000
	(0.060)	(0.054)	(0.001)	(0.001)
D.Urban pop.	0.270	0.171	−0.014	−0.015
	(0.901)	(0.829)	(0.020)	(0.015)
L.Ethnic fract.	5.106	3.210		
	(3.245)	(3.694)		
L.Tropic			Omitted by the software	
_cons	2.161	−5.498	0.605	0.333
	(7.168)	(9.110)	(0.094)***	(0.070)***
N	144	203	281	375

Standard errors are in parentheses. The regime reference (omitted) category is democracy in the analysis of hp1 and full authoritarianism in the analysis of hp2. Coefficients are estimated by OLS with p.c.s.e

*$p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$

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